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THEJUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR

JUDGE
STEPHEN H. ANDERSON

Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek. Michigan in 1940. She was graduated
a um /aud, from Smith College in 1962,
and from Harvard Law School in 1965. After graduating from law school, Judge
Seymour practiced law in Boston, Maschusetts from 1965 until 1966, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston, Texas from
168 until 1969. From 1971 to 1979 she practiced with the Tulsa law firm of Doerner;
Stuar, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson. In
1979, she was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar
Associations. Additionally, Judge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979, she served on the United StatesJudicial Conference Committee on Defender
Services, 1985-87, and as chair, 1987-90.

Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and BrighamYoung University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge
Anderson then attended the University of
Utah College of law where he received his
IL-B. degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief
of the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif,
and Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial
attorney in the tax division of the United
States Department ofJustice until 1964.

Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he practiced until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as President and Commissioner
of the Utah State Bar. Additionally, Judge
JUDGE
Anderson has been a member of the Utah
JOHN J. PORFIUO
Judicial Counsel and the UtahJudicial ConJudge Porfilio was born in Denver, Colo- duct Commission, and he has served as
rado in 1934. He received his B.A. from the Chairman of the Utah Law andJustce CenUniversity of Denver in 1956 and received
ter Committee. Judge Anderson's civic achis LLB. from the University of Denver Col- tivities include lectures at the University of
lege ofLawin 1959.Judge Porfilio then prac- Utah College of Law, member of the Executiced law with the Denver firm of Carbone tive Committee of the Salt Lake Area Cham& Walsmith until 1962. From 1962 until ber of Commerce, and director of numer1975, he worked in the Colorado Attorney ous corporations. He is a Master of the
General's Office. SpecificallyJudge Porfilio Bench, American Inn of Court Number VII.
served as Assistant Attorney General from
1962 until 1967, as DeputyAttorney General
JUDGE
from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney General
DEANELL R. TACHA
for the State of Colorado from 1972 until
1975.
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia, Kansas.
She
received her B.A. in American StudInJanuary, 1975,Judge Porfilio was appointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the ies from the University of Kansas in 1968 and
United States District Court for the District was a member of Mortar Board and Phi Beta
of Colorado where he served until 1982. Kappa. Judge Tacha then attended law
Judge Porfilio was then appointed to the school and received herJ.D. from the UniUnited States District Court for the District versity of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, shewas selected to be a White
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the House Fellow. During her year as a White
Tenth Circuit.

House Fellowjudge Tacha was sent on official trips to southeast Asia, east and central
Africa, and the European Economic Community. After her fellowship, Judge Tacha
was an associate with the law firm of Hogan
and Hartson in Washington, D.C. In 1973,
she returned to Kansas and entered private
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the faculty of the University of Kansas Law School
in 1974. In 1979, she became associate Vice
Chancellor ofAcademic Affairs, and in 1981,
she became the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
1985.
JUDGE
BOBBY R BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky, Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received hisJ.D. from the University of Arizona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, PA In 1983, he
became a federal districtjudge in Albuquerque, New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1985. In 1988,Judge Baldock received an Outstanding Judge Award from
the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE
MARY BECK BRISCOE
Judge Briscoe is a CircuitJudge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. She
was born in 1947 in Council Grove, Kansas,
and received her BA degree in German and
International Relations from the University
of Kansas, herJD degree from the University of Kansas School of Law, and her LLM
degree from the University of Virginia
School of Law.
Judge Briscoe worked as an attorneyexaminer for the Interstate Commerce

Commission from September 1973 to March
1974, and served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from March 1974 to March 1984. She
was appointed as ChiefJudge of the Kansas
Court of Appeals in September 1990. She
assumed her present position in May 1995.
Judge Briscoe is a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and the Kansas Bar
Foundation. She is a member of the American Bar Association and serves as Vice-chair
of the AppellateJudges Conference. She is
a member of the Kansas Bar Association and
serves on the Bench-Bar Committee. In 1992
she was awarded the KBA Outstanding Service Award for her work as Co-Chair of the
Task Force on the Status of Women in the
Legal Profession. She is also a member of
the Topeka Bar Association, the Washburn
Law School Association, the Women Attorneys Association of Topeka, the American

Judicature Society, and the National Association of WomenJudges. She serves on the

University of Kansas Law Society Board of
Governors.
Judge Briscoe is married to Charles
Briscoe, an attorney in Topeka, and an instructor in the legal aid clinic at the University of Kansas Law School.

JUDGE
WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23,1934 in
Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in Upton
and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge Brorby attended the University of Wyoming and received a B.S. in Business. He graduated with
a J.D. with Honor from the University of

Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He en-

gaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.Judge
Brorby was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
WyomingJudicial Supervisory Commission.
He has served on numerous Bar committees.

JUDGE
DAVID M. EBEL

of the Northern New Mexico American Inn
ofCourtJudge Kelly has been active in variJudge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kansas ous Bar activities. He has served on a New
in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. He Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, the New
received his BA in economics from North- Mexico AppellateJudges' Nominating Comwestern University in 1962 and received his mission, as a reviewing officer and Hearing
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law Committee chair for the Disciplinary Board
School in 1965, where he graduated first in of New Mexico Supreme Court, as a memhis class. While at the University of Michi- ber of the New Mexico Public Defender
gan Law School, he was elected to the Or- Board, the New Mexico State Personnel
der of Coif, the Barrister Society, and he was Board and as President of the Chaves
Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan Law Review. County Bar Association. Judge Kelly was
appointed to the United States Court of
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
Byron R. White of the United States Supreme Court during the 1965-66 term. From
JUDGE
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial lawROBERT H. HENRY
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, GraJudge Henry was born in Shawnee,
ham & Stubbs. In 1988,Judge Ebel was appointed to the United States Court of Ap- Oklahoma on April 3,1953. He received his
BA in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include in 1977, both from the University of Oklateaching Corporations as an adjunct profes- homa.
sor at the University of Denver College of
After graduating from law school,Judge
Law, teaching Professionalism and Ethics at Henry opened a private law practice in
Duke University School of Law, teaching Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma
the confirmation class at the St.James Pres- House of Representatives for five terms. In
byterian Church and participating in numer- 1986, at the age of thirty-three, he was
ous Bar Association activities. He has served elected Oklahoma Attorney General, runas vice-president of the Colorado Bar Asso- ning unopposed for re-election in 1990. In
ciation and is a fellow of the American Col- 1991, he became Dean of the Oklahoma City
lege of Trial Lawyers, a senior judge of the University School of Law, where he taught
Doyle Inns of Court, and a member of the in the areas of state and local government
law and legislation.
Town & Gown Society.
Judge Henry served on numerous comJUDGE
mittees of the National Association of AtPAUL J. KELLY
torneys General, including the Supreme
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in Court Committee, which he chaired, and
Freeport, NewYork, in 1940. He received a the State Constitutional Law Advisory Board.
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the He is an American Bar Foundation Fellow,
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his a Commissioner for Oklahoma on the NaJ.D. from Fordham University School of Law tional Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and a member of the
in 1967.
American Law Institute. Judge Henry has
From 1968 to 1992,Judge Kelly engaged also served on numerous civic and educain a general litigation practice with the New tional boards including the Oklahoma NaMexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Edton, ture Conservancy, the Board of Visitors of
Cofflield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served in the University of Oklahoma Press, and the
the New Mexico House of Representatives Western History Collection of the Univerfrom 1977 to 1981.
sity of Oklahoma. He has received the ConCurrently, Judge Kelly is a member of servationist of theYear Award from the Oklathe Board of Visitors of the Fordham Uni- homa Wildlife Federation, the Human
versity School of Law and serves as President Rights Award from the Oklahoma Human

Rights Commission, and is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa.
Judge Henry was appointed to the
United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1994.
JUDGE
CARLOS F. LUCERO

Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit. Judge
Murphy began private practice in 1973 as
an associate in the Salt Lake City law firm of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. He
remained with that law firm until his appointment in 1986 by Governor Bangerter
to the Third District Court, a trial court of
general jurisdiction over Salt Lake, Summit
and Tooele Counties, Utah. Judge Murphy
was the presidingjudge of the Third District
Court from 1990 until his appointment to
the Tenth Circuit in 1995.

Judge Lucero was born in Antonito,
Colorado in 1940. He received his BA from
Adams State College and his J.D. from
George Washington University. In 1995, he
Judge Murphy has served on many
was appointed to the United States Court of boards, commissions, and committees, inAppeals for the Tenth Circuit.
cluding the Utah State Sentencing CommisJudge Lucero clerked forJudge William sion, the Utah Advisory Committee on Child
E. Doyle of the District Court of Colorado Support Guidelines, the Utah Child Sexual
for the 1964-1965 term. Prior to his clerk- Abuse Task Force, the Board of District
ship, he was a staffaide for the United States CourtJudges, and the Utah Supreme Court
SenateJudiciary Subcommittee on Admin- Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Proistrative Practice and Procedure. He en- cedure. Judge Murphy was namedJudge of
tered private practice in Alamosa, Colorado the Year by the Utah State Bar in 1992. In
where he became a senior partner in the 1989 he was awarded the Freedom of Information Award by the Society of Professional
law firm of Lucero, Lester and Sigmund.
Journalists and, in 1995, the Utah Minority
While in private practice,Judge Lucero
Bar Association award.
served on the Colorado Supreme Court
Judge Murphy is a Fellow of the AmeriBoard of Law Examiners, the ABA Action
Commission'to Reduce Court Cost and De- can Bar Foundation, a member of the Utah
lay, the advisory board to the ABAJournal, and American BarAssociations and a former
the ABA Committee on the Availability of member of the Wyoming State Bar. He is
Legal Services, and the CBA Ethics Commit- also a member and past president of
tee. He also served on President Carter's Sutherland Inn of Court I. Judge Murphy
Presidential Panel on Western State Water was appointed to the Tenth Circuit of the
Policy, the Board of Directors of Colorado United States Court of Appeals by President
Rural Legal Services, the Colorado Histori- Clinton on August 14, 1995. His chambers
cal Society and the Santa Fe Opera Associa- are in Salt Lake City, Utah.
tion of New Mexico. In addition, he was
president of the Colorado Bar Association
SENIOR JUDGE
in 1977-1978.
MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge Michael R. Murphy was born Judge McKay then received hisJ.D. from the
August 6,1947 in Denver, Colorado. He was University of Chicago in 1960 and was the
raised in Rawlins, Wyoming. He received a law clerk forJusticeJesse A.Udall of the AriBA from Creighton University in 1969 and zona Supreme Court for the 1960-61 term.
hisJ.D., with honors, from the University of From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay practiced
Wyoming in 1972.
with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in PhoeHe is married to Mickey Donnelly nix, Arizona; however, he did take a two year
Murphy and has two children, Amy and leave to serve as Director of the United
Michael. In 1972-73,Judge Murphy served States Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa.Judge
as a law clerk to the late David T. Lewis, then McKay was a law professor at Brigham Young
JUDGE
MICHAEL MURPHY

University from 1974 until 1977. In 1977,
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge
McKay currently resides in Provo, Utah.

SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT

Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyoming in 1922. He is the son of the late Frank
A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's ConSENIOR JUDGE
gressman, Governor and United States SenaWILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
tor. Judge Barrett attended the University
The son of a former Oklahoma gover- of Wyoming for two years prior to his sernor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo, vice in the Army during World War II. FolOklahoma in 1923 and later moved to Okla- lowing the war, he attended Saint
homa City in 1927. During World War II, he Catherine's College at Oxford University
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army. Af- and Catholic University of America and reter the warJudge Holloway returned to com- ceived his LLB. from the University ofWyoplete his undergraduate studies at the Uni- ming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he reversity of Oklahoma, receiving his BA in ceived the Distinguished Alumni Award
1947. judge Holloway then attended from the University of Wyoming.
Harvard Law School, where he graduated
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
in 1950.
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
an attorney with the Department ofJustice for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re- towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri- the Niobrara County Consolidated School
vate practice. Judge Holloway was appointed District From 1967 until 1971,Judge Barrett
to the United States Court of Appeals for served as Attorney General for the State of
the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and became Chief Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to the
Judge in 1984. He is a member of Phi Beta United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth
Circuit In 1987, he assumed senior status.
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
SENIOR JUDGE
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign InROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
telligence Surveillance Court of Review, and
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina, was a trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in Home.
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the UniverSENIOR JUDGE
sity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an
JAMES K. LOGAN
Honorary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
During World War II,Judge McWilliams Kansas, in 1929. He received his BA from
served in the United States Army and was the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
served as a Deputy District Attorney and as Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
a Colorado District CourtJudge. In 1961, for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Judge McWilliams was elected to the Colo- Huxman and subsequently practiced with
rado Supreme Court where he served until the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
he was appointed to the United States Court & Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profesof Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. In sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean of
1984, he assumed senior status.
that school. He served in that capacity until
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi 1968. Since 1961,Judge Logan has been a
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi visiting professor at Harvard Law School, the
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
University of Texas Law School, Stanford

University School of Law, and the University of Michigan Law School. He lectures at
Duke University Law School. He was a special commissioner for the United States District Court for the District of Kansas from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate planning, administration and corporate law. In
1977, he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

EDITOR'S NOTE

Thank you to all authors, editors and Denver University Law Review
staff who worked together to bring this survey to completion. We hope
that this issue will be most helpful to the practitioners of the Tenth Circuit.

Cathleen Coffey, Editor
THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL TENTH CIRCUIT SURVEY

ATrORNEYS' FEES
INTRODUCTION

In the United States, attorneys' fees are not awarded to the prevailing party unless a contractual agreement, a statute, or procedural rule
provides otherwise.' The English Rule, on the other hand, provides that
the loser pays both his costs and those of the successful litigant.2 The
American approach has garnered support and endured criticism;
throughout time, numerous exceptions to the rule have evolved.'
This survey examines recent Tenth Circuit decisions concerning
attorneys' fees.' Part I provides a brief history of the English Rule. Part I
also details the background of the American Rule, including justifications, criticisms, and exceptions to the rule. Parts II and III explore two
Tenth Circuit cases awarding attorneys' fees in which one party acted in
bad faith.! Part IV explores choice-of-law problems in the context of a
recent Tenth Circuit case.6
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the English system the losing party pays his own fees, and in addition pays the fees of the prevailing litigant.! Historically, English courts
have either awarded fees based on statutory guidelines or on a discretionary basis.8 The Statute of Gloucester, enacted in 1275,' was the first
to provide attorneys' fees, establishing that "whereas before time Damages were not taxed, but to the Value of the Issues of the Land; it is provided, that the Demandant may recover against the Tenant the Costs of

1. Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Colo. 1989).
2. See generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929) (providing a history of
the manner in which costs are awarded in the English system).
3. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578-93 (1993).
4. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
5. Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758 (10th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. Roscoe, 100
F.3d 121 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also addressed attorneys' fees and tax retums.
See Dye v. United States, 121 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1997). In Dye, the court considered the characterization of attorneys' fees. The Tenth Circuit determined that these fees could be described as
either capital gains or ordinary expenses on a tax return. Id. at 1411. However, the Tenth Circuit
declined to determine the method of allocating the attorney fees in connection with these claims. Id.
Although the court rejected the methods utilized by other appellate courts, the Tenth Circuit did not
establish a method of allocation. Id. Finally, the court remanded the case for a determination of
allocation. Id.
7. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1569. The English Rule is sometimes called the "loser pays"
rule. Id. In England, the term "costs" applies to fees paid to the court, to the solicitor, to counsel,
expenses of witnesses, and all other necessary expenses. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 856-59.
8. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1570-71.
9. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 852 (citing Statute of Gloucester 6 Edw. I c. 1 (1275)).
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his Writ purchased, together with the Damages abovesaid.""' Courts construed this statute liberally and extended the doctrine to cover the legal
costs of the parties."
The law awarding costs to a prevailing defendant in a lawsuit
evolved at a slower pace. 2 Initially, seeing a plaintiff fail in his case was
considered rewarding enough for a successful defendant. 3 In 1531, England established a statutory provision awarding a prevailing defendant
costs in certain suits." Finally, in 1607, new legislation allowed a defendant to recover costs in all kinds of suits when he prevailed.'5
In 1875, the English modified their statutory system significantly'6
so that judges could use their discretion in awarding costs. Although the
English have amended and expanded these rules, they are still in effect
today.'8 In addition, the British judiciary recently devised a taxing system
with which courts calculate the attorneys' fees a party must pay. 9 In this
system the prevailing party's attorney must prepare a detailed list of the
taxable expenses.' If the losing party agrees he pays the costs;2' when the
loser disagrees with the winner's calculations, both the plaintiff and defendant present their lists to a taxing master who determines the correct
amount.n
The early American colonies rejected the English Rule.' Some
commentators believe that frontier individualism and the notion of "the
solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights" led to the development of the
American Rule.2 ' After the Revolution, a general resentment for the English fueled the colonists' rejection of the English legal models.' One
commentator argues, however, that an inadvertent error actually led to
the rejection of the English Rule.' In 1848, the New York legislature
fixed the amount of attorneys' fees one could recover in actual amounts,

10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 853.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing 23 Hen. VIII c. 15 (1531)). Costs were available only in certain cases, including
those for trespass, case, debt, contract covenant, and account actions.
15. Id. (citing 4 Jac. I c. 3 (1607)).
16. Id. at 854 (citing Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 38 & 39 Vict c.77 (1975)).
17. See id.
18. id.
19. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1571.
20. Id.
'21.
Id
22. Id.
23. See John V. Tunney, Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636,640 (1974).
24. Id. at 641.
25. Id.
26. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 792,798-99 (1966).
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rather than by percentage of the amount recovered.' These amounts, considered nominal, were never adjusted." "[Lilt was this process of gradual
forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that has apparently
caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to the recovery of his
counsel fees."
Rather than ordering the loser to pay both parties' costs, the Supreme Court adopted the American Rule in 1796.30 The rule stated that
"absent a specific, contractual, statutory, or procedural rule providing
otherwise," a prevailing party was not entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees." In such a case, each party must pay their own attorneys' fees.32
The American Rule reflected the colonists' suspicion of lawyers.
Members of the ruling class were reportedly jealous of attorneys' standing in the community."' In some colonies attorneys were forbidden to
charge any fee.3" Colonists believed the law was straightforward, and
therefore, they considered lawyers unnecessary.'
Individual colonies enacted statutes in an effort to formalize the
regulation of attorneys' fees.37 Some colonies set attorneys' fees at a specific level, while others created fee schedules. In Virginia the maximum
an attorney could receive was fifteen shillings, or one hundred pounds of
tobacco.39 Other colonies set the amount an attorney could receive according to the service performed, for example an attorney could charge
per line of typing in a document submitted on behalf of the client. ' It was

27. Id. at 799.
28. Id.
*29. Id. On the other hand, Professor Luebsdorf argued that the New York legislature was
aware that the award of fees was small compared to actual fees, and deliberately declined to increase
the amount available. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (1984).
30. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
31. Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1283, 1390 (Colo. 1989).
32. Id.
33. Tunney, supra note 23, at 640-41.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Over time, however, lawyers gained more respect, and by the eighteenth century, many
people hired attorneys to represent them.
37. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1572.
38. Id. New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina and New Hampshire set fees and
cost recovery fees at the same level. Id.
39. Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620 (1931).
40. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1573; see also Goodhart,supra note 2, at 873-74. A New York
statute established the following fee schedule:
Retaining fee, three dollars and seventy-five cents, to one counsel only;
Perusing, amending, and signing every petition of appeal, and every answer to a petition
of appeal, two dollars and fifty cents;
Perusing and amending every other petition to the court, in a case where an appeal is
pending, or in which a writ of error shall have been brought, one dollar and twenty-five
cents;
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unclear whether these fixed amounts represented the maximum an attorney could charge, or whether lawyers could charge more through a private contract with the client." In addition, some colonies established an
amount for a specific type of case, but reduced the amount if the parties
entered into an out-of-court settlement.'
Following the Revolution, some states established schemes in which
the prevailing litigant collected attorneys' fees. 3 This scheme, though
similar to the English system, differed in that it did not consider complex
taxation schemes addressed by the English. This left the prevailing
American litigants to receive less in recovery than they might if they
prevailed in England."
Throughout the laissez faire era, attorneys contracted for their services in an effort to set their own charging scheme. 5 Contracting for services outside of the legislatively-established fee schedules influenced the
establishment of the American Rule. ' In 1789, Congress authorized federal courts to follow state law concerning fee awards." Later, the Supreme Court set forth the American Rule in a case in admiralty."
The 1789 Act and legislation expired by 1800, but Congress did not
adopt other provisions related to attorneys' fees until 1853.' 9 During the
time between 1800 and 1853, federal courts examined state law to determine attorneys' fee issues.' Because different states had passed different types of legislation, the federal courts took an inconsistent approach
to attorneys' fees.' Eventually, Congress passed the 1853 fee bill"2 al-

Perusing, amending and settling every special pleading, entry or order, one dollar and
fifty cents;
Attending the court to make or oppose a motion, or to present or oppose a petition, one
dollar and twenty-five cents;
Arguing every special motion or petition, two dollars and fifty cents;
Arguing every cause, or attending for such argument pursuant to notice, three dollars and
seventy-five cents;
But the foregoing fees shall be allowed only to one counsel on each side who shall have
been actually employed and rendered the service charged.
Goodhart, supra note 2, at at 874.
41. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1573.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1573-74.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1575.
46. Id.
47. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (repealed 1792); see also Vargo, supra note
3, at 1576.
48. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
49. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1576.
50. Id.
51.

Id.

52. Id. at 1577; Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 161-62 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1923(a) (1994)). The text as codified reads:
(a) Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States may be taxed as
costs as follows:
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lowing a party to collect docket fees up to twenty dollars. 3 This fee bill is
still in effect today and provides that "absent either statutory or judicial
exception, the winning party in litigation can recover only the twentydollar docket fee." 4
Legal commentators offer several justifications for the American
Rule. If a potential litigant thought she might have to pay the opposing
counsels' fees if she lost, she may be discouraged from initiating a lawsuit."5 Unable to afford the risk of paying the other party's attorneys' fees,
she may elect not to sue, and consequently never have her day in court.
This could have a chilling effect on those unable to pay, and may deter
parties from bringing meritorious lawsuits.' Others support the American
Rule because attorneys' fees are not considered foreseeable. 7 Unless
damages are foreseeable, a person cannot be held liable for those costs."
If not foreseeable, those fees are not recoverable as damages. 9 In addition, the time and expense of assessing attorneys' fees may be burdensome for the judicial system.'
Despite these justifications, many oppose the American Rule, instead preferring the English System."' Critics argue that under the American Rule, people are actually encouraged to bring frivolous suits because
no matter the outcome, parties only pay their own costs.' More specifically, a person would have no incentive to suspend a frivolous suit When

$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered by the
court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers less than $50 the proctor's
docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
(b) The docket fees of United States attorneys and United States trustees shall be paid to
the clerk of court and by him paid into the Treasury.
(c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the briefs of the successful party not more than: $25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000;
$50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000;
$75 where the amount involved is over $5,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1923(a).
53. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1578.
54. Id.
55. M. Isabel Medina, Comment, Award of Attorney Fees in Bad FaithBreaches of Contract
in Louisiana-AnArgument Against the American Rule, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1177.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1176-77.
60. Id. The author noted, however, that this argument ignores prescribed fee schedules for
determining attorneys' fees. Id. at 1203 n.30.
61. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1590-91.
62. Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV.
75,78 (1964).
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all the party is required to pay are his own costs.' The English system, on
the other hand, operates to deter these suits because the litigant risks
payment of both parties' costs."
Others argue that a winner can never be made whole unless he can
collect attorneys' fees.' When a person prevails in a lawsuit, she should
not be penalized by having to pay her attorneys' fees.' In addition, many
consider that a prevailing party should be reimbursed for her attorneys'
fees because in bringing her successful lawsuit she has acted as a "private attorney general." As a private attorney general, the prevailing
party provides a "socially beneficial" advantage to the public by bringing
the suit, or by defending her position.' Critics of the American Rule argue, however, that a person should not have to bear the costs if the lawsuit benefits public interest.'
Perhaps due to the weaknesses of the American Rule, exceptions
developed quickly in American jurisprudence."0 Parties in a contract may
provide that if a dispute arises from that contract, one of the parties has
to pay the other's attorneys' fees." The "common fund" exception protects named litigants in class action lawsuits from bearing the costs of the
lawsuit." When funds have been set aside to benefit entities rather than
the individual litigants, a court may dip into this fund when the court has
control over the fund, and the fund beneficiaries are identifiable. This
exception is applied in commercial litigation, mass disaster lawsuits, and
other class action suits." The "substantial benefit" exception is similar,
but applies to nonpecuniary benefits, including for example, the enforcement of a statute. Finally, when a party enforces a final order
through a contempt proceeding, he can collect those attorneys' fees for
the enforcement of the contempt order.

63. Id.
64. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1591.
65. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1994)
(recognizing that winning litigants may not be made whole when forced to pay their own costs).
66. See Vargo, supra note 3,at 1591.
67. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (discussing the
private attorney general rationale).
68. Rowe, supranote 67, at 663.
69. Id.
70. Vargo, supranote 3, at 1578-93 (discussing the various exceptions).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240,
248 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing awards of attorneys' fees in commercial litigation in which lawyers recovered for the benefit of a class).
73. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1581.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1580 (stating that nonparties should help to bear the cost of the lawsuit).
76. Id. at 1583.
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In addition, Congress established exceptions to the American Rule
through legislation." In response to an increasing amount of litigation,
Congress enacted statutes penalizing parties for bringing a groundless,
vexatious, or frivolous lawsuit. 8 Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, if an attorney signs a pleading that he knows is not
grounded in either fact or law, a court may impose sanctions against the
lawyer." These statutes are characterized as punitive because they penalize either the parties or attorneys for acting in bad faith.' ° Many statutes
allow an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing litigant despite the
absence of bad faith or vexatious actions.' These statutes assist individuals in bringing claims that they not would otherwise have the opportunity
to litigate because of an inability to bear the costs." These are described
as incentive statutes. Because the American Rule is riddled with exceptions, coupled with many state and federal statutes allowing fee shifting,
many issues surrounding attorneys' fees remain unresolved.
II. BAD FArrH CONDUCT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Background
Recognizing that courts are susceptible to parties' abuse of the litigation process, courts have embraced and expanded upon exceptions to
the American Rule.' In 1993, the Supreme Court established that a party
seeking to enforce a final judgment through a contempt action could
collect attorneys' fees for the enforcement in Toledo Scale Co. v. Com-

77. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American
Rule?, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (discussing the extent of fee shifting legislation
among the states and by Congress).
78. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-e (1994) (The Miller Act). There are many other statutes that
authorize such an award. An example of a state statute providing fee shifting appears in Colorado
law:
The general assembly recognizes that courts of record of this state have become increasingly burdened with litigation which is straining the judicial system and interfering with
the effective administration of civil justice. In response to this problem, the general assembly hereby sets forth provisions for the recovery of attorney fees in courts of record
when the bringing or defense of an action, or part thereof (including any claim for exemplary damages), is determined to have been substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. All courts shall liberally construe the provisions of this
article to effectuate substantial justice and comply with the intent set forth in this section.
COLD. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (1997).
79. FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
80. See also Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the JudicialSystem, 61
N.C. L. REV. 613 (1983).
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1994) (Equal Access to Justice Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
(1994) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (Civil Rights Statute); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994)
(FOIA); 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) (1994) (International Child Abduction Act).
82. See Vargo, supranote 3, at 1588.
83. See generally Goodloe Partee, Note, Procedure-Sanctions--FederalProceduralRules
Do Not Displace Inherent Powers of Court to Award to Award Attorney's Feesfor Bad Faith Conduct, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1991), 14 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 107 (1991)
(discussing a Supreme Court case to illustrate the general acceptance of the bad faith exception).
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puting Scale Co.9" In Toledo Scale, the Court noted that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it "impose[d] as a penalty, compensation
for the expenses incurred by the successful party to the decree in defending its rights in the [trial] court."s' While other courts have expanded
on this general proposition, fee shifting in enforcement proceedings remains a recognized exception to the American Rule.9'
Similarly, courts embraced the exception of fee shifting in cases
where bad faith conduct has occurred. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the
Supreme Court reviewed the bad faith exception to the American Rule.
Chambers entered into a purchase agreement with NASCO to sell his
television station facility and broadcast license for $18 million. ' After
the parties entered into the agreement, Chambers expressed his desire to
terminate the agreement. 9 He informed NASCO, the buyer, that he
would not file the necessary papers with the Federal Communications
Commission, and in response the buyer initiated a suit for specific performance.' To protect the radio station, the seller and his attorney transferred the station to the seller's sister through a trust.9' Neither Chambers
or his attorney informed the court until the trust documents were signed
despite the judge specifically questioning the attorney about the possibility of a transfer to a third party.' Ignoring warnings about their unethical
conduct,
Chambers and his attorney continued to abuse the judicial proc93
ess.
Eventually the case evolved into one addressing a federal court's
power to award attorney's fees when one party has acted in bad faith.'
The Supreme Court reiterated that courts have broad discretion to impose
sanctions on parties, and articulated that the purpose of the bad faith exception included policing the parties, and the court." Determining that
the district court sanctioned Chambers for the fraud perpetrated on the
84. 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
85. Toledo Scale, 261 U.S. at 428.
86. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1583 (discussing three cases which expanded this general
rule); see also Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 485 F.2d 114, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1973)
(allowing an award of discovery expenses where party incurred costs in determining whether the
other party acted in contempt); Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1966)
(awarding fees to a party based on the other party's defiance of prior court orders); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 378 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (awarding fees when one party made ex parte
communications with plaintiffs in violation of disciplinary rules).
87. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
88. Id. at 35-36.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 36-37.
92. Id. at 37-39.
93. Id. at 38-39. Chambers denied the validity of a preliminary injuction issued by the trial
court, filed meritless motions and refused to close the sale, even when ordered by the court. Id. The
judge warned Chambers and his attorney many times throughout this process. Id.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 46.
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court, and not for the breach of contract, the Supreme Court affirmed the
sanction and the award of attorneys' fees to NASCO.' The Court, however, expressly declined to reach the issue of sanctioning purely prelitigation bad faith.'
B. Martinez v. Roscoe"
1. Facts
In 1993, the district court issued an injunction prohibiting the defendants, who were owners of an apartment complex, from engaging in
certain activities not specified by the court." Two years later, the plaintiffs, tenants in the same apartment complex, sought to enforce this injunction after the defendants failed to comply with the order." Not only
did the court find that the defendants violated the order, but the court
issued another injunction and awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees."°
The defendants appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit, requesting
reconsideration of the attorneys' fee award. Specifically, the defendants
argued that the court erred in awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees
° The defendants asserted that punbased on the defendants' bad faith. m
ishment for violation of the court order should have been addressed in a
contempt proceeding, rather than through the bad faith exception to attorneys' fees." In the alternative, the defendants argued the court should
not have awarded attorneys' fees when the legal services were provided
by a publicly-funded legal aid program.'
2. Decision
The court disposed of both arguments with only minor discussion.
After determining that the lower court's findings were not clearly erro96. Id. at 54. The Court expressly declined to explore whether bad faith prior to the initiation
of litigation should be considered. Id. at 54 n.16. The dissenting justices would have refused to
extend the bad faith exception to prelitigation behavior. Id. at 59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Scalia explored the bad faith exception and other inherent powers of the judiciary. Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting). He stressed, however, that the court's inherent conduct should not "'reach beyond the
court's confines' that does not 'interfere] with the conduct of trial."' Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987)). Justice
Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion. id. at 60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy asserted that
the majority opinion could be read to extend to prelitigation conduct, and opposed such an extension.
Id. at 74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He agreed that sanctioning prelitigation bad faith exceeded the
bad faith exception. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 72.
98. 100 F.3d 121 (1OthCir. 1996).
99. Martinez, 100 F.3d at 122.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 123.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 124.
105. Id. at 123-24.
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neous, the court addressed the contempt argument." The court stated,
"we are not impressed with defendants' argument that they may be punished in a separate contempt proceeding for the same conduct punished
here. This claim of some possible future unspecified detriment is too
speculative for our consideration.""
The court found there was not sufficient evidence to address the issue of reasonableness of the award.'" Finally, the court considered the
award for services provided through legal aid."° The purpose of awarding
attorneys' fees, the court asserted, is to sanction the party who acted in
bad faith. ' Therefore, the court construed "no reason to distinguish between attorneys who are paid by a party and attorneys who are paid with
public funds.'".
C. Analysis

Surprisingly, the court did not appear to consider addressing possible issues of res judicata."2 For example, if the plaintiff filed a separate
contempt proceeding, under the historical exception relating to contempt
proceedings, a court could award attorneys' fees."3 On the other hand, the
court in Martinez specifically articulated the reasons for awarding attorneys' fees--to punish the defendant for acting in bad faith. Therefore, if

106. Id.
107. Id. at 123-24.
108. Id. at 124. The defendants argued that the fees were unreasonable. Id. However, it appears
that they made only generalized statements regarding the award and did not present any evidence. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11l. Id. The court held in accord with several other courts, which have upheld the fees award to
publicly-funded programs. Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984) (awarding
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to private nonprofit legal services organization); New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980) (awarding attorneys' fees to public
interest legal services provider in Title VII action); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d
Cir. 1977) (awarding attorneys' fees to nonprofit, federally-funded legal services provider in
ADEA); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing that Congress placed no limit
on amount payable to publicly-funded organization under a federal statute which provided for award
of fees in voting rights case)).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). This statute provides one articulation of the rule:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States,
or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or
Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of
the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that
the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
Id.
113. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1583.
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there were a separate contempt order, it is unlikely the defendants would
be punished for the same behavior under the res judicata doctrine. Furthermore, the parties might never pursue a contempt proceeding, and the
defendants' action might go unpunished.""
The purpose behind the bad faith exception remains punishment of a
party for bringing a frivolous lawsuit." ' As the Tenth Circuit determined,
it is irrelevant that a legal aid attorney represented the prevailing party,
though some may argue that the prevailing party is unjustly enriched.
The support for the Tenth Circuit's determination was not very persuasive, however, and could easily be distinguished from previous case law.
Namely, this case involved a judicially-created exception to the American Rule, rather than a statute specifically authorizing fee shifting. The
court did punish bad faith behavior, however, and this result operates to
justify the extension of the bad faith exception.
III. MILLER AcT AND BAD FAITH
A. Background
In 1935, Congress enacted the Miller Act to meet the concerns of
individuals who were subcontractors on projects for the United States."'
Congress addressed the subcontractors' concerns that there was no guarantee of payment because they were not in privity of contract with the
United States by requiring contractors to furnish a bond to their subcontractors for jobs over $2,000. " '

Although the Miller Act does not expressly provide for attorneys'
fees, the Supreme Court established a bad faith exception to the Miller
114.

SeeMartinezv. Roscoe, 100F.3d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 1996).

115. See, e.g., Medina, supra note 55, at 1197.
116. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-e (1986).
117. See Joseph E. Edwards, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Miller Act (40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270a270e) Litigation,4 A.L.R. FED. 685 (1970). The Miller Act provides:
(a) Type of bonds required
Before any contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building
or public work of the United States is awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to
the United States the following bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of the
contract to such person, who is hereinafter designated as "contractor":
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer awarding
such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the protection of the
United States.
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract for the use of each such person. Whenever the total amount
payable by the terms of the contract shall be not more than $1,000,000 the said payment bond shall be in a sum of one-half the total amount payable by the terms of the
contract. Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be more
than $1,000,000 and not more than $5,000,000, the said payment bond shall be in a
sum of 40 per centur of the total amount payable by the terms of the contract. Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be more than
$5,000,000 the said payment bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000.
40 U.S.C. §§ 270a.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

Act in 1974."8 In F.D. Rich v. United States ex rel IndustrialLumber Co.,
a subcontractor agreed to supply plywood for several of the contractor's
projects."' After the contractor fell behind on several payments, the subcontractor initiated a Miller Act claim."2 The court of appeals held that if
state law allowed an award of attorneys' fees under the Miller Act so
should the federal court.'"' Because California allowed for attorneys' fees
in this type of case, the court awarded attorneys' fees.'"
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's justification.'"
Examining the purpose of the Miller Act, the Supreme Court found that
the intent of the act was to protect subcontractors working for the government.'" The Court found that the Miller Act created a federal cause of
action, and therefore, the Court preferred to establish a uniform federal
rule rather than relying on state law.'" Unless the Court established a
uniform rule, the Court feared that subcontractors would not always be
compensated, even when their claim was successful.'" The Court also
noted that in Miller Act cases, construction can occur in more than one
state, causing confusion as to which state's law applies.' Finally, although the Court recognized the bad faith exception to the American
Rule, the Court found that no bad faith occurred in F.D. Rich.'"
B. Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc.'"
1. Facts
Towerridge, a subcontractor, agreed to complete most of the asphalt
and concrete work for the prime contractor, T.A.O."0 While Towerridge
worked, the parties consistently disagreed as to whether the work was on
schedule, and which party was at fault for any delays.'' Due to these
disputes, Towerridge sought damages, claiming that money was due on

118. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974). The
Court inferred Congress' intent in establishing the Miller Act included the award of attorneys' fees
when bad faith occurred. Id. at 128. Without fee shifting, claimants under the Miller Act would
never be fully compensated. Id. They would always have to pay for legal representation. Id. The bad
faith exception would help eliminate that concern. Id.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. at 120.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 127.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 126-29
126. Id. at 128.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 129.
129. 111 F.3d758(1OthCir. 1997).
130. Towerridge, I l l F.3d at 761.
131. Id.
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the contract.' The jury found in favor of Towerridge, and further found
that T.A.O. acted in bad faith. 3' Accordingly, the district court awarded
Towerridge attorneys' fees.'" On appeal, T.A.O. challenged the award of
attorney fees." T.A.O. argued that the court could not award attorneys'
fees for prelitigation bad faith."'
2. Decision
Initially, the court noted that the Miller Act allowed an award of
attorneys' fees, including awards for bad faith conduct.' The court examined the purpose and source of the bad faith exception to determine
whether the exception applied to prelitigation bad faith.'38 Finding that
the purpose was to punish abuses of the judicial process, the court determined that the Miller Act did not apply to prelitigation behavior.'39 The
court distinguished prelitigation behavior from behavior during judicial
proceedings, noting that "[b]ecause the origin of the bad-faith exception
is the federal judiciary's necessary and inherent power to police proceedings before it.... we find it unlikely that exception reaches to badfaith conduct not occurring during the course of the litigation itself."''
The court distinguished the claim before it from one in which there was
bad faith during prelitigation, along with bad faith during the litigation
itself.'" In such a case, courts are divided as to whether to consider the
prelitigation behavior."
Finally, the court clarified that it did not condone any of T.A.O.'s
behavior that resulted from bad faith."3 The court refused, however, to
extend the exception to the American Rule to include prelitigation conduct because to do so "risk[ed] swallowing of the Rule.... ."" The court

noted that to expand the exception so much "could open the door to fee
shifting in the ordinary tort or contract case" and therefore could go beyond its scope and purpose.'"
132. Id. at 762.
133. Id. at 760.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 765.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 766. The court examined a Supreme Court decision to determine the purpose of the
act. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). In that case, the Supreme Court did not
expressly decide this question, but alluded to what their decision would have been. See id. at 53. The
court also noted that in Chambers, the dissent shared the same view regarding prelitigation bad faith.
Towerridge, Ill F.3d at 766.
139. Towerridge, 111 F.3d at 766.
140. Id. at 766.
141. Id. at 767 n.6.
142. Id.
143. ld. at 769.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61
N.C. L. REV. 613,634 (1983)).
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C. Other Circuits
Several other circuits have held in accordance with Towerridge.'"
The Fifth Circuit addressed the question of prelitigation bad faith in
Galveston County Navigation DistrictNo. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co. "7 As
a result of the defendant's failure to open a drawbridge, a tug boat collided with the bridge and subsequently sued the drawbridge operator."
The plaintiffs were awarded $20,000 in attorneys' fees.'' The trial court
based its attorneys' fees award on the defendant's refusal to pay damages
in an amount to which both parties stipulated, thereby causing the plaintiffs to incur attorneys' fees in an effort to recover those damages.'" The
Fifth Circuit held, however, that "[n]ot acting 'in an equitable manner'
was not grounds for an award of attorney's fees."1 While the defendants
may have acted in bad faith with regard to the underlying tort, there was
no evidence that the defendants acted in bad faith throughout the
lawsuit.'52 The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case from one in which a
party took a position maliciously, failed to comply with discovery requests, or otherwise abused the litigation process."
In the Eighth Circuit, Lamb Engineering & Construction Co. v. Nebraska Public Power District'" clarified the issue of prelitigation bad
faith.'55 In Lamb, the court examined a contract between a public power

146. See Lamb Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir.
1997); Galveston County Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co., 92 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
1996); Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc, 976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1992) (en
banc); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Ft. Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004 (11 th Cir. 1985); Shimman v. Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1980).
147. 92 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1996).
148. Hopson Towing, 92 F.3d at 354.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Id. at 359.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also Association of Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549-50 (finding no reason to
construe the exception broadly, the court limited the application of the bad faith exception to actions
occurring during the litigation itself); Woods, 765 F.2d at 1004 (holding that bad faith must occur in
the course of the litigation itself, because "[v]exatious conduct inherent in the fraudulent acts that
make up the ... cause of action cannot be the basis for an attorney's fee award because punitive
damages are not available.
...); Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1226 (examining the rationale for the
American Rule, the Court stated that "[t]o allow an award of attorney fees based on bad faith in the
act underlying the substantive claim would not be consistent with the rationale behind the American
Rule..."); Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 339 (implying that the bad faith exception only applies to litigation conduct by noting that claims must be without merit).
154. 103 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1997).
155. Prior to this decision, the Eighth Circuit's decisions could be read to allow attorneys' fees
in the prelitigation context. See Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 530 F.2d 126 (8th
Cir. 1976) (1976) (agreeing with the district court that the defendant union acted in bad faith in
representing the plaintiffs in the employment context leading up to trial, rather than during litigation).
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district and a contractor, Lamb, to refurbish electric lines." Lamb experienced difficulties in carrying out the contract.'" Eventually, the power
district terminated the contract, and Lamb brought action against the
public power district."
The district court expressly awarded attorneys' fees because of
prelitigation bad faith conduct."9 The Eighth Circuit concluded that an
award of prelitigation attorneys' fees was not in accord with Nebraska
law." After examining federal law, the Eighth Circuit also concluded
"that the district court's inherent power to award attorney fees as a sanction for bad faith conduct does not extend to pre-litigation conduct."' 6'
Despite its holding, however, the court stated that prelitigation conduct
could be considered when examining attorneys' fees; however, prelitigation conduct alone could not be a basis for a fee award.'62
D. Analysis
In NASCO, the Supreme Court interpreted the bad faith exception
narrowly, prohibiting courts from sanctioning purely prelitigation bad
faith conduct. The Tenth Circuit has followed this approach accordingly.
The court left undecided, however, whether a court can consider prelitigation bad faith conduct when it is coupled with bad faith conduct during
the litigation itself.
The Eighth Circuit's approach addressed prelitigation bad faith.'6'
That court permitted consideration of prelitigation bad faith behavior
when awarding attorneys' fees for bad faith conduct during litigation."
This approach operates to eradicate bad faith, and allows courts to take
all the factors into account when sanctioning a party. Unless a court considers prelitigation bad faith, a party could act in bad faith up to the filing
of a lawsuit with impunity. If this party also acted in bad faith during the
litigation, the party would only face sanctions for the litigation behavior
and not be punished for other bad faith conduct.
Those actions which could be considered prelitigation conduct are
extensive. For example, parties often discuss the possibility of initiating a
lawsuit. During this time, parties collect background information and
conduct research to assess whether litigation is a viable option. Negotiation often occurs during this stage as well. Bad faith during this time
156. Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1427.
157. Id. The two parties have markedly different accounts concerning the breakdown of the
contract. See id. at 1427-28.
158. Id. at 1429.
159. Id. at 1434.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1437. The court distinguished Richardson, determining that certain acts of the union
were in the context of the litigation. Id. at 1436.
162. Id. at 1435.
163. See id. at 1422.
164. Id.at 1437.
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goes unpunished and courts will not even consider the behavior when
addressing bad faith awards.
Therefore, equity requires that courts be permitted to consider both
the prelitigation behavior and the litigation behavior when bad faith has
occurred throughout both stages. If one party does not comport with
good faith requirements during this crucial time, not only could unnecessary lawsuits be filed, but the other party might incur vast amounts of
fees during this phase. These fees would be a direct result of the other
party's bad faith. When this occurs the party who has acted in bad faith
should bear the costs associated with his bad faith conduct.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND ATrORNEY'S FEES

A. Background
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins,' federal courts sitting in diversity have generally applied federal procedural law and state substantive law. " No federal common law
exists and because common law generally governs substantive issues,
courts apply state law in those cases.'6" This result encourages uniformity
in both state substantive law and federal procedural law.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society," caused confusion among lower federal courts in
situations when courts must determine which state law applies in a fee
shifting situation."0 Some commentators argued this confusion was a
result of unclear language in Alyeska.' ' In Alyeska's footnote 31, the
Supreme Court indicated that a federal court sitting in diversity should
apply state fee shifting laws, provided those laws reflect the policy of the
state.' Courts have interpreted that to mean they are always to apply
state fee shifting laws. 7 Because some, though not all fee shifting laws

165. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
166. See Jeffrey A Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Substance/ProcedureProblems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PiTr. L. REV. 393, 394 (1988).
167. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
168. See Parness, supra note 166, at 394.
169. 421 U.S. 240 (1938).
170. See John G. Hanlin, Choice of Law in the Interpretation of Insurance and Reinsurance
Contracts,2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (1991); Paness, supranote 166; Partee, supra note
83, at 107.
171. Parness, supranote 166, at393.
172. Aleyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 n.31. The Court stated:
A very different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a diversity case. '(I)n
an ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court, and usually it will not, state law denying the right to attorney's fees
or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed.'
Id.
173. Parness, supranote 166, at 414.
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are procedural, this interpretation is inconsistent with the language from
Erie which directed a federal court to use only federal procedural law."
Procedural fee shifting laws generally govern litigation conduct,
while substantive fee shifting laws relate to remedies available for specific claims.' This becomes relevant when attempting to harmonize Erie
and Alyeska.'"' For example, if a fee shifting law is considered procedural, then under Erie, a court would use federal fee shifting laws.'" On
the other hand, when a fee shifting law is substantive, under Alyeska, a
court would apply the state's fee shifting law. 8 Under this analysis, attorneys' fees in the context of a contract would be substantive because
they relate to a remedy available from the specific contract claim, which
comprises the substantive claim. When courts apply only state fee shifting laws, the language from Erie becomes moot.
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of which state's law a
court should use when sitting in diversity and determining attorneys'
fees.'" They decided this issue in a contract suit in Bill's Coal Co v.
Board of Public Utility.' ° After the parties reached a settlement agreement, the purchaser filed for declaratory judgment as to nonliability in
the federal district court in Missouri.' 8' Subsequently, the sellers filed a
breach of contract claim in an Oklahoma federal district court.'82 Eventually, the Oklahoma court transferred the sellers' action to the court in
Missouri, but the Missouri court transferred the actions back to Oklahoma.'" After several procedural phases the case went before the Tenth
Circuit, which addressed which state's law was applicable to resolve the
issue of attorneys' fees.'"
Finding that attorneys' fees must be determined by state law and
that an award of attorney's fees was substantive, the Tenth Circuit court
applied Missouri law because the substantive law of that contract was
Missouri law.' 5 The Tenth Circuit determined that "[i]n diversity cases
generally, and certainly in this circuit, attorney fees are determined by

174. Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Util., 887 F.2d 242 (1989).
175. Pamess, supra note 166, at 401.
176. Id at 402.
177. Id. at 414.
178. Id. at 411-12.
179. Bill's Coal, 887 F.2d at 245.
180. Id. at 242.
181. Id. at 243.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 245. The district court originally found that the sellers had breached the contract and
the case was dissolved. Id. at 249. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded that dissolution. Id. The district court, on remand, applied Missouri law with regard to attorneys' fees. Id. The
sellers appealed. Id.
185. Id. at 246.
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state law and are substantive for diversity purposes."'" The Tenth Circuit
did not, however, decide which state's choice-of-law rules to apply. 87
Bill's Coal created some confusion regarding choice-of-law rules.
Courts agreed that attorneys' fees were substantive and the law that governed the contract should govern the underlying lawsuit. Courts were
unclear, however, which state's choice-of-law rules should be applied in
the first instance.
B. Boyd Rosene
and Associates, Inc. v. Kansas Municipal Gas
Agency '
1. Facts
The defendants prevailed on an appeal from a district court ruling.'"9
The defendants sought attorneys' fees as prevailing parties, pursuant to
an Oklahoma statute, but the district court ruled that each party must bear
their own costs.'9 The defendants then sought en banc consideration of
which state's law should apply to determine an award of attorneys'
fees. 9' The lower courts agreed that attorneys' fees were substantive and
that Missouri law governed the parties' contract.' The issue before the
Tenth Circuit, however, required the court to determine which state's
choice-of-law rules applied: Missouri or Oklahoma.' 3
2. Decision
The court asserted, as in Bill's Coal, that attorneys' fees were substantive for diversity purposes, therefore, courts must apply the substantive law of the state which governs the contract.' However, the court
noted that generally in diversity cases, a federal court should apply the
substantive law of the forum state.'" Therefore, "[riather than automatically applying the law of the state providing the substantive contract law,
a district court must first apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules in
resolving attorney's fees issues."' ' The court then remanded the case for
application of Oklahoma's choice-of-law rules.'9

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. (quoting In Matter of King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1981)).
Id. at 243.
123 F.3d 1351 (10th Cir. 1997).
Boyd Rosene, 123 F.3d at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Other Circuits
In other jurisdictions, this area of the law appears to be settled.
Many courts reiterated the accepted notion that federal procedural rules
and state substantive rules govern in diversity cases.'" For example, in
Mentor Insurance Co. v. Brannkasse," the Second Circuit applied the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state, New York, that was determined
by an agreement of the parties." The court noted that under New York
law, parties may agree what law applies, and therefore the court did not
need to address the issue. °'
The Eighth Circuit also held that a federal court sitting in diversity
must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.' In that case, the
forum state generally recognized stipulations made by the parties in their
contract.' In addition, the First Circuit applied the forum's choice-oflaw principles in a contract suit to determine which state's substantive
law applied. ' In that case the trial court judge applied Massachusetts'
choice-of-law provisions to determine that Massachusetts law, rather
than California law, applied and the appellate court did not disturb this
finding.'
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, in Heller International
Corp. v. Sharp' held that a district court sitting in diversity should have
applied the substantive law and the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which it sits.' In that case, however, the forum was Illinois, and because
the parties had already agreed that Illinois law governed, there was no
real choice-of-law question.'
D. Analysis
Choice-of-law rules are generally well settled coming from long
standing civil procedure cases such as Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.' Courts
apply federal procedural law and state substantive law. Due to ambiguity
created by Alyeska, however, courts have been perplexed as to how to
treat attorneys' fees because they can be considered as either procedural

198. For example, many courts cited Erie for the proposition that a federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state, including choice-of-law principles. Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941).
199. 996 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1993).
200. Mentor lns., 996 F.2d at 513.
201. Id. at 513-14.
202. Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1991).
203. Id.
204. Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 940 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 70.
206. 974 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1992).
207. Heller, 974 F.2d at 856.
208. Id.
209. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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or substantive issues, as evidenced by the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Bill's Coal.
The Tenth's Circuit approach is consistent with other state's efforts
to harmonize choice-of-law problems that arose from Erie and Alyeska.
This approach may, however, burden a court to apply the forum state's
choice-of-law provisions, and then another state's substantive law.
The Seventh Circuit's approach, which applied both the substantive
law and the choice-of-law rules from the forum state, is a possible alternative. While providing a bright line rule, this approach ignores the fact
that the substantive law of the forum state may differ from the substantive law of the contract as in Boyd Rosene, which occurs often when parties entered in to a contract with the intent that a certain state's law shall
govern. If a federal court were to only apply the forum state's law, the
intent of the parties to the contract would not realized.
Applying the forum state's choice-of-law rules in the first instance
serves two purposes. First, it gives the federal court state substantive law
with regard to choice-of-law rules. Second, it allows the substantive law
governing the contract to be applied to the contractual part of the dispute,
and generally, this law has been agreed upon by the parties.
CONCLUSION

The American Rule and its exceptions continues to evolve throughout the United States. Many issues are left unresolved, but the Tenth Circuit appears to be in accord with the majority of jurisdictions. During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit clarified important areas of the law, including that the bad faith exception is applicable even if a party could be
punished through a contempt proceeding. However, the bad faith exception cannot be used to punish bad faith actions taken prior to the initiation of litigation. In addition, the Tenth Circuit clarified choice-of-laws
analyses utilized to determine which state's fee shifting laws should apply in diversity cases.
Dana C. Schneider

BANKRUPTCY LAW
INTRODUCTION

In adjudicating a bankruptcy, a court must maintain a delicate balance between a creditor's right to a fair and orderly distribution of the
assets and a debtor's right to a fresh start. Throughout this process, a
court must also consider basic elements of fairness, preservation of the
assets, and equality in distribution of the assets. This survey addresses
recent decisions of the Tenth Circuit in which the court had the opportunity to consider these fundamental issues in unique situations. Part I of
this article provides a background in basic bankruptcy procedures and
concepts. Part II discusses the effect of an action taken by a creditor in
violation of the automatic stay. Part III explores the viability of prepetition setoffs under 11 U.S.C. § 553(b). Part IV analyzes a creditor's objections to discharges while Part V addresses due process requirements
for lien modification in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Part VI examines
dischargeability of gap period interest on a tax claim.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

The number of individuals and companies filing bankruptcy is increasing at an alarming rate.' Congressional sources estimated that one in
every one hundred American families would file for bankruptcy during
1997.2 An increase in bankruptcy filings effects the commercial credit
sector.3 Bankruptcy provides a convenient forum for collecting and equitably distributing the debtor's assets to creditors, and provides debt
relief to the financially burdened debtor.'
The Bankruptcy Code5 governs the administration of bankruptcy
cases and permits almost any person or entity, including a municipality,
to qualify as a debtor.' Bankruptcy proceeding may be initiated in several

1. See The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th
Cong. 138 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on Crisis in Consumer Credit] (statement of the American
Bankruptcy Institute) (reporting that 1,178,555 bankruptcy petitions were filed in 1996).
2. See Operation of the Bankruptcy System and Status Reportfrom the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 6 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System] (statement of Brady C. Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
3. See id. at 35.
4. Arnold M. Quitner, Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and PriorBankruptcy
Laws, in BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION

1987: THE

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL BASICS

7, 13 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4208, 1990).
5. See I I U.S.C. §§ 1-360 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Congress has the enumerated power "to
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
6. See It U.S.C. § 109. Certain entities, including railroads, insurance companies and banks,
do not qualify as debtors. Id.
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ways. Debtors voluntarily commence bankruptcy by filing a petition under Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.! In
addition, three or more creditors with aggregate, unsecured or undersecured claims of "at least $10,000 more than the value of any lien on
property of the debtor securing such claims" may commence an involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.8 The bankruptcy court
automatically enters an order for relief upon the filing of a voluntary or
involuntary bankruptcy petition, which stays all action by a creditor
against the debtor or the estate.9
Chapter 7 governs liquidation bankruptcy proceedings." In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the court liquidates the nonexempt assets of the debtor
and distributes the proceeds to the creditors." Approximately eighty percent of all debtors file bankruptcy under Chapter 7.2 Under Chapter 7,
the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to supervise the administration of
the estate. 3 At the conclusion of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, an individual
debtor usually receives a discharge, essentially releasing a debtor from
his existing debts."
Unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
allows a debtor to retain his nonexempt assets and repay creditors
through a plan funded by the debtor's postpetition earnings.'- As in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee supervises the administration of the estate.'6 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor must submit a plan of re-

7. See id. § 301 ("A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under
such chapter."). Debtors who qualify as "family farmers" may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter
12. See id. § 101(18); Hearing on Operationof the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
9. See 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 133:7 (2d
ed. 1997).
10. Hearingon Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of Charles
Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
11. Id.
12. Hearing on Crisis in Consumer Credit, supra note 1,at 138 (statement of the American
Bankruptcy Institute).
13. See Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 208 (Jagdeep S.Bhandari & Lawrence
A. Weiss eds., 1996). The duties of a trustee include the responsibility to "collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves." 11 U.S.C. § 704(1).
14. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225 (1986);
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of
Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1995).
15. See ARNOLD B. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTORCREDITOR MATTERS 9114-401, at 234 (1981).

16. See Paul L. Bindler & Shalom Jacob, Basic Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, in
BASIC BANKRUPTCY 241, 289 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A44221, 1988).
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payment for confirmation by the bankruptcy court.'7 The debtor must also
commence making payments to the trustee within thirty days of the date
the plan is filed.'8 Once the court confirms the plan, the provisions of the
plan bind the debtor and all creditors.'9 All property of the estate vests in
the debtor unless the plan provides otherwise.' After the debtor completes the plan payments, the court discharges the debtor of all debts described in the plan.2' Because relatively few debtors elect to file under
Chapter 13 and repay their obligations, some organizations have proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would provide incentives for more debtors to proceed under Chapter 13.'
Chapter 11 bankruptcy gives a business the opportunity to rehabilitate itself so that the business can continue to operate, provide jobs, and
pay its creditors.' Because a court generally permits the Chapter 11
debtor to continue operating its business throughout this process,2 ' unique
issues arise with respect to rights of secured creditors, especially concerning the use of cash collateral to continue the operation of the business.' The resolution of these various issues involves both bankruptcy
law and nonbankruptcy law. 6
The ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to obtain a confirmed plan of reorganization.' Bankruptcy procedure requires the debtor
or a creditor to propose a plan of reorganization and to solicit acceptance
of the plan from creditors through disclosure statements and ballots. 8
The confirmed plan binds the debtor and all creditors, and vests all property of the estate in the debtor.' The court deems all property addressed

17. See II U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1325; see also Bindler & Jacob, supra note 16, at 289 (explaining
that the plan may provide for repayments over an extended period).
18. See Bindler & Jacob, supra note 16, at 289.
19. Id
20. Id.
21. See Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 47 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
22. Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supranote 2, at 7 (statement of Brady C.
Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
23. See COHEN, supra note 15, 1 14-501, at 265.
24. See Hearing on Operation of the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
25. See id. at 43-44; see also Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for CorporateReorganizations, in CORPORATE BANKRuPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 336,
345 (explaining that, in a liquidation creditors' rights are fixed and payments made in cash, but in a
reorganization more issues are unresolved, including the value of shares in the reorganized company).
26. See Baird, supra note 25, at 345.
27. See id. See also II U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1994) (describing some of the mandatory plan provisions).
28. See Hearing on Operationof the Bankruptcy System, supra note 2, at 44-45 (statement of
Charles Tatelbaum, Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a)-(b) (1994).
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in the confirmed plan as free and clear of all claims and interest of
creditors, unless the plan provides otherwise."
In sum, the bankruptcy system prioritizes the rights of various
claimants to particular assets.31 Despite the complexity of the bankruptcy
laws, this system serves to protect the commercial credit economy and
allow debtors to become economically productive members of society 2
II. VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY

A. Background

Congress designed the automatic stay, to protect debtors from a
creditor's efforts to collect property while the debtor attempts to regain
financial stability.' The automatic stay prohibits creditors from taking
any action to enforce debts or liens against the debtor or the bankruptcy
estate. By preserving the prepetition state of affairs, the automatic stay
protects both debtors and creditors. The stay temporarily relieves the
debtor from collection efforts, while simultaneously protecting creditors

from diminishment of the estate.3 ' The breadth of the automatic stay is
expansive, encompassing activities such as sending a demand letter and
perfecting a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate. 7

30. Id.§ 1141(d).
31. See Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, in
CORPORATE BANKRUvTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 58.
32. See Quitier, supranote 4, at 30.

33.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

34. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97.
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy.
Id.
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. The statute states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this titie, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this tile; ....
Id. § 362(a)(1), (6).
36. See Timothy Arnold Barnes, Note, The Plain Meaning of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: The Void/Voidable DistinctionRevisited, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 293 (1996).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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Although the automatic stay applies to all entities, including governmental agencies, the protection it offers can be limited." A creditor
may request termination, modification or annulment of the stay in certain
circumstances. 9 Termination of the automatic stay, the most frequently
granted form of relief, prospectively ends the stay.' Although less frequent, courts also grant an annulment of the automatic stay, which retroactively validates an act that violated the stay.'1 If a creditor does not seek
annulment from the automatic stay, courts will consider an action taken
in violation of the automatic stay as void or voidable.'
Actions in violation of the automatic stay are classified as either
void or voidable, a determination which has important implications. A
void act simply has no legal effect, whereas a voidable act requires action by the debtor to undo the effects of the creditor's act." Most courts
have considered an action taken in violation of an automatic stay as
void." When a court finds that an act taken in violation of the automatic
stay is void and, therefore, of no effect, the court furthers the goal of the
automatic stay: preservation of the debtor's prepetition financial circumstances.'3 Those courts that find acts taken in violation of the automatic
stay voidable view an annulment as a remedy available to a creditor
seeking relief from the automatic stay." When a court annuls an act taken
in violation of the automatic stay, the court may then retroactively validate the act.' Because a court can retroactively validate an act that would
have been in violation of the stay, some courts believe that these acts
must be voidable because a court would be incapable of retroactively
validating a void act, an act defined as being entirely without effect. '
38. 3 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.03 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. 1997) (noting that "entity" is broader than the term "person').
39. 11 §362(d)(1).
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest; ....
Id.
40. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 227 (3d ed.
1993).
41. See id.
42. See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990); COLLIER,
supra note 38, $362.11 [1].
43. See In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992). The distinction between a void or
voidable act is similar to the difference between a void or voidable contract. Barnes, supra note 36,
at 306-08. A court cannot cure a defect in a void contract or enforce a void contract, as in the case of
a contract made to further an illegal purpose. Id. Unlike a void contract, a court may enforce a voidable contract unless one of the parties to the contract objects, such as when a minor disaffirms a
contract. Id. at 307.
44. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1362.11 [].
45. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571.
46. See COLLIER, supra note 38, $ 362.11 [1].
47. See II U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
48. See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been recognized "as one of
the most blatant violators of the automatic stay." Some common actions
taken by the IRS in violation of the automatic stay include a setoff of tax
refunds against tax liabilities, filing a tax lien against a debtor's property
and other collection activities? ° Courts have also found that the completion of a tax assessment by the IRS violates a stay.' An assessment is an
initial step in collecting taxes, and usually the assessment occurs automatically upon the filing of a tax return. 2 An assessment determines the
amount of taxes due and is not a condition precedent to the accrual of tax
liability.?
If the IRS assesses taxes without seeking relief from the automatic
stay, the validity of the assessment depends upon the void/voidable distinction. ' A void tax assessment has no effect on the rights of the creditor
or debtor, while a voidable tax assessment is valid and affects the parties'
rights until and unless the debtor challenges the assessment." If a court
considers a tax assessment void, the court must then determine the consequences of the void assessment.' Logic dictates that if the assessment
is not required to create tax liability, a void tax assessment should not
relieve a debtor of the liability, but should only detrimentally affect the
collection of the taxes, such as by removing a tax lien.'7
The Tenth Circuit previously determined that a violation of the
automatic stay renders the act void and of no effect.' In Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp.,' the court held that the granting of a motion
for summary judgment before obtaining relief from the automatic stay

49. Barnes, supra note 36, at 315.
50. Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ.1363, 1393-94 (1994).
51. See In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1991); Alesia Ranney-Marinelli et al.,
Recent Developments: Automatic Stay Litigation, in 18TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION, 1996, at 925,932 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook No. A4-4498, 1996).
52. See Frances R. Hill, Toward a Theory of Bankruptcy Tax: A Statutory CoordinationApproach, 50 TAX LAW. 103, 154-55 (1996) (explaining that the IRS may automatically assess taxes
upon the filing of a return or summarily assess taxes if the amount due is understated due to a
mathematical or clerical error).
53. See United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that an assessment
of income taxes is not a prerequisite for income tax liability); Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d
1507,1514 (10th Cir. 1983) (explaining that no requirement exists in the Internal Revenue Code that
a notice of tax deficiency or assessment must be given before liability accrues for employment taxes
since liability arises by the duty to collect such taxes). Recent revisions to the Internal Revenue Code
require issuance of a preliminary notice before making an assessment, suggesting that an assessment
may be a prerequisite to liability. See I.R.C. § 6672 (West Supp. 1997).
54. See Bames, supra note 36, at 306; In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 571.
56. See In re Goldston, 104 F.3d 1198, 1199-200(10th Cir. 1997) (considering whether a void
tax assessment relieves the debtor of tax liability).
57. See Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 574-75 (affirming a bankruptcy court order denying IRS claim).
58. Meyerv. Rowan, 181 F.2d 715,716(10th Cir. 1950).
59. 894F.2d371 (1OthCir. 1990).
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rendered the order on summary judgment void.' The Tenth Circuit also
determined that liability for taxes is independent of a tax assessment,
although Marvel v. United States" was not decided in the context of the
automatic stay.' In Marvel, the court concluded that deficient tax notices
did not relieve a taxpayer of liability because the Internal Revenue Code
did not require a notice of assessment before liability accrued.' In In re
Goldston," the court had the opportunity to consider the consequences to
the IRS of a tax assessment made in violation of the automatic stay. Although the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have largely rendered the void/voidable distinction moot with respect to tax assessments,
the amendments were not applicable in Goldston.'
B. In re Goldston
1. Facts
Goldston, the owner of Sunnylane Electric, withheld approximately
$27,000 in FICA and federal employment funds from his employees
wages, but failed to remit those funds to the IRSV' In October 1989,
Goldston filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 6'The IRS assessed
a penalty of $27,829.79 against Goldston without obtaining relief from
the automatic stay." Goldston subsequently dismissed the bankruptcy,
and the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien with the state register of
M In December 1991, Goldston filed a petition under Chapter 13. '
deeds."
The IRS, based on the notice of federal tax lien, filed a secured claim."
Goldston challenged the claim, arguing that the assessment was void and
that therefore, the IRS was not entitled to a secured claim.' The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on the basis

60. Ellis, 894 F.2d at372-73.
61. 719 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1983).
62. Marvel, 719 F.2d at 1514.
63. Id.
64. 104 F.3d 1198 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
65. See II U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (1994); A. Breault et al., Bankruptcy Act Covers Tax Collection,
54 TAX'N FOR ACCr. 125, 125 (1995). Although the tax assessment may be valid under the recent
amendments, the tax lien that arises from such assessment may not take effect with respect to property of
the estate unless the tax is nondischargeable and the property to which the lien may attach is not property
of the estate. See 6 NORTON, supranote 9, § 133:7. The Bankruptcy Code amendments became effective on October 22, 1994, and did not apply to cases commenced prior to the effective date. See I1
U.S.C. § 362.
66. Goldston, 104 F.3d at 1200.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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that Goldston's liability for the taxes existed independent of an assessment."3 The district court affirmed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether a valid tax assessment is a
prerequisite to a subsequent secured claim for the taxes." In determining
the validity of the tax assessment, the court asserted that the debtor's
liability derives from his statutory duty to pay taxes. ' The court found
that the debtor met the definition of a "responsible person" contained in
the Internal Revenue Code and that his liability arose at the moment he
withheld taxes from his employees' wages." The court held that the tax
assessment, though void, did not alter the debtor's liability for the tax.'
As a penalty against the IRS for violating the automatic stay, the court
deprived the IRS of its secured status, rather than invalidating the tax
assessment.79
C. Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar issue in In re Riley.' The IRS
issued a notice of proposed assessment pursuant to Internal Revenue
Code § 6672 without obtaining relief from the automatic stay." After the
stay expired, the IRS issued an assessment, of which the debtor paid a
portion and sought a refund for the remainder The Eighth Circuit determined that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code did not require
the IRS to issue a proposed assessment. Although the proposed assessment notice was void, the court concluded that the subsequent tax assessment was not void."
D. Analysis
The Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code are not systematically coordinated." The goals of bankruptcy and the collection of
tax revenue conflict, particularly when the automatic stay prevents the

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1199-1200.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1201.
80. 118 F.3d 1220 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1997) (No. 97-990).
81. Riley, 118 F.3d at 1221.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1222.
84. Id. The IRS assessment was not void simply because it was "issued after a 'void' notice
that the agency was under no obligation to issue in the first place." Id.
85. Hill, supra note 52, at 105.
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M The automatic stay
IRS from taking ordinary steps in collecting taxes."
preserves the assets of the estate for equitable distribution among creditors." The effectiveness of the automatic stay depends upon the cooperation of creditors in ceasing their collection efforts and, for this reason,
courts use judicial sanctions to ensure cooperation.' When a creditor,
including the IRS, violates the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court must
determine the effect of the creditor's act."

In considering the effect of a violation of the automatic stay, the
Tenth Circuit focused on the debtor's underlying liability for the taxes.' °
The Tenth Circuit only had to decide whether a void assessment absolved the taxpayer of liability because the IRS had conceded that the
penalty assessment was void.9 The court determined that the IRS should
simply be denied any benefit gained by the assessment and the taxpayer
should not be relieved of underlying tax liability.' This result is appropriate because an assessment, a prerequisite for collection of the tax,
does not affix liability for the taxes. 93
Although 1994 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code resolved
the issue the Tenth Circuit confronted in Goldston by excepting assessments from the stay, a similar issue may arise in the future concerning
the validity of a preliminary notice of tax assessment. Before the IRS can
impose a penalty for failure to remit trust fund taxes (taxes collected and
withheld from employees), the IRS must follow certain statutory proceM To meet one of the procedural requirements, the IRS must issue a
dures."
preliminary tax notice before assessing a penalty against a responsible
person." Although the Bankruptcy Code now excepts tax assessments
from the automatic stay, the 1994 amendments did not create an exception to permit the IRS to issue such preliminary notices without seeking
relief from the automatic stay.' Thus, the issue of the effect of a void act
made in violation of the automatic stay may also arise when the IRS is-

86. Id. at 156.
87. Barnes, supra note 36, at 298 (describing the "feeding frenzy" that might occur on the
debtor's assets absent the automatic stay).
88. Id. at 292.
89. Id. at 306-07.
90. In re Goldston, 104F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. James S. Niblock, Comment, Moran v. United States: You Pay Your Money and You Take
Your Chances,22 J. CORP. L. 153, 166 (1996).
94. JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55.104 (1942);
Matthew J. McGowan, Enjoining Enforcement of the 100% Tax Penalty in Corporate Chapter 11
Proceedings,34 R.I. B. J. 5, 5 (1986).
95. I.R.C. § 6672(b) (Supp. 1997).
96. II U.S.C. § 362(d)(9) (1994).
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sues a preliminary notice of tax assessment without obtaining relief from
the automatic stay.97
Goldston indicates that a court may find that the void notice renders
a subsequent assessment invalid.9 Under the Tenth Circuit's Goldston
analysis, a court could conclude that the debtor's liability existed regardless of the void notice and resulting defective assessment.99 A court
might further reason that the IRS should be placed in the same position it
occupied before the debtor filed bankruptcy. In other words, the court
could deny the IRS any benefit it obtained from issuing a notice in violation of the stay."
III. VIABILrrY OF PREPETITION SETOFFS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)
A. Background
State law has traditionally governed a creditor's right of setoff.'°'
The right of setoff allows a creditor to reduce the amount that the debtor
owes the creditor by the amount that the creditor owes the debtor." Setoff often arises in transactions where a bank makes a loan to a debtor
who has a depository account at the bank." If the debtor defaults on the
loan, the bank may offset the amount owed to the bank by the amount the
bank owes to the customer on the depository account.'
The Bankruptcy Code preserves the right of a creditor to offset a
debt owed to the creditor as the right exists under state law." Nevertheless, the creditor's right to setoff is not unlimited." Prepetition setoffs
97. See In re Riley, 118 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W.
3434 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 97-990) (implying that the assessment might be invalid if proper
procedures are not followed).
98. Id.
99. In re Goldston, 104 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997).
100. For example, the court could eliminate the secured claim. See Alesia Ranney-Marinelli et
al., supra note 51, at 933-34 (describing case law interpreting the effect of an action taken in violation of the automatic stay).
101. Russell J. Passamano, Setoff in Bankruptcy: An Overview of the Mechanics, 105 BANKING
L.J. 349,351 (1988).
102. See Paul Amiel et al., Take the Money and Run: Setoff and the Bankruptcy Code, in
ADVANCED BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP:. CASE STUDIES IN HANDLING CHAPTER I I PROBLEMS 661,
663 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4217, 1988) (stating that the
bank's right to offset the indebtedness of the depositor is equitable and does not depend on the
existence of a lien).
103. Jack F. Williams, Application of Cash Collateral Paradigm to the Preservation of the
Right to Setoff in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 27, 31 (1990).
104. See Jack B. Justice, Setoff Against a DepositorFacing Bankruptcy: A Question of Timing,

110 BANKING L.J. 310, 310 (1993).
105. See Williams, supra note 103, at 30 (stating that the Bankruptcy Code preserves any
nonbankruptcy setoff right).
106. The right of setoff is also subject to certain restrictions. The primary restriction is mutuality.
See id. at 33. The mutuality requirement prescribes that the debt to be setoff must be owed between the
same parties in the same capacity. Mr. Avery, E Pluribus Unum-Maybe: The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
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are subject to the scrutiny of the trustee and the bankruptcy court,'" while
setoffs made after the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy are precluded
by the automatic stay." Under the code, creditors who exercise the right
of setoff risk the possibility that the trustee would seek to have the setoff
avoided by the court.'"m If the court avoids the setoff, the creditor has an
unsecured claim. " In contrast, when a creditor refrains from exercising
its right to setoff, the creditor retains a secured claim.11' Moreover, bankruptcy law treats postpetition setoff rights as the equivalent to a lawful
preference."' Without such preferred status for setoff rights, creditors
would precipitously exercise their setoff rights, rather than risk losing
that right in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings."3 The regulation of setoff rights therefore promotes the commercial policy of bankruptcy
avoidance because setoffs can prematurely force debtors into
bankruptcy.""
When a creditor exercises its prepetition setoff rights, the court considers whether the creditor gained an unfair advantage over other creditors by exercising the prepetition setoff."' If so, the setoff should be
voided."' To make this determination, the trustee uses the "point in time"
(or improvement in interest) test."7 Utilizing this test, the court calculates
Conflict on Bankruptcy Setoff Rights Involving More than One Government Agency, ARMY LAW.,
Nov. 1995, at 30. The requirement of mutuality is usually strictly construed. See Samuel R. Maizel,
Setoffand Recoupment in Bankruptcy, in 19TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION 1997, at 733, 742 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4519, 1997). Mutuality serves the purpose of defining those kinds of prepetition claims and
debts that may be fairly offset in bankruptcy. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1 553.03[3][a].
107. See Samuel R. Maizel, supra note 106, at 832 (stating that prepetition setoffs may be
avoided or limited by the trustee if the setoff improved the position of the creditor).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1994). The statute states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against any claim against the debtor ....
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11.
See Williams, supra note 103, at 35 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code treats a right to
setoff as a secured claim).
112. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 553.02 (stating that setoff rights are protected in bankruptcy
in the same manner as rights arising from a security agreement); Philip T. Lacy, Setoff and the Principle of Creditor Equality, 43 S.C. L. REV. 951, 964-65 (1992) (explaining that the rationale for the
trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers is to preserve creditor equality, which means unsecured creditors should share equally in a debtor's estate through pro rata distribution).
113. See Justice, supra note 104, at 323 (describing the dilemma facing a bank with a setoff
right).
114. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1 553.02[2].
115. Lacy, supra note 112, at 975-76.
116. Id.
117. See II U.S.C. § 553(b)(I)(A)-(B).
Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362(b)(6), 362(b)(7),
362(b)(14), 365(h), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to
the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the
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the creditor's setoff position, that is, a comparison of the amount the
debtor owed to the creditor with the amount the creditor owed the debtor,
ninety days before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. "8 The amount by
which the creditor's claim exceeds the amount owed to the debtor is the
insufficiency."9 The same measurement is also made on the date of the
setoff. Finally, a comparison is made between the creditor's setoff position at the initial reference point and the date on which the setoff was
actually taken.'"' The trustee can recover any improvement in the creditor's position.'" The application of this test does not depend upon the
debtor's insolvency at the time of setoff."'
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed a federal administrative agency's challenge to the bankruptcy court's application of
the point in time test."4
B. In re Turner"
1. Facts
Over a period of time, the Turners borrowed approximately
$200,000 from the Small Business Association (SBA).'" The Turners
defaulted on the loan and the SBA attempted to accelerate the debt and to
require that the Turners immediately pay the entire outstanding balance
due on the loan." The Turners subsequently executed four contracts with
the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), in
which the Turners agreed to withhold certain land from production in
exchange for deficiency payments." The SBA notified the Turners that it
intended to exercise an administrative offset of any ASCS payments
owed to the Turners against the debt they owed to the SBA.'" From December 30, 1992 to February 8, 1993, SBA offset approximately
filing of the petition, then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset
to the extent that any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency
on the later of(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
Id.
118. COLLIER, supra note 38, i553.09[2][a].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. id.
122. Id.
123. See Passamano, supra note 101, at 351-52 (explaining the trustee's power to recover a
prepetition setoff).
124. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1996).
125. Turner,84F.3dat 1296.
126. Inre Turner, 59F.3d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.

19981

BANKRUPTCY

$24,599.35.3 The bankruptcy court held that setoff was avoidable under
11 U.S.C. § 553(b) because the setoff occurred within the ninety day
preference period. 3 ' The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.' On the first appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that 11
U.S.C. § 547 governed the setoff, rather than 11 U.S.C. § 5532"33 After
voting to grant rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit asserted that 11
U.S.C. § 553 rather than 11 U.S.C. § 547 should be applied.'"' The en
banc court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit panel for consideration
of the setoff under 11 U.S.C. § 5532',
2. Decision
The panel found that the Turners were not entitled to recover the
ASCS payments, and that the setoffs were proper.'' The court concluded
that the amount of the insufficiency did not change between the date
ninety days before the petition was filed, and the date of the setoffs because the ASCS payments would have reduced the amount owed to the
Turners by the same amount that the debt owed to the SBA would have
been reduced.' 7
C. Other Circuits
In Bakersfield Westar Ambulance v. Community First Bank,' the
Ninth Circuit analyzed a fully secured creditor's rights under the improvement in position test. 9 The creditor argued that a fully secured
creditor cannot improve its position relative to other creditors.'" Before
analyzing the creditor's argument, however, the court found that the
creditor did not have a valid security interest, and the improvement in
position test of 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) was applicable."' The court concluded

130. Id.
131. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1996). Section 553(b) provides for use of the
"point in time" test. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
132. Turner, 96 F.3d at 465.
133. Id.; see also Turner, 59 F.3d at 1043 (stating that section 553 applies to setoffs, and section 547 applies to voidable preferences).
134. In re Turner, 84F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1996).
135. Id.
136. Turner, 96 F.3d at 468.
137. Id. at 468. On the date of the petition was filed the amount owed the SBA was
$199,551.58 and the amount owed the Turners was $24,599.35, and thus the insufficiency was
$174,952.23. Id. After the first setoff in the amount of $2,788.00, the Turners would have owed the
SBA $196,763.58 and the Turners would be owed $21,811.35 by the ACSC. Id. Thus, the insufficiency remained unchanged. Id.
138. 123 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. Bakersfield, 123 F.3d at 1246.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1248. In determining the extent of the creditor's security, the court focused on the
description of the collateral in the security agreement. Id. at 1247.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

that the creditor was undersecured and4 2affirmed the bankruptcy court's
conclusion that the setoff was voidable.
D. Analysis
Because the Bankruptcy Code only preserves a creditor's setoff
right as it exists under state law, the court must determine, as a threshold
issue, whether the creditor has a valid setoff right under state law.' 3 As
illustrated by the decision in the Ninth Circuit, a court must first determine the extent of the creditor's setoff rights before deciding the validity
of the prepetition setoff.'"
If the setoff is valid under state law, the trustee may challenge the
setoff if it occurred on or within ninety days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 5 If the creditor exercised its right to setoff during this
prepetition time period, the trustee may recover the amount by which the
creditor improved its position.'" If the creditor did not improve its position, however, the trustee cannot recover.147
To determine whether the creditor improved its position due to the
setoff, a court compares the difference in value of the creditor's security
at two points in time.' To illustrate the proper operation of the test, suppose a bank gave a loan to a debtor in the amount of $15,000, and ninety
days before filing bankruptcy the debtor had $10,000 in a deposit account.' 9 Thus, ninety days before the bankruptcy, the insufficiency was
$5,000.'" Thirty days before filing bankruptcy, the debtor deposited an
additional $4,000 in the account, which reduced the insufficiency to
$1,000.'1' If the bank exercises its right to setoff, the bank improved its
position in the amount of $4,000 ($5,000 insufficiency at ninety days;
$1,000 insufficiency at the time of setoff) 2 The trustee may recover the
amount of $4,000 from the bank.'53
When the Tenth Circuit applied the test, the court reduced the
amount owed to the SBA by the amount of the setoff in calculating the
insufficiency, which appears to be a misapplication of the test.'' The
court stated that the amount of the insufficiency did not change because
142. Id. at 1248-49.
143. Williams,supra note 103, at 30-31.
144. Bakersfield, 123 F.3d at 1247.
145. I1U.S.C.§553(b) (1994).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 5 COLLIER, supra note 38,1[553.09[2][b].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Justice, supra note 104, at 317 (illustrating that the setoff amount does not reduce the
loan amount for purposes of calculating the insufficiency).
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the setoff decreased the amount owed to the debtor by the same amount
as the debt owed to the creditor was decreased."' The Tenth Circuit calculated the insufficiency as $174,952.23 by compaing $196,763.58, the
amount owed to the creditor, as reduced by the setoff amount, to
$21,811.35, the amount owed to the debtor, as reduced by the setoff
amount. The Tenth Circuit's calculation appears faulty because it calculated the insufficiency using the setoff amount." According to this
analysis, a creditor could never gain an improvement in position because
the amount of the setoff always reduces the amount owed to the creditor
by the amount of the setoff. Despite the flawed calculation, the Tenth
Circuit's result was proper because the SBA did not improve its position
by the setoff, 7and the trustee should not be entitled to recover the amount
of the setoff.1

IV. DENIAL OF DISCHARGE UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727
A. Background

A discharge relieves a debtor of his or her preexisting obligations
and grants the debtor a fresh start, achieving the ultimate goal of a bankruptcy proceeding." 8 Rewarding an honest debtor with a discharge reflects a policy choice to forgive the debtor instead of punishing the
debtor for his financial negligence or indolence."9 A discharge is a privilege, not a right.'" Only individuals may receive discharges.' 6 ' Further, a
discharge only relieves a debtor of those debts that arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, so a court cannot discharge debts incurred
after the bankruptcy commences.'62 If a discharge is denied, the debtor
remains liable for repaying his debts.'"
Because of the strong policy preferences for granting a debtor a
fresh start, however, a discharge may be denied only in certain limited
statutory exceptions." In a bankruptcy case, the creditor bears the burden

155. In re Turner, 96 F.3d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1996).
156. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 38, 553.09[2][a] (illustrating proper application of
the improvement in position test).
157. See 3 NORTON, supra note 9, § 63:18.
158. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793.
159. See Craig H. Averch, Denial of DischargeLitigation, 16 REV. LTIG. 65, 66 (1997) (describing the history of debtor law and the Roman punishment of cutting up a debtor's body and
dividing the pieces among his creditors); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 1047, 1052 (1987).
160. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supranote 14, at 239.
161. COHEN, supranote 15,913-311.22[l].
162. Averch, supra note 159, at 70.
163. See Andrea A. Wirum & Jacqueline S. Dailey, Discharge, in BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION 1992, at 635, 637 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4391, 1992).
164. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.01 [1]; Howard, supra note 159, at 1050-51 (describing
that the Bankruptcy Commission found little empirical substantiation of the incidences of dishonest
conduct by debtors).
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of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor should be
denied a discharge.'" The bases for denial of discharge include the failure
to maintain adequate records, the knowing or fraudulent making of a
false oath in connection with a bankruptcy, and the transfer of assets
within one year of the filing for bankruptcy with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud a creditor.'" These exceptions focus on the debtor's attempts to conceal or prevent distribution of his assets.
The refusal to discharge for failure to maintain adequate records
stems from the belief that a creditor has a right to ascertain the debtor's
financial status and verify the information he has provided under oath.'
The standard for adequacy of records is determined on a case-by-case
basis.'" The records do not have to be in a specific format, but the form
must be appropriate to a debtor's business." The debtor must make
documents and computer-generated records that reflect a debtor's f'mancial condition available to the creditors." ° If the court determines that the
debtor breached this duty to maintain these records, and the debtor fails
to adequately justify this breach, a denial of discharge is appropriate. 7 '
A court may also deny discharge if the debtor knowingly and
fraudulently made a false oath in connection with the case.' This exception ensures that the debtor provides reliable information throughout the
bankruptcy proceedings.'73 A court may find that a debtor has misrepresented his financial state if the bankruptcy petition and schedules contain
false information because the debtor must sign these documents under
oath."" The knowing or fraudulent making of a false oath in connection
with a bankruptcy, by definition, excludes inadvertent errors by the
debtor.' 5 The false statement must, however, relate to a material matter in
the case, which generally includes statements that relate to the discovery
of assets or the business dealings of the debtor.' 6

165. Averch, supra note 159, at 128-29.
166. See I I U.S.C. § 727 (1994).
167. 6 NORTON, supra note 9, § 74:9 (stating that complete disclosure is a "quid pro quo for
discharge").
168. See Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1230 (3rd Cir. 1992).
169. See Johnson v. Bockman, 282 F.2d 544, 547 (10th Cir. 1960) (noting that impeccable
bookkeeping is not required).
170. See COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.03[1 ].
171. Id.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994).
173. Averch, supra note 159, at 104.
174. COLLIER, supra note 38, T1727.04[1][a]; see also Averch, supra note 159, at 106-07 (suggesting that understatement of income of value of assets may be considered a false oath under II
U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994)).
175. See In re Espino, 806 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11 th Cir. 1986) (upholding a bankruptcy court
finding that debtor's failure to list a contingent claim was not an act intended to defraud creditors).
176. See In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11 th Cir. 1984); Averch, supra note 159, at 102-03.
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Denial of discharge is also appropriate if the debtor transferred assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.'" Courts
broadly construe what constitutes a transfer.'8 Courts examine evidence
of the debtor's intent as the determinative factor in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful transfers." The intent of the debtor to defraud
creditors must be an actual, rather than constructive intent. ,"'The creditor
may use circumstantial evidence or suggest inferences from a course of
conduct to establish fraudulent intent.'"' The debtor's intent to favor one
creditor over another, without additional evidence, however, is not sufficient to warrant denial of a discharge.'82 Similarly, the conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy, without additional evidence, does not establish the debtor's intent to defraud creditors.8 3

In order to grant a denial of discharge, courts must make factspecific evaluations. For this reason, appellate courts review the trial
court's findings using the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.'" The
Tenth Circuit used this standard to resolve an appeal in which the creditor claimed that the debtor should have been denied discharge on all
three statutory grounds.
B. In re Brown'
1. Facts
Four days before filing bankruptcy, Brown transferred a security
interest in an antique car collection." Through the transfer, Brown
sought to infuse cash into his business to pay attorneys and suppliers. '
Brown continued to possess and use the collection.' Some discrepancies
existed between the value of the debtor's assets as disclosed on prepetition financial statements and the submitted bankruptcy schedules, and the

177. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1994).
178. Id. § 101(54). Transfer is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." Id.
179. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 14, at 243-44 (explaining that the outcome of
cases on objection to discharge appear to be based on the court's subjective assessment of the
debtor's honesty instead of the debtor's intent in effectuating the transfer).
180. COLLIER, supra note 38, 1727.02[3][a].
181. See In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 304-05 (11 th Cir. 1994).
182. in re Parnell Lumber Co., 107 F. Supp. 794,800 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
183. Averch, supra note 159, at 87.
184. See In re Schneider, 864 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988).
185. 108 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 1997).
186. Brown, 108 F.3d at 1293.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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debtor omitted an automobile from his schedules.'89 The debtor also
failed to keep adequate records involving the antique car collection."
2. Decision
The court held that a denial of discharge was not warranted in this
case,'9' rejecting all three of the creditor's bases for denial of Brown's
discharge. The creditor objected to discharge because the debtor transferred a security interest in the antique car." The court found that although the granting of a security interest is a transfer, the circumstances
did not indicate that the debtor acted with the intent to hinder or defraud
the creditor.'9" The mere fact that the transfer occurred soon before the
filing and that the debtor retained control of the assets did not alter the
fact that the transaction was made at arm's length.'"
The debtor's errors on his bankruptcy schedules created the second
potential basis for the denial of discharge.'95 The court found that because
the debtor voluntarily disclosed what he claimed had been inadvertent
omissions, he lacked fraudulent intent. 6
The creditor also argued that the court should deny the discharge
because the debtor maintained inadequate records.'" To make a prima
facie case on this claim, the creditor must demonstrate that the failure to
preserve adequate records made it impossible to ascertain the debtor's
financial condition and material business transactions.'" In addition, the
court considered the debtor's cash transactions not unusual because they
were in furtherance of his hobby."9
C. Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit reviewed two cases in which the trial court denied a discharge for failure to disclose assets in the bankruptcy schedules. Utilizing the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the Fourth
Circuit,' affirmed the denial of a debtor's discharge based upon the
debtor's false oath in failing to disclose material information on his
schedules pertaining to his ownership interest in a business the debtor

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Jaray, 114 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir. 1997).
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owned and operated.' The court found the debtor's attempt to amend his
schedules inadequate to cure the false oath.'
In In re Kestell, 3 the debtor filed for bankruptcy thirteen days after
a divorce judgment was awarded to his ex-wife, and reaffirmed almost
all debts, except those owed to his ex-wife.' The debtor's ex-wife filed
an objection to discharge based upon the debtor's failure to disclose and
turn over to the trustee his income tax refund in the approximate amount
of $13,000 and accrued sick leave benefits in the amount of
$33,511.09.' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial
of discharge, but based its decision on 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), which permits
a court to dismiss a bankruptcy case for substantial abuse of the Chapter
7 provisions.' The court found that the debtor was using the bankruptcy
simply to antagonize his ex-wife.' The Fourth Circuit stated that only
honest and forthright debtors were entitled to receive a fresh start.'
D. Analysis
The goal of bankruptcy is to reward an honest debtor with a fresh
start.' For this reason, courts tend to construe the statutory provisions
describing the bases for denial of discharge in favor of the debtor."'
The Tenth Circuit's analysis and conclusions in Brown"' reflect this
tendency by establishing an extremely high standard for denial of discharge for failure to maintain adequate records." ' A creditor must show
that the inadequate records made it impossible to ascertain the debtor's
financial status and business matters.2 3 The adequacy of the records depends on the type of business and the sophistication of the debtor, but
such a high standard makes it difficult for a creditor to establish a basis
for denial of discharge.' The Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit similarly require a creditor to prove that it is impossible to ascertain the
debtor's financial conditions. " ' While a standard of impossibility comports with the underlying policy that a debtor is entitled to a discharge,

201. Id. at1176.
202. Id.
203. 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996).
204. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 147.
205. Id. (stating that the debtor deposited the funds in his bank account in Jamaica).
206. Id. at 149.
207. Id. at 150.
208. See id. at 149.
209. Howard, supra note 159, at 1047.
210. In re Brown, 108 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997).
211. Brown, 108 F.3d at 1290.
212. Id. at 1295.
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting that cash sales for the debtor's hobby was not uncommon in concluding that the
debtor's minimal records were adequate under the circumstances).
215. See Cox v. Cox, 41 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1994); Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d
1226, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1992).
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this standard nevertheless conflicts with the policy requiring a debtor to
provide full disclosure of information." 6 Congress intended to encourage
disclosure of information, but the Tenth Circuit's decision subverts this
intent to the extent that a debtor does not have to explain his failure to
maintain records until after the creditor shows it is impossible to ascertain the debtor's financial condition.
Courts do not always determine that the policy of rewarding honest
debtors with discharge should trump other policy considerations. Although a creditor's objection to a debtor's discharge must establish that
the debtor acted with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, in
Kestell, the Fourth Circuit denied the discharge because of the debtor's
failure to file for bankruptcy in good faith, rather than focusing on the
intent of the debtor.2 "8 The Fourth Circuit's analysis supports the theory
that courts resolve objections to discharge through subjective assessment
of debtor's honesty rather than on the debtor's fraudulent intent."9
Reviewing courts tend to defer to the findings of the trial court because discharge determinations are dependent on the facts of each case.
The differing outcomes of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in Jaray and
Brown reflect this deference. In In re Jaray,2 ° the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's finding that the debtor's attempt to amend his bankruptcy
schedules was inadequate to cure his false oath."' In considering whether
a subsequent disclosure can cure a false oath, the Tenth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion and found that a delayed attempt by a debtor to
disclose omitted information was strong evidence the debtor lacked
fraudulent intent.' These decisions indicate that the debtor's actions in
correcting an omission, as well as the nature of the omitted asset, can
influence the court's determination of whether the debtor willfully made
a false oath.'
V.

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS WITH LIEN MODIFICATION

A. Background
The Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate bankruptcy, '
but this enumerated power is limited by the Fifth Amendment's due pro216. See Averch, supra note 159, at 99 (stating that maintenance of records is a prerequisite to
granting a discharge in bankruptcy and absent justification for a failure to maintain records, a discharge should not be granted).
217. 3 NORTON, supra note 9, §74:9.
218. In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
219. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 14, at 123-24.
220. 114 F.3d 1176(4th Cir. 1997).
221. Jaray, 114F.3dat 1176.
222. In re Brown, 108 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 1997).
223. See Averch, supra note 159, at 103-04 (explaining that the requisite intent may be inferred
if the debtor fails to clean up inconsistencies by filing amendments to the bankruptcy schedules).
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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cess requirement." To invoke the constitutional due process protection,
some governmental action must affect a constitutionally protected property right.n In the bankruptcy context, enforcement of the Bankruptcy
Code by a federal court is a type of governmental action that affects constitutionally protected property rights of secured creditors. ' A creditor
must have notice of the proposed action that would affect its property
rights and an opportunity to be heard to satisfy the due process requirement.'m
Congress has recognized that compliance with due process is essential. Specifically, Congress provided that in the bankruptcy context, certain actions may only occur after a notice and opportunity for a hearing.2"
Although Congress has stated that the notice must be "appropriate in the
particular circumstances, ' ' " Congress has not elaborated on the circumstances in which notice is appropriate, nor described the type of notice
necessary.' The Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution
requires that creditors be notified, even if the creditor knows of the
pending bankruptcy proceeding. 2 The Supreme Court rejected, however,
the notion that creditors have a general duty of inquiry. 3
225.

U.S. CONST. amend V.
226. Id. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; ....
").
227. See Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations on the Modification of Liens Through
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 45 (1997); Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances
Gecker, Due Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J.47, 71-72
(1994) (stating that secured creditors have property rights subject to protection and suggesting that
unsecured creditors also have rights subject to protection).
228. Mullane v. Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding .. . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.").
229. See II U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining "after notice and a hearing"); id. § 362(d) (allowing
relief from stay after notice and a hearing); id. § 502 (providing for objections to claims after notice
and hearing); id. § 727(d) (stating that a discharge may only be revoked after notice and a hearing);
id. § 1128 (requiring a notice and hearing to confirm a plan of reorganization).
230. Id. § 102(l)(A).
23 1. See Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy
Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1218-19 (1994). Because of the many issues that may arise
in a bankruptcy case, the appropriate notice varies. For example, certain emergency matters, such as
a debtor's use of cash collateral, may require notice and hearing within hours of the filing of a motion, whereas a motion for relief from the automatic stay, which is usually not an emergency matter,
permits a longer period for notifying interested parties of the proposed action. See Eisenberg &
Gecker, supra note 227, at 86-88 (explaining that certain peculiar bankruptcy situations exist that
may require taking action before notice and an opportunity to be heard can be given).
232. City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297
(1953).
233. City of New York, 344 U.S. at 297 ("[C]reditors who have knowledge of a reorganization
have a right to assume that the statutory 'reasonable notice' will be given them before their claims
are forever barred."). But see Nicholas A. Franke, The Code and the Constitution: Fifth Amendment
Limits on the Debtor's Discharge in Bankruptcy, 17 PEPP.L. REV. 853, 862 (1990) (arguing that the
Bankruptcy Code's requirement of notice is significantly less substantial than the notice found
unconstitutional in City ofNew York).
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Due process is particularly important in the context of modification
of a creditor's lien in a reorganization under either Chapter 11, Chapter
12 or Chapter 13."' In a bankruptcy filed under one of these chapters, a
secured creditor files a proof of claim to protect its secured interest."
The statutory provisions pertaining to plan modification allow for the
amendment of a creditor's lien through a plan of reorganization. 6 A confirmed plan binds all the creditors, regardless of whether they approved
of the plan,"' and all property vests in the debtor free and clear of the
claims and interests of a creditor, unless the plan provides otherwise.' If
a creditor does not know that the plan modifies its lien and the court confirms the plan, the creditor's lien could be extinguished without offering
the creditor an effective opportunity to object." ' Even if a secured creditor receives a copy of a plan of reorganization, the creditor may not review the plan provisions because it erroneously believes the legal maxim
that liens survive bankruptcy.'
The federal courts have concluded that due process may be satisfied
at different phases of the reorganization. Specifically, decisions of the
courts indicate that due process may be satisfied during either the claims
procedure or confirmation of the plan."4 One commentator has suggested
that the federal courts fall into one of three categories in their approach
to satisfying due process requirements in a lien modification.2" Some
courts give priority to confirmation of the plan, precluding creditors from
collaterally attacking the plan, while other courts gives priority to claims
allowances precluding modification of liens in the absence of an objection to the claim. Finally, a third category of courts recognize lien modification by confirmed plans, provided that secured creditors receive adequate preconfirmation notice of the proposed lien modification."3

234. See Richards, supra note 227, at 44.
235. William J. Wahoff, Comment, The Adequate Protectionof Secured Creditors in Termination of Stay Litigation Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 715, 720 (1982).
236. See Richards, supra note 227, at 52.
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994) ("iThe provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor... and
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim of interest of
such creditor ...is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor... has accepted the plan.").
238. Id. § 1141 (b) ("Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan,
the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the debtor.").
239. See Franke, supra note 233, at 867 (stating that creditors with allowed claims must be
given notice of confirmation of a plan and an opportunity to be heard).
240. See Richards, supra note 227, at 51-52 (explaining that the reorganization provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code allow modification of a creditor's security interest).
241. See In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when a
plan does not expressly preserve a lien, the lien may be extinguished if the lienholder participated in
the reorganization); Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that liens can
only be modified through an adversary proceeding, not during confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan).
242. See Richards, supra note 227, at 65.
243. Id.
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Before this survey period, the Tenth Circuit rejected a creditor's
claim that it was denied due process when the creditor specifically received notice of the treatment of its claim in the reorganization plan.2" In
re Barton Industries, Inc.,"45 the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to establish which of the three categories the court recognized as providing
due process for the secured creditor.2"
B. In re Barton Industries, Inc.
1. Facts
In Barton, the debtor contracted with Transamerica Insurance Finance Corporation (TIFC) to borrow money for the purpose of purchasing casualty insurance. 7 The loan required the debtor to assign to TIFC
all unearned return premiums as security for the repayment of the loan.2'"
The debtor borrowed the down payment for the loan from its primary
creditor, American Bank and Trust Company (ABT).2" Under a preexisting credit arrangement with ABT, the debtor had granted ABT a security interest in all intangible assets of the debtor, which arguably included
any return premiums.'
Shortly after the loan was made, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition." The debtor canceled the insurance policy,
and the insurance company refunded the return premiums to the insurance agent, who then remitted the return premiums to TIFC." ABT
commenced an adversary proceeding against TIFC alleging that the plan
of reorganization conveyed to ABT all of the return premiums or a security interest in the premiums superior to TIFC." In response, TIFC argued that it did not receive meaningful notice of the plan, and therefore,
was not bound by the plan.'
2. Decision
The court noted that a creditor's claim is not subject to a confirmed
plan if inadequate notice denied the creditor due process.' 5 The court also
concluded that due process required that TIFC receive notice describing
244. Turney v. FDIC, 18 F.3d 865, 868-69 (10th Cir. 1994).
245. 104F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1997).
246. See Richards, supra note 227, at 52.
247. Barton Indus., 104 F.3d at 1244.
248. Id. Return premiums are premiums paid in advance by the insured, but unearned at the
time the insurance coverage is reduced or canceled so that a refund of those premiums is made to the
insured. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1245.
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the treatment of TIFC's claim sufficient for TIFC to make an informed
judgment about the plan in this case.'
The court found that TIFC had not received sufficient notice because the plan and disclosure statement sent to TIFC did not specifically
refer to the return premiums or TIFC's interest in the premiums.' The
court determined that "[wihile creditors have a responsibility to take an
active role in protecting their claims," TIFC could not sufficiently evaluate the notice because it inadequately explained the modification of
TIFC's lien.' The court concluded that TIFC's claim was not modified
by the plan."
C. Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of
due process in the bankruptcy context during the survey period. The
Fourth Circuit considered the adequacy of the notice received by creditors when their interests were affected by plans of reorganization. In
Spartan Mills v. Bank of America,' the Fourth Circuit found that the
modification of the creditor's lien did not violate due process because the
creditor received notice of its lien modification, but chose to wait to litigate its claim in a different forum. 61 An order authorizing the sale of the
debtor's assets free and clear of liens was sent to the creditor, who held a
textile processor's lien on some of the debtor's equipment. 2 The creditor
negotiated with another creditor to permit the sale of the assets, but it
reserved the right to litigate the priority of its claim on the proceeds.'
The creditor argued that it did not receive due notice; however, the court
asserted that the creditor cannot sit silently while an order extinguishes
its lien and hope to attack the order collaterally.'
A different notice issue arose in Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors'
Liquidating Trust, 5 in which the Fourth Circuit determined that when a
creditor received a copy of a plan of reorganization, the creditor was
bound by the terms of the plan even though the creditor's claim would
arise in the future.' The plan of reorganization stated that the sale and
transfer of the debtor's assets would be exempt from state transfer
taxes.26 As an existing creditor, Maryland received a copy of the plan of
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
112 F.3d 1251 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 417 (1997).
Spartan Mills, 112 F.3d at 1257-58.
Id. at 1252-53.
id. at 1254.
Id. at 1256.
123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997).
Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 781.
Id. at 780.
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755

reorganization.' Maryland did not object to the tax exempt provision
until approximately one year after the bankruptcy court confirmed the
plan.2" The court concluded that the adequacy of the notice did not depend on the status of the creditor, but merely on whether the creditor
received adequate notice of the plan provisions. '
In In re Hairopoulos,"' the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether the
terms of a confirmed plan could bind a creditor who had received some
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, but did not file a proof of claim."2
The debtor commenced a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7, and
the bankruptcy court clerk issued a notice stating that no dividends were
expected and that creditors should not file proofs of claim."' Subsequently, the debtor converted his case to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but
the IRS apparently did not receive notice of the conversion."' The
debtor's confirmed plan did not mention the debt to the IRS."' After the
debtor received a discharge, the IRS began collection efforts." 6 The bankruptcy court found that the IRS was on inquiry notice when it learned the
debtor filed bankruptcy and discharged the tax debt.' The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the IRS did not have a duty to inquire about the status of
the bankruptcy proceedings and reinstated the debt due to the inadequacy
of the notices.'
D. Analysis
Large bankruptcy cases can affect thousands of claimants and providing notice to each claimant may not be fiscally feasible. 9 In order for
the reorganization to be successful, however, each claimant must be
bound by the plan of reorganization. ' The National Bankruptcy Conference recognized this dilemma and recommended that Congress modify
the Bankruptcy Code to substantially reduce the information required in
the disclosure statement in small business Chapter 11 reorganizations,
financially
where providing notice can become particularly
burdensome. 8 ' Unless such changes go into effect, however, a court may

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
118 F.3d 1240 (8th Cir. 1997).
Hairopoulos, 118 F.3d at 1242-43.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Lawless, supra note 231, at 1218.
Id.
1 BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY:

THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS

637 (1997).
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resolve the dilemma by employing a balancing test that weighs the cost
of providing notice against the property interest at stake. 2
Once a court determines who should receive notice, the court must
then focus on the adequacy of the notice. 83 This issue is particularly important when a plan of reorganization modifies a creditor's lien.' No set
rules exist to assist the courts in determining whether the contents of a
notice are sufficient." Some forms of notice, however, are clearly inadequate. Constructive notice to a creditor known to the debtor cannot satisfy due process requirements for the discharge or modification of that
creditor's claim.28 In addition, as illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hairopoulos,notice that does not inform a creditor that its rights
could be affected clearly fails to satisfy due process. '
At a minimum, due process requires that the creditor receive some
form of notice that the plan of reorganization will adversely affect its
lien.' The Fourth Circuit found that simply giving the creditor a copy of
the plan of reorganization, even though a creditor may not review the
plan because of the complexity of the provisions, satisfies due process.'
While this approach may satisfy due process, it is questionable whether
the notice realistically apprises the creditor of the adverse treatment of its
claim.'
The Tenth Circuit rejected the approach utilized by the Fourth Circuit and determined that adequate notice must inform the creditor of how
the plan of reorganization treats its claim so that the creditor could make
an informed decision on the plan.' While the Tenth Circuit now appears
to require more than a generic description of the claim in the plan of reorganization, the Tenth Circuit did not specify the extent of detail necessary to satisfy due process.' One alternative would be to require a sufficient level of detail such that the notice would alert even an unsophisticated creditor that its lien rights are in jeopardy. 3 The information in the
notice would not need to be voluminous, but would have to go beyond

282. Lawless, supra note 231, at 1231.
283. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 54.
284. Richards, supra note 227, at 43.
285. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 59.
286. Franke, supra note 233, at 868.
287. In re Hairopoulos, 118 F.3d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the debtor's argument
undermines the very purpose for giving parties the right and opportunity to participate in bankruptcy
proceedings).
288. Richards, supra note 227, at 104.
289. Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 783 (4th Cir. 1997).
290. See Richards, supra note 227, at 104-05 (suggesting that the adequacy of the notice must
apprise the creditor of the specific property interests at stake).
291. In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that it was a "close
case" in determining the adequacy of the notice to the creditor).
292. Barton Indus., 104 F.3d at 1245-46.
293. Richards, supra note 227, at 105.
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boilerplate to satisfy due process. ' Another alternative would be to determine the necessary amount of detail by utilizing a test that weighs all
the interests at stake and the nature of the proposed action."
Regardless of how a court would determine the necessary level of
detail, the Tenth Circuit's decision is pragmatic because it assures creditors that they will receive fair notice, while allowing debtors the flexibility to determine the type of notice that is appropriate under the circumstances. Because the sufficiency of notice necessarily varies on a case by
case basis in bankruptcy,' such an approach reflects the reality that requirements of due process depend on the type and nature of the hearing,
as well as the interests at stake.f 7
VI. DISCHARGEABILITY OF "GAP PERIOD INTEREST" IN CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS

A. Background
Congress debated the appropriate balance between the collection of
revenue and the rehabilitation of debtors in drafting the 1978 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.' The need to collect revenue proved a
stronger policy motivation than the need to ensure liberal discharge
privileges, and today certain types of tax debts receive special protection
through priority claims and nondischargeable status.' Protection of tax
claims is not unlimited, however, and certain taxes may be dischargeable."o
The IRS may file a proof of claim for either assessed or unassessed
taxes. °' A proof of claim is a written statement describing the creditor's
claim." If the claim is filed in accordance with the bankruptcy rules, it
constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount" of the
creditor's claim.?3

294. Id.
295. Id. at 93.
296. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 227, at 93.
297. Id. at 116.
298. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 77-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5862-64; see also
Paul D. Bancroft, Post Petition Interest on Tax Liens in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 327, 327-28 (1988) (stating that a conflict exists between the equitable bankruptcy goals and the
need to maintain revenue collection).
299. See Hill, supra note 52, at 148 (describing how the automatic stay, claims procedure, and
priority scheme modify the tax collection process); see, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994) (establishing priority status for tax claims); id. § 523(a)(1 ) (making certain tax debts nondischargeable).
300. See Hill, supra note 52, at 166.
301. Id. at 158.
302. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a). Claim is broadly defined as, a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or undersecured." I I U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A).
303. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(0.
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A creditor's claim may be secured or unsecured, and these categories also apply to claims of the IRS.7' A secured claim means a creditor
has a right to have the debtor's assets applied to its claim before such
assets are used to satisfy the claims of other creditors,' To the extent that
the value of the collateral is insufficient to pay the claim, it is undersecured and will be divided into a secured and an unsecured claim component." Secured claims are usually paid before unsecured claims may
receive proceeds from the liquidation of a debtor's assets." Among unsecured creditors, the Bankruptcy Code creates a system of prioritizing
claims placing unsecured creditors in competition with other unsecured
creditors.' For example, an unsecured tax claim has priority over a general unsecured claim in certain circumstances, but an unsecured, priority
tax claim is subordinate to administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
estate. m°
Generally, unsecured creditors cannot collect unmatured or postpetition interest. 1° Secured creditors, however, may collect interest that
has accrued on the claim after the filing of the petition but before confirmation of the plan if the value of the collateral exceeds the value of the
claim.' This type of interest is referred to as postpetition or gap period
interest."2 The policy which permits secured creditors, but not unsecured
creditors, to collect gap period interest is based upon concern for expedient administration of bankruptcy estates."' The delays inherent in liquidating the debtor's assets financially harm creditors by prolonging the

304. Jack E. Kams, Can the InternalReview Service Levy and Collect Against ERISA Qualified
PensionPlan Benefits in Bankruptcy Proceedings?,27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 668 (1992).
305. COHEN, supra note 15, T21-100.
306. See Mary Josephine Newborn, UndersecuredCreditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman, and the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 549-50 (1993) (describing two methods of
analyzing an undersecured claim); COHEN, supra note 15, 21-201 (defining undersecured as when
the collateral is less than the amount of the claim).
307. Veryl Victoria Miles, Bankruptcy Relieffrom Secured Tax Liens, PRAc. LAW., Apr. 1996,
at 35, 38.
308. See Hill, supra note 52, at 163.
309. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994).
310. See id. § 502(b)(2) (stating that claims will be disallowed to the extent the claim amount is
for unmatured interest); Seth D. Gould, Unsecured Creditors'Entitlement to Postpetition Interest in
Solvent Debtor Bankruptcy: The Code's Silent Abrogation of a Pre-Code Doctrine, 37 WAYNE L.
REV. 1849, 1849-50 (1991) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code diminishes an unsecured creditor's
right to postpetition interest).
311. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (providing for postpetition interest when the value of the collateral
exceeds the secured claim); Bancroft, supra note 298, at 328 (explaining that one of the incidents of
a secured claim is postpetition interest).
312. See United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing gap period
interest in the context of a Chapter I I reorganization); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 579 (1989) (defining postpetition interest as
interest that accrues after the petition is filed but before the proceeding is terminated by liquidation
or confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization).
313. See In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1989).
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distribution of assets."' With secured claims, the collateral serves as security315for the interest, lessening the concern with administrative expediency.
Ordinarily, a debtor receives a discharge from any debt which arose
prior to confirmation unless it is the type of debt which has been statutorily excepted from discharge."' If a tax debt is nondischargeable, the interest that accrues on the debt is likewise nondischargeable." 7 During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the circumstances under which
the IRS may collect gap period interest.
B. United States v. Victor"'
1. Facts
This case presented consolidated appeals of decisions pertaining to
the dischargeability of gap period interest. 39 Brumback filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding, in which the IRS filed a proof of claim for employment taxes in the amount of $93,175.22.72 Of that amount,
$60,208.80, including interest and penalties, was secured.3 1 The claim
stated that to the extent that postpetition interest was unpaid, it was nondischargeable. " The confirmed plan of reorganization provided for payment in full of the secured and priority claim of the IRS, but it did not
provide for payment of gap period interest.3 After Brumback satisfied
the tax claims, he brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment for
an order to discharge the gap period interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). 24
In the second case, Victor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, in which the IRS filed a proof of claim for employment taxes in the
amount of $74,002." Of that amount, $70,891 was secured, including
interest and penalties."' The proof of claim form similarly noted that to
the extent postpetition interest was due, it was nondischargeable." Victor's confirmed plan of reorganization provided for payment in full of the

314. See Gould, supra note 310, at 1869 (explaining the policy concern that debtor's could
abuse the bankruptcy process through delay tactics that are detrimental to creditors).
315. See Bancroft, supra note 298, at 330 (justifying postpetition interest on the basis that a
creditor relies on its secured position in extending credit).
316. See I I U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2).
317. In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 289, 830 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S.
358, 363 (1964)).
318. 121 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1997).
319. Victor, 121 F.3d at 1384.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1384-85.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 1385.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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secured and priority tax claims." Victor sold his business, and the proceeds were distributed in accordance with the bankruptcy plan.3" The
IRS sought to recover gap period interest.3"
2. Decision
The court found that the terms of a confirmed plan of reorganization
bind all interested parties and that a creditor must object at the time of
the confirmation of the plan if the creditor opposes the treatment of its
claim by the plan. 3' The court rejected the IRS' claim that it could not
object to the treatment of its claim because unmatured interest is generally disallowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).32 The court stated that secured
creditors are entitled to postpetition interest and thus the IRS could have
objected to the plan provisions which did not provide for postpetition
interest on the secured tax claims.333
The IRS alternately claimed that it was entitled to interest as part of
the nondischargeable tax debt owed by the debtor. ' The court found that
the Bankruptcy Code created two types of tax claims, secured and unsecured.33 The special provisions pertaining to nondischargeability do not
apply to secured claims because the source of repayment for secured
claims is the collateral'36 In contrast, unsecured priority claims rely on
special treatment by the Bankruptcy Code to obtain repayment 3 The
court held that the exception to tax debts applies only when the IRS held
an unsecured priority claim.338 Because the IRS held a secured claim, and
the plan did not provide for the gap period interest, the court discharged
any gap period interest due.339
C. Other Circuits
In In re T-H New Orleans Limited Partnership," the Fifth Circuit
considered the extent to which a secured creditor may recover postpetition interest when the creditor becomes oversecured during the interim
between the commencement of the bankruptcy case and the confirmation
of the plan of reorganization." The creditor held a security interest in

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
Id. at 1386.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1386-87.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1386.
See id. at 1388-89.
Id. at 1389.
See id. at 1389.
Id. at 1390.
See id.
116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1997).
T-H New Orleans, 116 F.3d at 796.
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various hotels owned by the debtor. '2 The creditor was undersecured at
the filing of the bankruptcy, but because of payments made by the debtor
the creditor was oversecured when the bankruptcy court confirmed the
plan of reorganization.3 The Fifth Circuit found that valuation of the
collateral and the creditor's claim should be flexible and not fixed on a
set date, such as the date the plan was commenced or the confirmation
date.' " Using this test, the court concluded that the creditor could recover
postpetition interest if it established by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was oversecured'4
D. Analysis
Determining whether a creditor has the right to gap period interest is
one of the most difficult aspects of a bankruptcy case.' While it is clear
that a secured creditor is entitled to gap period interest, it is less certain
whether a nondischargeable unsecured tax lien is similarly entitled to
such interest. ' This conflict arises in the context of tax claims because
tax claims may be secured by a lien on a debtor's property or it may be
given priority, nondischargeable status." A lien may survive bankruptcy,
and thus a secured tax claim does not require special statutory
protection.' 9 Unsecured claims are generally discharged, and in order to
protect repayment of unsecured tax claims, a statutory exception to discharge was created."'
In Victor, the IRS filed a secured claim, and sought gap period interest arguing that it was entitled to such interest because the tax debt
was nondischargeable, notwithstanding its secured status.3 1' As the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged, the categories of secured and priority claims are
mutually exclusive because a tax claim cannot be both a secured and an
unsecured priority claim. 2 By upholding the distinction between a secured claim and a priority tax claim, the Tenth Circuit's decision follows
the statutory order of priority of claims."' Such a scheme attempts to
balance the divergent interests of debtors, creditors, and the IRS 54 Strict
adherence to the distinctions between the different types of claims is
important to maintain balance and fairness among these divergent inter-

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Carlson, supra note 312, at 579.
Bancroft, supra note 298, at 328.
Sather, supra note 50, at 1366.
Miles, supra note 307, at 37.
11U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1997).
Sather, supra note 50, at 1366.
See Miles, supra note 307, at 38.
Hill, supra note 52, at 178.
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ests. For these reasons, the Tenth Circuit properly denied the IRS' claim
for gap period interest on the unsecured claim.
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, discuss the propriety of
awarding gap period interest on secured tax claims. If the main purpose
of a secured tax claim is to secure repayment of taxes, it is difficult to
explain why such claims should include gap period interest. ' Consensual secured creditors may recover gap period interest in order to preserve the benefit of the secured creditor's bargain." A similar reason
does not exist for the nonconsensual tax lien" 7 Awarding gap period
interest on tax claims compromises the principal of equality of distribution among creditors. 58 When the IRS receives gap period interest on its
secured tax claim, the amount available for distribution to other creditors
is reduced."
CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided cases involving
fundamental issues in bankruptcy: discharge, the automatic stay, and
exceptions to discharge. Many of these issues were resolved through
analysis of the legislative history, as well as the applicable statutory language. Overall, the Tenth Circuit did not prefer the debtor or the creditor
in its decisions. The decisions reflect the court's willingness to consider
the facts and the applicable law, without undue regard to the decisions of
the other circuits.
Sherri L. Rotert

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Bancroft, supra note 298, at 339.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.

CORPORATE LAW: DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE
ENTITY
INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law ... possess[ing] only.those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it ... ." Under modem law, corporate formation is governed by the
state. Once formed, a corporation is a legal entity, distinct and separate
from those who created it.2 The most prominent feature of the corporation is that it limits the liability of both the shareholders who comprise it
and the directors, officers, and corporate personnel who operate within
its parameters.' A parent corporation's liability can also be limited with
respect to the wrongs of its subsidiary.! Limited liability in a corporation
is often referred to as "the corporate veil." The corporate veil doctrine,
however, is not unqualified.
This survey explores two specific exceptions to the corporate limited liability principle. Part I provides a background of the classic common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which allows the shareholders of a corporation to be held personally liable for the acts of the
corporation. This part analyzes the Tenth Circuit's latest interpretation of
the common law doctrine in a case in which the plaintiff attempted to
hold a parent company liable for its subsidiary's actions. Part II examines
a "statutory pierce" under the Internal Revenue Code section 6672,
looking at two cases exemplifying the recent position of the Tenth Circuit.
I.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990).
HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 130 (3d ed. 1983); see Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Bumett, Piercing
the CorporateVeil in Florida:Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NOVA L. REV. 663, 665 (1997). All
2.
3.

fifty states have adopted the principle of limited liability as a fundamental rule of corporate law.
Peter French, Parent CorporationLiability: an Evaluation of the Corporate Veil Piercing Doctrine
and its Application to the Toxic Tort Arena, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 605, 610 (1992). This rule has been

articulated in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, providing that:
(a) A purchaser from a corporation of its own shares is not liable to the corporation or its
creditors with respect to the shares except to pay the consideration for which the shares
were authorized to be issued or specified in the subscription agreement.
(b) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1991). With respect to shareholder liability, the corporate veil

protects both natural persons and artificial entities, such as corporations or similar business associations, that hold stock in the corporation. French, supraat 610.
4. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997) (determining that a consumer of a subsidiary's product could not pierce corporate veil of parent company).
5. Carsten Alting, Piercing the CorporateVeil in American and German Law-Liabilities of
Individualsand Entities: A Comparative View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187, 190 (1995).
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I. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
A. Background
The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" provides an exception
to the principle of limited liability.' Courts will pierce the corporate veil
when a corporation is used in the furtherance of crime, to facilitate fraud,
to justify a wrong, or to defeat public convenience Additionally, courts
may pierce the veil when a corporation has not functioned independently
from the wrongdoer.' Once the corporate veil is pierced, the corporation
is no longer viewed as a legal entity Instead, the corporation is viewed
as an association of persons, exposing the personal assets of the stockholders, corporate directors, and personnel connected with the wrongful
activity to claims by creditors seeking compensation for the wrongs
committed by the corporation." Thus, when the corporate veil is pierced,
only the individuals who are responsible for the acts justifying the pierce
are exposed to liability while passive shareholders incur no liability." In
the absence of a pierce, the liability of corporate shareholders is generally limited to their respective investment in the capitalization of the
company."
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.'3 represents a classic corporate veil-piercing case."' The Fourth Circuit regarded
corporate veil piercing as an equitable doctrine, placing the burden of

6. French, supra note 3, at 606.
7. Shaun M. Klein, Comment, Piercing the Veil of the Limited Liability Company, From Sure
Bet to Long Shot: Gallingerv. North Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd., 22 J. CORP.,L. 131, 136
(1996) (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905));
see also Lowell Staats Mining Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264-65 (10th Cir.
1989) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the corporate veil "was used to defeat
public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong, fraud or crime").
8. See American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130, 134(2d Cir. 1997)
(setting forth criteria for determining whether a president dominated his company, thus allowing the
corporate veil to be pierced); Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the
veil may be pierced when the wrongdoer either exercises pervasive control over the company to its
detriment or when the companies are so intermingled that they are ambiguous).
9. Klein, supra note 7, at 136.
10. French, supra note 3, at 606.
11. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.2, at 43 (1994) (noting that only those who
caused the piercing lose the protection provided by the corporate form).
12. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 130. There are, however, unlimited or double
liability corporations which exist in a limited number of jurisdictions. Id.
13. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
14. French, supra note 3, at 612. In DeWitt, the creditor brought action seeking to hold the
corporation's president personally liable. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 683. The Fourth Circuit determined
that the shareholders were separate from the corporation in which they held shares and determined
the president was personally liable. Id. The court noted that ruling otherwise would create an extension of the corporate form, beyond its legitimate purpose, or would produce an unjust or inequitable
result. Id.
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loss on the most responsible party, despite a lack of intent to defraud."
Many states have adopted this doctrine, though courts have not all applied it as liberally as the Fourth Circuit in DeWitt.'6 Many modem courts
utilize a two-part inquiry to consider when determining whether to pierce
the corporate veil and subject the corporate insiders to personal liability."
First, the courts address whether the unity of interest and ownership are
strong enough to make the corporate identity indiscernible from that of
the individual. Second, the court considers whether an inequity would
result if the bad acts are treated as those of the corporation alone.'9
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that the corporate veil exists for
the purpose of insulating businesses from liability and therefore has been
reluctant and cautious in its application of the veil piercing doctrine." In

15. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 683. The court enumerated eight factors to consider in determining
whether equity would be served by piercing the corporate veil. These factors include
whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized for the purposes of the corporate
undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, debtor
corporation insolvency at the time, dominant shareholder siphoning of corporate funds,
non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact
that the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant shareholder or
shareholders.
DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 686-87 (citations omitted); see also French, supra note 3, at 613.
16. French, supra note 3, at 614. This variation in application is not surprising, however,
because states have developed widely divergent methods and rationales for piercing the corporate
veil. Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95
HARV. L. REv. 853, 855 (1982).
17. Sung Bae Kim, A Comparison of the Doctrines of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the
United States, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 73, 75 (1995); see Oklahoma Oil and Gas Exploration
Drilling Program v. W.M.A. Corp., 877 P.2d 605, 609 (Okla. Ct. App 1994); Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constr., Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). There does exist a federal common
law doctrine pertaining to piercing the corporate veil. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d
1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993). This test requires two distinct inquiries:
(i) Was there such unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate identity of
the corporation by its shareholders that the personalities and assets of the corporation and
the individual are indistinct, and (ii) would adherence to the corporate fiction sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.
City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052. The "intemal affairs doctrine" allows federal common law to be applied when the state has little interest in the case and there are federal interests involved. Kim, supra
at 77-78.
18. Kim, supra note 17, at 75.
19. Id. Some states have not required a showing of inequity resulting from a failure to pierce
the veil, but have necessitated a demonstration of injustice which would result from such a failure.
See Jackson Hole Traders, Inc. v. Joseph, 931 P.2d 244, 251 (Wyo. 1997). Some courts have established a third prong to this test which necessitates a showing that an injustice would result from a
failure to pierce the corporate veil. Kim, supra note 17, at 75; see Doughty v. CSX Transp., Inc., 905
P.2d 106, 111 (Kan. 1995); see also French, supra note 3, at 611 (citing Saphir v. Nuestadt, 413
A.2d 843, 853 (Conn. Super. 1979)). Many jurisdictions have, however, considered this third factor
to be superfluous, finding that it is encompassed within the second prong. Kim, supra note 17, at 75.
20. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Cascade Energy and
Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576 (10th Cir. 1990); Skidmore v. Canada Life, 907 F.2d
1026 (10th Cir. 1990). State courts within the Tenth Circuit have also been "reluctant and cautious"
when piercing the corporate veil. See Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 751 (Kan. 1983); Kvassay v.
Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 906 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc. 761
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Yoder v. Honeywell,2' the court established that the corporate veil could
be pierced when recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity
would be unfair.' Hence, the court found that equity would permit a
court to disregard the corporate form when the shareholders used the
corporation as a mere instrumentality to conduct their own personal affairs, without regard to the corporation's independent existence, or for
the purpose of evading or defeating legislative policy, or to perpetrate
fraud.?
The veil of a parent corporation may also be pierced in a parent/subsidiary relationship, holding the officers of the parent corporation
personally liable for the actions of its subsidiary." The Tenth Circuit established that when determining whether a subsidiary acted as a mere
instrumentality of its parent, warranting a pierce requires a review of
many factors.' The court must consider the amount of subsidiary stock
owned by the parent company, the amount of the subsidiary's expenses
and salaries paid by the parent company, and the amount, if any, of
shared business and assets.' In addition, the court must determine if the
companies have common officers and directors in order to assess
whether the subsidiary's officers and directors acted independently, or
whether the subsidiary's officers took direction from the parent corporation. ' The court also considers how adequately the subsidiary has been
capitalized.' The court must also examine the parent company's designation and classification of the subsidiary in its financial statements.'
Finally, the court must investigate whether each company meets the formal requirements of incorporation." By weighing each of these factors,
21. 104F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997).
22. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1220; see Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Colo. 1986);
AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73,81 (Wyo. 1982).
23. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1220; see Micciche, 727 P.2d at 373; see also Reader v. Dertina and
Assoc. Mktg., Inc., 693 P.2d 398, 399 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a court may pierce "where
the corporate entity has been used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or to protect, wrong,
fraud, or crime or in other similar situations where equity requires"); Kvassay, 808 P.2d at 906
(stating a corporate entity may be disregaided if it is used to cover fraud or to work injustice, or if
necessary to achieve equity); Rogers v. Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
Oklahoma law allows the piercing of the corporate veil if the corporate entity is used "(I) to defeat
public convenience, (2) justify wrong, (3) to perpetrate fraud whether actual or implied, or (4) to
defend crime."); Bergh v. Mills, 763 P.2d 214, 218 (Wyo. 1988) (stating that a showing of fraud
may be sufficient in itself to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil).
24. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940); see Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc., 753
P.2d 897, 900 (N.M. 1988) (determining that mere control by a parent corporation is insufficient to
pierce the corporate veil, and instead requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate moral culpability attributable to the parent, such as use of the subsidiary to commit fraud).
25. Fish, 114 F.2d at 191.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court must examine whether the subsidiary was referred to as a subsidiary or as a
department of the parent corporation. Id.
30. Id.
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the court can assess whether the subsidiary acted as a mere instrumentality of the parent company, enabling the court to assign liability to a parent for the actions of its subsidiary. The Tenth Circuit considered just
such a case during the survey period.3"
B. Yoder v. Honeywell Inc."
1. Facts
In Yoder, the plaintiff, an employee, claimed she incurred stress injuries from the consistent use of a defectively designed keyboard while at
her place of employment. The plaintiff sought compensation for her injuries and subsequent suffering.33 Rather than suing the manufacturer of the
keyboard, Bull HN Information Systems Inc. (Bull), the plaintiff sought
to pierce the corporate veil and hold Honeywell, Inc. (Honeywell), Bull's
parent, liable."' The plaintiff contended that Bull was not a corporation
separate from Honeywell, but rather that it was a mere instrumentality of
Honeywell. The district court granted Honeywell summary judgment
and dismissed the claim, relying on the fact that the keyboards were not
made by Honeywell, but rather, by Bull, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Honeywell. 6
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first made the determination that Colorado law
shall govern. 7 The court recognized that the purpose of incorporation
includes the isolation of liabilities among separate entities.38 When it
would be unfair to recognize the subsidiary as a separate entity because
of a significant improper use of the corporate structure, however, the
parent company should be held liable for its subsidiaries' wrongs. 9 In
order to demonstrate this "unfairness," the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the parent company disregarded the independence of its subsidiary
and that the subsidiary acted as a mere instrumentality for the transaction

31. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
32. 104F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 1997).
33. Yoder 104F.3d at 1218.
34. Id. at 1220. Bull HN Information Systems Inc. is a subsidiary of Honeywell that was
formerly known as Honeywell Information Systems Inc. Id.at 1218.
35. Id. at 1218.
36. Id. at 1219.
37. Id. at 1220. The court concluded that Colorado law applied even though the case originated in New York and the company was incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 1219-20. In accordance
with New York law, once it is determined that there is an actual conflict in substantive law, then the
"interest analysis" test is applied to determine jurisdiction of a case. Id. (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985)). The interest analysis test requires the court to first
decide which state has the greatest interest in the litigation, then apply the substantive law of that
state. Id. at 1220.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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of the shareholders' own affairs. ' In addition, the plaintiff must show
that the subsidiary acted to perpetrate wrongful behavior or to evade important legislative policy."'
In considering all the relevant factors, the court determined that Bull
acted as an independent subsidiary, rather than as an instrumentality of
Honeywell. 2 The court found that Honeywell owned all of Bull's stock,
and the two corporations shared some of the same directors. In addition,
Honeywell provided financial support to its subsidiary and facilitated the
process to incorporate Bull."
Although these two entities were closely linked, the court found that
Bull was not grossly undercapitalized, nor did Honeywell pay salaries or
other expenses for Bull. 5 Honeywell constituted only five percent of
Bull's business. ' Additionally, the court also determined that Honeywell
did not refer to Bull as a department or division in its financial statements, nor did Honeywell direct Bull's executives or directors.' Moreover, Honeywell consistently observed the legal formalities in the maintenance of the separate identities of these two corporations." Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit recognized Honeywell and Bull as separate corporate
entities and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's products
liability action. '9
C. Other Circuits
Within the survey period, other circuits set forth the rationale for
piercing the corporate veil. In National Soffit & Escutcheons Inc. v. Su40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1221. This test sets forth an elementary basis for determining whether the subsidiary
is an instrumentality of the parent. These elements include whether.
(1)The parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
(2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers. (3) The
parent corporation finances the subsidiary. (4) The parent corporation subscribes to all
the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation. (5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital. (6) The parent corporation pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary. (7) The subsidiary has substantially no business except
with the parent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation. (8) In the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its officers,
"the subsidiary" is referred to as such or as a department or division. (9) The directors or
executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but
take direction from the parent corporation. (10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not observed.
Id. at 1215 (quoting Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1262-63
(10th Cir. 1989)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1221-22.
45. Id. at 1222.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1225.
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perior Systems, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reiterated the general doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil.' The court asserted that a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that the corporate form was "ignored, controlled or manipulated, and that it was merely the instrumentality of another, and (2)
that the misuse of the corporate form would constitute a fraud or promote
injustice."" Further, the court established eight factors to consider when
determining whether to employ its equitable power to pierce the corporate veil, with respect to parent/subsidiary relationships.' These factors
include (1) the undercapitalization of the subsidiary; (2) the absence of
corporate records; (3) the fraudulent representation by the corporation's
shareholders or directors; (4) the use of the corporation to promote fraud,
injustice, or illegal activities; (5) the payment by the corporation of individual obligations; (6) the commingling of assets or affairs; (7) the failure to observe required formalities; and (8) the other shareholder acts or
conduct."
The Second and Ninth Circuits both embraced a veil-piercing test
similar to that established in Escutcheons.' These courts require evidence
of complete domination over the subservient corporation, coupled with a
showing that this domination was used to perpetrate a fraud or wrong'
In Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit asserted that the
corporate form could be disregarded if the corporate entity was so dominated that its alter ego, the dominating individual or parent, was actually
conducting its own business, and not that of the corporation.' The court
determined that the common ownership of three corporations by the parent company alone, was not enough to justify ignoring the corporate
shield. 7
In American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Development Co.," the
Second Circuit considered whether a president exercised such domina-

50. 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996).
51. Escutcheons, 98 F.3d at 265.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997); American Fuel
Corp., v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2nd Cir. 1997); BridgestonelFirestone, Inc.
v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 1996).
55. Chan, 123 F.3d at 1294; American Fuel, 122 F.3d. at 130; Bridgestone, 98 F.3d at 17.
56. Chan, 123 F.3d at 1294.
57. Id.
58. 122 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 1997). The court identified a list of factors to identify a dominated
corporation:
(I) Whether corporate formalities are observed, (2) whether the capitalization is adequate, (3) whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for personal rather
than corporate purposes, (4) whether there is overlap in ownership, officers, directors,
and personnel, (5) whether the corporate entities share common office space, address and
telephone number, (6) the amount of business discretion displayed by the allegedly
dominated corporation, (7) whether the alleged dominator deals with the dominated corporation at arms length, (8) whether the corporation is treated as an independent profit
center, (9) whether others pay or guarantee debts of the dominated corporation, and (10)
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tion over his corporation that a veil pierce is warranted."9 The company
had no contracts, no office space for employees, no capital of its own,
nor did it have an individual address or bank account. ' Additionally, the
president contributed his own capital to the company."' The court noted,
however, that the other corporate officer had the same amount of authority over the company.62 In addition, there was no indication that the
president commingled the corporate funds with his personal funds, or
that there was any need for an independent source of funds. 3 Upon consideration of these factors, the court determined that the company was an
entity separate from its president."
In Birbara v. Locke, ' the First Circuit embraced the two-part test
from the 1968 Massachusetts Supreme Court case My Bread Baking Co.
v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.' My Bread established two circumstances
which warrant a departure from the general principle of corporate separateness. 7 The court determined that when a representative of one corporation actively and directly participates in the activities of another corporation, exercising pervasive control to the detriment of one of the companies involved, the corporation will not be regarded as a separate entity."
Or, in the alternative, when the separateness of two companies is substantially disregarded in the intermingling of activities between the two
entities, or when serious ambiguity arises regarding the manner and capacity in which the corporations and their representatives are acting, the
court will set aside the principle of separateness.' The My Bread test is
more restrictive in its means of disregarding the corporate veil than those
means offered in other jurisdictions.
D. Analysis
The Yoder court adhered to the common law veil-piercing inquiry,
emphasizing that the veil could be pierced if it would be unfair to recognize the subsidiary as separate from its parent corporation.' Both the
Tenth and the Second Circuits have recognized a ten part test used to
whether the corporation in question had property that was used by the alleged dominator
as if it were the dominator's own.
American Fuel, 122 F.3d at 134.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id. at 134-35.
61. Id. at 135.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 99F.3d 1233 (1st Cir. 1996).
66. Birbara, 99 F.3d at 1238 (citing My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 748, 751-52 (Mass. 1968)).
67. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748,752).
68. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52).
69. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52).
70. Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 1997).
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determine whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality of its parent, which
would establish a unity of interest between the two and legitimize a
court's decision to pierce the veil." These tests differ in several ways.
Unlike the Second Circuit test," the Yoder test emphasized the parent
company's ownership of stock in its subsidiary, the designation of the
subsidiary as a department within the parent company's corporate papers,
and whether the parent company represents the majority of its subsidiary's business." Unlike Yoder," the Second Circuit's test evaluated the
amount of assets and office space shared by the parent and subsidiary
companies and the extent to which the subsidiary acted as an independent profit center."
The First Circuit's adoption of the My Bread veil-piercing test departed from the two-pronged veil-piercing test derived from common law
and exemplified in Yoder."6 Rather than looking at whether there was a
unity of interest among a corporation and an individual or subsidiary, as
the common law doctrine dictates, the My Bread test requires one of two
showings." There must be a showing that the corporation had either been
pervasively controlled to its detriment, or, in the alternative, that a lack
of separateness or a demonstrated intermingling of activities created an
ambiguous relationship between the company and the individual or subsidiary." The Second Circuit's My Bread test does not consider whether
there would be an injustice resulting from a failure to pierce the veil."9
The Sixth Circuit was much more stringent in its requirements, necessitating not only proof that the company was only an instrumentality of the
individual or subsidiary, but also that it was used wrongfully, resulting in
injustice.'
II. OFFICER LIABILITY

UNDER SECTION

6672

A. Background
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also examined the veilpiercing doctrine with respect to corporate officers in their capacity as

71. American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); Yoder,
104 F.3d at 1221.
72. American, 122 F.3d at 134.
73. Yoder, 104F.3d at 1221.
74. Id.
75. American Fuel, 122 F.3d at 134.
76. Compare Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996), with Yoder, 104 F.3d at
1220.
77. Birbara, 99 F.3d at 1238 (citing My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 748,751-52 (Mass. 1968)).
78. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d at 752).
79. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d at 752).
80. RCS Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., v. Himmelspach, 102 F.3d 223,226 (6th Cir. 1996).
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employers.8' An officer can be charged with the duties of collecting,
truthfully accounting for and paying over to the government taxes withheld from the company's employees. This officer is considered a "responsible person" for the carrying out of these duties." When a responsible person willfully fails to pay these tax withholdings to the government, Internal Revenue Code § 6672 imposes, among other penalties,
full liability upon the individual for the unpaid tax.3 The Tenth Circuit
analyzed this requirement, determining that "willfulness" is demonstrated when a corporate officer recklessly disregards the risk that withheld taxes would not be paid to the government."
B.

Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Finley v. United States
a. Facts

Finley, secretary-treasurer and board member of the Halsey-Tevis,
Inc. (Halsey), informed Halsey's president that the company had withheld social security and income taxes from its employees, but failed to
pay them for the last half of 1988.3 The president instructed Finley to
make these payments; however, the president took no other action and
did not make further inquiries into the matter, despite the fact that he had
the ability to issue checks on the company's behalf.'
In a subsequent tangle of financial problems, Halsey's bank account
was frozen." As a result, Halsey was unable to make these payments to
the government." Halsey did, however, provide the bank with $105,000

81. See Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997); Goldston v. United States,
104 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 1997); Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029 ( 10th Cir. 1993).
82. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997); see Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 (stating that a "responsible person" is personally liable for failure to pay witholding taxes); Goldston 104 F.3d at
1200; Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032.
83. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997). This statute provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by
this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not .collected, or not accounted for and
paid over.
ld.; see Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 248 (1978) (stating that persons responsible for
collecting income tax and failing to remit it will be subjected to personal liability).
84. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1343.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1344.
87 Id.
88. Id.
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in collections and requested that it be applied toward the debt. 9 The bank
refused and, instead, applied it to Halsey's loan indebtedness.'
The IRS assessed a $144,876 penalty against Halsey's president
personally for not taking further action and failing to pay the taxes under
section 6672.91 The IRS argued that Halsey's president, as a corporate
officer, should be held personally liable for his company's failure to pay
withheld taxes and social security when he knew of the failure and had
sufficient authority to correct it.' The district court found in favor of the
government in a post-trial motion for judgment, finding that "a reasonable jury could not have found that [the company president] met his burden of proof."'3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit stated that federal statutory law holds a corporate
officer or employee personally liable for the entire amount of the withheld taxes if he or she willfully failed to remit them to the government."
The statute holds an officer liable even if the officer did not have a motive or specific intent to defraud the government." The court asserted that
it may find that a corporate officer acted willfully when he or she proceeded with a "reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk that trust
funds may not be remitted to the government. '" Accordingly, the court
considered the president's failure to investigate or correct the mismanagement of funds as a demonstration of willful conduct.' The court noted
that a jury could determine whether a responsible person willfully failed
to pay the government, considering the totality of the circumstances."
The court proceeded to apply an exception to the general rule that a
presumption of liability results from a finding of willful conduct." The
court stated that the exception would be applied if the court found that
the officer had reasonable cause to withhold payment to the
°
government."
The court concluded that to successfully invoke this ex-

89 Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1345.
93. Id. at 1344.
94. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1345 (quoting Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033 (10th Cir. 1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1348.
99. Id.
100. Id. The "reasonable cause" exception has been narrowly construed in order to "(1) further
the basic purpose of § 6672 to protect government revenue, (2) discourage corporations from selfexecuting government loans using the tax monies they hold in trust, and (3) avoid making the government 'an unwilling partner in a floundering business."' Id. (citing Collins v. United States, 848
F.2d 740, 741-42 (6th Cir. 1988)); see Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11 th Cir.
1987); Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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ception, one would have to demonstrate that "(1) the taxpayer has made
reasonable efforts to protect the trust funds, but (2) those efforts have
been frustrated by circumstances outside the taxpayers control.""°' The
Tenth Circuit remanded Finley to the trial court to determine whether
Johnson met these criteria, a finding that would allow the company
president to escape liability.'"
2.

Goldston v. United States'°3

a. Facts
Goldston, the sole shareholder of Sunnylane Electronic, Inc. (Sunnylane), collected more than $27,000 in FICA federal income taxes from
his employees, but failed to remit this money to the IRS.'" Sunnylane
reported the withholdings to the IRS.'" The IRS assessed a penalty
against Goldston under section 6672, although the assessment was later
determined to be void.'" Goldston filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief
and the case was dismissed.'" As a result, the IRS filed a notice of a federal tax lien with the state register of deeds." Then Goldston filed for
Chapter 13 protection from liability in which the IRS filed a secured
claim.'" This claim of tax liability, however, was based on the prior assessment."0 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's granting of
the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute
obligates the taxpayer to pay the withheld taxes to the government."'
b. Decision
Because Goldston collected taxes and failed to remit them to the
government, the circuit court identified him as a "responsible person"
and imposed personal liability under section 6672 for the withheld
funds."2 The court determined that Goldston's failure to pay taxes was
actionable as a breach of his statutory duty imposed by section 7501,"'
which requires the employer to collect taxes from employees and remit
them to the government."" As a result, the IRS was entitled to collect the

101.
102.
103.

Finley, 123 F.3dat 1348.
Id. at 1350.
Goldston v. United States, 104 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997).

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

114.

26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1994). The general rule stated in this statute says that:
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tax despite the IRS's assessment of the liability."' Hence, liability attached to the corporate "responsible person" when he or she withheld the
collected taxes regardless of prior assessments."6
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period, the Seventh Circuit recognized the need to
demonstrate that an officer "willfully" failed to remit taxes and determined that the requirement was satisfied by the showing of a reckless
disregard of a known risk that the taxes might not be paid."" In Mazzeo v.
United States,"8 the Second Circuit interpreted "willfully" to include
those nonpayments of withheld funds to the government that were "voluntary, conscious, and intentional, as opposed to accidental." ' 9 Thus, the
Second
Circuit
' ' failed to include "recklessness" in its interpretation of
,,willfulness.
"
Similarly to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in Phillips v.
United States Internal Revenue Service,"' specifically asserted that a
showing of a reckless disregard may be sufficient to meet the "willful"
requirement necessary to hold an officer liable for failing to remit
taxes." Accordingly, the court defined willfulness as a "voluntary, conscious and intentional act to prefer other creditors over the United
States.'"" In addition, the court did not require a showing that the corporate officer acted with a "bad motive" in order to meet the definition of
willfulness.'2
In Bugge v. United States,'" the Fifth Circuit determined that the IRS
could hold each person deemed a "responsible person" accountable for
all of the corporation's delinquency.'" The Second Circuit held that the
definition of a "responsible person" was to include any person "connected closely enough with the business to prevent the [tax] default from

Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from
any other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The
amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such funds arose.
26 U.S.C. § 7501.
115. Goldston, 104 F.3d at 1201.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Kim, I 11F.3d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1997).
118. 131 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1997).
119. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 299 (quoting Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir.
1974)).
120. Id.
121. 73 F.3d 939 (9th Cir, 1996).
122. Phillips, 73 F.3d at 942.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 99 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. Bugge, 99 F.3d at 744.
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occurring." ' ' In Phillips, the Ninth Circuit determined that although the
corporate executive was hospitalized, he was held personally liable because he either clearly ought to have known that the withheld taxes were
not being paid, or that there was a risk that the money was not paid to the
government, when he had an opportunity to investigate whether they had
been paid."
D. Analysis
Finley" and Goldston"" represent cases in which the Tenth Circuit
pierced the corporate veil pursuant to a statutory rule, as opposed to the
application of the common law doctrine. Following the rule set forth by
section 6672, the Finley court held that a corporate officer could be held
personally liable when he or she willfully fails to investigate or correct
mismanagement after learning of tax withholding delinquencies.' The
Seventh Circuit determined that a reckless disregard of a risk that the
withheld taxed might not be paid was sufficient to meet the statutory
requirement of "willfulness."'' 2 The Second Circuit was more conservative in its interpretation of "willful," holding that proof of a reckless disregard of a known risk that the withheld taxes
may not be remitted was
33
insufficient to expose the officers to liability.'
The Goldston court applied the strict statutory rule thrusting personal
liability upon those who are responsible for collecting taxes and fail to
remit them, regardless of prior assessment liability. 3 4 Both the Second
and Ninth Circuits further defined what constitutes a "responsible person."'13 These circuits defined responsibility by examining the extent of
the individual's relationship to his or her business." Responsible persons
could, according to the Fifth Circuit, each be responsible for the entire
amount of the corporation's tax delinquency.

127. Mazzeo v. United States, 131 F.3d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiataruolo v. United
States, 8 F.3d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. Phillips, 73 F.3d at 940-44.
129. Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997).
130. Goldston v. United States, 104 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 1997).
131. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1343.
132. United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1997).
133. Mazzeo v. United States, 131 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1997).
134. Goldston, 104 F.3d at 1201.
.135. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 298; Phillips, 73 F.3d at 941.
136. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 298 (stating that responsible individuals include all those who are
connected closely enough with the company to prevent the tax default from occurring); Phillips, 73
F.3d at 941 (concluding that the defendants admission of his "responsible person" status was warranted due to the fact that he owned the company, was in charge of the bank accounts, and decided
which bills would be paid).
137. Bugge v. United States, 99 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).
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CONCLUSION
In the past year, the Tenth Circuit has further explored the parameters of the principle of corporate limited liability by examining circumstances that warrant its disregard. The court failed to pierce the corporate
veil when a parent company was sued for a tort allegedly committed by
its subsidiary. While some circuits differed from the Tenth Circuit's corporate veil-piercing analysis, the Tenth Circuit was consistent with the
prevailing common law interpretation of the doctrine. The Tenth Circuit
has broadly interpreted the "willful" requirement of section 6672, extending it to situations in which the officer recklessly disregarded a risk
that the tax withholdings would not be remitted to the government.
Michael P. Dulin

CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

American courts embrace an adversarial system. In order for this
system to thrive, plaintiffs and defendants alike must have competent
attorneys who advocate the respective sides of an issue. The need for
competent counsel is greatest when the state sets the adversarial process
in motion against a citizen. The United States Constitution affords criminal defendants various protections, but the Sixth Amendment provides
the critical right to assistance of counsel.2
This survey features cases addressing right to counsel issues' that
the Tenth Circuit decided between September, 1996 and August, 1997.
Part I provides an historical backdrop of the right to counsel and its evolution. Part II analyzes Tenth Circuit decisions that probe the adequacy
of appointed counsel. Additionally, it compares analytical approaches of
other circuit courts. Part III considers the corollary of the right to counsel, the right to self-representation, and the burden it places on trial
courts.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
criminal defendants with a series of critical rights.' These include the
right to a speedy trial, impartial jury, proper venue, and information
about the crime with which the defendant was charged. In addition, the
defendant has the right to confront witnesses, and "to have the Assistance

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause extends the right to counsel to state
proceedings. See infra discussion Part I, note 13, and text accompanying note 26.
3. Right to counsel issues arise in several settings. The focus of this survey article is the right
to counsel beyond the arrest and interrogation phase. Many right to counsel decisions, however,
consider the constitutionality of inculpatory statements made by a defendant in custody who does not
have counsel present and has not waived his right to counsel. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201,206 (1964). Although the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel guarantee is recognized in custodial interrogation situations, discussion of it is beyond the scope of this survey. Many custodial Sixth
Amendment issues were, however, addressed by the federal circuit courts. See, e.g., Bey v. Morton,
124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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of Counsel for his defence."' Courtroom complexity and the high risks
for defendants in criminal prosecutions justify these protections."
The practical reasons for having the right to counsel are best demonstrated by the dramatic facts that characterize the cases. A review of
Powell v. Alabama,7 the Supreme Court's landmark right to counsel case,
exemplifies the typical circumstances. In Powell, a posse of white men
and a deputy sheriff arrested "the Scottsboro boys," a group of black
teenagers, in a small Alabama town.! The boys were riding in an open
train car when they began fighting with some white youths During the
fight, the boys threw the white youths from the train, and two white
women who remained in the train car accused the black teenagers of
rape." In a state proceeding, an all white jury sentenced eight of the illiterate and out-of-state " Scottsboro boys to death.'2 While limiting its
holding to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 3 entitled the indigent
black youth to appointment of counsel.' Their ignorance, coupled with
the fact that the defendants faced capital punishment, justified the requirement of counsel.'5 Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Not only must there be a court free from coercion, but the accused
must be furnished with the means of presenting his defense. For this
the assistance of counsel is essential ....Especially is this true in a

capital case. The more heinous the charge the more important the
safeguards which the experience of centuries 6has shown to be essential to the ascertainment of even fallible truth.

5. Id. For the history of assistance of counsel under English rule, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 3 (1984). See also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35,39-42(1991).
6. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Scottsboro Case, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT: EXTRA JUDICIAL ESSAY ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 280-85 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1970), reprinted in KWANDO MBIAssI KINSHASA, THE MAN FROM
SCOTTSBORO: CLARENCE NORRIS AND THE INFAMOUS 1931 ALABAMA RAPE TRIAL

IN

HIS OWN

WORDS 188-91 app. C (1997) [hereinafter FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURTI.
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. Powell, 287 U.S. at 51; see MICHAEL L. RADELET Er AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: THE
ORDEAL OF 400 AMERICANS WRONGLY CONVICTED OF CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY DEATH 116(1992).

9. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50-51.
10. Id. at 51. Facts later emerged to show that the rape allegations were fabricated. RADELET
ET AL., supra note 8, at 118.

11. RADELET

ET AL.,

supra note 8, at 118.

12. Powell, 287 U.S. at 52.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .....
Id.
14. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment's securing of the right to counsel in state proceedings).
15. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 6, at 189-90. The Court has consistently focused on the degree and severity of punishment when
making inquiries into constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,785 (1987).
16. FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 189-90.
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Soon after the Supreme Court decided that the right to counsel attached to the right to a fair trial in a state proceeding,' the Court turned
its attention to the right to counsel in the federal context." Examining
Johnson v. Zerbst"9 and its Sixth Amendment implications, the Court
stated that the right to assistance of counsel is an "essential barrier
against ...[the) deprivation of human rights. ' '" In Zerbst, a South Carolina court tried two men who were accused of "possessing and uttering
counterfeit money."2' Counsel represented both men during preliminary
hearings, but neither was able to hire counsel for the trial. The men
never requested appointment of counsel from the trial judge; although the
defendants inquired about appointed representation and were told that
South Carolina only appointed counsel for capital crimes.' Both men
were tried without counsel in what the Supreme Court characterized as
an "intricate, complex, and mysterious" legal process. Zerbst extended
the right to appointed counsel to all defendants charged with federal
crimes in which incarceration might result from conviction. '
Following Zerbst, the Court expanded the right to counsel to its current standard, which extends it to all "critical stages"2' in a criminal
prosecution. The Court determined that critical stages includes pretrial
proceedings, and the trial itself.f The Court, however, has not extended
the right to some post-conviction proceedings.'
Although the Court in Powell firmly established the right to assistance of counsel, the question remained as to the kind of assistance that
must be provided. While Powell hinted at the idea of competent counsel

17. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
18. Id.; see Jeffrey L. Kirhmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The ConstitutionalRight to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
429-30 (1996).
19. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462.
21. Id.at 459.
22. Id. at 460.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 463.
25. Id. at 468. But cf Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (denying petitioner's request
for counsel in a state robbery proceeding), overruled by Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Gideon Court created a right to counsel for all state felony defendants. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345;
see Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 430.
26. Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 430. In another case, the Supreme Court extended the right
to counsel to all misdemeanor defendants facing jail sentences. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37 (1972); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (defining "critical stage" as
that when the absence of counsel would impair a defendant's right to a fair trial). A defendant can,
however, waive the right to counsel. See infra discussion Part III.
27. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (holding that the right to counsel is
violated when counsel is denied at an arraignment in a capital case).
28. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974) (denying the right to counsel in discretionary appeals, including petitions for certiorari to the state supreme court and the U.S. Supreme
Court).
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requirements, the Court articulated no such standard." In a footnote, the
Court merely announced that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."' Thus, circuit courts based the implied
right to effective counsel on Supreme Court dicta.
The first standard commonly applied was that of "farce and mockery."'3' District of Columbia Circuit Judge Thurman Arnold introduced it
by holding that ineffective assistance of counsel created due process infirmities "where the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of
' Under the "farce and mockery"
justice."32
standard, counsel's threshold
level of competency was low, 3 and the burden placed upon defendants
was exceedingly high."' Defendants were required to demonstrate that the
very nature of the proceeding lacked overall fairness. The rationale for
this test stemmed from the courts' fears that if attorneys were subjected
to "a public inquiry into the[ir] professional competence, ' they would
not "undertake as a public duty the defense of an accused.""3 Commentators and courts began a movement away from the "farce and mockery"
standard because of the difficulties in uniformly administering it, and
because of the undue burden the test placed upon defendants. 8 By 1983,
all federal circuit courts had rejected the "farce and mockery" test.3 9
After rejecting the "farce and mockery" test, courts employed various analytical tools to determine whether a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel was constitutionally infirm. ' Most courts determined

29.
30.

Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; 771 n.14 (1970); see Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at

435.
31. By 1970, all I1 circuit courts applied the "farce and mockery" test. See Kirchmeier, supra
note 18, at 431 & n.31; Brce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1052, 1055 (1980); see also J. Gregory Mermelstein, Note, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework for Review, 50 Mo. L. REV. 651, 656
(1985).
32. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667,670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
33. See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
34. See Green, supra note 31, at 1059.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) ("The proof of the
efficiency of such assistance lies in the character of the resultant proceedings .... ") (emphasis
added).
36. Mitchell, 259 F.2d at 793.
37. Id.
38. Jennifer N. Foster, Note, Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1379-80 (1994).
39. The Second Circuit was the last to reject the "farce and mockery" test. See Trapnell v.
United States, 725 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1983); David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1973).
40. Foster, supra note 38, at 1380-82. For an account of the various tests used by the federal
circuits prior to Strickland, see Richard P. Rhodes, Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the
Capital Defendant's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 121, 12135 (1992).

19981

CRIMINAL LAW

prejudice by using different variations of a harmless error test." Some
courts required the defendant to show that unreasonable performance
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' The circuits split on where
to place the burden in order to show harm or lack of harm.'
Finally, in Strickland v. Washington," the Supreme Court presented
the standard to determine the competency of counsel.' Strickland involved a defendant who received the death penalty." Strickland claimed
that his representation was ineffective because his counsel failed to request a psychiatric examination, and had not secured character
witnesses.' The Court introduced a two-prong inquiry to determine
whether a defendant's counsel was competent." First, a defendant must
show that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.'9 This prong considers the "countless ways [in which
attorneys] provide effective assistance," and the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Second, the defendant must demonstrate
that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different, but for ineffective counsel. 2
In most situations, the Strickland standard's second prong is the
more difficult for a defendant to prove. The potential for a different outcome alone does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel." For
the defendant to establish that she was prejudiced, the Supreme Court
requires that the "counsel's deficient performance renders the result of
the trial unreliable."' Moreover, a defendant must demonstrate he was
"deprive[d] . . .of any substantive or procedural right to which the law
entitles him." The prejudice standard is a more difficult one to meet

41. Robert J.Conflitti, Note, A New Focus on Prejudicein Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard,21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 37 (1983).
42. Id. The Supreme Court has articulated that "before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Fourth Circuit explained harmless error
review in two recent decisions. See United States v. Mackey, 114 F.3d 470, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1997).
See also Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts,
Ill HARV. L. REV. 771, 798-800, 818-22 (1998); cf In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
1997).
43. Conflitti, supra note 41.
44. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. Strickland,466 U.S. at 698.
46. Id. at 675.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 687.
49. id.
50. Id. at 689.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 687.
53. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
54. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371-72.
55. Id. at 372.
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than that of harmless error.' Some commentators prefer the harmless
error analysis, with the burden placed on the state, rather than a prejudice
analysis, with the burden placed on the defendant 7 The fact-driven, retrospective58 nature of the ineffective counsel inquiry may explain the
differing outcomes of cases with similar facts. Although Strickland may
not have expressly permitted hindsight examination, cases analyzing the
prejudice prong have not limited the inquiry to events at the time of
trial. 9 Justice Powell has even suggested that by evaluating with hindsight, only errors that undermine the accuracy of a trial's result should
establish the prejudice prong. ' Despite the hindsight debate, courts have
not significantly refined the Strickland standard, which still serves as the
foundation for the modem federal right to counsel."
The Court, however, did note that situations exist where prejudice
may be presumed. For example, a defendant is legally presumed to have
been prejudiced when he is actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel.' Likewise, prejudice is also presumed when a defendant can show that her counsel's actual conflict of interest adversely affected her representation."

56. Harmless error is "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights .... FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c); see William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin
Horn: Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
91, 137 (1995) (discussing the harmless error standard).
57. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Geimer, supra note
56.
58. See Foster, supra note 38, at 1369. But cf. Fretwell,506 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[U]nprincipled transformation of the standards governing ineffective-assistance claims,
through the introduction of an element of hindsight... has no place in our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence."). For a discussion of the retrospective aspects of the Strickland standard, see Charles M.
Kreamer, Adjudicating the Peart Motion: A Proposed Standard to Protect the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel Prospectively,39 LOY. L. REV. 635, 647-48 (1993).
59. In Fretwell, the Court employed a "rights requirement" analysis which may have permitted more flexibility in evaluating a defendant's rights. Foster, supra note 38, at 1393. But cf.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 381-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Strickland requires prejudice to
be determined at the time of trial, rather than from the vantage point of hindsight).
60. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. See infra discussion Part II; see also James G. Fannon, CriminalProcedure-Defendant's
Rights, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1130, 1131-32 (1995). The Strickland standard is only required in federal
courts. State courts may mimic the Strickland test or create their own standards for effective counsel.
See, e.g., Hawaii v. Silva, 864 P.2d 583, 593 (Haw. 1993) (replacing Strickland's second prong with
a test of whether counsel's "errors or omissions resulted in... withdrawal or substantial impairment
of a potentially meritorious defense"); New York v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. 1994) (rejecting
Strickland and requiring that a defendant show that she was "deprived of a fair trial by less than
meaningful representation").
62. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Supreme Court established the presumption of prejudice in conflict of interest
situations in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 489 (1978) (holding that prejudice is presumed when co-defendants are jointly represented over
their timely objections to such representation).
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In 1984, the same year that the Court decided Strickland, the Supreme Court reiterated the modem standard for the right to counsel in
United States v. Cronic. Cronic was sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison on numerous counts of fraud.' He and two associates had been
involved in a check-kiting scheme of approximately ten million dollars.'
The defendant declared himself indigent after his hired counsel withdrew
from the case, whereupon the court appointed a young real estate attorney with no actual trial experience." Justice Stevens, writing for eight
members of the Court, rejected the argument of the lower court inferring
a Sixth Amendment violation from the five factors it enumerated.' Instead, he emphasized that a defendant must show how identified errors
by counsel resulted in an unreliable conviction." In Cronic, the Court
focused heavily on the likely outcome of the proceeding.'
The substance of right to counsel jurisprudence cannot be completely understood without an understanding of its procedural underpinnings. Writs of habeas corpus" bring most of the right to counsel cases
into the federal system.73 The function of the habeas corpus writ is to
release an individual from unlawful imprisonment by the government. '
A defendant initiates an independent proceeding in which she states that
she is being unlawfully deprived of her liberty." The writ of habeas corpus permits prisoners to challenge a state conviction on constitutional
grounds." In the right to counsel context, defendants appeal state court
convictions to the federal courts based on a denial of the Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the body of habeas
corpus law is extensive enough to warrant volumes of independent discussion," in the context of this discussion, it provides defendants with a
mechanism for collateral attack. 8

65. 466 U.S. 648,653-55 (1984).
67. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650-52.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 652.
69. Id. at 658.
70. Id. at 659 n.26.
71. id. at 655. The order of analysis in Cronic may explain the lower courts' propensity to
examine the second Strickland prong, prejudice, before examining the reasonable representation
prong.
72. Habeas corpus is Latin for "you have the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed.
1990).
73. See infra discussion Pan 1I and accompanying notes.
74. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n. 12 (1980).
75. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1963).
76. Id.
77. For an in depth look at habeas corpus law and ineffective assistance of counsel from the
defense perspective, see Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986).
78. See Berger, supra note 77.
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II. THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT COUNSEL IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT

A. Tenth CircuitDecisions

1. Nickel v. Hannigan"'
a. Facts
Defendant Nickel lived in a household of disadvantaged individuals
who exchanged labor in a custodial service for lodging.' After an argument with his employer/landlord, Nickel went to the law office of Boyer,
who had previously represented him in various matters." While in
Boyer's office, Nickel confessed to killing Wanda Kuhlman, another
household member." Boyer instructed Nickel to bring his landlord back
to the office so that they could further discuss the confession." When
Nickel left his office, Boyer telephoned the police and reported that
Nickel had possibly committed homicide." Boyer instructed Nickel to go
to the police station, where he confessed to the murder."
At trial, Nickel's appointed counsel failed to renew objections to
Boyer's testimony on the grounds that the testimony violated the attorney-client privilege.' Likewise, he made no attempts to challenge
Nickel's statements or Nickel's confession to the police." A Kansas jury
convicted Nickel of first-degree murder."' The Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction.' After a review in state habeas corpus proceedings, Nickel brought a federal habeas action which the district court dismissed, upon finding that Nickel had not received ineffective counsel.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision."' The court
applied the two-part Strickland test.? It dispensed with the reasonableness of representation prong by assuming, without actually deciding, that
this first prong was satisfied.'3 Thus, the court essentially focused on the

79.
80.
81.
82.

97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1112(1997).
Nickel, 97 F.3d at 405.
Id.
Id.

83.

Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. Prior to Boyer's phone call, the police were unaware of Kuhlman's death. Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 408.
Id.
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second prong of the test-whether the deficient performance by counsel
had prejudiced the defendant. ' Because Nickel had provided information
to the police and to one other individual after speaking with Boyer, the
court reasoned that evidence of his confession would have been available
notwithstanding his counsel's ability to exclude Boyer's testimony at
trial.95 The court also noted that while Boyer may have breached Nickel's
attorney-client privilege, Boyer was not the defendant's appointed counsel, and therefore no responsibility to effectively counsel the defendant
had attached to Boyer."
Adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning,' the court also rejected the
argument that evidence derived from a breach of the attorney-client
privilege required exclusion under a "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine." The court did not apply exclusionary remedies for breaches of
evidentiary rules as it could have for breaches of search and seizure, or
other constitutionally-based rules. For this reason, Nickel's confession to
the police was not "suppressible. ' " The court also rejected the argument
that his statements to the police were involuntary, and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, based on Nickel's history
of mental problems."° The independent evidence, albeit a product of
Boyer's breach, was sufficient to satisfy the second element of the
Strickland test.'0
2. Houchin v. Zavaras' 0
a. Facts
A Colorado jury convicted Houchin on two counts of first-degree
murder." At the time of the murders, Houchin had been living in the
basement apartment of his in-laws.'" Linda, his wife, told Houchin that
she wanted a divorce.' The next day, while she and her mother were out,
Houchin shot his father-in-law twice with a single-action revolver.'"
94. Id.
95. Id. at 409.
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729. -[N]o court has ever applied [the fruits of the poisonous tree]
theory to any evidentiary privilege and.. . we have indicated we would not be the first to do so." Id.
at 731 n. 11. The "fruit of the poisonous tree," or derivative evidence doctrine, was introduced in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963). An exclusionary rule for evidence in
criminal proceedings, the doctrine focuses on the link between evidence procured and the initial
illegality of a police tactic. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
99. Nickel, 97 F.3d at 409.
100. Id. at 411.
101. Id.
102. 107 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. Houchin, 107 F.3d at 1467.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Houchin was shot once in the struggle.' He proceeded to the basement
apartment to change his shirt and pick up a rifle, with which he shot his
father-in-law at close range."° When his wife and mother-in-law returned, Houchin shot his mother-in-law while struggling with his wife."
The defendant was found the next day, asleep in his truck near his father's home." ° A subsequent blood alcohol test showed his blood alcohol
level to be .232."'
The public defender's office represented Houchin until his father
retained private counsel for him."' During Houchin's trial, his counsel
failed to present a theory of his case, failed to submit instructions concerning mens rea, " 3 and did not visit or prepare Houchin for trial."" In
fact, one of Houchin's attorneys was intoxicated while conducting crossexamination."' Following his convictions, Houchin filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in federal court, which denied the motion."6
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, deriving its
legal analysis from both Cronic and Strickland. Under Cronic, the court
determined that the "adversarial testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment occurred.""' Compared to other cases that clearly established the
breach of an attorney's duty of loyalty,"' Houchin's attorneys had not
clearly abandoned him, or conveyed to the jury that they believed he was
guilty."9 The court then focused on the first element of the Strickland
test, which is virtually identical to that in Cronic, and found that the attorneys had provided assistance falling below objective standards of adequacy."
Turning to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the court concluded that "overwhelming evidence" of Houchin's intent to commit
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The legal limit for blood alcohol content in Colorado is 0.10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 424-1301(2)(a) (1997).
112. Id. His father retained a Massachusetts attorney who secured local counsel. Id.
113. Id. at 1470. Houchin asserted that if a proper mens rea instruction had been given, he
would have received a charge of murder in the second-degree, which carries a shorter prison term
and more favorable parole considerations. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1471.
117. Id. at 1467 (describing Houchin's state proceedings).
117. Id.
118. The court cited instances in which defense counsel had "effectively joined the state to
obtain a death penalty" as examples of a counsel's complete abandonment. Id. (citing Osbom v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988)).
119. ld. at 1471.
120. Id.
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murder negated any possibility of a different outcome, regardless of the
unprofessional conduct of the attorneys." ' Thus, based on the absence of
prejudice to Houchin, the court found no reversible error. 2
3. Williamson v. Ward"
a. Facts
In 1982, Williamson allegedly murdered Debra Sue Carter after
sexually assaulting her."' Carter had worked at the Coachlight Club,
which Williamson frequently visited." According to a witness, Carter
had been working there on the night of the murder.'26 Before his trial for
the Carter murder, Williamson had spent time in jail for an unrelated
charge.'" An inmate of Williamson testified at the murder trial that while
in jail, she had heard Williamson confess to the Carter murder in his
sleep."
Before trial for the unrelated charge, state psychiatrists had diagnosed Williamson as mentally incompetent to stand trial, and placed him
in a state psychiatric hospital.'" Before the murder trial, the trial court
appointed Ward, a sole practitioner, as counsel.3 Ward had moved for,
and was appointed, assistant
counsel; however, he withdrew three weeks
3
later due to a conflict.' '
At the murder trial, Ward did not attempt an insanity defense, nor
did he investigate the possibility that Williamson was incompetent to
stand trial for the murders. 2 Ward also failed to investigate tapes containing a confession by a third party, to which the prosecution had objected. "3 As a consequence, the jury never heard evidence of a third party
confession.''

121. Id. at 1472.
122. Id. For a discussion of the harmless error test, the corollary to reversible error, see supra
discussion Part I.
123. 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
124. Williamson, I 10 F.3d at 1510.
125. Id. at 1511.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1512 n.3. During the same period of incarceration, Holland, the woman who had
allegedly heard Williamson's confession, claimed to hear another inmate confess to a different
murder. Id. As in Williamson, she was granted leniency in her punishment. Id. Counsel never attempted to investigate the striking similarities between the two alleged dream confessions, or the
motivations behind them. Id.
129. d.
130. Id. at 1512.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1518-21.
133. Id. at 1522.
134. Id.
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Williamson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death by an Oklahoma state court.'3" After the state rejected his attempts
to appeal,'36 Williamson brought a habeas corpus petition to the federal
trial court that granted relief based on constitutional violations in the
state proceedings.'37 The state appealed.'38
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 39 This case
stands as the only right to counsel case during the survey period in which
the court found that, under the Strickland analysis, the defendant was
prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel."' Like its other decisions,
the court applied Strickland, but its initial discussion centered on the first
prong-whether counsel gave reasonable representation" The court
examined Ward's representation in light of Kimmelman v. Morrison,""
which established a structure with which to evaluate a counsel's
strategy. 3 While the court described a "wide range of professional assistance" as effective, it determined that because Ward had not pursued
various defense strategies, his assistance fell below the level of acceptable representation.'"
Relying on Burger v. Kemp,"' the court established that because of
the potential for capital punishment, stricter scrutiny was required of
counsel's strategy."' Quoting its 1986 decision, the court stated that "in a
capital case, counsel's duty to investigate all reasonable lines of defense
is strictly observed."" " The extensive discussion of Williamson's mental
state revealed the court's concern with possible due process violations, if
in fact Williamson was incompetent to stand trial." Thus, the court's
concern over potential constitutional infirmities, coupled with the penalty
that Williamson faced, led to the decision that Ward's failure to further
investigate Williamson's mental history rendered his counsel
ineffective."'

135. ld. at 1510.
136. Id.
137. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 1523.
140. Id. at 1508.
141. Id. at 1514.
142. 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986).
143. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1514.
144. Id.
145. 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987) ("Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking
care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.").
146. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1514.
147. Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
148. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1517-18.
149. Id. at 1517. The bulk of the opinion discusses the "voluminous records" of Williamson's
treatment history. Id. at 1514, 1515 & n. 10, 1516-20.
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In addition, Ward was not prepared to introduce the third party confession supporting the ineffective assistance claim.'" Diverging from the
pattern of analysis found in other cases decided this survey period, the
court spent little time discussing the prejudice prong of Strickland.'' Instead, it summarily concluded that failure to introduce a third party confession was enough to undermine the court's confidence in the conviction. 2
Notably, the court did not criticize Ward alone for failure to provide
Williamson with effective counsel."3 It also blamed the state's appointment system under which "Ward was forced to operate."'" Ward faced
many challenges during the pretrial stages of Williamson's case,5 ' in
addition to the fact that he was a sole practitioner. For example, at one
proceeding, Williamson became enraged and overturned counsel's table
while threatening his co-defendant." After his motion to withdraw as
counsel was denied, Ward, who was blind, instructed his son to sit "behind him during the trial with instructions to bring [Williamson] to the
ground if he made any sudden move toward [him]."'5 7 Furthermore, the
court remarked that Ward received only the statutory maximum, $3200,
for his work, which exceeded 155 hours.' Assistant counsel had not
been appointed after his first assistant withdrew,'59 and Ward received no
investigative assistance."
4. United States v. Gallegos6 '
a. Facts
Gallegos was convicted of drug and money laundering offenses.'62
She appealed on several grounds," including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on a conflict of interest on the part of her at-

150. Id. at 1512.
151. See id. at 1520-21. The court discussed prejudice in only one paragraph. Id.
152. Id. at 1522.
153. Id. ("[We] are not insensitive to the hardships imposed on appointed counsel who work
with little or no compensation under difficult conditions.") (quoting Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d
589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1512.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Congress has provided a defendant in a capital trial the appointment of two counsel. See
id. at 1522 n.16; see also United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1098 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[At least
one of appointed counsel] shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.") (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3005 (1995)).
160. Federal funds for expert and investigative services in federal capital cases are provided for
by 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) (1995). See Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1522 n.17.
161. 108 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1997).
162. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1277.
163. Id. at 1278. Five issues were raised on appeal. Id.
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torney.'" Gallegos was indicted with nine co-defendants, all allegedly
involved in a "family-run organization [that] specialized in the sale and
distribution of large amounts of marijuana and cocaine." 65 Her attorney,
Blackburn, learned during trial that a potential witness in the case was a
former client.'" Blackburn notified the court that he was concerned about
his ability to question the witness, Gutierrez, because of the possibility of
violating the attorney-client privilege.'6" While Gutierrez could offer exculpatory information about Gallegos, he and Blackburn felt that he
could only do so by incriminating himself.'" Blackburn requested that the
court sever Gallegos' trial from that of her co-defendants.'" The prosecuting attorney also requested that the court appoint independent counsel
for Gutierrez in order to resolve the conflict issues."
The court denied the severance request, and did not appoint another
attorney for Gutierrez."' The trial court stated that it did not matter
whether "'Mr. Blackburn, F. Lee Bailey or Mr. Shapiro represent[ed]
him.""" It believed that Gutierrez would have asserted the Fifth
Amendment "with or without the advice of Mr. Blackburn."'' 3 Gutierrez
never testified on Gallegos' behalf.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.'" After discussing the
normal procedural process for ineffective assistance of counsel claims,'"
the Tenth Circuit applied Powell'7" and Strickland' as the cornerstone
cases of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.' 8 The court
noted that effective assistance includes the right to "'representation that
is free from conflicts of interest."" 9 The court then compared Gallegos'
situation with that of the defendants in United States v. Cook," a strik-

164. Id.
165. Id. at 1275.
166. Id. at 1276.
167. Id. at 1276-77.
168. Id. at 1277.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
173. Id. at 1283.
175. Id. at 1279. The court noted that most ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be
brought in collateral proceedings in order to develop a "record on the tactical reasons for trial counsel's decisions, the extent of trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, and the asserted prejudicial impact
on the outcome of the trial." Id. at 1280.
176. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
177. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
178. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1280.
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995)).
180. 45 F.3d 388 (10th Cir. 1995).
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ingly similar Tenth Circuit case in which defendants sought to retain
separate counsel."'

Finally, the court considered whether Gallegos had waived her right
to conflict-free counsel. 82' The court examined Holloway v. Arkansas,"'
and determined that it was the controlling precedent.'8 ' Following the
reasoning of Holloway, the court reversed Gallegos' conviction based on
the trial court's actions. 8 ' The court listed three measures that could cure
conflict of interest situations, which the trial court had failed to administer 1) appointing separate counsel; 2) taking steps to ascertain whether
the risk of conflict was too remote to require separate counsel; and 3)
determining whether both Gallegos and Gutierrez were willing to waive
conflict-free counsel.M
B. Other Circuits
Other circuits apply the Strickland test, with the same variation in
analytical approaches.' Depending on the facts and penalties, circuits
may focus on the prejudice prong.'" In other circuits, in the absence of a
presumption of prejudice,"9 representation is presumed to have been reasonable."' When competency is an issue, however, other circuits examine
the strategy employed by counsel.'9' They appear to pay particular attention to those cases in which a defendant is subject to a harsh penalty."'
Additionally, as the Tenth Circuit in Williamson v. Ward,"' other circuits
consider the often difficult situation in which appointed counsel is
placed."
While the Tenth Circuit addressed only one case in which there was
a presumption of prejudice,"' other circuits applied per se ineffective

181. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1281.
182. Id. at 1281-82.
183. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
180. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1282.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 1997).
188. See, e.g., Claboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ineffective counsel claim failed "for lack of prejudice" without first analyzing whether the defendant's
attorney's performance was deficient).
189. See supra discussion Part I, note 64, and accompanying text.
190. See United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1997).
191. Accord Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1996); Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d
1357, 1367-68 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing defense counsel's failure to secure all medical records, including prison medical records,
to determine competency).
192. See Amaya-Ruiz, 121 F.3d at 494-96.
193. 110F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
194. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990).
195. United States v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1997).
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assistance of counsel analysis, " or focused on situations in which conflicts of interest were an issue.'" One circuit delineated three ways of
applying Strickland,'" yet still found that the defendant had failed to satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong."
C. Analysis
Federal courts adhere strictly to Strickland when deciding right to
effective counsel cases. The order of analysis of the test's two prongs,
however, seems to depend on the facts of each case, and whether other
constitutional infirmities are an issue. In all right to effective counsel
cases, the Tenth Circuit placed different weight on the presumption that
counsel's performance was reasonable.' Likewise, the penalties facing
the defendant played a crucial role in the outcome." In reality, the prejudice prong makes it clear that hindsight and the severity of the defendant's penalty determine whether the reviewing court will find ineffective assistance.' When Strickland was applied, the court appeared to use
a balancing test rather than a two-prong test. This approach may provide
more protection to defendants than the outcome-prejudice approach that
has emerged.' Defendants may likewise enjoy more protection of their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in those situations in which a court
finds actual or constructive denial of counsel, or where a conflict of interest can be shown.

196. See Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining the difference between ineffective assistance of counsel claims and constructive denial of counsel claims); see also
Griffin v. United States, 109 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a denial of counsel where a
defendant's lawyer failed to prosecute a timely filed appeal).
197. Freund v. Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1997); see supra note 64.
198. United States v. O'Neil, 118 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit's three categories
include: 1)per se violations of the Sixth Amendment, such as where an attorney is not licensed to
practice law, or where she is implicated in the defendant's crime; 2) where a conflict of interest
exists that tends to jeopardize the representation; and 3) situations in which ineffective assistance of
counsel is unrelated to a conflict of interest, and the two-pronged Strickland test applies. O'Neil, 118
F.3d at 71.
199. Id. at 72-73.
200. See, e.g., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d at 1514. In Nickel, the court "assume[d] without
deciding" that the defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Nickel v. Hannigan, 97
F.3d 403,408 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.I 112 (1997).
201. See supra Part H.A.3. While none of the cases mention Powell v. Alabama, its progeny
seem to focus on the potential penalty and inequities, such as indigency or incompetency, that affect
the defendant. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
202. See Foster, supra note 38, at 1370, 1393-95. But cf.Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465,
1471 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We refrain from using hindsight to second-guess counsel's tactical decisions.") (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
203. See Berger, supra note 77, at 99 ("[Tlhe court has linked a disfavored right with an unloved remedy [habeas corpus] and not enhanced the status of either.").
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III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION: OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT COINm

A. Background
The right to self-representation is deeply rooted in the philosophy of
self-determination.' The Supreme Court announced the right to waive
the assistance of counsel in Johnson v. Zerbst.' In order for a defendant
to forego her right to counsel, this waiver must be "knowing and intelligent."2' The Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden on trial courts to
prove that the "knowing and intelligent" standard is met."n Just how
heavy this burden is was clarified in Von Moltke v. Gillies.' Von
Moltke, a former German countess was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act.2 ° Although the Court found that she was an "intelligent, mentally acute woman,"2 " it concluded that she did not comprehend her legal rights, and therefore could not make a knowing and
intelligent waiver."' Notably, the Court analogized her situation to that of
the Scottsboro boys in Powell v. Alabama. 23 Like those boys, Mrs. Von
Moltke was a victim of public hostility, because at the time of her conviction, the United States was at war with Germany."'
In creating a strong presumption against waiver in cases like Von
Moltke, the Court essentially requires a judge to "investigate as long and
as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.2 1
When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, trial judges must ensure that
the defendant is aware of the dangers inherent in her choice. 6 Factors
such as the defendant's age and history must be considered, in addition
to the defendant's knowledge of, and ability to follow, technical trial

204. United States v. Pumett, 910 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The right to self-representation
and the assistance of counsel are separate rights depicted on the opposite sides of the same Sixth
Amendment coin.").
205. Randall B. Bateman, Federaland State Perspectives on a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Self-Representation, 20 J.CONTEMP. L. 77, 81 (1994).
206. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
207. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). In Zerbst, the original test required competent and intelligent waiver. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469. For a discussion of the difference, if any,
between the two standards, see Bateman, supra note 205, at 90 n.61.
208. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
209. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 709-21.
210. Id. at 709.
211. Id.at 720.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 720-21.
215. Id.at723.
216. For a comprehensive examination of waiver standards, see Jennifer Elizabeth Parker,
Constitutional Law-United States v.Goldberg: The Third Circuit's NontraditionalApproach to
Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1996).
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rules, before a trial judge can assume a "knowing and intelligent waiver"
has occurred.2
Forfeiture of counsel may be considered analogous to waiver of
counsel. The Supreme Court, however, has failed to recognize any analytical distinction between the two. It has, in similar circumstances, held
that a defendant can forfeit constitutional rights based on conduct."8
Some circuit courts recognize the difference between voluntary and involuntary relinquishment of counsel" 9 and apply different analytical
standards and categorizations to waiver and forfeiture concepts.'m The
Tenth Circuit, however, has not specifically addressed the difference
between waiver and forfeiture. It has found that a defendant's "stubborn
failure" to hire counsel after several urgings by the court to do so constitute a "knowing and intelligent" waiver." The Tenth Circuit employs a
high standard of "knowing and intelligent" waiver, thereby imposing a
heavy burden on the trial court to insure that a defendant understands the
ramifications of waiver of counsel.
B. United States v. Taylor'
1. Facts
A federal jury convicted defendant Taylor of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.' The court appointed Wells to represent Taylor, but Wells later
moved to withdraw on the grounds that the defendant intended to represent himself."4 This motion was denied, and Wells was instructed "to
serve in a stand-by advisory capacity. ' Taylor, however, did not utilize
Wells's guidance, although the trial court strongly encouraged him to do
so.'m During his trial, Taylor made no opening statement, but did cross217. Id. at 190-91.
218. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345-56 (1970) (holding that a defendant's misbehavior
in the courtroom caused him to forfeit his right to be present at trial).
219. SeeParker,supranote216, at 1196-1211.
220. The Third Circuit broke waiver down into three categories: "waiver," "forfeiture," and
"waiver by conduct." United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-2001 (3rd Cir. 1995). Each
category received different analytical treatment. Parker, supra note 216, at 1207-08. In another case,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel due to his abusive and
threatening behavior toward his attorney. United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11 th Cir. 1995).
The lower court had stated that the defendant had waived his right to counsel because of the poor
treatment of his attorney. McLeod, 53 F.3d at 323.
221. United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir. 1980).
222. 113 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1997). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit decided other waiver of
counsel cases that were not selected for publication.
223. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1138.
224. Id.
224. Id.
226. Id. The court instructed Taylor:
I do want to encourage you, however, to utilize Mr. Wells and get his guidance on matters that might not be familiar to you. It's very technical, it's not a simple matter, federal
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examine some of the government's witnesses."' He allowed Wells to
cross-examine one witness, and he permitted him to make objections to
certain testimony, in addition to relying on some of Wells's advice."
Taylor, however, delivered his own closing statement." After the jury
found him guilty of the cocaine and firearm possession charges, the
judge asked Taylor at his sentencing whether he wished to continue representing himself." Taylor replied that it no longer mattered."' The judge
commended him for his intelligence, and sentenced him to a total of seventy years." 2
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, noting
the "strong presumption against waiver."" Following the rationale of
Von Moltke, the court focused on whether the judge made a thorough,
comprehensive examination of Taylor's waiver." The court found that
the judge had warned Taylor of the complexities inherent in trial and
criminal procedure." Likewise, the judge had instructed him to use his
appointed counsel.
Despite these findings, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the court had not
ensured that Taylor's waiver was "knowing and intelligent."" 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Taylor was never advised of the
dangers of self-representation." 7 Additionally, the trial judge never ascertained Taylor's reasons for wanting to proceed pro se," and failed to
determine whether he actually understood the consequences of his decision to do so."' The court compared Taylor's situation to that of a similar
Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Willie.' In Willie, the defendant asserted that he would not accept help from his court appointed attorney,
criminal procedure, and I want to make sure that this trial is fair to you .... So [Wells is]
there as a resource to you, and I do encourage you to use him as much as you can in order
to facilitate the trial.
Id.
227. Id. at 1139.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. For each drug charge, he received 360 months in prison, and for the possession of a
firearm charge, he received 120 months. Id. The sentences were to run concurrently. Id.
233. Id. at 1140 (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987)). The
facts in Padillaare strikingly similar to those in Taylor. See Padilla,819 F.2d at 954-56.
234. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1140. In Von Moltke, the Supreme Court required that waiver be made
"after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708,719 (1948).
235. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1141.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 941 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991).
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and "unequivocally assert[ed] his right to self-representation." ' The
Tenth Circuit found additional support for concluding that Taylor had not
waived his right to counsel in that his representation was hybrid.""
As a final step, the court subjected the case to harmless error
'
review.
court concluded
a fair
is so dependent
on
the right toThe
counsel,
violation ofthat
thatbecause
right was
not trial
harmless
error.2"
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Schmidt, " " the Second Circuit, like the Tenth
Circuit, examined the trial court's efforts to ensure that a defendant's
waiver was knowing and intelligent.2" The Seventh Circuit, in Hall v.
Washington, 7 questioned whether a "hint in [the] record"2" could constitute waiver. Defendant Hall faced the death penalty.4 " In an earlier
proceeding, he had been uncooperative with counsel, but the court did
not find that this hint of misconduct constituted his waiver of effective
assistance of counsel.'
Two Ninth Circuit opinions focused on procedural issues ancillary
to waiver of counsel. In United States v. Stocks,"I the court discussed the
procedural stages during which the right to counsel attached to determine
if waiver was an issue. 2 In 1992, Stocks pled guilty to possession of an
illegal firearm, 3 and drug charges. He was placed on probation.' The
court considered whether waiver could apply to a modification of his

241. Willie, 941 F.3d at 1390.
242. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1143. Although a thorough discussion of hybrid representation is
beyond the scope of this survey, the concept presents an interesting challenge in waiver of counsel
situations. Hybrid representation occurs when both a defendant and her attorney conduct the trial. In
this situation, the waiver of assistance of counsel is ineffective. See Metcalf v. Mississippi, 629 So.
2d 558, 562-65 (Miss. 1993); Fannon, supra note 61, at 1139-40. A related type of representation
occurs when the court appoints advisory standby counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984); J. David MacCartney, Jr. & Lisa A. MacVittie, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 1341,
1353-54 (1992).
243. Fannon, supranote 61, at 1135.
244. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1144; see United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1579-80 (10th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
244. 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 130(1997).
246. Schmidt, 105 F.3d at 87.
246. 106 F.3d 742(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264(1997).
248. Hall, 106 F.3d at 751.
249. Id. at 744.
250. ld. at 751.
251. 104 F.3d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 259 (1997).
252. Stocks, 104 F.3d at 312-13 (holding that waiver could not apply because the right to counsel did not extend to probation hearings).
253. Id. at 309. Stocks had a sawed-off shotgun in his possession. Id.
254. Id.
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probation," or whether a right to counsel attached based on the stage and
nature of the proceeding.'
D. Analysis
Courts require a full investigation into waiver of counsel. Not only
must a judge inquire about the voluntariness of such waiver, she must
uncover the reasons for the defendant to proceed pro se. For complete
assurance, a judge should clearly explain the potential perils of selfrepresentation. A pro se defendant's partial reliance on appointed counsel will not defeat a failure to waive counsel claim. The waiver must be
accompanied by strong evidence of a defendant's knowing and unequivocal desire to proceed pro se.
The Tenth Circuit, as well as other federal circuit courts, will need
to focus on the distinctions that can be drawn between types of waiver.
Likewise, standards for forfeiture should be articulated. With the recent
public focus on the Theodore Kaczynski proceedings and his attempts to
waive his right to counsel,' courts will likely continue to grapple with
the fallout questions which link competency with the ability to waive a
constitutional right.
CONCLUSION

In right to counsel cases, the Tenth Circuit has acted consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. Like other circuits, it applies the Strickland
standard from the inevitable hindsight approach. Unlike approaches utilized in other circuits, the Tenth Circuit seems to sympathize with defendants with outstanding circumstances. This does not, however, represent
a departure from Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court's own
approach to the factually intense circumstances of cases like Powell v.
Alabama and Von Moltke v. Gillies justifies a lower court's ad hoc analysis of right to counsel issues.
The Tenth Circuit has yet to offer an innovative analytical approach
in waiver of counsel scenarios. Like the Supreme Court, it has not articulated any differences between waiver and forfeiture. The Tenth Circuit did, however, require arguably higher standards for a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver of counsel than those of other circuits.
Laura J. Calese

255. Id. at 313.
256. Id.
257. Court Order, United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 15068, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1998).

EDUCATION: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF SCHOOLS,
STUDENTS, AND THE COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
In 1996-97,' the Tenth Circuit refined its application of controversial federal statutes and case law in education-related cases. First, the
court carved out a new interpretation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) to require public school districts to provide special education services to students voluntarily enrolled in private
schools.2 Subsequently, IDEA amendments3 trumped the decision and the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case in light of those amendments.'
Second, the court continued to clarify the Pickering' and Connick6 tests to
define "matters of public concern" in public employee free speech
claims." Third, the court integrated a new federal statute which changes
the administrative standard for determining a child's eligibility for social
security disability payments, effectively reducing the number of children
receiving benefits." Finally, the court dismissed an action challenging the
constitutionality of the Colorado Constitution's busing clause and the
state charter schools and school choice statutes because the case did not
present a justiciable case or controversy."0
This survey analyzes the implications of each of the educationrelated cases decided over the past year. Part I examines the impact of
the court's ruling in Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259" on the
ability of public schools to deliver special education services in compliance with the IDEA. Part II discusses the continuing struggle to balance
the First Amendment rights of public employees against the censorship
needs of schools and other public agencies. Part III assesses the conse-

1. The survey period covers cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
2. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 806-09 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S.
Ct. 2503 (1997).
3. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
4. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
5. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
6. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
7. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812-16 (10th Cir. 1996); Bunger v. University of
Okla. Bd. of Regents, 95 F.3d 987, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1996).
8. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9. See Brown v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (10th Cir. 1997). Social Security
Disability indirectly affects schools because evaluation of the child's disability and therapies often
surrounds the child's cognitive and emotional functioning in the classroom.
10. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 119 F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1997).
11. 107 F.3d 797 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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quences of the Welfare Reform Act 2 on children seeking SSI disability
payments under more stringent evaluation standards. Part IV discusses
the court's dismissal of a desegregation action for want of standing and
ripeness 3 in light of the enduring battle over court supervised desegregation efforts.
I. SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS
A. Background:Individuals with DisabilitiesEducationAct (IDEA)"
States and locally elected school boards bear the major responsibility for determining educational policy as well as maintenance and operation of the public schools." State constitutional provisions grant legislatures authority to provide a general and uniform system of free public
schools open to all.' 6 The federal government provides financial assistance to state and local educational agencies to meet the special needs of
educationally deprived children."
In 1990, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)," which replaced the 1975 Education of the Handicapped Act. 9 The primary goal of the IDEA is to "assure that all children
with disabilities have available to them. . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs."' The Act provides federal grants to assist
school districts furnishing special education services. 2' Each eligible student must have an Individual Education Plan (IEP) to assess the student's
present levels of educational performance and to identify annual goals
and the specific services the student requires.' Litigation and judicial
interpretation of the IDEA shape the meaning of "free and appropriate"
12. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 Stat.
2105. The titles Welfare Reform Act and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act are used synonymously in this article.
13. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1443-46.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
15. See Board of Educ, v.Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
16. See, e.g., In re Kindergarten Sch., 32 P. 422, 423 (Colo. 1893) (holding that the state
legislature has the authority to establish a kindergarten department in the public school system).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(a) (1994).
18. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat.
1103, 1141, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1990); see also Tobin P. Richer, San Diego v. California Special
Educ. Hearing Office: A Misapplication and DrasticExpansion of IDEA Coverage, 26 J.L. & EDUC.
1, 2 (1997) (discussing background and impact of the IDEA).
19. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 901(a)(2).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1990).
21. Id. § 1412(1); see also James D. Oegema, Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act:
Ensuring an Education for Individuals or Ensuring an Education for Individuals Who Attend Public
Schools? 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 99 (1997) (providing background on the IDEA, its
corresponding regulations, and cases interpreting the Act).
22. William D. Goren, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Interrelationship to
the ADA and Preventive Law, 71 FLA. B.J. 76, 76 (1997).
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and "related services," and determine situations in which a public school
district must reimburse parents for special education costs.' School districts, motivated by concerns of economic efficiency amidst shrinking
budgets, have argued for a limited scope of IDEA coverage.'
In Board of Education v. Rowley,' the U.S. Supreme Court defined
the terms "free and appropriate" education and "related services.... "Free
and appropriate" education is provided at public expense, meets state
educational standards, includes an appropriate preschool, elementary or
secondary school education, and is consistent with the student's IEP.'
"Related services" are those that help a student benefit from special education.' The school district satisfies the "free and appropriate" provision
if, at the time the IEP was created, it was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive some educational benefit."'
Attending a private school does not waive or invalidate a disabled
student's right to free and appropriate education at public expense. ° Because the local public school might not meet the needs of all students,
private school placement may be necessary.' While local education
agencies (LEAs)" place some students in private schools, parents also
voluntarily place their children in private school without the approval of
an LEA."
Although school districts must provide special services to students
placed in private schools by LEAs,"' a district's obligation to provide
special services to disabled students voluntarily placed in private schools

23. See Richer, supra note 18, at 2.
24. See id.
25. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
26. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.
27. Id.
28. Id. Some examples of related services include transportation, speech pathology, physical
therapy, and counseling. Id. n.10.
29. Id. at 206-07; see Richer, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the Rowley Court's definition of
"free and appropriate education"). Some states, however, transcend the "reasonably calculated"
threshold and require public school districts to develop special education programs to maximize each
disabled student's potential. Goren, supra note 22, at 77.
30. See State Educational Agency Responsibility, 34 C.F.R. § 300.451 (1997).
31. Cf. Kathryn Browning Hendrickson, The IDEA: Conferring Rights on Disabled Children
in Unilateral Private School Placements, 4 KY. CHILDREN'S RTS. J. 1, 2 (1996) (concluding that the
IDEA "unquestionably allows private placement by a public agency at public expense ... where
there is no appropriate public placement available").
32. "Local Education Agencies" refer to public school districts and other public education
administrators. See Local Educational Agency, 34 C.F.R. § 300.11 (1997).
33. See Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
34. See Local Educational Agency Responsibility, 34 C.F.R. § 300.452 (1997).
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remains unclear.3 The IDEA vaguely governs special education services
to private school students,36 and provides:
[T]o the extent consistent with the number and location of children
with disabilities in the State who are enrolled in private elementary
and secondary schools, provision is made for participation of such
children in the program... [and] that children with disabilities in private schools.., be provided special education and related services..
at no cost to their parents or guardian.37
The phrases "consistent with the number and location of children with
disabilities" and "participation of such children" are ambiguous?8 In addition, the statute does not determine which services satisfy the participation requirement or whether a district must provide those services on
site at the private school.39 Department of Education (DOE) regulations
require that school districts afford private school students a "genuine
opportunity for equitable participation" in special education services.'
Such amorphous language leads to divergent circuit court interpretations
of public school district obligations to private school students.4'
The circuit courts that have addressed public school obligations to
furnish special education services to students voluntarily placed in private schools have produced mixed opinions and results." Relevant circuit
court opinions generally fall into two categories: the discretionary interpretation and the limited discretionary interpretation. 3 The Fourth and
Seventh Circuits have adopted the discretionary approach." In Goodall v.
Stafford County School Board," the parents enrolled their hearingimpaired son in a parochial school in order to further his religious education.' The public school district refused to provide an on site cuedspeech interpreter because the interpreter was available at the jublic
school.'7 Similarly, in K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.," the

35. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 98.
36. See id. at 100-01 (noting that vague statutory language had engendered different
interpretations in the circuit courts).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4) (1994).
38. See Oegema, supra note 2 1, at 101.
39. See id. at 101-02.
40. Responsibility of a State and a State Subgrantee, 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 (a)(1) (1997).
41. See, e.g., Oegema, supra note 21, at 101-03 (blaming the ambiguity of the Act for the
conflicting circuit court interpretations). Compare K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d
673 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that students attending private school are not entitled to special
education services at their own school), with Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concluding private school student entitled to on-site special education services).
42. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 101-03.
43. See id. at 104.
44. See K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 678-80 (7th Cir. 1996);
Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363,367-68 (4th Cir. 1991).
45. 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991).
46. Goodall, 930 F.2d at 364.
47. Id. at 365.
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district refused to provide an aide at a private school site for a child suffering from multiple disabilities and requiring a full-time instructional
assistant.'9 Both circuits concluded that the school district had discretion
in providing special education to students voluntarily placed in private
schools. ' The courts held that the public school district discharges its
obligations if the disabled private school student has a genuine opportunity to participate in the necessary services available at a public institution."' The courts did not require the district to provide the services on the
private school site itself"
In contrast, the Second and Fifth Circuits have circumscribed school
district discretion to provide special education services to students voluntarily placed in private schools." These circuits required that some
level of services be provided to those students at the private school setting.' The Second Circuit held that if comparable services at the public
school are inadequate, the school district must provide the services at the
private school as long as the costs do not exceed the cost of the services
at the public school." In Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board,' the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, 7 holding that voluntarily placed private school students must be active participants in the
special education programs designed by educational agencies that suffer
from limited funding. 8 In addition, the court determined that private
school students were not entitled to any greater share of special education funds than were similarly situated public school students. 9 Therefore, the public school district must provide on-site special education
services to private school students at the same approximate cost as the
district would incur in providing those services at public sites.' IDEA
Amendments passed on June 4, 1996,6 have since superseded Cefalu.62

48. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996).
49. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 675.
50. Id. at 679; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 367-68.
51. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 680; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 368.
52. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 680; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 367-69.
53. See Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997); Russman v.
Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996).
54. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 104 (discussing how the implications of economic realities
may "dictate that services be provided at one location," the public school).
55. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056-57.
56. 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997). Although Cefalu falls within the survey period, it is treated
here as background because the Tenth Circuit relied on it in making its decision.
57. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 398.
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id. at 398.
60. Id.
61. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-17, §
612(a)(10)(C), Ill Stat. 37, 63 (stating specifically that public school districts are not required to
pay for the cost of special education services for a voluntarily placed private school student at a
private school site if free appropriate education is available at the public school site). These
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B. Fowler v. Unified School District. No. 25963
1. Facts
Fowler, an elementary school student, suffered from severe hearing
impairments and required interpretive services.' The public school provided a full-time interpreter who assisted Fowler pursuant to his IEP.'
However, because Fowler was "gifted" with "superior intellectual capacity," his parents enrolled him in a nearby private school, which they
thought would better suit his intellectual needs. 7 Despite the parents'
request, the school district refused to pay for the interpretive services at
the private school site because they were available at the public school."
The trial court ruled in favor of the parents, and the school district appealed.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, relying on Cefalu and Russman, held that public
school districts must provide disabled students who are voluntarily enrolled in private schools with special education services at the private
school, but limited the district's financial obligation to the average cost
of such services provided at a public school.70 Relying on IDEA regulations, the court determined that although the school district must provide
special education services to the students voluntarily placed in private
schools,"1 the regulations allow some limited discretion regarding the
manner and extent of delivering those services."2
The court reasoned that voluntarily placed private school students
should not necessarily receive the identical level of special education

amendments and their effect on Fowler and similar cases in other circuits are discussed infra text
accompanying notes 85-97.
62. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
63. 107 F.3d 797 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
64. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 800.
65. Id.
66. Id. Fowler was eventually designated as "gifted." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 800-01.
70. Id. at 807-08.
71. Id. at 806 (citing Responsibility of a State and a State Subgrantee, 34 C.F.R. § 76.651
(1997)). Section 76.651 requires school districts to "provide students enrolled in private schools with
a genuine opportunity for equitable participation ...." 34 C.F.R. § 76.651. This amorphous
language suggests that providing services is required, but some discretion is afforded the districts in
managing those services.
72. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 806 (citing Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Dist., 103 F.3d
393, 396 (5th Cir. 1997)). For an interpretation of state educational agency responsibility, see 34
C.F.R. § 300.451 (1997). Section 300.451 requires that school districts must provide "[t]o the extent
consistent with their number and location in the state ... for the participation of private school
children with disabilities ... by providing them with special education and related services .
I.."
Id.
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services available to public school students, but a "genuine opportunity
for equitable participation" required services comparable in quality,
scope, and opportunity to those provided to public school students."
Thus, although the district must pay for the services at the private school,
the amount should not exceed the average cost the district would incur to
provide the same service to similarly situated students at the public
schools."
C. Analysis
The Fowler ruling appears to be a compromise between the financial needs of parents and those of school districts. This limited discretion
interpretation of the IDEA is plausible since the language of the statute
indicates congressional intent to grant a special education entitlement to
all disabled students, whether public or private school enrollees." However, problematic policy implications riddle the limited discretion approach. First, by limiting a school district's discretion in furnishing special education services, the ruling increases parental discretion to remove
children from public schools for virtually any reason. Fowler does not
require parents to place their children in private schools for special education purposes. The Fowlers did not contend that the public school provided inadequate interpreter services for their son's hearing impairment."6
They removed him because they felt the public school did not meet his
superior intellectual needs," a reason unrelated to his hearing impairment. Parents place students in private schools for a variety of reasons.
Some enroll their children in parochial schools because they seek a religious curriculum. Others might enroll their children in private schools
with superior athletic programs in order to increase exposure to college
scouts, or for some other reason independent of any special cognitive,
physical, or socio-emotional disability of the child. The court should
have limited the discretion of parents by requiring them to tie the private
school placement to the child's disability while also restricting the discretion of the public school districts.
Second, the Fowler ruling promotes inefficient allocation of scarce
special education resources. Special education is extremely expensive,
siphon precious funds from their general accounts .9 The court tried to
mitigate high expenses by limiting private school costs to the average
73. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 805.
74. Id. at 807-08.
75. Oegema, supra note 21, at 119.
76. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 800.
77. Id.
78. However, the reason was tied to his status as a gifted and talented student. Id. Gifted and
talented is often considered a special education designation. Therefore, the Fowlers arguably
removed Michael from the public school for special education purposes, but not for reasons tied to
his hearing impairment.
79. Thomas Frank, House Bill Increases Funds for Special-Needs Students, DENVER POST,
Feb. 11, 1997, at B6.
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cost of similar services for similarly situated public schools students. '
This approach, however, is shortsighted. Determining the average cost of
one student's special services is an onerous task because an IEP is individualized. Each student requires different services. Furthermore, different students require varying levels of services. Therefore, adequately
defining "similarly situated students" is an illusory benchmark, and
finding similarly situated students in order to compare costs is unmanageable.
Moreover, the costs of needed services may be greater at a private
school than at a public school. Public school special education departments are designed to meet the various and diverse needs of their many
students. Students often have multiple disabilities. For example, one special needs student suffered from retarded motor skill development, and
his IEP required a full time note-taking assistant." Yet, he also suffered
from Tourettes syndrome82 and severe emotional difficulty. Similarly, in
Anderson,"3 the student's disabilities created mobility, motor skill, and
expressive language difficulties and required use of a wheelchair." Both
students need a variety of special services. A public school, with a substantial staff of specialized instructors, can meet the many needs of these
students while simultaneously providing services to other students. However, if either student attends a private school, and the school lacks a
substantial special education department, a mini-staff must be built
around that student, increasing the costs of providing services to that
student and leading to an inefficient use of public resources. Under
Fowler, money needed for public school programs will subsidize extra
costs associated with providing special services at private schools,
thereby diluting other public school services.
The IDEA Amendments Act of 19975 put the debate to rest. The
amendments specifically state:
this part does not require a local educational agency to pay for the
cost of education, including special education and related services ...
at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate
education available to the child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school."

80. See Fowler, 107 F.3d at 807-08.
81. The author has been a public school teacher and the student was one of his students.
82. Tourettes syndrome is "a rare disease characterized by involuntary tics and by
uncontrollable verbalizations ....MERRIAM WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 821 (1996).
83. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996).
84. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 676.
85. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, §
612(a)(10)(c), Ill Stat. 37, 63 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
86. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments § 612 (a)(10)(C), Il1 Stat. at 63.

1998]

EDUCATION

The amendments attempt to clarify the legislative intent of the IDEA."7
After the passage of the amendments, the Fifth Circuit reversed its Cefalu opinion." The U.S. Supreme Court remanded Russman for reconsideration in light of the amendments. 9 In addition, the DOE's interpretation
does not require that districts pay for services for students voluntarily
placed in private schools, but rather, that free and appropriate education
is available to all disabled students, and a proportionate share of federal
funds are earmarked for students voluntarily placed in private schools.'
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court also remanded Fowler for reconsideration in light of the IDEA amendments.9 The Tenth Circuit ruled
that while the amendments clarified that the IDEA does not compel public school districts to provide on-site services at the private school, the
amendments were not retroactive' and took effect after June 4, 1997.93
Because the court decided Fowler prior to June 4, 1997, the amendments
did not apply to that case.' The court emphasized that a "clarifying"
amendment did not necessarily restate the intent of the original enacting
Congress, particularly for a law that was enacted twenty-two years earlier." Thus, the court applied the amendments only to cases occurring
after June 4, 1997'
It is axiomatic that all children should have access to needed special
education services as "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education
...on equal terms." Of course, no special needs student should be denied equal access to special education. However, retaining school district
discretion to determine the most appropriate and cost effective way to
administer those services does not deny any student access to special
education.
II. FREE SPEECH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Public employment is an enigma because civic agencies are both
"employers" and "public." The First Amendment generally restricts government action that restrains speech. 9 While acting as a business, a government agency is charged with maintaining an efficient workplace, and
87. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1997).
88. Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 233.
89. Board of Educ. v. Russman, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997). The case has yet to be reheard by the
trial court.
90. Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 232.
91. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
92. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997).
94. Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1434-35.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1436.
96. Id.
97. Hendrickson, supra note 31, at I (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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therefore has an interest in censoring speech that could be counterproductive to its operations.' However, the agency is also an arm of government, and therefore, a potential tyrant whose power must be curbed to
m The resulting split personality of the
protect free speech.'"
public employer affords its employees greater free speech protections than an atwill private employee would enjoy. °' An at-will employee can be terminated with or without cause, and therefore does not enjoy free speech
rights in the workplace. Conversely, government employees enjoy further protections because their employer is the state.
At the same time, the public employee compromises some free
speech rights in order to contribute to the productive operation of the
agency" and not disrupt the functioning of the enterprise."' Thus, free
speech in the public workplace is not absolute. Instead, courts balance
the interests of the public employer in controlling disruption against the
employee's interest in free speech and the dangers of censorship at the
hands of the sovereign."'
Two Tenth Circuit decisions reflect the uncertainty which riddles
public employee speech cases where courts apply the Pickering/Connick
balancing test.'"m Although the language of the test is simple, its application is maddeningly inconsistent. In both cases, public schools demoted
or terminated teachers who criticized school policies."'" However, the
court reached different conclusions in each case. In the first case,
m the court found, as a matter of law, that
Gardetto v. Mason,"
the
teacher's speech was protected by the First Amendment.'" One month
earlier, however, in Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Board of
Regents,"' the court denied claims that two public university professors
were terminated due to their speech because the specific speech was not
protected by the First Amendment."'

99. Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better Definition of
the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 994 (1997).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 994-95.
103. See Bernadette Marczely, Free Speech or Public Agency Efficiency?, 51 DISP. RESOL. J.
18, 19 (1996); see, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (noting that a state governor may
require high-ranking deputies to share the governor's political beliefs); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 616-18 (1973) (holding that government employees may be prohibited from participating
in political campaigns).
104. Hoppmann, supra note 99, at 995-96.
105. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996); Bunger v. University of Okla. Bd.
of Regents, 95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).
106. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 808-10; Bunger, 95 F.3d at 989-90.
107. 100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996).
108. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 816.
109. 95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).
110. Bunger, 95 F.3d at 992.
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A. Background
The seminal cases providing the backdrop of public employee free
speech claims are Pickering v. Board of Education"' and Connick v.
Myers."2 The cornerstone of the analysis is determining whether the
content of the speech reflects "matters of public concern.'"' 3 If the speech
does not reflect matters of public concern it is not protected speech."'
However, if the speech does reflect matters of public concern, the court
balances the speech interests against the government's censorship interests." 5 The First Amendment protects the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open."'' 6 "Matters of public concern" are political, social, or other concerns. 7 that contribute to the debate on public issues.
Internal personnel matters are not "matters of public concern" because
they do not address policy issues."8 "[T]he First Amendment does not
require a public office to be run as a roundtable for public employee
complaints" over the internal operations of public agencies."9
Pickering, a public school teacher, was terminated after writing a
newspaper editorial criticizing the school board's bond proposals and
spending decisions." The board argued that publication of the editorial
disrupted "the efficient operation and administration of the schools.'.'
The U.S. Supreme Court balanced the teacher's interest in "commenting
upon matters of public concern," and the state's interest "in promoting
the efficiency of public services."'" The Court found that comment on
bond proposals and spending decisions are matters of public concern,"
and teachers are informed members of the community who positively
contribute to public debate on school finance.' The Court ruled in favor
of Pickering because the school's interest in limiting efficiency did not
outweigh the teacher's interest in contributing to public debate and the
public's interest in unhindered discourse on matters of public importance.

111. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
112. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
113. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
114. Id.
115. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
117. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
118. See id. at 147.
119. Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Connick,
461 U.S. at 147-49).
120. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 568.
123. Id. at 571-72.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 573-74.
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In Connick, Assistant District Attorney Myers circulated an office
questionnaire soliciting views regarding certain office policies, the employee's level of confidence in their supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work on political campaigns." Connick terminated
Myers in part for distributing the questionnaire." The Court's "public
concern" analysis focused on the content, form and context of the questionnaire." The Court found that only the question addressing whether
employees felt compelled to work on political campaigns addressed a
matter of public concern.' The other questions either addressed the internal operations of the district attorney's office or were not of public
import in evaluating the office.'" Since one question did touch a matter
of public concern, the Court invoked the Pickering balancing test. "' The
Court found that Myers's interest in free speech did not outweigh the
government's interest in corralling office disruption, and upheld the termination.'32
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Gardetto v. Mason"3
a. Facts
Gardetto, Director of Special Student Services at Eastern Wyoming
College, ' alleged that the school demoted and suspended her in retaliation for her use of constitutionally protected speech.'33 Six instances of
speech formed the basis of Gardetto's claim."' She criticized the college's reduction-in-force procedures at a board of trustees meeting.' 7 She
opposed the procedures the college used in terminating a fellow employee.'38 She supported a no confidence vote in Mason, the college
president. "9 She criticized Mason's holding himself out as a "doctor"
without a doctoral degree.'" She supported three non-incumbent candidates for the college's board of trustees.'' Finally, she criticized the reor-

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
Id.
Id.at 147-48.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 154.
100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996).
Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ganization of the Adult Reentry Center to a visitor giving a speech at the
college."2 The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Mason because
the jury did not believe Gardetto's speech was the motivating factor behind the termination.13
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit fashioned a four-step test based on
Pickering and Connick." First, the court determines, as a matter of law,
whether the employee's speech constitutes a matter of public concern."Second, if it is a matter of public concern, the Pickering balancing test
balances the State's interest in efficiency against the employee's speech
interests." Third, if the scales tip in the employee's favor, the employee
"must prove that the use of the protected speech was a substantial or a
motivating factor" in the employer's decision." Fourth, if the employee
shows that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor, the burden
shifts to the employer to show that the same decision would be reached
in absence of the use of the protected speech.'" Steps three and four are
fact questions that need not be considered unless the court first finds, as a
matter of law, that the speech touches matters of public concern and that
the Pickeringtest favors protecting the speech."9
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's framework, the Gardetto court
defined matters of public concern as "political, social or other concern[s]
of the community."' ' Matters of mere personal interest such as internal
personnel disputes and working conditions do not address public concerns.'" The court found four of Gardetto's six statements to be matters
of public concern.' 2 Gardetto's criticism of the college's reduction-inforce procedures was a matter of public concern because it involved
public expenditures.' Like Pickering, Gardetto's opinion was informed
and valuable to public debate on the issue.'' Gardetto's support of nonincumbent candidates for board positions was of public concern because
the board sets educational policy, and does not deal merely with matters
of internal college functioning.' Gardetto's criticism of Mason's misrepresenting himself as a doctor is a matter of public concern because the

142.
144.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 810-1I.
ld. at 81I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,572 (1968)).
Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 812.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

integrity and qualifications of a college president impact the social and
political fabric of the community.'" Gardetto's no confidence vote in
Mason held similar public concerns."' However, Gardetto's criticism of
the termination of a fellow employee was not a matter of public concern
because it was a mere matter of internal departmental affairs, and not the
subject of public debate.""
Once the court established that several of Gardetto's statements
were matters of public concern, it employed the balancing test. 59 Pickering factors include the time, place, manner, and context of the statements, whether the statements impair the discipline and close working
relationships within the agency, and whether the speech has a detrimental
impact on the speaker's loyalty and performance." Since the school
failed to produce evidence that Gardetto's speech disrupted the college's
services, the court ruled that the speech interests outweighed the school's
interests.'6 ' The court remanded the case for a jury determination of the
third and fourth steps.'62
2. Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents 3
a. Facts

Bunger and Pradhan, two untenured professors at Cameron University School of Business,'" criticized election procedures for seats on the
university's policy-making council.'" Bunger campaigned for a seat on
the council.'" Despite receiving two-thirds of the votes, he was ineligible
to be elected to the council because he was untenured, and only tenured
professors were eligible for council positions.'67 The two professors complained that the election procedures violated the faculty handbook." The
professors demanded that untenured faculty be eligible for council positions and that the school honor Bunger's election.' 9 They were both ter-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 812-13.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 817-18.
95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).
Cameron University School of Business is part of the University of Oklahoma system.
Bunger, 95 F.3d at 989.
Id.
Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 989-990.
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minated at the end of the academic year.'" The district court dismissed all
claims against the school.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that the professors' statements regarding
the procedures for election to the Graduate Council were not matters of
public concern.' 2 Whether a university council position is limited to tenured faculty is a matter of internal structure within the university, and not
the subject of public debate.' The internal structure of the college is not
a political, social, or policy concern."" The court reiterated the policy set
forth in Connick that "what constitutes a matter of public concern must
be constrained by 'the common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.""" Since the grievances Bunger and Pradhan brought were internal and personal in scope, they did not constitute matters of public concern. 176
C. Other Circuits
The Seventh Circuit articulated the frustration the public concern
test poses. "As an inferior tribunal, our part is to apply the Supreme
Court's approach, fuzzy though it may be."'" Circuit courts struggle to
apply the Connick public concern test, especially when the speech could
easily be both public and private in nature. Not suprisingly, .the various
circuits produce inconsistent results.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated each of Gardetto's statements separately, requiring the district court to identify those statements which constituted a matter of public concern before the jury conducts its analysis.'
The Seventh Circuit, took the opposite approach in Khuans v. School
District 110.'"9 In Khuans, a teacher complained on numerous occasions
to school district officials about her supervisor's management skills.'" In
addition, she complained that the supervisor's failure to provide parents
with notification of educational planning meetings adversely affected the
special needs students at the school.'8 ' The court determined that statements concerning the supervisor's impact on special services constituted

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. at 992.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
Id.
Wales v. Board of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997).
Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 817 (10th Cir. 1997).
123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1016.
Id.
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matters of public concern, but general complaints about the supervisor
did not."2 Differing from the Tenth Circuit's approach, the court insisted
that where multiple statements formed the basis of the claim, the speech
must be viewed in its entirety.u3 Viewing all the remarks as a single
statement, the court found the speech "much closer to the 'private' than
the 'public' end of the spectrum. ' " Thus, the speech did not implicate
constitutional protections."
In Wales v. Board of Education," a public school teacher was terminated for statements she made to her principal.'8' While on medical
leave due to the stress associated with classroom disruption and lack of
discipline, Wales wrote a memorandum to the principal complaining
about the school's disciplinary policies and procedures.'88 The court noted
that the complaints could be a purely private matter because they dealt
with employment conditions or, conversely, a public matter because the
complaints surrounded school management.'89 The court interpreted the
speech as a private matter concerning her employment conditions because Wales addressed the memo to the principal, suggesting that her
intent was to benefit only her personal, private interests." Thus, the Seventh Circuit looked to circumstantial evidence of the motive behind the
speech to determine its content.
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit found that motive behind the
speech did not make it unprotected.'9 ' The plaintiff, a social worker,
complained about the school's policy regarding the reporting of child
abuse.' The school district alleged that the plaintiff's motive for the
complaint was "to deflect blame for delaying a child abuse report," not
for the purpose of public policy concerns.'9" The court noted that the
speech was protected even when made privately to an employer'" because complaints about child abuse reporting policies were matters of
public concern.'9"

182. Id. at 1016-17.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1017.
185. Id. at 1018.
186. 120 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1997).
187. Wales, 120 F.3d at 83.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 84-85.
190. Id. at 84. "Although the First Amendment is not limited to speech that is broadcast to the
world... an employee's decision to deliver the message in private supports an inference that the real
concern is the employment relation ... "Id.
191. Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 122 F.3d 1112, 1117(8th Cir. 1997).
192. Calvit, 122 F.3d at 1114.
193. Id. at 1117.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit adopted a content-based approach in determining
whether speech is a matter of public concern. ' 9 The court attempted to
distinguish political, social, or other concerns of the community" from
matters of personal interest, internal personnel disputes, and working
condition issues.' This approach is content-based because it requires the
court to evaluate the content of the speech and to assess the level of public interest. However, the content-based approach is highly speculative
and arbitrary. The court, in Bunger, seems to assume that procedures
governing election to the policy-making board of the college did not
raise issues of public debate. Yet, the policies the board promulgates
would likely be matters of public concern because the policies themselves affect the educational mission and effectiveness of the school.
Thus, the court tried to distinguish the policy-making board's procedures
for election from the policies themselves. While the content of the complaints may in fact be different, it appears arbitrary to assert that one is a
matter of public concern while the other is not. Both are policies of the
university. While the court could conceivably distinguish between them,
doing so seems difficult and subjective. The Tenth Circuit should have
fashioned some more principled test to determine whether a statement is
a matter of public concern.
Of course, free speech has never meant "unregulated
talkativeness.Y Nonetheless, free speech is one of this nation's most
cherished rights upon which courts should be reluctant to encroach.
Thus, application of the Pickering test should conform to the policies
behind the First Amendment. Free speech doctrine contemplates at least
two related policies." First, it facilitates "the discovery and spread of
political truth. '' "° Second, it provides a medium for self-expression.2 The
public concern threshold ignores the need for self-expression and focuses
exclusively on the public's need for information.' While the Tenth Circuit is constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court's directive of using a public concern threshold, it should apply Connick liberally in ascertaining
whether speech is a matter of public concern. Public concern is an elusive benchmark. What is of no concern to one member of the public may
196. Bunger v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 95 F.3d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1996).
"Whether speech is of public concern depends on the 'content, form, and context of a given
statement as revealed by the whole record."' Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48
(1983)).
197. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
198. Id.
199. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
121, 126 (1996).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 130.
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be significant to another. If the Tenth Circuit permitted more. speech to
be evaluated under the Pickering test, its decisions would be more consistent with the polices of self-expression and dissemination of information which underlie the First Amendment and the intent of the Framers.
III. SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY PAYMENTS TO DISABLED CHILDREN

A. Background
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides benefits to disabled
children in order to help poor families pay for modifications and therapies necessary for their child's disability.' These therapies in turn help
disabled children succeed in school and may be provided in conjunction
with other school services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determines SSI eligibility pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.' Traditionally,
"any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.., of comparable severity" to an impairment that would disable an adult constituted a disability.' A child engaged in gainful activity was not
disabled.' A child not engaged in gainful activity was deemed disabled
if the child's severe impairment was equivalent to an impairment identified in regulatory listings.' If the child's disability did not appear in the
listings, an individualized functional assessment (IFA) identified the
actual circumstances facing the child and assessed whether the impairment was of comparable severity to that which would disable an adult.'
The ALJ considered the effect of the child's impairment on six areas of
development.2 ° The ALJ could find "comparable severity" if the child
showed marked impairment in one domain and moderate impairment in
another. "'
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act,22 raising the SSI eligibility standard
because costs were skyrocketing. Congress had received reports that

204. Congress Picks Myth Over Reality About Kids: America's Disabledare Denied Benefits in
a Misguided Effort to Fix a System That Wasn't Broken, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 9, 1997, at
D6.
205. See Quinones v. Chater, 117 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1997).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994) (defining adults as disabled if they are unable "to
engage in any substantial gainful activity" by reason of their impairment).
207. Age as a Factor of Evaluation in Childhood Disability, 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1998).
208. Id. For a list of impairments see 20 C.F.R. § 404(subpt. p, app.l) (1998).
209. Quinones, 117 F.3d at 34; see Todd A. Smith, Access to Justicefor Kids-The Children's
SSI Project, 85 ILL. B.J. 352, 352 (1997) (discussing subsequent elimination of the "individual
functional assessment").
210. Quinones, 117 F.3d at 34. The six domains are: cognition, communication, motor abilities,
social abilities, personal behavioral patterns, and concentration, persistence, and pace in task
completion. Id.
211.
Id.
212. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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families were abusing the program,"' and the SSI price tag had tripled in
the previous six years."'
This new legislation redefined disability, effectively slashing SSI
eligibility for thousands of children and pulled the rug out from under
families who depend on SSI benefits."' The Act provides: "An individual
under the age of eighteen shall be considered disabled.., if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which
results in marked and severe functional limitations."" 6 The new standard
eliminates the IFA requirement to determine if the impairment is of
"comparable severity to that which would disable an adult."2 7 The new
standard also requires that if the impairments do not meet or equal a
listed impairment, the handicap is not marked and severe, and the child is
not disabled.' The ALJ may rely on considered testimony from the parent regarding the severity of the symptoms of the impairment, but medical evidence must support specific findings of impairment."9 Thus, under
the heightened scrutiny mandated by the new standards, a child is now
less likely to receive SSI benefits.
B. Brown v. Callahan'
1. Facts
Gertrude Brown appealed an order denying SSI benefits for her
daughter, Khilamey Wallace, who had asthma and a speech
impairment." The ALJ denied benefits, determining that her impairments were not severe enough to be comparable to that which would
disable an adult.' Subsequently, Congress enacted legislation affecting
SSI benefits,' which stated that the new standards apply to all cases not

213. Barbara Vobejda & Amy Goldstein, Quick Review Promised for SSI Rules; Thousands of
Children Have Lost Benefits, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 9, 1997, at A9. Congressional outrage was
inflamed by stories such as an Arkansas family who collected $61,000 a year for their eleven
children simply for the children "acting crazy." See Congress Picks Myth Over Reality About Kids:
America's Disabled Are Denied Benefits in a Misguided Effort to Fix a System That Wasn't Broken,
supra note 204.
214. Vobejda & Goldstein, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
217. Brown v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 1997).
218. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1135.
219. Id. at 1135-36.
220. 120F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 1997).
221. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1134.
222. Id. at 1135.
223. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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finally adjudicated including those on appeal since August 1996."' Thus,
the new standards applied to Brown's appeal. '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported the AL's determination that Wallace's impairment was not disabling. 226The AU found no medical evidence to establish mental or
nervous problems or that Wallace's speech impediment or her asthma
were disabling.' 7 In fact, medical records characterized the asthma as
mild." Since the evidence did not establish a mental or nervous impairment meeting or equaling a listed impairment, Wallace's impairment was
not marked and severe.22 Therefore, she was not disabled and not eligible
to receive SSI benefits/' °
C. Other Circuits
Decisions in other circuits mirror the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of the new statute. The Sixth Circuit, for example, noted "this legislation
removes the use of the 'individualized functional assessment' test." ' The
Second Circuit also acknowledged the new definition of childhood disability, but only applied the new definition to appeals filed after the effective date of the act. " Since the new standards are stricter than the old
standards, the Ninth Circuit found that any case denying benefits under
the prior standard should also be denied under the new standard. 3
D. Analysis
The new standards for defining disability and SSI eligibility make
disabled children and their families one of the premier casualties of the
nation's assault on welfare. The "marked and severe" threshold and the
elimination of the IFA clearly make children's collection of SSI benefits
more difficult. The IFA's broad scope increased a child's eligibility
chances because it considered the actual circumstances of the child,
rather than whether the circumstances fit an identified disability.'

224. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1135 (citing section 211 (d)(1) of the Act found in the notes following
42 U.S.C.A. § 1382(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1136.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Vibbert v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 121 F.3d 710, 710 (6th Cir. 1997).
232. Quinones v. Chater, 117 F.3d 29, 33 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997).
233. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1997).
234. See Smith, supra note 209, at 352.

1998]

EDUCATION

As a consequence of the heightened standards, Congress drastically
reduced the number of children eligible for benefits."5 Moreover, the
Social Security Administration must re-determine the eligibility of children who currently receive benefits under the previous standard. 6 In
effect, children currently receiving benefits may be told that they are "no
longer disabled." As a result, approximately 135,000 children stand to
lose their benefits; 7 approximately 112,000 of them have a mental disorder."8
The reforms are problematic because economic motives underlie
them, rather than principled reasons substantively tied to the child's disability. The suggestion that the child is less disabled in 1996 than she
was in 1995 because Congress changed the rules strains logic. To cut off
funds to the needy merely to save money or prevent abuse is shortsighted. Perhaps, most significantly, since the new law makes eligibility
much more difficult to obtain, families may feel compelled to retain
counsel at administrative hearings, 9 either at their own expense or
through pro bono services.2" In addition, families unable to obtain necessary therapies will turn to schools to try to compensate for those lost
therapies.
IV. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Perhaps the most politically charged Tenth Circuit case decided
during the past year was Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1"24 The case originated in 1969, and has evolved through several stages of litigation over
the past twenty-eight years."2 The appeal challenged desegregation in
Denver Public Schools and the constitutionality of the Colorado Constitution's busing clause,"3 Colorado's Public Schools of Choice Act2" and

235. Legislation & Regulations, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 761, 761 (1996).
236. Id.
237. Robert A. Rosenblatt & Melissa Healy, Welfare Law Will Exclude 135,000 Disabled
Children,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A24.
238. Jocelyn Y. Stewart, Kids Lose DisabilityPayments: New Rules Anger Parents,Advocates,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1997, at A12. Mental disorders which were previously, but no longer,
eligible include personality disorders, maladaptive behavior, learning disabilities, and attention
deficit disorder. Id.
239. Smith, supra note 209, at 352.
240. See id. (describing the Children's SSI Project as a coalition of legal services, pro bono, and
law school programs to help represent children in administrative SSI hearings).
241. 119F.3d 1437 (10thCir. 1997).
242. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1440. The original case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, 303 F. Supp.
279 (D. Colo. 1969), is referred to elsewhere in this survey as "Keyes I".
243. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1440. The "busing clause" provides that no student shall "be assigned
or transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of achieving racial balance."
COLO. CONST., art. IX, § 8 (amended 1974).
244. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-36-101 (1997) states, in relevant part:
[E]very school district ... shall allow [its pupils] ... to enroll in particular programs or
schools within such school district....
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Colorado's Charter Schools Act.' The Tenth Circuit dismissed the case
because the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction, ' the issues were
not justiciably ripe, and the plaintiffs lacked standing.'
A. Background
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that segregation in public
schools is unconstitutional.2' One year later, in Brown I,29 federal district courts were granted jurisdiction to fashion remedial decrees to desegregate public schools.' School districts had "primary responsibility
for . . . assessing and solving segregation problems. ' District courts
appraised school district efforts and ensured that the school districts
made a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance. ' ' "s The U.S.
Supreme Court, in Green v. School Board of New Kent County,"3 recited
a mandate from Brown II requiring that school boards take affirmative
steps to transform a "dual segregated system" into a "unitary system. '
The Green Court identified five aspects of school operations, including
student assignments, faculty and staff assignments, transportation, facili... Any school district may deny any of its resident pupils or any nonresident pupils
from other school districts within the state permission to enroll in particular programs or
schools within such school district only for any of the following reasons:
(a) ... lack of space or teaching staff....
(b) The school requested does not offer appropriate programs ....
(c) The pupil does not meet the established eligibility criteria for participation in a
particular program ....
(d) A desegregation plan is in effect for the school district, and such denial is
necessary in order to enable compliance with such desegregation plan.
(e) The student has been expelled ....
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104 (1997). The statute also states:
A charter school shall be a public non-sectarian, non-religious.., school which
operates within a public school district.
(3) A charter school shall be subject.., to any court ordered desegregation plan in
effect for the school district .... Enrollment decisions shall be made in a
nondiscriminatory manner ....
(6) Pursuant to contract, a charter school may operate free from specified school
district policies and state regulations.
Id.
246. Keyes, 119F.3dat 1440.
247. Id. at 1443-46.
248. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
249. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown i mandated the
elimination of racial discrimination in public schools and assigned roles to both school districts and
federal district courts to implement the desegregation process. See Haeryung Shin, Note, Safety In
Numbers? Equal Protection, Desegregation, and Discrimination: School Desegregation in a MultiCultural Society, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 191-92 (1996).
250. John E. Lee, The Rise (And Fall?) of Race-Conscious Remedies and "Benign" Racial
Discrimination Public Education, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 153, 160 (1996).
251. Shin, supra note 249, at 191-92.
252. Id. at 191 (quoting Brown, 349 U.S. at 300).
253. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
254. Green, 391 U.S at 437-38 (holding that the school district's freedom of choice plan was
insufficient to create a unitary system).
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ties, and extra-curricular activities, as the most important indicia of segregation. '
In response, many school districts instituted remedial measures
based on benign racial classifications, including racial quotas, redistricting, and busing students away from neighborhood schools which were
predominantly composed of one race.' In Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, the Court upheld busing as a race
conscious remedial measure to desegregate schools. 8 Two years later, in
Keyes v. School District.No. 1 (Keyes If 9 the Swann ruling extended to
northern and western states, holding that school districts without recent
history of de jure segregation were nonetheless obligated to desegregate
if any discriminatory history tarnished the district.2"
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that school districts were not
required to implement cross-district remedial plans absent an actual inter-district violation.' In addition, the Education Amendments of 1972,
known as the "Antibusing Amendments," prohibited construction of
education laws to require busing." During the 1980s, school districts
began their return to neighborhood schools.2" Recently, federal courts
have permitted school districts to abandon benign remedial plans if the
districts achieved "unitary status.' 'M In Board of Education v. Dowell,"
the U.S. Supreme Court held that desegregation injunctions were "not
intended to operate in perpetuity,"' and "the school district is under no
duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors." 67 The
court further noted that racial balance was necessary only as a response
to a constitutional violation by the school district."' In the 1990s, the
U.S. Supreme Court began to assess whether school districts achieved
unitary status.' A school district achieved unitary status "if it had engaged in good faith compliance with earlier desegregation decrees and

255. Id. at 438.
256. Lee, supra note 250, at 165-67.
257. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
258. Swann, 402 U.S at 29-31.
259. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
260. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210-13.
261. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
262. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1994). "No provision of this Act
shall be construed to require the assignment or transportation of students or teachers in order to
overcome racial imbalance." Id. § 165 1.
263. See Davison M. Douglas, The End Of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1723 (1997).
264. Id. at 1722.
265. 489 U.S. 237 (1991).
266. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248; see Shin, supra note 249, at 193, 195 (discussing the Supreme
Court's changing focus with respect to desegregation decrees).
267. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 407,494 (1992).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 486-87; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245; see Douglas, supra note 263, at 1723 (concluding
that historically segregated neighborhoods pose significant difficulties for courts attempting to
determine if public schools are guilty of historical discrimination).
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had eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination." ° In addition, in the
1990s, the Court has consistently applied "strict scrutiny" to government
racial classifications.27 '
School districts responded to judicial deference granted to them by
abandoning racially classified remedial programs in favor of charter
schools, magnet schools, and public schools of choice." Critics charge
that schools are returning to segregation as districts, such as Denver
Public Schools, seek to avoid federal court supervision, and as benign
race-based remedial measures are dismantled in favor of magnet and
charter schools." Charter schools are "legislatively authorized publicly
funded school[s] of limited enrollment" that exist outside the scope of
the existing school district structure." ' In exchange for public funding,
the trustees of the school contractually bind themselves to accountability
for student performance." 5 The charter schools movement started in Minnesota in 1991, and has gained momentum in the education reform
movement in the 1990s. 6 President Clinton recently called for more
charter schools nationwide, and the 1996 Republican Party platform also
endorsed charter schools.'
B. Keyes v. School District No. 1 (Keyes XIX)"7'
1. Facts
In 1969, the U.S. district court in Denver ordered a citywide desegregation plan after finding that from 1960-1969 the Denver School Dis-

270. Douglas, supra note 263, at 1723 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50). A vestige of
segregation is "a policy or practice which is traceable to the prior de jure system of segregation and
which continues to have discriminatory effects." See United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp.
214, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
271. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to redistricting
plan designed to increase minority representation); Adarand Const., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 23637 (1995) (subjecting federal race-based classifications to strict scrutiny); Lee, supra note 250, at
176-77.
272. See Douglas, supra note 263, at 1716. Magnet schools seek to achieve the effects of
integration by attracting white students to urban schools, which offer a specialty area of study not
available in the suburban school. Thus, the white students are voluntarily attracted to the urban
school. Similarly, charter schools and public schools of choice seek to attract voluntary integration
by emphasizing parental choice. Id.
273. Id. at 1715. Douglas argues that segregation levels have increased such that urban schools
are now more racially imbalanced than they were prior to 1971. Id. He noted that more than 80% of
the nation's minority students live in metropolitan areas, and in the nation's largest cities, 15 out of
every 16 Black and Latino students attend schools where most of the students are non-white. Id. at
1721-22.
274. Karla A Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The Legality of
CharterSchools, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1997).
275. Id. at 1374.
276. Id. at 1372.
277. Id. at 1373.
278. 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Keyes XIX].
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trict had established and maintained de jure segregation in the public
schools.' While under district court supervision, Denver Public Schools
(DPS) underwent significant change and took steps, including busing, to
remedy past discrimination. "80
The desegregation plan was revised in
1976 to include transporting students by bus."' As a consequence of
busing, the district lost more than 30,000 pupils to "white flight" into the
suburban school districts as families avoided forced busing of their children."
In Keyes XIX,' the district court terminated its jurisdiction and supervision over the DPS desegregation efforts because past de jure segregation had been eliminated and DPS had achieved unitary status.' In
that case, Keyes asked for a determination of the constitutionality of the
Colorado Constitution's busing clause as well as the charter schools and
schools of choice statutes.' The district court did not rule on the constitutionality of the busing clause or on the two statutory provisions because that determination would constitute an advisory opinion." On appeal, Keyes asked for a determination of the constitutionality of all three
laws, but did not challenge the termination of the district court's jurisdiction over desegregation efforts. 7 Keyes argued that the busing clause,
established in 1974, which prohibits the busing of students, blocks any
effective school integration program, thus precluding the district from
continuing desegregation efforts and violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by subverting benefits based on
race.28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first determined that Keyes's request to determine
the constitutionality of the busing clause, the Public Schools of Choice
Act, and the Charter Schools Act lacked .ripeness." The parties stipulated
there was conflict between the busing clause and the district's policies
which would justify a ruling on the constitutionality of the clause, but
they could not show actual conflict between the clause and any specific
policy.'

However, "parties cannot create a case or controversy ..

.

by

agreement."'" Keyes argued that the constitutional and statutory provi279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440.
Busing's Diehards Try Again, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 26, 1996, at 52A.
KeyesXIX, 119 F.3d at 1441.
Id.
Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995).
Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440.
Id. at 1442.
Id.
Id.
Id. at1444.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sions prevented the district and individual schools from instituting any
potential voluntary integration plan because the plan would conflict with
the busing clause.' However, absent any specific district or individual
school site attempt to implement a voluntary desegregation plan barred
by the busing clause, the problem was hypothetical."
Next, the court ruled that Keyes did not have standing to bring the
suit. ' To have standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate injury in fact."5 The
plaintiffs lacked standing for the same reasons that the issue lacked ripeness. They could not demonstrate that the school district or any school
had withdrawn policies or refrained from instituting desegregation policies as a result of the busing clause.m
C. Other Circuits
School districts nationwide continue to struggle with eliminating the
vestiges of past segregation. The Eighth Circuit, in Jenkins v. State of
Missouri,' affirmed the district court's order denying a declaration of
unitary status.' The court reiterated the good faith compliance and
elimination of vestiges of past discrimination standards for determining
whether a school district has become unitary.' In addition, unless the
school district has previously achieved unitary status, it bears the burden
of proof.' Once the court finds an unlawful dual school system in the
past, the court presumes current disparities are the result of unconstitutional conduct.0' Using the Green factors,3" the court found that the district carried its burden to prove unitary status only in the extra-curricular
activities category." Specifically, the district could not prove that wide
gaps in student achievement between white and black students was due
to socio-economic or demographic factors.tm Thus, the district had not
ameliorated racial isolation attributable to de jure segregation in the
past."
The Second Circuit, in United States v. City of Yonkers,3" held the
state of New York liable for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 1444-45.
Id.
Id. at 1445.
Id.
Id.
122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins, 122 F.3d at 591.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 593.
Id.
See id. at 592 n.3.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 591.
96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to take steps to remedy segregation." After several unsuccessful school district attempts, the district
court denied unitary status for the district in 1993, noting that minority
students received different education" from majority students and that
compliance with existing remedial orders would be inadequate to eliminate the vestiges of segregation.3 9" The state undoubtedly knew of the de
jure segregation in Yonkers School District, but did not take steps to end
it.' Moreover, the district court found "determined reluctance" by the
state to enforce its own desegregation policy because "race-based political opposition to integration" pressured the state to ignore signs of segregation in the district."' The Second Circuit found that foreseeability of
the segregative effect of the state's inaction and its departure from its
normal procedural and substantive sequences, sufficiently established
discriminatory intent required by the U.S. Supreme Court in equal protection racial disparate impact claims."
D. Analysis
Although the court dismissed Keyes, the case draws the battle lines
over desegregation in the future. Judge Murphy's opinion appears to
invite school districts or individual schools to implement their own specific desegregation plans that may be in conflict with the busing clause.
The basis of the denial of jurisdiction is the fact that no policies have
been put into place or that schools have refrained from putting them into
place. Thus, the case can become justiciable once districts begin to implement policies in conflict with the busing clause. Schools themselves
must establish their own programs to maintain integration. When these
programs are challenged, the constitutionality of the busing clause, the
Charter Schools Act, and the Public School of Choice Act should become justiciable because the cases are tied to specific desegregation programs.
However, it appears unlikely that schools will develop programs
that challenge the busing clause. The Denver public school system has
been fighting against judicial supervision for over twenty years, seeking

307. Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 617-18.
308. Id. at 603-04.
309. Id. at 604.
310. Id. at 607. "[The State] lost the will to act for the simple reason that its once touted
principles of racial equality in the schools had become politically untenable." Id. (quoting United
States v. City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. 212, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
311. Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 612. A plaintiff is required to show not only that the state action
produced disproportionate or discriminatory impact, but also that the state acted with intent to
discriminate. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
(setting forth a list of factors which aid in determining discriminatory intent); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (concluding that a law is not unconstitutional "solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact").
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freedom from mandatory busing." 2 Moreover, busing students is politically unpopular and too controversial for school districts to risk implementing." ' Thus, the court's apparent invitation to create a justiciable
issue may be unrealistic. According to the attorney for Keyes, the busing
clause "puts a dagger in the heart" of any future school desegregation
plans."" Because the Tenth Circuit ruling requires an actual desegregation
plan that the district is unlikely to implement, he may be right. However,
the Yonkers decision could encourage districts and state governments to
pursue voluntary desegregation plans in order to avoid equal protection
disparate impact liability. Because the Second Circuit inferred discriminatory intent from the state's failure to take steps to remedy known segregation in Yonkers,3 ' school districts and state governments are placed
in a tenuous policy position, feeling the pinch from political pressure on
the one side and from constitutional imperatives on the other.
CONCLUSION

Tenth Circuit decisions during this survey period appear to afford
greater deference to school district discretion in managing educational
affairs. The Keyes decision is a very clear sign of judicial deference to
school districts and indicates reluctance to intervene on desegregation
grounds. Although the Fowler decision seems to constrain district discretion in determining appropriate special education services, congressional clarification of the IDEA emphasized district discretion, and
caused the Tenth Circuit to retreat from its early Fowler ruling. The public concern threshold for public employee speech continues to constrain
free speech by public employees and to protect the discretion of public
agencies, including schools, to terminate employees for speech regarding
the internal operations of the school. The new SSI eligibility standards,
however, will have a powerful and detrimental residual impact on
schools. As more and more families watch their SSI benefits dry up, and
are consequently unable to pay for therapy, services, and treatment for
their disabled children, they will become increasingly dependent upon
schools to provide these essential and badly needed services.
Bryan M. Schwartz

312. See Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1997) (recounting history of conflict
between the Denver schools and the federal courts).
313. See Alan Gottlieb, Busing Changed Lives: Subject Still Deeply Divides Sides, DENVER
POST, Aug. 27, 1996, at A I (noting the contentious and dividing effect of busing).
314. Alan Gottlieb, Anti-Busing Clause Challenged Constitutional Amendment: Colorado
Constitutional Amendment Case Now in U.S. Appeals Court, DENVER POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at B6.
315. Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 607.

EMPLOYMENT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment in the workplace has been an enigma both in the
nature of the acts which violate Title VII and the extent of an employer's
liability for the acts of harassing employees. In recent decades Supreme
Court rulings have broadly advanced the goals of congressional legislation' to define both actionable sexual harassment in the workplace and
the related responsibilities of the employer.2 However, Congress and the
Court have left much of the specifics for the federal circuits to determine,
as discussed in the following analysis.'
Part I of this survey' analyzes the elements which make up a claim
for sexual harassment in the Tenth Circuit, focusing primarily on Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc.' Seymore adopted a four-part standard necessary for asserting a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment,
but failed to further clarify the specific nature of conduct violating Title
VII. Part II examines the employer's liability for the hostile environment
sexual harassment committed by both employees and supervisors, focusing on Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.6 In Harrison,the Tenth Circuit
appeared to establish strict liability for employers whose supervisors
commit hostile environment sexual harassment.

1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that
it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
2. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993) (adopting an objective/subjective
standard for determining the existence of hostile environment sexual harassment while clarifying
what types of behavior contribute to a hostile environment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII and that
courts should look to agency principles for guidance in determining employer liability for sexual
harassment by employees).
3. Jennifer L. Johnson, Note, Employment Law, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 965, 974-75 (1997). The
only guidance the Meritor Court gave regarding liability was to advise the district and circuit courts
to look to agency principles to determine employer liability for the hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors and stated that employers are not strictly liable for their supervisors' tortious
conduct. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73. However, due to the "malleable" nature of agency principles,
the circuits have reached conflicting conclusions regarding employer liability. Johnson, supra, at
975.
4. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1, 1996 and August 31,
1997.
5. I11 F.3d 794(10th Cir. 1997).
6. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); see infra note 232 (discussing the subsequent history of
Harrison).
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I. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM IN THE TENTH

CIRCUIT
A. Background
There are two theories of liability on which to bring a cause of action for workplace sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment.! Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employee
either performs sexual favors for a supervisor in return for employment
privileges or suffers adverse, work-related repercussions for refusing a
supervisor's advances In the early 1970s, when sexual harassment
claims were new to the courts, no analogous law addressed the issue.9 As
the case law sought to root sexual harassment in the expanded theories of
racial and ethnic harassment, the subsequent years saw the development
of the first cause of action recognized by the courts as the unlawful barter
defined in this theory of liability.'
Generally, the elements required for stating a claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment are that: (1) the victim/employee was a member of a
protected group; (2) the victim was subject to sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment was due to the victim's sex; (4) the victim's response to the
alleged harassment affected tangible aspects of the victim's employment
and the submission or refusal to cooperate with the harasser's demands
were an express or implied condition as to whether the victim's employment is positively or negatively impacted; and (5) the harassment was
carried on by the employee or supervisor in the course of his employment, incurring employer liability." In finding quid pro quo sexual harassment, most courts focus on the connection between the alleged har7. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 81 VA. L.
REV. 273, 280 n.15 (1995) (discussing the development and treatment of employer liability for quid
pro quo sexual harrassment among the various circuits).
8. Id.
9. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual HarassmentCommitted by Their Supervisors,81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 109-10
(1995) ('[C]onditioning employment on sexual demands, and harassment through sexual advances,
had no ready analogue in existing employment and discrimination law.").
10. Id.
11. Lynn T. Dickinson, Note, Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment:A New Standard,2 WM. &
MARY J. WoMEN & L. 107, 108-09 (1995). The article states:
To determine whether a plaintiff has proven quid pro quo sexual harassment, most
courts use the following five-part test:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) The employee's reaction to [the] harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The acceptance or rejection of the harassment by an employee must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of a tangible job
detriment in order to create liability under this theory of sexual harassment ....
(5) Respondeat superior.
Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir.1982)).
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assment and the promised employment benefit or detriment.'2 However,
to date, this set of elements has not been adopted by the Tenth Circuit."
The court instead focuses on whether "'specific benefits of employment
[were] conditioned on sexual demands' by the victim's supervisor.""
The second basis of liability is hostile environment sexual harassment," which results when an employee suffers sexually discriminatory
practices by co-employees or supervisors creating a hostile or abusive
work environment.'6 An actionable claim under this theory, defined by
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,'7 requires hostile
environment sexual harassment to be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.""' The Meritor Court found guidance from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which treated this
form of harassment as violating Title VII.'9 The EEOC adopted this position in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex'"despite controversy, including initial criticism by Reagan transition team member,
Clarence Thomas.2' However, the Court in Meritor ultimately concluded
that a cause of action existed by acknowledging the EEOC's conclusion
that hostile environment sexual harassment is unlawful.
In Meritor, a Meritor Savings Bank employee brought a claim for
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII against the bank and her supervisor.' The alleged harassment included rape and fondling of the employee by the supervisor in front of other employees.' The bank argued
that regardless of whether an actual sexual relationship existed, the language, congressional intent, and judicial interpretation of Title VII only
12. Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law
of Sexual Harassment,98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1989) ("Courts focus upon the nexus between the
alleged threats and economic detriment: The judicial gloss on the quid pro quo claim requires a clear
temporal link between the advances or threats and adverse employment decisions.").
13. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997).
14. Id. at 1443 (quoting Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 665 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995)).
15. Id.; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
16. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1443.
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 798 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
19. Id.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
21. Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 115-16. Oppenheimer states:
The EEOC's view that "hostile work environment" sexual harassment violates Title VII
was highly controversial at the time it was proposed. [The view] ... was criticized in a
report to President-elect Reagan from transition team member Clarence Thomas, who
predicted that it would lead "to a barrage of trivial complaints against employers around
the nation."
Id.
22. Meritor,477 U.S. at 65-67 ("Since the guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held,
and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.").
23. Id. at 60.
24. Id.
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focused on economic detriment resulting from the harassment or sexual
favors given quid pro quo for economic benefits.' The Court held that
the language of Title VII was intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment,"' and agreed
with the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex which
describe sexual harassment as including "verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature."' The Court found this treatment to be prohibited by Title
VII where "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." Rather than following the
EEOC's lead, however, the Court held that an actionable claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment required the harassment not only to affect working conditions, but also to be sufficiently oppressive to create
an abusive working environment.'
After Meritor, the federal circuits struggled with defining the conduct and injury that constituted actionable hostile environment sexual
harassment until the Supreme Court sought to resolve these conflicts in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." Harris clarified the Court's Meritor
decision by holding that a hostile environment exists "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
3
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."'"
This environment was to be evaluated in light of a standard, incorporating both an objective and subjective prong, adopted by the Court to determine the presence of a hostile working environment. 2 This standard
requires that the victim subjectively perceive the environment to be hostile while at the same time an objective person would also view the conditions as such." This standard helped address the question of whether
and what type of injury was required for Title VII to apply.'

25. Id. at 64 ("[Petitioner] contends . . . that in prohibiting discrimination with respect to
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment, Congress was concerned with what
petitioner describes as 'tangible loss of an economic character, [and] purely psychological aspects of
the workplace environment."' (quoting Brief for Petitioner 30-31, 34)).
26. Id. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
27. Merifor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R § 1604.1 t(a) (1985)).
28. Id. (quoting C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3)).
29. Id. at 67.
30. 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) ("We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
whether conduct, to be actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment ... must 'seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the plaintiff to 'suffe[r] injury."' (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
31. Harris,510 U.S. at 21 (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
32. Id. at 21-22.
33. Id. The court stated:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment . . . is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not
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Applying the objective/subjective standard, the Court stated that the
determining factor of whether a Title VII violation occurred was not
proof of actual injury, psychological or otherwise, but whether "the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive."' 5 Furthermore, the Court held that a determination of whether
an environment was hostile should be made only after examining all of
the circumstances." Such circumstances include "the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."' The Court noted
that the harassment's psychological effect on the employee was relevant
to finding an environment abusive but, "while psychological harm, like
any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is
required." 38
Even with the Harris clarification, the circuits still differ in their
opinions on the specific type and quantum of behavior that violates Title
VII. For example, the Seventh Circuit appears to require substantially
higher standards for demonstrating a hostile work environment.39 In
Baskerville v. Culligan InternationalCo., a supervisor of the defendant
employer subjected the plaintiff employee to vulgar and suggestive conduct over a period of seven months. ' This conduct included gestures
suggesting masturbation and references to the employee as "pretty girl"
and "Ms. Anita Hill."' The plaintiff brought an action for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII against her employer. ' At trial, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages. ' After Culligan International
appealed, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that no
reasonable jury could have found that the supervisor's remarks created a
hostile working environment." The majority stated that an actionable
hostile work environment for purposes of proving sexual harassment is
one considered "hellish" for the harassed women. ' In its analysis, the
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no Title VII violation.
Id.
34. Id. at 22 (stating that Title VII did not mandate a threshold question of whether the conduct affected the plaintiffs psychological well-being or suffered injury, but only required that "the
environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995).
40. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 428.
43. Id. at 430.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. ("The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women from the
kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women .... It is not designed to
purge the workplace of vulgarity."); see Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 502 (7th
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court declared that there was a "'line that separates the merely vulgar and
mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually harassing,"'
which was not a bright line but varied with the circumstances.' Furthermore, the court held that "[a] handful of comments spread over months is
unlikely to have so great an emotional impact as a concentrated or incessant barrage."'
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Meritor holding in Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Company.' In Hicks, a security guard alleged that she was subjected to sexual jokes, sexually offensive language, and unwanted
touching by her supervisor and other co-employees over an eight-month
period. '9 She also alleged that she was subjected to general disparate
treatment based on her sex.' At trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs
sexual harassment claims because it found no evidence that the supervisor made his advances or sexual treatment a condition of employment, or
quid pro quo harassment." The Tenth Circuit, deferring to the recent
Meritor decision, reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to
consider whether the conduct constituted hostile environment sexual
harassment. 2 Hicks further held that a finding of hostile environment
sexual harassment requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, rather than listing specific elements to be considered."
In Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,' the Tenth Circuit adopted the subjective/objective standard from the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Harris as the appropriate standard of review for
whether a work environment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII.L In Hirase-Doi, an operator for U.S. West Communications, Inc. (U.S. West) brought a sexual harassment claim alleging sexual

Cir. 1997) (stating that theoretically, a cause of action for hostile environment harassment will not
exist until the harassment reaches a "severe and pervasive" level).
46. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431 (quoting Car v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010
(7th Cir. 1994)).
47. Id.
48. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
49. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408-10. The allegations included an incident where the plaintiff's
supervisor rubbed her thigh and told her, "I think you're going to make it" an admonition that the
supervisor was going to "put his foot up [her] ass so far that [she] would have to go to the clinic to
take it out;" and her supervisor's touching of her buttocks while stating, "I'm going to get you yet."
Id. at 1409-10.
50. Id. at 1408-10.
51. Id. at 1411, 1414.
52. Id. at 1414-16.
53. Id.; see Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 575-76 (10th Cir.
1990).
54. 61 F.3d 777(10th Cir. 1995).
55. Hirase-Doi,61 F.3d at 782 ("In Harris v. ForklifI Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court required both an objectively hostile work environment, as well as a subjective perception by the plaintiff that the environment was abusive, for a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim."
(citation omitted)).
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harassment by a co-employee, Kenneth Coleman.' The harassment consisted of Coleman's sexually offensive behavior towards other employees and an incident where he grabbed the plaintiff between the thighs."
The grabbing incident led to Coleman's suspension and immediate resignation. 8 The trial court held that by suspending Coleman immediately
after grabbing the plaintiff, U.S. West took appropriate remedial action
and granted summary judgment for U.S. West 9 The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded, holding that even if U.S. West was unaware of Coleman's harassment of the plaintiff, it could have been put on
notice of the harassment by his previous conduct toward other employees.' Furthermore, the court held that Coleman's harassment of other
employees contributed to a hostile work environment as long as the
plaintiff was aware of it during the time she was harassed.6
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc.'
a. Facts
Lou Ella Seymore, a female journeyman electrician employee of
Shawver & Sons, Inc. (Shawver), was subjected to sexually offensive
remarks and gestures during her employment.' She repeatedly complained about the conduct to her job steward and filed a grievance with
her union." However, according to Seymore, the sexually inappropriate
conduct never ceased.' She filed a discrimination charge against
Shawver with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission (OHRC), who
then filed a charge with the EEOC on her behalf.' Shawver subsequently
terminated her employment.' Seymore then filed another charge with the
EEOC alleging both racial and sexual discrimination." In addition, she
filed suits against Shawver and the union alleging sexual discrimination
and retaliatory practices. ' At trial, the district court granted summary

56. Id. at 780.
57. Id. at 780-81. Coleman's harassing conduct towards employees other than the plaintiff
included sexually offensive comments, an attempted kissing of an employee, and possibly sexually
charged staring. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 783-86.
61. Id. at 782-83.
62. 111 F.3d794(1OthCir. 1997).
63. Seymore, Ill F.3d at 796 ("Ms. Seymore claims she was subjected to a plethora of sexually offensive remarks and gestures during her tenure at Shawver.").
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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judgment for the union. ' The court also granted summary judgment for
Shawver on the retaliatory practices claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Seymore did not allege retaliation in her EEOC charge
against Shawver.7' The jury returned a verdict for Shawver on the sexual
discrimination claim.72 Seymore appealed the district court's summary
judgment on her discrimination claim against the union, claiming error in
not holding the union responsible for unlawful sexual harassment by
Shawver and in granting summary judgment Shawver's favor."
b. Decision
In defining a sexually hostile work environment under the Meritor
rule, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's holding in Marquart
v. Lodge 837, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers," which established the four elements that comprise a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment." Under this standard a plaintiff must show that: "1) she is a member of a protected group;
2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) the harassment was
based on sex; and 4) the harassment altered a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiff's employment, creating an abusive working environment." '6 The court applied the Meritor severe or pervasive standard of
review to the adopted elements of hostile environment sexual harassment
and found that the union workers.' sexual harassment of Seymore was not
severe enough to violate Title VII."
The court further held that because the jury found for defendant
Shawver on the sexual harassment claim, Seymore's sexual harassment
claim against the union likewise failed because under Title VII the union
could not be held liable for the employer's actions as a matter of law: 8
[A] union may be held responsible under Title VII for discriminatory
practices by an employer if the union does not take appropriate action
against such practices .... However, where a jury determines an employer did not engage in unlawful discrimination under Title VII, a
union may not be held responsible under Title VII for the employer's
actions. 9

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
26 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 1994).
Seymore, III F.3d at 797 (citing Marquart,26 F.3d at 853).
ld. (quoting Marquart, 26 F.3d at 853).
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
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2. Harrisonv. Eddy Potash,Inc.'
a. Facts
Jeanne Harrison, a female underground potash miner, suffered unwanted sexual conduct from her male supervisor over a period of two
months." The supervisor's conduct including groping, requests to have
sex, and forcing Harrison to masturbate him.82 Subsequently, she reported
the conduct to a manager in the mine's safety office." In response, the
human resources manager placed her on administrative leave pending an
investigation into her grievance.' After hearing the conflicting accounts
of the events, including the supervisor's claims that the conduct was consensual, the human resources manager decided Harrison would be reimbursed for lost time, and provided with medical and counseling support if
needed."5 Moreover, her supervisor was placed on permanent probation
and ordered not to work with Harrison." Harrison never returned to work
and was terminated the following year due to reductions in the mine's
work force."
Harrison then brought actions under Title VII for hostile work environment sexual harassment against her supervisor and employer. " At
trial, the jury returned verdicts for the defendants on the sexual harassment claim and Harrison appealed, alleging that the jury was improperly
instructed regarding employer liability. 9 She also alleged that the trial
court improperly required that before establishing employer liability the
plaintiff must prove the harasser was a supervisor who had authority over
the conditions of employment, including the authority to hire and fire.'
b. Decision
Before analyzing the sexual harassment liability implications for the
employer regarding sexual harassment, the Tenth Circuit referred to
Meritor's quotation of the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex9' that hostile environment sexual harassment occurs where a
supervisor's or co-worker's sexual conduct "has the purpose or effect of

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
1993)).
91.

112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
Harrison,112 F.3d at 1440-41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1441-42.
Id. at 1442.
Id.
Id. at 1439.
Id.
Id. at 1447 (adopted from Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
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unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
C. Other Circuits
In Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,9 the Second Circuit held that hostile
environment sexual harassment required a showing of two elements.
The first is that the sexual harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment." '5 The second is that there was a basis on which
conduct creating the abusive environment could be imputed to the employer. '
To satisfy the severe or pervasive standard of the first element, the
alleged incidents had to be "more than episodic," and should be "sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive."9' The
court also noted that an important factor in finding a hostile environment
was the environment itself: "Evidence of a general work atmosphere...
as well as evidence of specific hostility directed toward the plaintiff'
should be evaluated." However, in Torres v. Pisano,' the Second Circuit
also noted that "even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough,
can establish a hostile work environment."' '
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in.Jansen v. PackagingCorp. of
America' that hostile environment sexual harassment occurs "[w]hen the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. ' ' "n The
court clarified the required threshold of unlawful conduct for actionable

92. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1443 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a))).
93. 115 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997).
94. Perry, 115 F.3d at 149.
95. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)).
96. Id. at 143. In Perry, the plaintiff claimed she was sexually harassed by her coworkers. Id.
at 146. Specifically, she alleged she was subjected to catcalls, that certain of her coworkers "asked
her to have sex, pulled at her bra strap, pulled at her pants, pawed her neck, rubbed up against her
and grab[bedJ at [her] chest." Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The
defendant employer presented evidence that it had in place a sexual harassment policy and that on
the day it was notified of the harassment by the plaintiff, it began an investigation which, in the
absence of any corroborating evidence for the plaintiff's allegations, resulted only in reprimands of
the coworkers. Id. at 148. The jury found that a hostile environment existed but that because the
employer took appropriate remedial action after notice of the harassment, it rendered a verdict for
the defendant and the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 143.
97. Id. (quoting Harris,510 U.S. at 2 1).
98. Id. (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.3d 1406, 1415 (1993)).
99. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. Torres, 116 F.3d at 631 n.4.
101.
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 533 (citations omitted).
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sexual harassment as consisting of neither "'isolated and/or trivial remarks of a sexual nature"' ''t nor harassment that is "'too tepid or intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she has
been discriminated against on the basis of sex."'"' Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its language from Baskerville stating that the purpose of hostile environment sexual harassment is "to protect working
women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace
hellish for women.' '
D. Analysis
While Seymore established the four factors necessary for a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, neither it nor
Harrison had any occasion to give further indication of what specific
types of conduct would contribute to hostile environment sexual harassment. Both decisions merely reiterated the vague definition of an actionable claim of hostile environment sexual harassment from Meritor. However, after both the Seymore and Harrisondecisions during this survey
period, a panel of Tenth Circuit court justices issued an order denying a
0 ' In a
petition for rehearing en banc in Rocha Vigil v. City of Las Cruses."
dissent, Judge Lucero critidized the panel, and the court as a whole, for
relying on its Hicks holding that for hostile environment sexual harassment to apply, "[t]here must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial [or
sexual] comment" such that the work environment is "so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority [employee]. ''""I Judge Lucero argued that in light of
the Supreme Court's holding in Harris, psychological injury alone cannot be a determinative factor indicating a Title VII violation and Hicks
should be overruled.'1
Furthermore, according to Judge Lucero, the Tenth Circuit cases
subsequent to Harrishave continued to require Hicks's "steady barrage"

103. Id. (quoting Galloway v. General Motors, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996)).
104. Id. (quoting Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993)).
105. Id. (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)). In Jansen,
the plaintiff argued that her boss sexually harassed her by subjecting her to unwanted and offensive
sexual advances that included intimations that her raise would not be held up if she allowed his
advances. Id. at 493. This was the basis for an unsuccessful quid pro quo argument. Id. Her hostile
environment claim was based on other remarks of a similar nature made by her boss. Id. The plaintiff claims she was subjected to sexual advances by one of her supervisors in her marketing division
of Burlington Industries which consisted of intimations that sexual relations with that supervisor
would lead to success and promotions. Id. In both cases, the court remanded for resolution of material issues of fact. Id. at 490, 495.
106. 119 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1997).
107. Rocha Vigil, 119 F.3d at 872 (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412-13
(10th Cir. 1987)).
108. Id. ("[O]ur claim in Hicks that 'Title VII is violated only where the work environment is
so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the
minority employee' cannot stand.").
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of harassing conduct to find a Title VII violation.'" Such a requirement is
not well-suited to this purpose in light of its historical association with a
required psychological injury."' He therefore argued that that test should
be abandoned because it requires a much more severe standard than required under Harris."'
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of the elements for a prima facie case
for hostile environment sexual harassment will provide a necessary and
uniform guide for employers, attorneys, and the courts in the future.
However, the absence of clear parameters or consensus as to the nature
and quantum of conduct necessary for an actionable hostile environment
sexual harassment claim leaves employers without direction as to how to
structure internal sexual harassment policies and evaluate such grievances from employees.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES BY
SUPERVISORS

A. Background
Quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual
harassment have had different liability implications for employers in the
Tenth Circuit."2 If a district court finds quid pro quo sexual harassment
by a supervisor, the employer is generally held strictly liable for the actions of the supervisor."' However, the Supreme Court specifically held
that employers should not be strictly liable for the hostile environment
sexual harassment caused by their supervisors"" and the Tenth Circuit has

109. Id. at 872.
110. Id.at872-73.
111. Id. at 873. Judge Lucero stated:
In its continued reliance on Hicks, this court appears to believe that only the most egregious cases will give rise to an actionable claim of hostile work environment under Title
VII. Such a belief is entirely without foundation. As the Second Circuit has noted even
since I requested an en banc hearing, Harris stands for a very simple and straightforward
proposition: "Whenever the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable
employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse, it is actionable under Title VII, so long as the employee subjectively experienced the hostile work
environment."
Id. (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 633 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
112. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997). The court stated that
"[i]n
cases involving quid pro quo harassment, courts routinely hold, with little or no discussion, that
the employer is 'strictly liable."' Id. However, the Tenth Circuit stopped short of this standard for
hostile environment sexual harassment: "As the Supreme Court specifically emphasized in Meritor,
and as this court has since acknowledged, an employer is not strictly liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment committed by one of its supervisors." Id. at 1451.
113. Id. But see Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Serv., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 920, 923 (W.D. La.
1995), affd, 78 F.3d 581 (5th Cir: 1996) (holding that defendant would be liable for quid pro quo
sexual harassment if the employer had notice of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action).
114. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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acknowledged this limitation."' The Meritor Court advised the lower
courts to refer to agency principles in order to avoid findings of strict
liability. "6
In the years following the Meritor decision, the circuits split over
the correct test for employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor."' Several circuits followed the negligence standard without holding the employer strictly liable."8 For example, the
Sixth Circuit, in Kauffman v. Allied Signal,"9 held that in order to find the
employer liable, the plaintiff must show that the supervisor's actions
were foreseeable or within his scope of employment.1 However, even if
the plaintiff carried its burden, the defendant could still succeed by
showing that the employer responded appropriately to avoid liability.'2'
In Kauffian, a supervisor and other co-employees harassed the plaintiff
after she had breast enlargement surgery."' Once the harassment by the
supervisor was reported to the company, the supervisor was terminated."'
The trial court found the harassment neither foreseeable nor within the
scope of the supervisor's employment.'" Ultimately, the trial court held
that the supervisor's immediate termination upon first notification of the
harassment was an appropriate remedial response and absolved the employer of liability; the Sixth Circuit agreed."'
The Third Circuit also followed this negligence standard in Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia." The Andrews court required the trial judge, in
light of all the circumstances, to determine whether plaintiff's working
environment was one which women of "reasonable sensibilities" would
find hostile or offensive.' Under such conditions an employer could be

115. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1451.
116. Id. (stating that since Congress's definition of "employer" includes agents of the employer,
this demonstrates an intent to limit the acts of employees for which employers are liable under Title
VII). The court stated in Meritor:
Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer . . .
surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
117. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 131.
118. Id.at132-33.
119. 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992).
120. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184 ("[Tjhe determination of whether or not Allied is liable for its
supervisor's actions depends on 1) whether [the supervisor's] harassing actions were foreseeable or
fell within his scope of employment and 2) even if they were, whether Allied responded adequately
and effectively to negate liability.").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 179-81.
123. Id. at 181.
124. Id. at 184.
125. Id. at 185.
126. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
127. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486.
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liable by respondeat superior if, under Meritor's direction to look to
agency principles, the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take adequate remedial action. 28' The First, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have subsequently followed this direct negligence
standard in a similar fashion.'"
Some circuits have kept the negligence standard while also adopting
elements of agency law. 3' The Eleventh Circuit, in Faragherv. City of
Boca Raton,3 ' held the employer could be liable if it had actual or constructive knowledge of the sexual harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.' 2 In addition, the court held that liability would attach if
the harassing supervisor acted as the employer's agent while creating the
hostile environment.'33 However, the court noted it would be rare for a
supervisor to act as an agent while creating a hostile environment, since
such tortious behavior is not within the scope of any supervisor's employment.'
The Second Circuit in Karibian v. Columbia University,'5 came
close to holding employers automatically liable for their supervisors'
sexual harassment of employees.' In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
she was pressured into a sexual relationship with her supervisor. "'i
The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant employer on the

128. Id. ("Thus, if a plaintiff proves that management-level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action, the employer will be liable.").
129. See Klessens v. United States Postal Serv., 42 F.3d 1384 (1st Cir. 1994) (adopting direct
liability standard and holding that the victim's verbal complaints of harassment by her supervisor to
management were insufficient to put the company on notice and also that the employer's subsequent
transfer of the supervisor was appropriate, thereby avoiding liability); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that even where the vice-president of the company is the
alleged harasser, employer liability would result only if the company failed to adequately respond to
the victim's complaint, ignoring any claim of vicarious liability); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs.,
Inc., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that since the victim gave notice of sexual harassment to
the branch manager, she did not have to also complain to corporate headquarters to impute liability
to the employer); Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 134.
130. See id. at 136.
131. 76 F.3d 1155, vacated on reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1346 (11 th Cir. 1996).
132. Faragher,76 F.3d at 1164 ("The district court correctly reconciled this precedent in holding that an employer may be liable in a hostile environment case if either (1) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action, or (2) the harasser
acted as the employer's agent.").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1164-65.
135. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). In holding that employers could be liable solely if the harasser
was aided in the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship under Restatement (Second)
of Agency section 219(2)(d), the Harrison court found support in the Second Circuit's holding in
Karibian.Harrison,112 F.3d at 1445-46.
136. David L. Gregory, Sex Discrimination:Continuing Clarifications by the Second Circuit,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 363, 393-94 (1995) (explaining how the court's merging of liability standards
for quid pro quo sexual harassment indicate the court's pro-plaintiff slant).
137. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776.
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plaintiff's hostile environment sexual harassment claim on the grounds
that the employer had no notice of the harassment and also had a grievance procedure in place.'38 the Second Circuit reversed, holding that if
the factfinder found for plaintiff on her allegations of hostile environment sexual harassment, the employer would be liable regardless of actual or constructive notice because the supervisor misused the employer's delegated authority to create an abusive working environment.'39
However, the Karibiancourt also stated that if the supervisor did not rely
on his authority, then employer liability could only be established using
the negligence standard."
In contrast to the Second Circuit's holding in Karibian, the D.C.
Circuit in Gary v. Long'' stated that the supervisor's agency relation to
the employer always aids accomplishment of the unlawful activity because the supervisor's authority includes responsibilities requiring the
supervisor to be proximate to and regularly meet with his or her employees. 2 The court agreed with the district court that the employee had suffered hostile environment sexual harassment but refused to hold the employer liable for the supervisor's abuse of authority to facilitate the harassment."3 The court held that no liability imputes if an employer creates
a hostile work environment grievance policy and informs the plaintiff
employee to the extent that the employee knew or should have known
that the unlawful conduct of her supervisor was not authorized or condoned by the employer.'"
In Hicks, the Tenth Circuit adopted sections 219(1) and 219(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency as possible bases for employer liability in hostile environment sexual harassment in employment. ' These

138. Id. at 775.
139. Id. at 780. While not specifically addressing the separate clauses of section 219(2)(d), the
court nevertheless held that the employer, Columbia, would be liable "regardless of the absence of
notice or the reasonableness of Columbia's complaint procedures." Id.
140. Id.; see also Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the
negligence standard when supervisor did not rely on supervisory authority).
141. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
142. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397 ("In a sense, a supervisor is always 'aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency' because his responsibilities provide proximity to, and regular contact
with, the victim." (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mackinnon, J.,
concurring))).
143. Id. at 1397-98. The harassment included threats of termination if sexual demands were not
satisfied, battery and rape. Id.
144. Id. at 1398. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that an employer may not be held liable for a supervisor's hostile work
environment harassment if the employer is able to establish that it had adopted policies
and implemented measures such that the victimized employee either knew or should have
known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to the
employer without fear of adverse consequences.
Id.
145. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We find guidance in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958). Under section 219(1), an employer is liable for
any tort committed by an employee 'while acting in the scope of... employment."'). However, the
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principles were further defined in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corre:tions
Department," which held that an employer could be liable for the actions
of a supervisor or employee only if: (1) the employer failed to "remedy
or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known" (negligence or recklessness standard); 7 (2) the unlawful
actions of the harassing employee were within the scope of his employment; or (3) the harassing employee "'purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or
he [or she] was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.""' 9 Of these separate and exclusive avenues of employer
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment, the Tenth Circuit has
been most reluctant to hold an employer liable only under the scope of
employment theory because sexual harassment is never a part of an employee's job description."
While these same principles apply to both supervisors and coemployees, the nature of these respective positions trigger different liability principles. Employer liability is more likely to attach when supervisors, rather than employees, sexually harass employees under the hostile environment theory.'' The Tenth Circuit has generally applied the
"knew or should have known" negligence standard as the basis for employer liability for employees' hostile environment sexual harassment of
co-employees.' 2 In the case of supervisor harassment, however, the court

court found that section 219(1) was not a reliable tool for finding an employer liable for sexual
harassment by its employees since ."sexual harassment simply is not within the job description of
any supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business."' Id. at 1417-18 (quoting David
Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Development in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 239, 276 (1987)). Instead,
the court felt that section 219(2) was a more helpful standard. Id. at 1418. Section 219(2) "creates
employer liability when (1) the master was negligent or reckless ... and (2) where the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance on apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)).
146. 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
147. Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 (quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
148. Id. at 576-77.
149. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d)(2)) (alteration in original).
150. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417-18 ("'[Clonfining liability ... to situations in which a supervisor
acted within the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that employers
would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors to
molest women employees."' (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
151. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 (upholding the district court's finding that because the
harasser was not the plaintiff s supervisor there was no apparent authority and the employer could
only be held liable if the negligence standard was met).
152. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
that since the parties have not disputed the harassing employees' lack of apparent authority, the court
will examine employer liability under the negligence standard); cf Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,
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has yet to hold an employer liable under the "apparent authority" rule of
liability for a supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment of supervised employees
under Restatement (Second) of Agency section
53
219(2)(d).'
The Tenth Circuit clarified the definition of "employer" in Sauers v.
Salt Lake County.'" Finding no definition of "agent" in the text of Title
VII, the Sauers court held that a supervisor qualifies as an "employer"
under Title VII if the supervisor holds significant control over the plaintiff's work environment, including the hiring and firing of the plaintiff. 5
Moreover, under this definition, the supervisor functions as the employer's "alter ego" and can make the employer liable by his or her illegal actions regardless of whether the employer had notice of the supervisor's conduct."w However, in Harrison this language was limited to a
court's determination of whether a sexual harassment claim naming only
the harassing supervisor can also function as a claim against the employer and does not bear on the employer's liability.''
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc."'
a. Facts
After allegedly being exposed to sexually offensive remarks and
gestures by co-employees, Seymore filed grievances with her job steward
and her union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.'59
Even after she filed these complaints, the plaintiff claims that the har86 F.3d 167, 170-71 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to hold employer liable but focusing exclusively on
the negligence basis).
153. See Griffith v. Colorado, 17 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying the negligence
"knew or should have known" standard while acknowledging the "apparent authority" avenue);
Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding only that the supervisor
held sufficient authority over plaintiff to allow plaintiff's claim against supervisor to also be a claim
a claim against the employer); Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 579-80 (affirming the district court's finding
that harassing supervisor did not purport to act on behalf of employer under section 219(2)(d));
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417-18 (rejecting negligence as only standard for employer liability for supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment of supervised employees and remanding for review in
light of agency principles).
154. 1F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
155. Sauers, I F.3d at 1125 ("We agree with the Fourth Circuit that 'an individual qualifies as
an "employer" under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant
control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment."' (quoting Paroline v. Unysis
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989))). This language was subsequently limited in Harrison v.
Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997). See infra Part Il.B.2.b.
156. Sauers, I F.3d at 1125 ("In such a situation, the individual operates as the alter ego of the
employer, and the employer is liable for the unlawful employment practices of the individual without regard to whether the employer knew of the individual's conduct.").
157. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
158. 111 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 1997).For a discussion of the facts, see supra Part I.B. L.a.
159. Seymore, Ill F.3d at 796.
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assing conduct continued.'" The plaintiff then filed a discrimination
charge against Shawver with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission
(OHRC), who filed a charge on her behalf with the EEOC.6' Subsequently, Shawver terminated her employment, which resulted in the
plaintiff filing another charge with the EEOC alleging both racial and
sexual discrimination." She also filed suits against Shawver and the union alleging only sexual discrimination and retaliatory practices.' At
trial the district court granted summary judgment for the union.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reiterated the agency principles recited in
Hirschfeld." However, these principles were never applied to the facts
because the court found that the defendant's employees had not satisfied
the requirements for sexual harassment under Title VII.'" In this case, the
plaintiff also wanted to hold the union liable on the basis that unions
should not be able to ignore an employer's unlawful discrimination and
avoid Title VII liability.'67 The court held that because the jury found the
employer not liable for sexual harassment, the union could not likewise
be held liable since the original conduct was not found to be unlawful."
2. Harrisonv. Eddy Potash,Inc.'"
a. Facts
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the jury instructions failed to
properly instruct the jury regarding employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII.'" Specifically, Harrison alleged that the trial court: (1) incorrectly combined two separate bases for
employer liability under Title VII; (2) erred in instructing the jury that
the allegedly harassing supervisor, Brown, had to be empowered with a
high degree of control over the plaintiff to impose liability on the defendant;'7' (3) wrongly defined "apparent authority;.. and (4) improperly

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
follows:

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1442. For a discussion of the facts, see supra Part I.B.2.a.
Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1442. The jury instruction defining an agency relationship was as

In order for you to hold the defendant Eddy Potash, Inc. liable to the plaintiff Jeanne
Harrison for the acts of Robert Brown, you must find that Robert Brown was an agent of
defendant Eddy Potash, Inc. In order to determine whether Robert Brown was an agent of
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rejected three of her proposed instructions for employer liability for the
sexual harassment of its supervisors under Title VII.'"
b. Decision
In determining whether the district court properly instructed the jury
regarding employer liability, the Tenth Circuit examined the third possible avenue of liability under the Restatement (Second) of Agency section
219(2)(d)."' The court held that the first and second clauses of section
219(2)(d) should be viewed as two separate bases for liability instead of
one as held in Hirschfeld.' Under the first clause, the court held that a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the employer vested the harassing supervisor
with authority to control "significant aspects" of the harassed employee's
work environment; "6 (2) the supervisor sexually harassed the plaintiff;."
and (3) the plaintiff relied or acted on the apparent authority of his or her
supervisor."'

defendant Eddy Potash, Inc., you must find that Robert Brown exercised significant control over plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment at Eddy Potash, Inc., such
that Robert Brown's supervisory position was equivalent to that of managerial control
over plaintiff, thereby creating an employer/employee relationship, thus making Robert
Brown the alter ego of Eddy Potash, Inc.
Id. at 1448.
172. Id. at 1449. The jury instruction on apparent authority was as follows:
If you find that Robert Brown was an agent of Eddy Potash, Inc. then you must also
determine whether Robert Brown was acting with "apparent authority" as an agent of
Eddy Potash, Inc.
In this regard you are instructed that an employer, such as Eddy Potash, Inc., may not
be liable to an employee for the acts of its agent (supervisor) unless its agent had
"authority," whether apparent or otherwise, to commit the acts in question.
In order to determine whether an agent had "apparent authority" you should consider
what knowledge the plaintiff had regarding the authority of the agent to commit such acts
in question. In this regard you should consider whether the employer had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that it had adopted policies against sexual harassment, and
had implemented measures such that a victimized employee knew or should have known
that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to her employer without fear of adverse consequences.
Id.
173. Id. at 1442.
174. Id. at 1443-46.
175. Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990).
176. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444 ("The first element is established '[wihenever an employer
vests its supervisor with the authority to control significant aspects of the work environment."'
(quoting Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principlesfor Guidance in Finding Employer Liability for A Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1057,
1089 (1995)) (alteration in original)).
177. Id.
178. Id. The court states that this element would be difficult to prove if the employer has a
formal written grievance policy and has "taken steps 'to remove any possible inference that a supervisor has authority to sexually harass his subordinates."' Id. (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at
1090). In contrast, if an employer fails to have such an established grievance policy, "'a victim of
sexual harassment will reasonably perceive her only available options to be silently acquiescing in
the harassment or leaving her job."' ld. (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1090). The court
appears to imply that absent a grievance policy, the employer is likely to be liable.
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The second clause of section 219(2)(d) states that the employee
"was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."" The court determined that this clause is satisfied when the employer authorizes a supervisor to control a work environment and the
supervisor abuses that authority by sexually harassing an employee."
Moreover, the court held that employer liability can attach regardless of
whether or not the employer had a written sexual harassment grievance
policy in place which was known to the plaintiff."' The court limited the
extent of this liability, however, by holding that the employer would not
be liable if the agency relation only placed the supervisor in proximity to
the plaintiff. 2
The court summarized its new interpretation of the agency principles with which to hold employers liable for sexual harassment as follows:
In summary, an employer in this circuit can be held liable under
Title VII for hostile work environment sexual harassment committed
by one of its supervisors if any of the following conditions are met:
1)

The supervisor committed the harassment while acting in
the scope of his employment. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 219(1).

2)

The employer knew about, or should have known about,
the harassment and failed to respond in a reasonable manner. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b).

3)

If the employer manifested in the supervisor the authority
to act on its behalf, such manifestation resulted in harm to
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acted or relied on the apparent authority in some way. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 219(2)(d), clause 1.

4)

If the employer delegated the authority to the supervisor to
control the plaintiff's work environment and the supervisor
abused that delegated authority by using that authority to
aid or facilitate his perpetration of the harassment. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), clause 2.'"

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1445 ("[I]f the supervisor 'is able to misuse that power to create a
hostile work environment, the employer will be liable for having placed him in the position to do
so."' (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1091)).
181. Id. at 1446.
182. Id. ("We emphasize ... that this interpretation does not allow liability of attach where the
harasser's agency relationship merely provided him with proximity to plaintiff.").
183. Id.
179.

180.
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The Harrisoncourt also limited its holding in Sauers regarding the
definition of an "agent" for purposes of Title VII liability.'8" The court
agreed with the plaintiff that she was not required to show that the harasser was a supervisor who exercised "significant control" over workplace conditions including hiring and firing, which the trial court interpreted as a prerequisite to establishing employer liability under Sauers.'8
The court explained that the Sauers holding concerned whether a claim
against a supervisor, in his official capacity, could also operate as a claim
against the employer, who was not listed as a party in the plaintiff's initial cause of action.'" Because Harrison appropriately filed claims against
both her supervisor and the employer, Sauers did not apply.'87
In addressing the question of whether the jury was properly instructed, the court held that employer liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment under section 219(2)(d) requires the supervisors to
have apparent or actual authority over the plaintiffs working environment and that the harassment be aided by that authority.'" Moreover, all
that is required for apparent authority is that the victim or plaintiff reasonably believe that the supervisor has such authority based on "written
or spoken words or any other conduct" of the employer. 9
C. Other Circuits
Many circuits are struggling with the correct agency standard to
apply to employer liability for the sexual harassment by a supervisor. For
example, a plurality of justices on the Seventh Circuit in Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America believed that negligence was the best standard in
cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, including that of supervisors.'" However, there was not much clarification on the specific negligence standard.'9 ' In fact, a per curiam opinion in Jansen called on the

184. Id. at 1448 ("[Wie conclude the discussion in Sauers of who constitutes an "agent" for
Title VII purposes is strictly limited to situations in which a court is determining whether a claim
against a named individual defendant (in his official capacity) can operate as a claim against the
employer itself.").
185. Id. at 1447-48 (holding that the requirement of showing the harassing supervisor's significant control over the work environment only applies in determinations of whether a suit may proceed against an employer not listed in the pleadings and "has no applicability in deciding whether
the employer is liable for the conduct of its employees").
186. Id. at 1448.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1449-50.
189. Id. at 1450 (stating that jury instruction wrongly focused on the knowledge of the plaintiff
regarding apparent authority rather than the plaintiff's reasonable belief).
190. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1997) ("All the judges
with the exception of Judges Easterbrook, Rovner, and Wood believe that negligence is the only
proper standard of employer liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment even if as
here the harasser was a supervisor rather than a coworker of the plaintiff.").
191. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493-94; see Michael A. Wamer, Jr., Franczek Sullivan Labor and
Employment Report: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Sexual HarassmentCases While Lower Courts
Struggle, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1998, at 61 (referring to Jansen, the article states "[a] narrow
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Supreme Court to "bring order to the chaotic case law in the important
field of practice.''
In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton," the Eleventh Circuit, applying
the negligence standard, held that "[a]n employer is directly liable for
hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably
diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take
immediate and appropriate action." ' The court further reiterated it's
holding that "in a pure hostile environment case, a supervisor's harassing
conduct is typically outside the scope of his employment," because in
conducting hostile environment sexual harassment only, the supervisor is
not acting within his "actual or apparent authority to hire, fire, discipline
or promote.""'9 The court further emphasized, in deference to Meritor,
that "employers are not automatically liable for the hostile environment
sexual harassment by their supervisors or employees.' However, in
addition to the above direct avenue of employer liability, the Eleventh
Circuit would allow indirect liability to attach if the harassing employee
were acting within the scope of his employment in conducting the harassment or if he or she was acting outside the scope of his or her employment, but is nevertheless aided in accomplishing the unlawful activity due to the existence of the agency relationship."

majority of the Seventh Circuit agreed that... a 'negligence' standard applies to claims in which a
supervisor's sexual harassment is alleged to have created a 'hostile work environment").
192. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 494-95. The Seventh Circuit, aware of the problems its holding in
Jansen would present the district courts, advised them to "recognize in this welter of opinions that
certain views do command a majority within our court: in particular, that the standard for employer
liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment by a supervisory employee is negligence,
not strict liability." Id.; see Brendan Stephens, 7th Circuit Divided Over Liability for Harassment,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 14, 1997, at I (summarizing the court's divisive ruling in Jansen).
193. 111 F.3d 1530 (11 th Cir.), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, which was decided after the conclusion of this
survey period, see infra note 232.
194. Faragher, Ill F.3d at 1535. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that under this theory the
city could be held liable for its own negligence but would not be liable for the harassing conduct of
its supervisors. Id. Like many circuits, the Eleventh Circuit labeled the various agency employer
liability categories as direct and indirect: "[A]n employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the
wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the
agent's wrongful act." Id. Tle employer is likewise indirectly liable for the sexual harassment by its
supervisors if the supervisor was acting within the scope of his or her employment, and if there's an
"agency relationship which aids the supervisor's ability or opportunity to harass his subordinate."Id.
195. Id. at 1535-36.
196. Id. at 1536.
197. Id. The court stated that
this circuit has articulated two agency principles under which an employer may be held
indirectly or vicariously, liable for hostile environment sexual harassment: (1)when a
harasser is acting within the scope of his employment in perpetrating the harassment and
(2) when a harasser is acting outside the scope of his employment, but is aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.
Id. (citations omitted). The court explained that the harasser could be within his or her scope of
employment if the harassing act was the agent's method for accomplishing an authorized purpose.
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The plaintiff in Faragherargued that she suffered alleged harassment by her supervisors when she was a lifeguard between 1985 and
1990. '" The alleged harassment consisted of unwanted touching and patting."' However, the plaintiff did not officially complain to her management, the City of Boca Raton's Parks and Recreation Department." The
plaintiff subsequently left her employment to attend law school in 1990
and filed her sexual harassment action against the city in 1992.201 At trial,
the court found for the plaintiff on the sexual harassment claim, awarding
nominal damages of one dollar.' The trial court reasoned that the city
was directly liable for the supervisors' conduct under agency law due to
the supervisors' authority over the plaintiff and the management structure.' Furthermore, the court held that the city was indirectly liable due
to the fact that the conduct was severe and pervasive, supporting "an
inference of knowledge, or constructive knowledge, on the part of the
city" regarding the supervisors' conduct.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment
for plaintiff on the sexual harassment claims, finding that: (1) the supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment because no
evidence supported an inference that the supervisors committed the harassment in performing a service for the city;' and (2) the supervisors
were not aided in accomplishing the sexual harassment due to the existence of the agency relationship because, under common law, the definition of "aided" refers to use of "an instrumentality of the agency or
through conduct associated with the agency status" to accomplish the
harassment.' Because no such evidence was present in that case the employer could not be held liable for the unlawful conduct of its supervisors.W
The Second Circuit in Torres v. Pisano' provided an alternative
approach of applying agency principles to employer liability in holding
Id. In this situation, the employer would be unable to avoid liability even if the harasser had been
specifically instructed not to engage in the unlawful behavior. Id.
198. Id. at 1533.
199. Id.
200. Id. The plaintiff did discuss the subject with a friend who was a supervisor but the conversation was not in the context of a subordinate to superior discussion and the supervisor never reported the incidents to management. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1534.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1537 ("[T]here is no evidence that Terry and Silverman harassed [the plaintiff] in
order to perform any service for the City, or that they were either explicitly or implicitly authorized
by the city to engage in such harassment."). Furthermore, the court stated that "[this case provides
the archetypical example of employees stepping outside of the scope of their employment and seeking to further personal ends." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
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that an employer is liable for the sexual harassment by one of its supervisors if:
(a) the supervisor was at a sufficiently high level in the company, or
(b) the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment
by the existence of the agency relationship, or (c) the employer provided no reasonable avenue for complaint, or (d) the employer knew
(or should have known) of the harassment but unreasonably failed to
stop it.'

Furthermore, in order for the plaintiff to prove liability on the grounds
that the supervisors abused the agency relationship to commit the harassment, he or she "must allege facts which establish a nexus between
the supervisory authority and the harassment."2 " This would mean that if
the supervisor was aided in accomplishing the tort simply because his
position put him in regular proximity and contact with the victim, no
liability would attach."' Neither would an employer be liable under the
abuse of the employment relationship standard if the plaintiff failed to
complain or resist the harassment because he or she feared
repercussions." '
In Torres, the Second Circuit limited a portion of its broad holding
in Karibian in a footnote which drew, ironically, from the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the second clause of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of Agency in Harrison."' Karibian had held the existence of a
complaint procedure and lack of notice to the employer would not automatically protect the employer from liability." In contrast, Torres focused on Harrison'sstatement that the apparent authority standard will
be difficult to prove "and will often hinge upon whether the employer
has a formal policy against sexual harassment." Moreover, "if an employer has taken steps to remove any possible inference that a supervisor
has authority to sexually harass his subordinates, the victim is likely
aware the harassment is not authorized and reliance on apparent authority
209. Torres, 116 F.3d at 634; see Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employment Law:
Liabilityfor Sexual Harassmentby Supervisors, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 1997, at 3 (explaining the Torres
decision).
210. Torres, 116 F.3d at 635 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1306 (2d Cir.
1995)).
211. Klein & Pappas, supra note 209.
212. Id.
213. Torres, 116 F.3d at 635 n. 14 ("(T]he first clause of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement..
provides for liability if 'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)
(1958))).
214. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Gregory, supra
note 136, at 386 ("Most significantly, the court [in Karibian]held that lack of notice to the employer
and the existence of complaint procedures do not automatically insulate an employer from liability.").
215. Torres, 116 F.3d at 636 n. 14 (quoting Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444).
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will be difficult to establish." 6 Under this new language, the Torres
court found that because it was not disputed that the plaintiff knew of the
defendant's sexual harassment policy, the employer could not be liable.2 '
The effect of Torres was to limit Karibian to its facts in regards to the
apparent authority issue. This means that the presence of a sexual harassment policy combined with efforts to make the employees fully aware
of that policy will, in the Second Circuit, generally shield employers
from liability for the sexual harassment by its supervisors as long as the
employer is not actually or constructively aware of the harassment."'
D. Analysis
Under the Tenth Circuit's new interpretation of the agency principles regarding employer liability, the court appears to have made employers strictly liable for their supervisors hostile environment sexual
harassment of their supervised employees, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Meritor. The decision also allows employees to bring
hostile environment sexual harassment claims against co-employees under the court's interpretation of the third basis of liability, instead of the
standard "knew or should have known" direct negligence approach.
Unlike past hostile environment sexual harassment cases involving
co-employees, the negligence standard need not be applied in cases alleging supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment. The third
basis of liability, as interpreted by the court, bypasses all other avenues
of liability and hinges only on the plaintiff's reasonable, subjective belief
that the employer authorized the supervisor's behavior."9 An employer's
216. Id. (quoting Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444).
217. Id. at 635 (explaining that liability under the indirect apparent authority argument "cannot
attach ... in the instant case ... as it is undisputed that Torres knew of NYU's harassment policy
and its availability").
218. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 209 ("Torres' contrary application of § 219(2)(d) limits
Karibian to its facts and supercedes this aspect of Karibian."). A particular irony for the Tenth
Circuit occurred with the Torres holding. Essentially, the Second Circuit in Torres borrowed specific
language on apparent authority from the holding in Harrisonto limit its broad language in Karibian,
which was in conflict with a majority of the federal circuit courts. Id. ("Karibian ... place[d] the
Second Circuit in conflict with a majority of the other federal circuits by suggesting that a claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment could be established even in circumstances where the
employer had a written policy against sexual harassment and took prompt action to end it following
proper notice of the victim's claim."). Harrison, however, borrowed that same language from
Karibian,limited by Torres, to announce a much broader reading, not of the first clause of section
219(2)(d), as Karibian did, but for the second clause. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1446 ("In our view, the
better interpretation is that adopted by the Second Circuit in Karibian (which] ... allows an employer to be held liable, even if a sexual harassment policy is in place and is made known to plaintiff, where the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to aid or facilitate his perpetration of
the harassment.").
219. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1450. The court stated that apparent authority only requires that the
victim, or third party, perceive that the supervisor is empowered by "written or spoken words or any
other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the (victim] to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Id.
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958)). This "consent" reasonably perceived
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strongest defense argument appears to be that the plaintiff's belief in the
apparent authority of the supervisor is unreasonable due to the existence
of a written sexual harassment grievance policy, combined with efforts to
notify prospective plaintiffs that the supervisor has no authority to sexually harass them.'
However, even this defense is circumvented by the new interpretation of the second clause of section 219(2)(d), which finds the employer
liable only if the supervisor is empowered to control the work environment and then abuses that authority in harassing employees.22 ' Such employer consent to the supervisor's control is virtually inherent in all supervisory authority.2 Any hostile environment sexual harassment by the
supervisor that occurs while on the job is an abuse of the supervisor's
authority over his or her employees. As long as these basic employment
circumstances are proven, the employer is strictly liable.
Yet, even in Karibian,with its similar holding to Harrison,the Second Circuit held an employer automatically liable only if its supervisor
relied on his authority in committing hostile environment sexual harassment.' Under Karibian, if no such reliance is found, liability is not
automatically imputed to the employer and the negligence standard is
applied. ' The Harrisoncourt suggested no such distinction." Therefore,

by the victim can merely include the fact that the supervisor is continuously employed by the principal. See Oppenheimer, supranote 9, at 81 ("The principal may manifest his consent to a community
of persons in a variety of ways, including continuously employing the agent.").
220. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1450 (stating that the first clause of section 219(2)(d) will be difficult to prove if there is an existing grievance policy plus efforts "to remove any possible inference
that a supervisor has authority to sexually harass his subordinates" (quoting Staszewski, supra note
176, at 1087)).
221. Id.
222. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 80 ("Employers ...often act only through the actions
of their supervisors. Supervisors act as the eyes, ears, and, most importantly, voice of the employer
in all interactions with employees. Supervisors . ..oversee operations.. . and generally influenceand at times determine-the working environment of non-supervisory employees.").
223. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,780 (2d Cir. 1994).
224. Id.
225. Harrison,112 F.3d at 1450 ("[T]he fact that the supervisor has actual or apparent authority
to control the victim's working environment, and is aided in harassing the victim by that authority, is
sufficient to establish employer liability under the second clause of § 219(2)(d)."). The Harrison
court's requirement that the supervisor's authority "aid" the supervisor's conduct is a lower standard
than the Karibiancourt's requirement of a supervisor's "reliance" on his own supervisory authority
to enable his harassment. Reliance on existing authority implies active invocation or assertion of that
authority to act unlawfully, whereas existing authority as aiding or facilitating unlawful activity
implies a passive, opportunistic activity. For example, a supervisor who calls a victim to his office
for the purpose of harassing him or her relies on the employee's obeying his delegated authority and
dutifully reporting to the office at the time the supervisor chooses; however, a supervisor who receives random, unscheduled visits from his employees in his office for purposes of daily updates
may choose to take advantage of such a chance visit to commit unlawful harassment once the opportunity has presented itself. In the first instance, the supervisor has actively initiated the harassing
encounter by exercising the authority on which he relies to compel the employee into his office. In
the second instance, the supervisor merely takes advantage of a chance situation, whereby the em-
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if a supervisor is found by a jury to have committed hostile environment
sexual harassment of employees under his or her control under Title VII,
the employer is strictly liable.'
The Tenth Circuit attempted to avoid criticism of applying strict
liability in an area forbidden by the Supreme Court by stating that the
employer will not be held liable if the authority delegated to the supervisor only provides the supervisor with proximity to the plaintiff. However,
such a scenario could not occur unless the supervisor had no supervisory
authority over the plaintiff. In this situation, the supervisor's legal status
for purposes of employer liability is converted to that of a co-employee.
For example, if the supervisor did have authority over the plaintiff
then the supervisor would not only have the right to be in proximity to
the plaintiff but would also have supervisory control over the plaintiff. If,
however, a harassing supervisor's delegated authority only gives him the
right to be in proximity to the plaintiff and the plaintiff does not reasonably believe that the supervisor has authority over him or her, then the
supervisor is merely a co-employee in relation to the plaintiff. Therefore,
the issue is no longer whether a supervisor harassed his employee, but
whether a co-employee harassed another co-employee. In this situation
the "knew or should have known" negligence standard would apply. 27
Another effect of the court's decision regarding the third basis of
liability is that an employee may reasonably perceive a co-employee to
hold supervisory authority over him or her and argue hostile environment
sexual harassment under the third or fourth bases of liability instead of
under the negligence standard similar to past cases. Because the court
rejects the Sauers requirement of proving the employer vested the employee with supervisory power over the plaintiff prior to establishing
employer liability, no such determination ever has to be made under the
ployee has entered his office under no compulsion but to inform the supervisor of job-related developments in deference to the supervisor's authority. This small distinction will lead to different results depending upon whether the case arises in the Second or Tenth Circuits: under Karibian,only
the first scenario will impute liability to the employer whereas under Harrisonboth scenarios will
result in employer liability. Id. at 1445, 1448.
226. See Gregory, supra note 136, at 391-92. In discussing the second clause of section
219(2)(d) as interpreted by the Second Circuit in Karibian, which contains the same language
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Harrison, Gregory argues:
[Uinder the [Karibian] court's broad holding, a high-level supervisor charged with creating a hostile work environment invariably will be viewed by the employee as able to
harass primarily because of his position in the company. The employee naturally will be
fearful that the supervisor will use the authority delegated by the employer to retaliate.
Thus a plaintiff will always be able to show that-at least from her perspective-the supervisor was "aided in accomplishing" the harassment because ... he was a supervisor.
Whether that supervisor in fact used his supervisory authority to create the abusive environment becomes irrelevant. An employer is thus held strictly liable for misconduct by
supervisors, even though the supervisor did not utilize the power granted by the employer
to further his illicit actions.
Id.
227. For a discussion of the different standards of employer liability between harassment by
supervisors and harassment by co-employees, see supra Part II.A.
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third basis for liability.2" All that is required is that the plaintiff reasonably believed that the harassing employee held sufficient authority from
the employer to control "significant aspects" of the work environment,.'
based on written or verbal communications, "or any other conduct" of
the employer." °
For example, co-employees may appear to have authority to control
"significant aspects" of the victim's work environment if the harassing
employee holds seniority over the victim; they may have been authorized
or told to train the victim by the company's management; or the employee may simply believe that management's favorable treatment of
senior employees coupled with their assertion of authority over the victim demonstrates their control over the victim's work environment. If the
company does not have a written sexual harassment grievance policy in
place and has not taken steps to assure the employee that the harasser has
no authority to sexually harass him or her, the harassed employee may
feel he or she has no other options but to endure the abusive environment
or quit his or her job.'
Policies behind hostile environment sexual harassment law are not
well served under the court's ruling in Harrison. Employers may establish sexual harassment grievance policies and employee training programs at great expense, but even the most efficient of such programs will
have no effect upon the employer's liability where a plaintiff brings a
hostile environment sexual harassment action against an employer under
the fourth basis of liability. Recall that Harrisononly requires that the
employer give an employee control over a particular work environment,
and, if in the course of supervising that environment, the supervisor is
found to have committed hostile environment sexual harassment then the
employer is automatically liable. As a result of this decision, employers
can only extensively train their supervisors regarding sexual harassment
and then hope that they never commit an indiscretion or act in any way
that may be interpreted as creating a hostile environment under Title VII.
Once an incident of sexual harassment by a supervisor occurs, the
employer's defenses-() that it was unaware of the activity, (2) that it
took appropriate remedial action to end the harassment, or (3) that the
employee was aware of sexual harassment grievance policies and failed
to use them-are all irrelevant. The employer is left with the alternatives
of settlement or expending all of its energies in court trying to prove the
sexually hostile environment did not exist. In other words, regardless of
228. For a discussion of the Harrisoncourt's limitation of the Sauers opinion, see supra Part
II.B.2.b.
229. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444.
230. Id. at 1450.
231. Id. at 1444 ("'When an employer lacks a formal written grievance policy, a victim of
sexual harassment will reasonably perceive her only available options to be silently acquiescing in
the harassment or leaving her job."' (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1090)).
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what positive, proactive, effective steps the employer has taken to eradicate sexual harassment and provide victims with internal recourse, its
prior efforts are in vain once such harassment occurs.
CONCLUSION

Seymore and Harrisonrepresent a significant shift in the Tenth Circuit's attitude toward the elements of hostile environment sexual harassment and the employer's liability for such acts by both employees and
supervisors. In Seymore, the court established clear-cut elements for a
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment but failed to
address the nature of the conduct contributing to a hostile environment.
More significantly, Harrison'sholding poses a new and substantial
risk to employers. Harrison's holding gives plaintiffs an entirely new
basis to establish liability and allows the plaintiff's subjective perceptions of the authority of the harasser to impute liability to the employer.
Thus, in the Tenth Circuit the deep pockets of the employer have become
substantially more accessible to plaintiffs with viable hostile environment claims against their supervisors."2 Moreover, under Harrison, liability insurance providers may choose to raise their premiums as well as
their requirements for coverage due to employers' increased liability
under Harrison.
The cost of this decision in terms of financial expenditure and irrelevant good intentions falls on the backs of the employers. This was the

232. The Tenth Circuit's holding in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., regarding employer liability
for sexual harassment by supervisors, proved to be short-lived. Following this survey period and the
completion of this article, the Supreme Court issued two decisions on June 26, 1998, Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275 (1998), which announced a new standard of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors.
In these cases, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for the sexual harassment
committed by their supervisors and will be automatically liable "when the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
However, where the supervisor's harassment does not result in a tangible employment action,
yet still creates an allegedly hostile environment, the employer may raise an affirmative defense as to
liability or damages. Id. at 2293. The affirmative defense must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence and requires the satisfaction of two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id.
On the same day that the Court decided Bulington Industries and Faragher, it vacated and
remanded Harrisionv. Eddy Potash, Inc. for reconsideration in light of the new liability standard.
Eddy Poatash, Inc. v. Harrison, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998) (mem.). At publication, the Tenth Circuit has
yet to render a decision in the case.
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very same fate the Supreme Court in Meritor directed the federal circuit
courts to avoid."3
Robert P. Henley

233. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court held that because Congress's definition of "employer" in Title VII included the employer's agents, Congress intended to
limit employer liability for certain sexually harassing acts by supervisors. Id. Therefore, the Court
held that employers are not always "automatically" liable under such circumstances but neither can
employers always insulate themselves from liability by arguing they had no notice of the harassment. Id.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INTRODUCTION

During the period between September 1, 1996 and August 31, 1997,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases concerning
environmental issues. Of particular note ' are three cases involving contribution suits brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). ' In the
1995 case United States v. Colorado & EasternRailroad Co.,' the Tenth
Circuit clarified the distinction between cost recovery suits brought under section 107 of CERCLA, and contribution suits under section 113.'
The three cases decided this survey period further clarify the distinction
made in Colorado & Eastern, but also indicate a lingering confusion
regarding the relationship between section 107 cost recovery section 113
contribution actions Part I of this survey discusses the statutory and
judicial background of CERCLA, including Colorado & Eastern, and
then analyzes the holdings of each of the three recent Tenth Circuit cases
on which this survey focuses.
The Tenth Circuit also decided a procedural standing case. The
claim involved a challenge to the United States Forest Service's decision
not to prepare an environmental impact statement before issuing a special
use permit to a ski area corporation. Procedural standing, particularly
when used to challenge forest plans under the National Forest Management Act, has generated much comment and confusion since the United
States Supreme Court first mentioned, without fully explaining, the concept in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." Part II of this survey examines
the Tenth Circuit interpretation of procedural standing in Committee to
Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero.' This decision clarifies much of the confusion, and may provide an opportunity for environmental plaintiffs to
expand the use of procedural standing in the future.

1. Also of note, but not discussed here, is City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Native American tribes could establish stricter water quality standards than
federal standards, and that the EPA has the authority to require upstream dischargers to comply with
the tribal standards. For a discussion of this case, see Timothy M. Reynolds, Tenth Circuit, Indian
Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 977,996-1002 (1998).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
3. 50 F.3d. 1530 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Colorado & Eastern, see Cameron R.
Getto, Tenth Circuit Survey, EnvironmentalLaw, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 753 (1996).
4. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 154-36.
5. Indeed, the court in Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. commented, "For the third time in as
many years, we are faced with the task of further defining and clarifying the relationship between §§
107 and 113 of [CERCLA]." 124 F.3d 1187, 1188 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
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I. CERCLA COST RECOVERY AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS

A. Background
CERCLA is one of the most powerful and expansive environmental
statutes ever legislated! It is designed to provide for prompt cleanup of
contaminated sites, or sites that are threatened with contamination from
the release of hazardous substances The power of CERCLA lies in the
fact that individuals or corporations may be held entirely liable for these
expensive cleanups.'" CERCLA authorizes the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to rehabilitate contaminated sites either
by using Superfund monies," or by ordering any responsible person to
perform the cleanup." If EPA cleans the site, it may still seek recovery of
its costs by bringing a section 107 "cost recovery" suit against any person deemed liable under that section.'3 To attach personal liability, the
EPA need only show that the party is a past or current owner of the contaminated site, or a person who arranged for hazardous substances to be
disposed at, or transported to, the contaminated site."' Anyone belonging
to this group of potentially liable persons is known as a potentially responsible party (PRP). Since CERCLA sites often have a complex history of ownership and waste disposal, there may be a large number of
PRPs for each site.'"
Although legislative history reveals that Congress expressly avoided
delineating CERCLA liability as strict, and joint and several,'6 courts
quickly agreed that liability for cleanup costs incurred by the government
was both strict,'7 and joint and several'8 unless a defendant could prove

8. There are currently over 1,200 sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). 40 C.F.R.
pt. 300 (1997). In 1994 the average cost of CERCLA cleanup was estimated at $40 million per site.
Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: The Redistribution of CERCLA
Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 36, 37 (1994).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6119-20.
10. SeeCERCLA§ 111,42U.S.C. §9611 (1994).
I1. See id. (governing the use of Superfund).
12. See CERCLA §§ 104(a), 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a) (1994).
13. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1994).
14. See CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)(A) (1994)
15. See, e.g., Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1189 (10th Cir. 1997)
(involving a contaminated landfill site where the EPA identified dozens of companies that had used
the site to dispose of hazardous substances).
16. For a discussion of Congress's intent to allow courts to determine CERCLA liability, see
Cathleen Clark, Comment, Should the Butcher, the Baker and the Candlestick Maker Be Held
Responsiblefor Hazardous Waste?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877-80 (1994).
17. A close reading of the statute supports this interpretation; section 107(a) attaches liability
to owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters without regard to causation and provides for only
limited defenses in section 107(b). CERCLA § 107(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a), (b) (1994).
18. Under CERCLA's joint and several liability provision, one defendant may be held liable
for the entire cost of cleanup, regardless of its fair share, or that other parties are known to have
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divisible harm.'9 This, however, is often very difficult to prove.' As a
result, this joint and several liability can cause gross inequities because
one party may be singled out and held responsible for all of the cleanup
costs even though it disposed of only a small fraction of the hazardous
substances at the site.2'
To mitigate the harshness of CERCLA liability, courts implied a
right of contribution for parties responsible for cleanup costs22 from other
responsible parties.' In 1986, when Congress re-authorized CERCLA, it
expressly provided for the right of contribution in section 113."2 Far from
quieting all controversy, section 113 has become the source of much
confusion and divergent opinion;' it may be the greatest source of litigation in CERCLA cases. 6
CERCLA initially only provided for cost recovery under section
107, which provides that any PRP shall be liable for "all cost of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government ... [and]
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person...
. Section 107 liability is strict, and joint and several." Under section
contributed to the contamination. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11
(S.D. Ohio 1983).
19. Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes only where there are
distinct harms, or a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that even though defendant's waste contained levels of hazardous waste below naturally occurring
background levels, defendant could not prove the harm was divisible when its waste commingled
with the hazardous waste of other contributors). But see United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., 64
F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding harm was divisible where a single hazardous substance,
chromium, entered a sealed aquifer as the result of similar operations by three parties at mutually
exclusive times; harm was proportionate to the volume of chromium-contaminated water each had
discharged into the environment).
21. United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995). Under
joint and several liability, the EPA can collect all the cleanup costs (including any insolvent PRPs'
share, known as "orphan shares") from any single PRP. Thus, the EPA need only find one "Fortune
500" company to ensure recovery of all cleanup costs at a site. William D. Evans Jr., The "Road
Warrior" Quality of Superfund Contribution Litigation, 32 TENN. BUS. J. 26, 28 (1996).
22. Contribution under CERCLA provides equitable apportionment, whereby a party is
entitled to relief from other PRPs to the extent that it can demonstrate the divisibility of harm and
that it paid more than its fair share. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535-36.
23. David L Bearman, Note, CERCLA--Cost Recovery, Contribution and Statutes of
Limitations: Working Toward a Solution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 149, 154 (1996); see, e.g., Colorado
v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that the right to contribution
under a federal statute may arise in either of two ways: through the creation of a right of action by
Congress expressly, or by clear implication; or through the power of the federal courts to fashion a
federal common law of contribution).
24. CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1994).
25. See Evans, supra note 21, at 29-30. The split appears to be mostly at the trial court level.
Among the circuit courts that have addressed the issue, all have held that actions for reapportionment
of costs between PRPs are ones for contribution. Id.
26. Id.
27. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
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113, however, contribution actions are governed by equitable factors.'
For this reason, a liable PRP would clearly prefer to recover the costs of
cleanup from other PRPs under the provisions of section 107 rather than
section 113, since joint and several liability would allow the liable party
to recover the full cost of the cleanup, not just the amount paid in excess
of its equitable share." Section 107 provides an additional benefit in the
form of a six year limitations period, whereas contribution claims are
generally barred after three years."
Despite the "any other person" language in section 107, liable PRPs
attempting to use the section 107 "cost recovery" provision have generally not been allowed to do so. 2 The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in
United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad," concluding that any
claim reapportioning costs between PRPs is the "quintessential claim for
contribution," and thus governed by section 113."
Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have held that, in a contribution
action, the liability of a defendant must first be determined according to
the categories set forth in section 107 (owners, operators, arrangers, and
transporters) before apportionment can be determined by equitable factors." The Tenth Circuit decisions build upon this important point to answer the more specific question: which costs are recoverable in a contribution suit. 6
The Tenth Circuit also recently considered the statute of limitations
period that should apply to contribution suits brought by PRPs incurring

28. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995).
Courts may consider several equitable factors when apportioning costs, known collectively as the
"Gore factors" after an unsuccessful amendment to CERCLA offered by then-Congressman Al
Gore.
The Gore factors include 1)the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution
can be distinguished, 2) the amount. of hazardous substance involved, 3) the degree of
toxicity of the hazardous substance, 4) the degree of involvement by the parties in
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal, 5) the degree of care exercised
by the parties taking into account the characteristics of the hazardous substance, and 6)
the degree of cooperation by the parties with government officials to prevent harm.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 367 (2d
ed. 1996).
30. A section 107 cost recovery claim allows recovery for all necessary response costs, while
contribution allows only for reapportionment of costs where it is possible to determine each party's
fair share of the harm caused using equitable factors such as the Gore factors. Colorado & Eastern,
50 F.3d at 1536.
31. CERCLA § I 13(g)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3) (1994).
32. In the Tenth Circuit, see Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1530.
33. Id. at 1536.
34. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between cost recovery claims and contribution
claims, see Getto, supranote 3,at 755.
35. "Recovery of response costs by a private party under [CERCLA] is a two-step process."
Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 1996).
36. See discussion infra Part I.B.

19981

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

costs due to compliance with section 106 administrative orders, 7 instead
of as a result of settlements (consent decrees)" with, or cost recovery
suits by, the EPA.39 The issue arises because the limitations period that
section 1 13(g)(3) provides for in contribution actions sets forth four specific triggers, none of which occur when a PRP begins cleanup in response to a section 106 administrative order, and later seeks contribution
from other PRPs. '
No other circuit court has considered this question."' The First Circuit did suggest in a footnote the possibility of a PRP who "spontaneously initiates" a cleanup (the so-called "innocent PRP") pursuing a cost
recovery claim under section 107.2 The court declined to rule on the
limitations issue; rather, it cautiously noted that "it is unclear to us
whether such a cause of action would be subject to the three-year or the
six-year prescriptive period."' 3 The court, however, believed that situations existed where a PRP might bring a cost recovery (section 107) action instead of a contribution (section 113) action, and thus receive a six
year limitations period. In the Tenth Circuit, however, that possibility
may not exist because of the court's holding in Colorado & Eastern that
limits a PRP to a section 113 contribution suit when seeking to recover
costs of cleanup."
Although the circuit courts have not considered the statute of limitations period directly, several district courts have recently held that parties complying with a section 106 administrative order did not trigger the
three year statute of limitations for contribution actions.'3 Such parties

37. Section 106 of CERCLA provides that the President may issue such orders as necessary to
protect public health, welfare, and the environment where contamination of the environment by
hazardous substances is found to be an imminent and substantial public or environmental
endangerment. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994). This authority has been largely
delegated to the EPA, which may issue an administrative order or obtain an order from a federal
district court. Id.
38. Section 122 of CERCLA allows the EPA to enter into settlement agreements, known as
consent degrees, with PRPs to facilitate the cleanup of contaminated sites. CERCLA § 122(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9622(a), (d) (1994).
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
40. "[N]o action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more
than three years after" the date of any action for the recovery of costs, or the date of a consent decree
or judicially approved settlement. CERCLA § I13(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (1994).
41. Search of Westlaw database (December, 1997). See Aaron A. Garber, Note, The PRP, the
Section 106 Administrative Order, the Contribution Claim, and CERCLA's Statute of Limitations: A
Complete Statutory Analysis, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 115, 116-17 (1997).
42. United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 99 n.8 (1st Cir. 1994).
43. Id.
44. United States v. Colorado & Eastem R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1539 (10th Cir. 1995). Colorado
& Eastern may be distinguished, however, because in that case, the PRP seeking contribution had
been found liable under section 107, whereas in United Tech., the PRP's liability had not been
proven.
45. See Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Ekotek
Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995); Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc.,
888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995); seealso Garber,supra note 41, at 116-17.
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may have an indefinite period of time in which to bring a contribution
claim. ' For example, the court in Ekotek Site PRP Committee v. Self relied on the plain language of the statute, and the equitable argument that
a PRP entering into an administrative order with the EPA does not know
its total liability for the cleanup. The court concluded that it would be
unfair to commence the statute of limitations period for a contribution
claim before ascertaining the party's liability.'
B. Tenth CircuitCases
1. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, Inc."
a. Facts
Bancamerica owned an industrial site found to be heavily contaminated with lead and other hazardous substances.' The site had several
previous owners and operators, ' including ASARCO, who owned and
operated a lead smelter at the site from 1899 to 1902.' From 1907 to
1984, nonparties to the suit operated a steel fabrication facility on the
site. 2 In 1984, Bancamerica purchased the site, whereupon it was immediately leased to Trinity Industries, a subsidiary of Mosher Steel. 3 Trinity
used large amounts of lead-based paints and solvents at the site until the
lease was canceled in 1987.' Upon termination of the lease, Bancamerica
discovered that the site was heavily contaminated with lead originating
from lead smelter ash left by ASARCO, and lead-based paint left by th&
nonparties and Trinity."
In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into a
settlement with Bancamerica that required the latter to begin cleanup of
the site.' In 1991, the EPA issued an administrative order 7 under
CERCLA section 106 to ASARCO, which required it to assist in the
cleanup.' Bancamerica and ASARCO completed the cleanup and later
filed suit seeking contribution from Trinity under CERCLA section 113."
The district court held Trinity partially responsible for the contamination
46. Garber, supra note 41, at 116-17.
47. Ekotek, 881 F. Supp. at 1523.
48. 100 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. For a detailed summary of the facts, see Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Trinity Indus.,
900 F. Supp. 1427, 1435-50 (D. Kan. 1995).
50. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 795.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 33.
58. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 795.
59. Id.
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and ordered it to reimburse Bancamerica and ASARCO $555,293 for
cleanup expenses attributable to its conduct.'
b. Decision
Bancamerica and ASARCO appealed the decision, claiming that the
district court erred by refusing to grant prejudgment interest.' Additionally, Bancamerica argued that the court erred by solely considering toxicity and volume to allocate responsibility and liability for cleanup of the
lead contamination.' Trinity also raised several issues on appeal, including: 1) whether EPA orders required Bancamerica and ASARCO to
meet the public comment requirements of the national contingency plan
(NCP),' and 2) whether Bancamerica was entitled to recover the costs it
incurred in 1988 and 1989, prior to entering into a settlement with EPA."
Trinity claimed that Bancamerica and ASARCO did not comply
with provisions in the EPA orders that stated all required actions must be
undertaken in accordance with applicable federal laws. Trinity argued
that under these provisions, Bancamerica and ASARCO were required to
comply with the NCP regulations that established public comment requirements.'
In affirming the district court's ruling that the orders did not require
Bancamerica and ASARCO to comply with the NCP's public comment
requirements, the Tenth Circuit relied on an NCP provision stating,
"[a]ny response action carried out in compliance with the terms of an
order issued by [EPA] pursuant to section 107 of [CERCLA] ...will be
considered consistent with the [NCP]. ' '"7 The court also noted that in
drafting the 1990 contingency plan, the EPA required section 106 orders
to contain the cleanup standards necessary to maintain consistency with
the NCP."
Trinity claimed an additional error was made by the district court in
its failure to determine whether the cleanup was a "removal" or "reme-

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. id. at 795-96.
63. The national contingency plan requires private parties engaged in cleanup to provide the
general public an opportunity to comment on the selection of the response action. 40 C.F.R. §§
300.415(n), 300.430(f)(3) (1997). See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th
Cir. 1991).
64. This issue was decided in favor of Bancamerica, because Trinity failed to raise it with the
district court. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 798.
65. The president is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994) to establish NCP procedures and
standards for cleaning up contaminated sites. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1997).
66. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 796.
67. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii) (1997).
68. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8797-98 (1990) (stating that section 106 orders governing private
persons might not contain all of the public participation requirements of the NCP).
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dial" action.' Trinity claimed this was necessary before the court could
decide whether the cleanup was consistent with the NCP. ° The argument
was rendered irrelevant, however, by the court's earlier holding that actions performed in accordance with section 106 orders are consistent
with the NCP."
Bancamerica and ASARCO contended the district court erred in
refusing to grant them prejudgment interest on those response costs for
which the court held Trinity liable.'2 They asserted that CERCLA section
107 mandates the award of such interest." Trinity countered with the
argument that Bancamerica and ASARCO's claim for contribution was
properly brought under section 113, not section 107, and that section 113
does not provide for the award-of prejudgment interest.' The court, however, interpreted CERCLA as requiring an award of prejudgment interest
in both section 113 and section 107 actions. 5
In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the differences between a section 107 cost recovery claim and a section 113 contribution
claim; it then decided that Bancamerica and ASARCO had asserted section 113 contribution claims because their actions were for cost apportionment between PRPs. 76 The court reasoned that any section 113 claim
must, by necessity, incorporate the liabilities established in section 107."
The court noted that recovery of response costs by a private party under
CERCLA is a two-step process. Initially, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant is liable under section 107(a). Once that is accomplished, the
question is the portion of the response costs for which each defendant
will be responsible under section 113.8
Section 107(a) states "[t]he amounts recoverable in an action under
this section shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D)."'9 Even though section 107 apparently refers
only to "actions under this section," the court reasoned that because a
section 113 contribution claim necessarily incorporates the liability pro-

69. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24) (1994). CERCLA distinguishes a removal as a short-term and
immediate response, while a remedial action may involve additional or different steps consistent
with a permanent remedy.
70. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 796. The NCP's regulations governing remedial actions are
more stringent than those governing removal actions. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck,
840 F. Supp. 470,475 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
71. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 797.
72. Id. at 799.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 800.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934-36 (8th Cir. 1995)).
79. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994)).
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visions of section 107, "a § 113(f) action for contribution is an action
under § 107."
To grant prejudgment interest is consistent with logic and policy,
the court asserted, because to do otherwise would result in parties undertaking cleanup "losing the time value of money they spent on behalf
of other liable persons, [while] those persons will have gained an equal
amount."'" Thus, it would create incentive for private parties to undertake
cleanup actions later, rather than sooner, since they would gain the time
value of money by delaying. 2 The court noted that this holding was consistent with other decisions." The court also determined that Bancamerica and ASARCO were both entitled to prejudgment interest because they satisfied the section 107(a) requirement that a demand for
payment be made in writing."
Bancamerica and ASARCO next argued that the district court erred
in considering only toxicity and volume when allocating liability for the
site's lead contamination. The court of appeals started with section
1 13(f)(1): A court "may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."'" It
further stated that when considering reapportionment, "a court may consider several factors, a few factors, or only one determining factor...
depending on the totality of the circumstances presented to the court."
The court found no error in the district court's consideration of only the
factors of volume and toxicity when allocating liability. 7

80.

Id. at 801.

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Bell Petroleum Servs. Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 1993)

(noting that 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)( 4 ) expressly provides for prejudgment interest); Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Ter Maat, 1996 WL 67216, at *5 (N.D. IIl. Feb. 16, 1996) (noting the express language of
42 U.S.C. § 9607, and citing Bell Petroleum).

84. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 801. Section 107(a) states: "interest shall accrue from the later
of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the
expenditure concerned." CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994). Bancamerica
satisfied the writing requirement with a letter sent to Trinity stating that it had incurred $45,818 for
environmental work performed on the site, and that it believed Trinity to be liable for these costs.
Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 801. ASARCO satisfied the written demand requirement when it filed the
third amended complaint notifying Trinity that it had incurred costs "in excess of $1 million," for
which it was seeking reimbursement. Id.
85. Bancamerica,100 F.3d at 802; CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(0)(1) (1994).
86. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 802-03 (quoting United States v.Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50
F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996)).
87. Id. at 803.
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9
2. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc."

a. Facts
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., a site became
contaminated with oil sludge as a result of the operation of a waste-oil
reclamation business by tenants on the Glenn Wynn site, part of a larger
refinery near Tulsa, Oklahoma. 9 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO)
acquired part interest in the site in 1969, which it sold in 1987.' In 1986,
the area was identified as a Superfund site requiring excavation and offsite thermal destruction of the sludge.9 '
The EPA and ARCO negotiated a settlement under which ARCO
agreed to undertake cleanup of the site and to pay the EPA's response
and future oversight costs relating to implementation of that remedy.'
The site was cleaned up by 1993, after which ARCO brought consolidated contribution actions against other PRPs, including companies
whose waste oil had been delivered to the site. 3 These defendants stipulated to liability for their proportionate share of the costs of cleaning up
the site, but argued that ARCO was not entitled to recover the attorney's
fees it incurred in negotiating the settlement, nor the costs of EPA's
oversight of the cleanup. '
The district court determined that ARCO could not recover litigation attorney's fees, but could recover those fees it incurred negotiating
the consent decree. 9 It also allowed ARCO to recover the costs it paid to
EPA for overseeing the cleanup according to the terms of the
settlement.' The defendants appealed the court's ruling on recovery of
oversight costs, and ARCO cross-appealed the court's failure to award
attorney's fees incurred in locating PRPs, and the court's apportionment
of fees paid to the settlement judge."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that ARCO was entitled to recover its
payment of the EPA's oversight costs, holding that they were part of
"response" costs for which PRPs are liable under CERCLA section 107,
and may be reapportioned among PRPs in a section 113 contribution
88. 98 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 566. The waste-oil reclamation business was operated from
1964 to mid-1982.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 555.
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suit." The court, however, reversed the holding that allowed recovery of
attorney's fees incurred by ARCO in negotiating the settlement. ' The
court noted that nonlitigation attorney's fees were recoverable, but disallowed ARCO's cross-appeal for attorney's fees incurred in locating
°
PRPs because ARCO had not raised the issue during trial." The court
also affirmed the district court's ruling that ARCO and the collective
defendants should each pay 50% of the settlement judge's expenses. '
In ruling that EPA oversight costs were recoverable in contribution
claims under section 113, the court of appeals explained that a liable
party may seek contribution from any other PRP who is found liable under section 107."m Since section 107 establishes the liability of a PRP and
section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that PRPs are liable for any other neces°
sary cost of remedial action incurred by any other person," the court
examined the definition of remedial action to determine if it included
oversight costs.'"'
Section 101(24) defines remedial actions as "those actions consistent with permanent remedy ... [and] the term includes any monitoring
reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health
and welfare and the environment."'" Using the ordinary meaning of
monitoring-to regulate or oversee-the court found that government
oversight of private party cleanup efforts was synonymous with monitoring, and necessary to "protect the public health, welfare, and environment."'"m Thus, the cost of oversight was recoverable. 7
The defendants argued that the Third Circuit, in United States v.
Rohm & Haas Co.,"m had found that oversight costs were not costs of
removal and, therefore, not recoverable under section 107 ." Calling the
decision questionable,"' the Tenth Circuit noted that most of the district

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.

101. Id. at 571-72.
102. Id. at 567.
103. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
104. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 569.
105. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994)).
106. Id. at 570.
107. Id. at 569-70.
108. 2F.3d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1993).
109. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1271. The court relied on a Supreme Court opinion, Skinner v.
Mid-America Pipeline Co., that stated "Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the
Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the
benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as 'fees'
or 'taxes' on those parties." 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989). In Rohm & Haas, the court concluded that the
costs incurred by the government were administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of that
party, but rather to the public at large. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273.
110. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 568.
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courts outside the Third Circuit had declined to follow it."' It also found
that the Third Circuit had only held that oversight costs were not a "removal" action." 2 The Tenth Circuit noted that the definition of remedial
action, at issue in Atlantic Richfield, was much broader than that of removal action, and clearly allowed recovery of government oversight
costs in private party remedial actions."'
The court next held that nonlitigation attorney's fees necessary to
the cleanup (such as the cost of locating other PRPs) were recoverable.""
The court refused to award ARCO the costs of locating PRPs, however,
because it had failed to raise the issue at trial."' The court also declined
ARCO's appeal that, as a prevailing party, ARCO should be awarded its
share of the fees and expenses it paid to the settlement judge."6 The court
deferred to the district court's ruling that ARCO and the defendants
should share these expenses equally, since each side benefited from those
services."7
3.

Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc."8'
a. Facts

In Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc., the contaminated site
was an abandoned limestone quarry operated as a landfill in which hazardous materials were disposed, and later seeped into the soil and water
surrounding the site."9 The EPA placed the site on the National Priority
List (NPL)'" and identified Sun Company as a PRP because it had con111. Id.; see, e.g., Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, 935 F. Supp. 317, 324-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); California v. Celtor Chemical Corp., 901 F. Supp. 1481, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also
Patrick M. Flynn, Comment, Government Recovery of Superfund Cleanup Oversight Costs: A
Critiqueof United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 789 (1995).
112. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 568-69.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 571 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 919 (1994) (finding
that attorney's fees incurred in identifying other potentially responsible parties are recoverable as a
necessary cost of response)).
115. Id. ARCO claimed it did not raise the issue at trial because it thought the court's pretrial
ruling had precluded it from so doing. The court of appeals, however, ruled that the district court's
ruling did not prevent ARCO from raising the issue. The court had simply found that litigation fees
were not recoverable, while nonlitigation fees necessary to the cleanup were. Id.
116. Id. at 571-72. ARCO argued that the judge was a special master, and as a prevailing party,
ARCO was entitled to an award of its share as part of its costs. The court ruled that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a), district courts have discretion to apportion the compensation of a
special master among the parties. The district court reasoned that both sides benefited from the
services of the settlement judge. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
each side should pay half the costs incurred. Id. at 572.
117. Id.
118. 124F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. For a detailed summary of the facts, see Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 1523, 1527-28 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(e) (1994) authorizes the EPA to identify and rank contaminated
hazardous waste sites. The worst sites are listed in the NPL at 40 C.F.R. part 300, app. B (1997).
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tributed hazardous waste to the site.'2' After attempts to negotiate a consent decree failed, the EPA issued a unilateral administrative order pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA'22 compelling Sun to pay for the costs of
remediation.'" Sun completed remediation and incurred $6.2 million in
cleanup costs.'' It was then able to identify other PRPs, and brought section 107 cost recovery, and section 113 contribution, claims against these
PRPs.' The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment.
b. Decision
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the section 107 claim, holding that Sun's claim was for an
equitable apportionment, and was therefore a contribution claim under
section 113.'" The court of appeals affirmed,"7 leaving the length of the
limitations period that should be applied to the contribution suit to be
determined." Section 113(g)(3) provides a three-year limitation period
for contribution suits brought after any action for recovery of costs, or a
settlement concerning the cleanup, has occurred.'" Sun, however, undertook cleanup action in response to a section 106 administrative order,
there was no settlement or civil action prior to this suit."' As a result,
none of the triggering events provided for in section 113(g)(3) had occurred before Sun brought its suit for contribution.' 3'
The district court found that this anomaly was the result of an inadvertent omission on the part of Congress, and thus turned to another area
of federal contribution law to hold that Sun's cause of action had accrued
when it paid more than its equitable share of the cleanup 3costs.' As a
result, most of Sun's contribution claims were time-barred.' 3

121.
122.
necessary
123.
124.

Sun, 124F.3dat 1189.
CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994), authorizes the EPA to issue such orders as
to protect public health, welfare and the environment from imminent endangerment.
Sun, 124F.3dat 1189.
Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. The court cited United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th
Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Colorado & Eastern relating to cost recovery and contribution
actions see supra notes 29, 30, and accompanying text.
127. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1190.
128. Id.
129. CERCLA § 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9 613(g)(3) (1994) provides a three year limitations
period for actions that commence after judgment in any action under section 9613 (contribution
actions for recovery of such costs or damages, or an administrative order under section 9622(g), and
de minimus settlements, or section 9622(h) (cost recovery settlements), or entry of a judicially
approved settlement with respect to such costs and damages.
130. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1190.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The court of appeals, however, found that the district court had
erred by importing other contribution law into its decision."' Instead,
CERCLA section 113(g)(2) was applicable because no civil action or
settlement had commenced."' Therefore, Sun's contribution claim was an
"initial action" for recovery of costs that was governed by a six year
limitations period under section 11 3(g)(2).'36
Browning-Ferris argued that section 113(g)(2) should apply only to
section 107 cost recovery actions that are governed by strict, and joint
and several liability, and thus not available to Sun as a PRP seeking contribution. 7 The court of appeals rejected this argument. It noted that although section 113(g)(2) is subtitled "Actions for recovery of costs," and
refers only to actions within section 107, the Bancamerica'' opinion established that a section 113(f) action for contribution is an action under
section 107.' 3' Because no settlements had been entered into, and previous actions for the site had been filed under section 107, Sun's action for
equitable apportionment was an "initial action" for the recovery of such
costs.'" The court found that this interpretation gave meaning to each
provision of section 113(g) and was not inconsistent with Congress' intent to provide a three year limitations period for contribution actions
filed after the four events enumerated in section 113(g)(3). The court
reasoned that if the contribution suit was not an initial action, then a previous action must have been filed, thus one of the triggering events in
section 113(g)(3) would have occurred, and the three year limitations
period would be invoked. 2
The court made it clear that the statutory language permits two types
of contribution actions, governed by different statutes of limitations.'3
First, if a PRP incurs its cleanup costs pursuant to a civil action under
section 106, section 107, or a resulting settlement, the PRP has three
years from the date of judgment or settlement in which to bring its contribution claim. Second, if the PRP incurred its cleanup costs in some
other way, such as responding to an EPA order rather than a court order,
the PRP has six years from the start of remediation in which to bring suit.
The court noted, however, that it left undecided whether PRPs who assert

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1192.
136. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1994) provides: "An initial action for recovery of costs
referred to section 9607 must be commenced . . . (B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action ....(emphasis added).
137. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1192.
138. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 1996).
139. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1192.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1192-93.
142. Id. at 1193.
143. Id. (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994) ("recognizing two
'similar and somewhat overlapping' contribution actions under sections 107 and 113")).
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their innocence with regard to any waste at a site may be able to recover
all of their costs from other PRPs in an action under section 107."
C. Other Circuits
Most circuits that have addressed this issue agree that an action between PRPs is one for contribution and thus governed by equitable factors, not strict, and joint and several liability. " For example, in Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,' the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court decision to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss claims
brought by a PRP seeking to recover the totality of response costs from
other PRPs under joint and several liability.' The court acknowledged
that bringing a contribution claim necessarily involves establishing the
defendant's liability under section 107, but still found that recovery is
governed by equitable apportionment under section 113, not the joint and
several liability provisions of section 107.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, has made an exception to the rule that
claims by one PRP against another must normally be brought as contribution claims under section 113. In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner
Corp.,'4 the court recognized that a PRP may bring a section 107 cost
recovery claim if it is not responsible for any of the contamination." The
Seventh Circuit later clarified that the exception applies in cases where it
is factually uncertain whether the PRP is partially responsible for contaminating the site. In Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 5 the court
held that the owner of a recently acquired landfill (a PRP under
CERCLA section 107(a)(1)) alleging that it did not pollute the site could
initially bring a section 107 cost recovery action against defendant
PRPs If the facts establish that the owner was partially responsible for
the contamination, however, that owner may only proceed in a claim for
contribution.5 The Third Circuit has also held that section 107 cost recovery claims may be brought by innocent parties that have undertaken
cleanups.'" Other courts have acknowledged that a class of cases might
exist in which a PRP might sue under section 107, but have yet to rule on

144. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1191 n.1.
145. Jose R. Allen & Karen L. Peterson, Private Party Litigation Under Superfund: Claims for
Cost Recovery and Contribution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 663, 674 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, June 23, 1997); see, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101-03 (1st Cir. 1994);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989).
146. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1306.
148. Id. at 1305-06.
149. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
150. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 763.
151. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
152. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241-42.
153. Id. at 1241.
154. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997).
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the issue.'" Most circuit courts have not addressed the issue of prejudgment interest.'- Some district courts, however, have awarded prejudgment interest for contribution claims.'5 '
With the exception of the Third Circuit, no other circuit court has
decided the issue of whether oversight costs are recoverable in private
party contribution suits.' The Fifth Circuit ruled that the government
may recover the cost of oversight from PRPs in a cost recovery action.'"
In United States v. Lowe, the court refused to follow the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Rohm & Haas, citing Atlantic Richfield with approval."w
The Fifth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit's interpretation that
CERCLA provides for recovery of any costs incurred as part of remedial
action, including any "monitoring" necessary to protect the public health
or environment.'6 ' Like the Tenth Circuit, the court found EPA oversight
akin to monitoring, and thus recoverable as a necessary response cost.'62
D. Analysis
The decisions in Bancamerica, Atlantic Richfield, and Sun reflect
the Tenth Circuit's interest in mitigating some of the harsh and inequitable consequences of CERCLA liability. These decisions provide incentive for private parties to undertake cleanup of hazardous waste sites
sooner rather than later. For instance, the court's decision in Bancamerica granting prejudgment interest for contribution claims is a logical attempt to reward parties who undertake cleanup before all PRPs are
identified. To withhold prejudgment interest would, as the court pointed
out, create a "perverse incentive" for PRPs to delay involvement in
cleanups because they gain the time value of the money that would otherwise be spent on the cleanup."
CERCLA can be unfair in its application because it allows a single
PRP to be held liable for the entire cost of cleaning up a contaminated
site to which there are potentially many contributors. Once the first PRP
is identified and found liable, CERCLA places the burden on this PRP,
rather than the EPA, to identify other PRPs and bring contribution ac-

155. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1996); United
Tech. v. Browning-Ferris Corp., 33 F.3d 96, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1994).
156. The Fifth Circuit, however, upheld the award of prejudgment interest in Bell Petroleum
Servs. Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 1993).
157. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 1996 WL 67216 (N.D. 11.Feb. 16, 1996); Boeing
Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1139 (D. Or. 1996).
158. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 568 (10th Cir. 1996).
159. United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1997).
160. Id. at 403-04.
161. Id. at 402-03; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994) (defining remedial action).
162. Id. at 401-03.
163. Bancamerica Commercial Co. v. Mosher Steel, Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 1996).
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tions for the apportionment of costs.'" If the initial PRP cannot recover
prejudgment interest, CERCLA imposes a penalty on the first PRP held
liable. This penalty is unnecessary and creates an incentive for a PRP to
conceal its connection to the site. A PRP that is held liable for the entire
cleanup cost is also penalized because, as determined in Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States,'" it may not recover the attorney's fees it incurred
to litigate the contribution action.'" Only nonlitigation costs, such as locating other PRPs, could be recovered.'"
The court's decision in Atlantic Richfield allowing a liable PRP to
recover the cost of EPA oversight from other PRPs in a contribution action ' " is also sensible. It mitigates the harshness of CERCLA liability,
while encouraging a careful and thorough cleanup effort. To hold otherwise would again enforce an arbitrary penalty against those PRPs that are
identified first, creating incentive for a PRP to hide its connection to a
site until other PRPs had been identified and charged with cleanup costs.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Sun is consistent with earlier holdings and CERCLA's goal of achieving an immediate response to hazardous substance releases because it encourages PRPs to undertake cleanup
actions without prompting from EPA. If a PRP knows it will have more
time to identify and bring suit against other PRPs, this may result in it
voluntarily undertaking cleanup actions sooner. PRPs will have less
hesitation to begin cleanup before other PRPs can be identified when
they have less fear of being time-barred from bringing contribution suits
in the future.
The Tenth Circuit has thus far been firm in holding cost recovery
claims may not be brought by PRPs-an action for apportionment between PRPs is the "quintessential claim for contribution.'" While the
First Circuit has responded to the inequity of CERCLA liability by allowing certain PRPs that have paid more than their fair share of cleanup
costs to bring section 107 cost recovery suits,'"° the Tenth Circuit has
refused to allow PRPs to bring cost recovery actions in any situation.'
Nevertheless, the court's decisions indicate a willingness to interpret
CERCLA's liability provisions favorably for PRPs that have incurred
more than their share of cleanup costs. The court's decision in Sun may
be an extreme example of this willingness.

164. Section 107 allows the EPA to hold any PRP liable for the entire cost of cleanup. Thus,
there is little incentive for the EPA to identify more than one solvent PRP.
165. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
166. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at818.
167. Id. at 820.
168. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 571 (10th Cir.).
169. United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (1995).
170. Id. at 1539.
171. Id. There may still be room, however, under the Colorado & Eastern decision for the court
to find that certain "innocent" PRPs may bring a section 107 cost recovery action. See supra note 44.
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The holding in Sun is not necessarily intuitive. The district caurt's
assertion that the inapplicability of section 11 3(g)(3) (limitations period
for contribution claims) was merely a drafting oversight72' seems at least
equally plausible. This is a natural conclusion to draw from the fact that
section 113(g) (relating to limitations periods) is divided into separate
sections entitled "Actions for recovery of costs" (section 11 3(g)(2)) and
"Contribution" (section 11 3(g)(3))."' Thus, it seems likely that Congress
intended to have different limitations periods for contribution and cost
recovery claims. '
The Tenth Circuit's decision nevertheless promotes CERCLA's
goal of achieving the prompt cleanup of hazardous substance releases,
because it encourages responsible parties to undertake cleanup efforts
sooner rather than later. The court was constrained by its earlier holding
in Colorado & Eastern because Sun was clearly a responsible party, thus
a cost recovery claim was not available. Sun was also, however, a cooperative party in achieving CERCLA's goal of initiating prompt response
to the release of hazardous substances into the environment. The Tenth
Circuit wisely chose to reward, rather than penalize, such efforts without
compromising the distinction between cost recovery and contribution
suits.
Arguably, this decision goes too far by putting responsible parties
on par with those who are innocent or responsible, and who undertake
cleanup without any prodding from the government.'" Sun was neither an
innocent party, nor was its cleanup completely voluntary. In fact, it was
ordered by the EPA to begin cleanup after failing to reach a settlement."
There may be little difference between this sort of PRP and the PRP that
undertakes cleanup only after negotiating a settlement with EPA. It
seems clear that the PRP that is not proven liable, yet spontaneously undertakes cleanup without any government prodding, should be rewarded
more so than PRPs such as Sun. The court has not yet addressed this
issue. The court's decisions in Sun and Colorado & Eastern, however,
may not have left any room to further reward such a PRP." Despite this
defect, Sun is still a sensible decision because it mitigates the harsh effects of CERCLA liability on those PRPs underiaking cleanup efforts
with only a minimum of governmental prodding.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1189 (10th Cir. 1997).
CERCLA § I I3(g)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g)(2)-(3) (1994).
See Garber, supra note 41, at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Sun Co. (R&M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d at 1189.
But see supra notes 44, 171.
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II. PROCEDURAL INJURY AS A BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING

A. Background
Standing is a constitutional doctrine of judicial restraint that has
only recently attained much vigor. ' Standing has three main requirements. First, the plaintiff must show an injury in fact which is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.79 Generalized grievances shared
by all are not sufficient to meet this standard." Second, the plaintiff must
show a causal connection between the injury and the offending
conduct."' Finally, the injury must likely be redress by a favorable decision. In other words, the court must be able to provide a remedy that will
cure the injury.' 2
These requirements make it difficult to challenge government action
having diffuse impacts, or involving the cooperation of many agencies.
For example, a plaintiff desiring to challenge an agency decision for failure to follow the procedure prescribed in its organic statute may find it
difficult to show that failure to follow procedure will result in harm to a
concrete and particularized interest. If the plaintiff can show a concrete
injury fairly traceable to the agency's failure to follow procedure, redressability will still present a problem to the plaintiff because the only
remedy a court may provide-a court order to the agency to follow procedure-will not necessarily change the agency's final decision.
Standing is often a formidable barrier for plaintiffs desiring to challenge decisions made by federal agencies concerning the management of
public lands.' Many commentators believe that one Supreme Court decision in particular, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, " has narrowed environmental standing considerably' 5 and inhibits environmentalists' ability
to air their grievances in federal court." Standing analysis is difficult
178. "Standing" is a relatively new issue. By 1992, the Supreme Court had mentioned standing
in 117 cases; 109 of those cases occurred after 1965, and 55 cases occurred after 1985. Sunstein,
infra note 185, at 169.
179. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
180. The injury in fact test may be traced to Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Sunstein,
infra note 185, at 169.
181. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
182. Id. at 560-61 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
183. See, e.g., id. at 562-67 (holding that plaintiffs who had an interest in wildlife, and an
intention to visit the habitat of the Nile crocodile some time in the future, was not enough to confer
standing to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior that might harm the endangered Nile
crocodile); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990) (holding that
plaintiffs who used land in the "vicinity" of an area of some two million acres did not have standing
to challenge a Bureau of Land Management decision affecting only 4,500 acres within that area).
184. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
185. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen's Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164-66 (1992).
186. Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, I I J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 75, 91 (1995).
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under Lujan because the court tightened the requirements that plaintiff
must meet to show a justiciable environmental injury in most cases,
while alluding to relaxed standards for environmental injuries in other
cases.
Congress, however, has expressed an intent to create standing for a
large number of plaintiffs by including citizens' suit provisions in most
environmental regulatory laws, as well as the Administrative Procedure
Act.'5 ' These provisions generally provide that "any person aggrieved" by
agency action has the right to judicial review.' Prior to Lujan, many
courts had found standing for plaintiffs seeking to challenge procedural
violations in agency decision making, based on these citizen suit provisions."9 In Lujan, however, the Court made it clear that federal statutes
alone do not confer standing." Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
stated that standing is derived from Article III of the Constitution, and
may not be granted by Congress without violating the separation of powers doctrine.'9 Congress may lower any prudential standing barriers with
citizen's suit provisions, but may not lower constitutionally derived
standing requirements."
The Supreme Court, however, also recognized that Congress "may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which create [the
foundation of] standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute.""'9 For example, under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), Congress mandated that federal agencies making certain management decisions must follow prescribed procedures, including public
participation, and examination of alternatives identified in an environ-

187. Sunstein, supra note 185, at 164-66; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
188. For example, section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act states "A person . . .
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
189. Roger Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1, 14 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 26, 1995). This fact prompted
Justice Blackmun to dissent, arguing that the majority opinion "amounts to a slash and bum
expedition through the law of environmental standing." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606.
190. Lujan, 504 U.S at 576.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 577-78. Justice Scalia stated that standing is an essential element of the separation of
powers doctrine. To allow Congress to grant standing would be to "discard[] a principle fundamental
to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch." Id. at 576. This is essentially the
same view that Justice Scalia expressed in a 1983 law review article, in which he criticized cases
granting environmental standing. See Sunstein, supranote 185, at 163.
193. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 n.3 (1973).

1998]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

mental impact statement (EIS).'" The violation of such procedures, such
as a failure to prepare an EIS, results in a procedural injury.'"
If an environmentalist plaintiff were allowed to substitute a procedural injury for injury in fact, the standing barriers to challenging an
agency's decision based on its failure to follow decision making procedures would largely disappear, because the injury and redressability requirements are more easily met when the injury is defined as procedural,
rather than factual." Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan made it
clear that a plaintiff may not substitute procedural injury for injury in
fact. " In a confusing and now famous'" footnote'" Justice Scalia acknowledged that procedural rights may afford a plaintiff special treatment under standing doctrine.'
Scalia wrote that "[t]here is much truth to the assertion that 'procedural rights' are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."'" Footnote
seven, however, is confusing and raises more questions than it answers,
since the court did not apply the standards it set forth;' it did not apply
the standards because Lujan was not a procedural rights case.' Thus, the
lower courts are given the task of interpreting and applying the standards
it set forth.
Footnote seven did not expressly lower the injury in fact requirement.' Instead, Justice Scalia illustrated the dual standard for the requirement in a hypothetical involving the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).' He wrote that "one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the
licensing agency's failure to prepare an [EIS], even though he cannot

194. NEPA requires agencies to consider the effects of their actions on the environment by
preparing a detailed EIS, which must include a discussion of alternative proposals. 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(c) (1994).
195. Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine: Challenging
Resource Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 223,
238 n.87 (1996).
196. See William M. Orr, Note & Comment, Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen: An Improper
Application of Lujan to a Procedural Rights Plaintiff, 15 PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 373, 375 (1997).
197. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
198. The procedural standing mentioned in Lujan is now sometimes referred to simply as
"footnote seven standing." Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91.
199. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
200. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91.
201. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
202. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 108-09.
203. The Court expressly rejected the court of appeals finding of a procedural injury. Lujan,
504 U.S. at 572.
204. See id. at 572 n.7.
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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establish with any certainty2 that the statement will cause the license to
be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed
for many years."' Thus, the hypothetical suggests that the actual harm
requirement of the injury in fact element may be satisfied by showing the
plaintiff's "geographical nexus" to the affected area. Indeed, lower
courts have generally held that a procedural injury must be accompanied
by a showing that the plaintiff regularly uses, or lives adjacent to, the site
of the challenged project.'
Justice Scalia argued that the "normal standards" for immediacy and
redressability need not be met in a procedural injury claim, but he did not
indicate whether these standards are eliminated or simply relaxed. 2'0 Examination of the hypothetical, however, suggests the immediacy requirement for procedural plaintiffs is virtually eliminated when plaintiffs
do not control the timing of the injury, such as in the case of the dam
scenario."' Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have dispensed with
the immediacy requirement after deciding that footnote seven applies. '2
Footnote seven is less clear about the redressability requirement.
The dam hypothetical might be simply one example where the facts met
a relaxed standard, or it might be interpreted to eliminate the standard
altogether. 3 If footnote seven means the former, then it begs the following question:
How distant or removed must an injury be before it is unre1
'
dressable?
Redressability and causation are closely related, and the plaintiff's
ability to satisfy both elements depends on how the injury is defined. For
example, if the injury is defined in terms of the government's failure to
follow the law-as is the case with statutes like NEPA, which prescribes
detailed procedures with which to make major federal land management
decisions-the causation and redressability requirements are easily met
in most cases.2 5 If the agency fails to follow a prescribed procedure, the
206. NEPA requires only that agencies prepare an EIS, when necessary, to consider the
alternatives to the proposed action, but does not mandate any particular decision to be made
following this consideration. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
225 (1980).
207. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
208. The term was first used by a court in relation to a procedural injury in City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975). Orr,supra note 196, at 380.
209. Id. at 380-81.
210. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91-92.
211. Id. at 99.
212. Id. at 100.
213. Id. at 108.
214. See id.
215. This is the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v.
Lucero, 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996). The court devoted most of its analysis to the injury in fact
element. Id. at 448-51. Having established that the procedural injury shall be the foundation of the
injury in fact element, the court decided the causation and redressability requirements with much
less discussion. Id. at 451-52.
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injury is directly traceable to the federal agency, and can be redressed by
a court judgment that requires the agency to follow the prescribed procedure.
If the injury is defined in terms of the harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests, however, the plaintiff in a NEPA suit would be caught on
the familiar horns of not being able to show that its factual injury (e.g.,
environmental degradation caused by completion of the project in question) is "fairly traceable" to the agency's failure to prepare an EIS. 2 ' Nor
would the plaintiff be able to show that its injury is redressable because
the district court could not order the agency to make any particular decision regarding the project following consideration of the EIS.2"
Ambiguity arises because the determination of causation and redressability is critically related to how the injury is defined. Footnote
seven, however, does not clarify this relationship, nor does it even mention causation. Thus, the footnote does little more than affirm that a procedural injury claim does exist for claims brought under NEPA, without
articulating the reasons why.21' For this reason, it does not provide a
workable framework for evaluating procedural injuries that might be
recognized under other action-forcing statutes similar to NEPA, such as
the National Forest Management Act of 1976."9 Consequently, the lower
courts have taken slightly different paths in interpreting footnote seven
standing.' For example, the D.C. Circuit has distinguished cases in
which a plaintiff alleged injury stemming from broad programmatic decisions, from cases in which the plaintiff challenged an action directed at
a specific decision made.22 "The court imposed stricter requirements in
the former case.'
The Tenth Circuit, in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,m
clarified footnote seven and provided a workable procedural standing
analysis framework by defining injury in fact as a two part test." ' The test
216. See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994). The Act directs the Forest Service to develop land and resource
management plans ("forest plans") for each forest unit in the National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. §
1604 (1994).
220. Beers, supra note 189, at 14. Compare Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an environmental group had Article III standing
to challenge a decision of the Committee "if for no other reason than that they allege procedural
violations in an agency process in which they participated"), with Region 8 Forest Service Timber
Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 810 (11 th Cir. 1993) (denying standing to a council of
timber purchasers to challenge actions taken by the Forest Service because the injuries asserted by
the council to its rights to participation and informed decision-making were generalized grievances
that do not confer Article III standing).
221. Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see infra notes
267-72 and accompanying text.
222. FloridaAudubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 667.
223. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
224. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
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requires the plaintiff to prove 1) that the agency's failure to follow procedure results in increased environmental risk and 2) that its concrete
interests are harmed by that increased risk."2 Thus, in NEPA cases, the
injury in fact requirement will be met if the plaintiff can show a geographical nexus to an area that will be subjected to increased environmental risk due to an agency's uninformed decision making. The causation and redressability elements are then satisfied in terms of the procedural injury, rather than in terms of harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests. ' The court has yet to address the broader issue of procedural
standing for claims brought under statutes other than NEPA.m Nevertheless, as explained below, the court did present a workable procedural
injury framework under which plaintiffs may be able to use procedural
standing to challenge a broader range of land agency decisions.
B. Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucerom
1. Facts
Taos Ski Valley, which operates a ski area by permit within National Forest lands in New Mexico, proposed to expand the operation of
its facilities so as to include summertime use.' In considering the request, the Forest Service prepared an environmental assessmente ° in order to analyze the impact the proposed expansion would have on the environment. Based on the assessment, the Carson National Forest supervisor prepared a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)2 and approved
the proposed summertime expansions.2"
The Committee to Save the Rio Hondo (Committee) brought this
action claiming that the Forest Service had failed to follow NEPA procedures when it approved the ski area's summertime expansion." The ski
225. Id. at 449-51.
226. Id. at 45 i-52.
227. The Tenth Circuit decided one other case involving a procedural injury claim brought
under NEPA. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429
(10th Cir. 1996). This opinion contained a relatively brief discussion of the standing issue and did
not elaborate on the injury in fact test. Id. at 1433-34.
228. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
229. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 446.
230. Id. "An environmental assessment contains a less exhaustive environmental analysis than
does an environmental impact statement." Id. It is used by the agency to determine whether a full
EIS is necessary. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), (c), 1508.9 (1997).
231. The issuance of a FONSI is a finding that preparation of an EIS is not necessary. It is
usually the last NEPA action on a project. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13 (1997).
232. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 446.
233. The court stated:
The Committee claimed the Forest Service's approval of the amended master plan and
special use permit was either a 'major Federal (sic) action significantly affecting the ...
environment' requiring the Forest Service to prepare an environmental impact statement,
or the approval was a 'substantial change' to the plan, requiring the Forest Service to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement.
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area moved to dismiss the Committee's claim for lack of standing. " In
response, the Committee filed affidavits from two of its members that
claimed they used and enjoyed the land and water surrounding the ski
area for recreation, and that their use and enjoyment would be damaged
by year-round operation of the ski area. 35
The district court found that the Committee lacked standing because
it had not shown either sufficient injury in fact, or redressability.' The
injury was too speculative because the Committee could not prove that
the agency's decision would change if proper NEPA procedure had been
followed." The court also found that the Forest Service had complied
with NEPA by completing an environmental assessment, and therefore,
that a favorable decision would not redress the Committee's injuries."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the Committee's claim satisfied the prudential "zone of interests" test,239 and that it had also met all
three requirements of constitutional standing.2" The court began by acknowledging that a NEPA procedural injury may be the foundation for
injury in fact.' The court classified the injury in fact requirement as a
two-prong test: 2
[First,] the litigant must show that in making its decision without
following [NEPA] procedures, the agency created an increased risk of
actual, threatened, or imminent environmental harm; and [second] the
litigant must show that the increased risk of environmental harm injures its concrete interests by demonstrating either its geographical
nexus to, or actual use of the site of the agency action.,4

Id. at 447 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v) (1994) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1995)).

234.

Id.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. NEPA requires only that alternatives be identified and considered, but does not
mandate any particular decision. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1980).
238. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 477. The court of appeals found the Committee's injury was
redressable but did not rule on the question of whether the Forest Service had already complied with
NEPA. Id. at 453.
239. The zone of interest is a fourth element of standing doctrine, however, it is judiciallycreated rather than based upon the Constitution. Bennet v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997).
Because NEPA does not contain a private right of action, plaintiffs must rely on section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act to gain the right of judicial review. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448. The
court found the Committee had properly alleged it was adversely affected by some final agency
action within the meaning of NEPA because the Committee sought to protect its recreational and
aesthetic interests in the land and water, and their alleged injuries fall within the zone of interests
that NEPA was designed to protect. Id.
240. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448-52.
241. Id. at 449 (citing Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d 1495, 1499-1501 (9th Cir. 1995)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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The court found that the plaintiff satisfied the first prong because increased environmental risk would result from the agency's uninformed
decision making.' The court determined that the second prong was satisfied because the Committee had showed that its members actually used
the area and, therefore, could show a risk of environmental harm to a
particularized and concrete interest."5
The court found that the Committee satisfied the causation requirement because the increased risk was "fairly traceable to the agency's
alleged failure to follow [NEPA] procedures."" The court then indicated
that the injury resulted not from the agency's decision, but from the
agency's uninformed decision making. 7 The court specifically rejected a
D.C. Circuit opinion holding that the test for causation required the
plaintiff to show a demonstrable risk to his particularized interests.'M The
Tenth Circuit indicated that this analysis confused the issue of the likelihood of the harm (better addressed in the injury in fact requirement) with
its cause."4 9 Whether an increased risk will or will not occur due to the
agency action determines whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact,
not causation.'
Because the injury was so defined, the court found that it would be
redressed by a favorable judgment."' "That the Forest Service may not
change its decision to allow summertime operations at the ski area after
preparing an [EIS] is immaterial.""2 What was important was that the
Committee had established that its injury would be redressed by a judgment requiring the Forest Service to comply with NEPA procedure."
C. Other Circuits
Given the Supreme Court's scant explanation of procedural standing
in Lujan,"4 it is not surprising that the lower courts have diverged when
interpreting standing requirements for procedural injury cases. The Ninth
Circuit has generally been enthusiastic in recognizing standing based on
footnote seven." In Douglas County v. Babbit,' that court granted
standing to the county to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's deci244. Id.
245. Id. at 451.
246. Id. at 452 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 451.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 454.
252. Id. at 452.
253. Id.
254. Lujan, 504 U.S.at 572.
255. Yumee A. Shim, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman: When a Tree Falls in
the Forest, Is Anything Left (of) Standing?, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 277, 295 (1996).
256. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
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sion to designate certain federal land as critical habitat for the Northern
Spotted Owl because the plaintiff showed that sufficient injury to concrete, particularized interests had a reasonable probability of
occurrence. 7 The court quoted the language of footnote seven, stating
that the normal standards of redressability and immediacy are relaxed."
It acknowledged the uncertainty of whether the plaintiff's concrete interests would be affected by the Secretary's decision to designate land as
critical habitat, but stated this concern was "not important." ' 9 Thus the
Ninth Circuit approach related the causation and redressability requirements to the plaintiff's concrete injury, but relaxed the standards for both
elements to one of "reasonable probability." 26°
The D.C. Circuit has taken both restrictive and expansive views of
footnote seven standing. In Moreau v. F.E.R.C.,6 1 the court held that the
plaintiff had standing to challenge the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision to build a pipeline, based on the agency's failure to
give the plaintiff proper notice of a public hearing regarding the construction. 62 The court noted that redressability of the plaintiff's injuries
would be highly unlikely,' 3 yet this was not fatal under the footnote
seven standard of redressability. ' Thus, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits applied a relaxed, but undefined, standard for causation and redressability
that relates the injury to the plaintiff's concrete interests. 5
The D.C. Circuit, however, has distinguished cases in which the
plaintiff alleged injury premised upon broad rulemaking, from cases in
which the plaintiff challenges an action at a particular location." In
FloridaAudubon Society v. Bentsen77 the court noted that the standard is
stricter in cases involving the former.2' Bentsen involved a challenge to
the Secretary of the Treasury's decision to expand a tax credit for ethanol
made from corn and other crops.2' 9 The plaintiff first argued that NEPA
required the secretary to prepare an EIS before making this decision.
Secondly, the tax credit would increase the production of crops, which
would cause environmental harm to land that the plaintiffs used."' The
court held that in this situation, standing required the plaintiff to show a
particularized, demonstrable injury, fairly traceable to the act of the

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n.6.
982 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir 1993),
Moreau, 982 F.2d at 567.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
See Gatchel, supra note 186, at 102-06.
See Ott, supra note 196, at 390.
94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
FloridaAudubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 667.
Id. at 662.
Id.
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agency, and substantially probable to cause the injury."' By adding a
demonstrable injury requirement and refusing to relax the redressability
and causation requirements as suggested in footnote seven, the court
made it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs who challenge programmatic decisions, or decisions with diffuse impacts, to establish
standing. 2
D. Analysis
Footnote seven in Lujan made it clear, without articulating why, that
plaintiffs who use or live near land which is the site of a proposed project
that will be affected by an agency decision will have standing to force
the agency to follow proper NEPA procedure. 3 Thus, Rio Hondo was
not a difficult case to decide because its facts so closely paralleled the
hypothetical in footnote seven." ' Rio Hondo is important, however, because the court recognized a two-part test for procedural injury claims
like those brought under NEPA:2.. (1) The plaintiff must first establish
that the agency's failure to follow procedure will result in a procedural
injury that will affect its concrete interests; and (2) thereafter, the injury
will be defined in terms of procedural injury for purposes of immediacy,
redressability, and causation."6 This makes the injury in fact requirement
the most important element of environmental standing, because redressability and causation will be easily satisfied in most cases where the
agency that is required to follow procedure is a party to the case."
The court's interpretation, although logical, is not necessarily supported by a strict application of the language in footnote seven. The footnote suggests that a person who has been accorded a procedural right
through action-forcing statutes like NEPA, may enforce this right to
protect a concrete interest "without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy."" The Rio Hondo decision, however, applies normal standards, but applies them to the procedural injury, rather
than to the concrete interests injury.
Nothing in footnote seven or the majority opinion in Lujan suggests
that the immediacy and redressability standards should be applied to the
procedural injury. Indeed, there would be no need to discuss special
271. Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
272. See Orr, supra note 196, at 397-98.
273. See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
274. Id.
275. Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 (10th Cir. 1996).
276. Id. at 451-52.
277. Redressability will be a problem in a relatively few number of cases where the agency that
must follow the procedure is not a party to th suit, as in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. See Gatchel,
supra note 186, at 97-98. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service was the agency that failed to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior, and it was not a party to the case. The district court could
order the agency to follow procedure only if it was a party to the case. Id.
278. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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standards for immediacy and redressability were this so. If the foundational injury is the procedural violation, the injury is suffered as soon as
the procedure is violated; furthermore, the harm is clearly redressable by
a court order to follow procedure. It only becomes necessary to lower the
redressability and immediacy standards when they are related to a factual
injury rather than a procedural injury.
Clearly, footnote seven is difficult to apply to procedural standing
cases because its standards are explained only in terms of a hypothetical,
and are not applied elsewhere in the opinion.279 The footnote's emphasis
on special immediacy and redressability standards, however, indicates an
intent to apply these standards to the ultimate harm (construction of the
dam), not the procedural violation.' The D.C. Circuit also focused on
the probability that the ultimate harm will be redressed in cases involving
challenges to broad programmatic decisions. 8 ' Thus, by making the procedural injury the foundation of injury in fact, the Tenth Circuit may
have misapplied the footnote. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's approach
is more logical, and comes closer to expressing a workable test than the
unarticulated standards of footnote seven.
Under the decision in Rio Hondo, the important nexus is between
the agency's failure to follow procedure and the harm to the plaintiff's
concrete interests. If the plaintiff can show the procedural failure results
in harm to her concrete interests, then the elements of causation and redressability are applied to the procedural injury rather than the injury to
concrete interests. Although the Tenth Circuit did not acknowledge this
fact, the Rio Hondo approach essentially incorporates much of the traditional causation element into the injury in fact test. The critical reason for
ruling in the Committee's favor was the court's finding that failure to
follow NEPA procedure would cause increased environmental risk to the
Rio Hondo watershed.f 2 The Committee could then prove harm to its
concrete interests by showing its members had used the watershed for
much of their lifetimes, and planned to continue to use the area in the
future. n3
The court's approach comports with the footnote seven standard in
that it essentially reduces the redressability requirement for standing under NEPA. If this were not so, NEPA claims would otherwise fail due to
the fact that it requires the agency to follow certain decision making procedure, but does not mandate any particular outcome.' Under Rio
Hondo, the redressability requirement has bite only in the rare situation
where the agency that must follow the procedure is not a party to the

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
Gatchel, supra note 186, at 102-03.
See supra notes 266-72.
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445,448-49 (1996).
Id. at 450.
See supra note 235.
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case. More importantly, the causation requirement, which footnote seven
does not expressly relax, is essentially kept intact-it is incorporated into
the injury in fact test. The injury in fact test in Rio Hondo can only be
met if the court finds the agency's failure to follow procedure caused
harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests.2 "
The Rio Hondo opinion is significant for two reasons. First, the
court recognized that a procedural injury may be the foundation for a
claim brought under NEPA.' This lowers the barriers that the requirements of redressability and causation traditionally imposed on claims
based on procedure-enforcing statutes like NEPA. Second, the court expressly found that the agency's failure to follow procedure would result
in increased environmental risk. To establish standing, the plaintiff
merely had to show its members had a geographical nexus to the area at
risk in order to show injury to its concrete interests. Therefore, Rio
Hondo provides a clear step-by-step process that plaintiffs can follow to
prove standing under NEPA, and other action-forcing statutes, like the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA)Y or the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act.'
First, the plaintiff must show sufficient connection with the managed area to satisfy the geographical nexus test. Second, the plaintiff
must show that its concrete interests are injured by some failure of the
agency to follow the mandates of the law. The description of the injury is
critical to establishing this part of standing.289 The plaintiff should phrase
the injury in terms of harm to some concrete opportunity that is protected
by the agency's procedural statute, such as some injustice the statute was
designed to prevent.' ° In cases involving failure to follow NEPA procedure, this will usually mean characterizing the harm as increased environmental risk resulting from uninformed decision making. For claims
challenging planning decisions under statutes like the NFMA, this may

285. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
286. Id.
287. Congress initially enacted the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994). NFMA was enacted in 1976, in an amendment to the Resources
Planning Act, 83 Stat. 852 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The Act directs the Forest
Service to develop land and resource management plans ("forest plans") for each forest unit in the
National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). The plans must also be prepared in accordance
with NEPA. Id.
288. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1994). The Act was signed into law the same day as NFMA, and
prescribes planning procedures for the Bureau of Land Management.
289. Murphy, supra note 195, at 255.
290. Id. This not only assures redressability, but is necessary for statutes like NEPA and
NFMA, which do not contain citizen suit provisions. Id. For injuries under these statutes, the right to
judicial review must be achieved by reliance upon the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires
the injury to be contemplated "within the meaning of the relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
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mean phrasing the injury as the lost opportunity to appreciate a forest, an
interest acknowledged by NFMA.29
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed standing for procedural injury
claims brought under statutes other than NEPA. Other circuits that have
addressed the issue are split.' The Tenth Circuit's clear affirmation of
procedural rights based upon NEPA claims, however, may signal a willingness to recognize standing for plaintiffs alleging procedural injuries
based upon other statutes, and using the two-prong injury in fact test.
Without deciding the issue of procedural standing under other statutes,
Rio Hondo nevertheless strengthens procedural standing for environmental plaintiffs by providing a clear blueprint to follow in bringing procedural injury claims in the future.
CONCLUSION

CERCLA is a powerful statute that imposes enormous liability on a
party that may be only partially responsible for the contamination of a
site. Although CERCLA cases are likely to become less frequent in the
future,' it remains important for courts to reduce disincentives to undertake the cleanup of hazardous substance releases that occurred in the
past. The powerful sword of strict, and joint and several liability is
needed to accomplish the difficult task of cleaning up contaminated sites.
Yet it would be foolish to wield this sword in such a way as to encourage
PRPs to hide their connection to a site or delay the cleanup of such a site
for as long as possible. The decisions in the three recent CERCLA cases
discussed indicate the Tenth Circuit's cognizance of CERCLA's swordlike qualities. These cases show wise restraint on the part of the court,
which avoids penalizing PRPs unnecessarily.
With regard to standing for environmental plaintiffs, Rio Hondo
involved NEPA claims factually similar to the dam hypothetical in footnote seven of Lujan. For this reason, Rio Hondo did not expand Tenth
Circuit procedural standing outright. The Tenth Circuit has yet to grant
standing for any procedural injury beyond NEPA claims. Yet Rio Hondo
offers hope for plaintiffs wishing to bring procedural injury claims under
other action-forcing statutes like NFMA. The opinion eliminates much of

291. Murphy, supra note 195, at 255; see National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600,
1604(e), 1604(g) (1994).
292. Compare Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
environmental plaintiffs could not challenge a forest plan because the plan "does not effectuate any
on-the-ground environmental changes," and, therefore could not be the basis for injury), with
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1300, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the procedural
standing requirements for claims brought under the NFMA are similar to the standards of NEPA
claims, because Congress intended procedural safeguards to be similar in the two, and in this case
those procedural requirements had been satisfied by the plaintiffs).
293. CERCLA liability is widely known and offers powerful incentive for PRPs to prevent
releases of hazardous substances in the future. Thus, as cleanup of old sites continues, the number of
newly contaminated sites should decrease over time.
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the confusion surrounding footnote seven standing, and focuses the
plaintiff's attention on establishing the elements of the two-part injury in
fact test. Rio Hondo may have laid the groundwork necessary for plaintiffs to use NFMA to challenge an agency's decision. It may now be possible to present a well-fashioned argument that the agency's failure to
follow NFMA procedure will result in a lost opportunity to appreciate a
forest, or similar injury to a concrete interest that the statute sought to
prevent.
Douglas Sinor

ERISA PLAN CHANGES
Recently hit with unexpected financial constraints,Acme Company begins to investigate various cost reduction measures. Under
one cost reduction strategy, the Acme Company would reduce its
long-term labor costs by offering an enhanced retirementpackage to
those employees opting to retire within a given period. Another cost
reduction plan would require all current retirees to pay their health
insurance premiums. The currentplan document guarantees that the
company will not reduce or eliminate retiree benefits. Elsewhere in
the plan document, a less conspicuous statement reserves to the company the right to amend or terminate the plan, but only if deemed
necessary.
Six days prior to retirement,John, an employee of Acme Company, makes inquires regarding the possibility of obtaining a more
lucrative retirement package. Acme Company declines John's solicitation. A month after John retires,Acme Company offers current employees a more lucrative retirementpackage than provided to John.
In addition, the company informs current retirees that, beginning next
month, it will require all retirees to pay their entire health insurance
premiums. Has Acme Company breached its contractualor fiduciary
duty to John? '
INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA)
establishes general fiduciary duties for employers administering employer-sponsored retirement plans.' ERISA leaves the responsibility to4
the courts to develop specific duties through the common law of trusts.

1. Fact pattern is inspired by Hockett v. Sun Co., (R&M), 109 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1997) and
Chiles v. Ceridian Co., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1997).
2. Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA), § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1994).
3. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (fiduciary responsibility provisions); see
Steven Davi, Note, To Tell the Truth: An Analysis of Fiduciary Disclosure Duties and Employee
Standing to Assert Claims Under ERISA, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 638 (1995).
Under ERISA
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting managment of such plan or exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets; (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so; or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan ....
ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-5 to .75-6 (1997) (providing
questions and answers relating to fiduciary status).
4. Edward E. Bintz, FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary Duty
to Disclose?, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 979, 984-85 (1993). For pre-ERISA cases in which the courts
relied on the common law of trusts, see Lix v. Edwards, 147 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298-99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978), Erion v. Timken Co., 368 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976), and Branch v. White, 239
A.2d 665,671 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
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Not surprisingly, this broad grant of judicial discretion results in inconsistent judicial interpretations.! An employer's legal obligations in making and disclosing plan amendments is one area in which the courts strive
to establish a consistent rule of law.'
This survey examines three cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period in which participants vehemently objected to various plan changes made by their employers. Part I examines Hockett v.
Sun Co., (R&M),' in which the Tenth Circuit adopted the "serious consideration" test.9 This test requires employers to disclose all benefit plan
changes under serious consideration by management. '° Part II examines
Chiles v. Ceridian Corp.," in which the Tenth Circuit allowed an
amendment to an employer-sponsored welfare program that provided for
a prospective plan change, even though the original plan guaranteed that
the employer would make no such changes.'2 Part III examines the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp.,'" which upheld a plan

5. See Bintz, supra note 4, at 990 (commenting on the unsettled nature of case law addressing a fiduciary's duty to disclose proposed plan changes); Henry H. Rossbacher et al., ERISA's Dark
Side: Retiree Health Benefits, False Employer Promises and the Protective Judiciary, 9 DEPAUL
BUS. L.J. 305, 333 (1997) ("[T]he lower court decisions have varied widely, some circuits even
denying that plan beneficiaries and participants have the right to enforce fiduciaries' duties under
ERISA."); Davi, supra note 3, at 638 (noting that circuit courts disagree on the fiduciary's disclosure
requirements for plan amendments proposed but not implemented). Compare, e.g., Nachwalter v.
Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11 th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that ERISA does not provide a remedy
when an employer provides only oral or informal promises and later fails to fulfill these representations), with Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (misleading
communications to participants constitutes breaches of fiduciary duty).
6. Compare Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 544 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that a company did
not breach its duty by failing to notify an employee of amendment provisions in the plan), and
Payonk v. HMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989) (ruling that an employer's lawful
termination decisions, absent misrepresentation designed to mislead employees, is not covered under
ERISA), and Kytle v. Stewart Title Co., 788 F. Supp 321, 323 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that the
fulfillment of ERISA reporting requirements is all that is necessary to uphold its fiduciary duties),
with Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a failure to
disclose considerable efforts being undertaken to implement a retirement benefits program constituted breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA), and Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246,
252 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that the company had a fiduciary duty to keep participants informed so
they could make appropriate decisions), and Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747,
750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the company had a fiduciary duty to inform all participants of
their options when the benefit program was canceled), and Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858
F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (asserting that the fiduciary had a duty to avoid misrepresentations once the company gave serious consideration to a plan), and Peoria Union Stock Yards Co.
Retirement Plan v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that lying is
inconsistent with the fiduciary duty owed under ERISA).
7. This survey period covered cases from September, 1996 to August, 1997.
8. 109F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1997).
9. Hockett, 109 F.3d at 1523.
10. Id. at 1522.
11. 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996).
12. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1512.
13. 112 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997).
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amendment changing the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven,
thereby reducing the benefits to current retirees."
I. DISCLOSURE OF PLAN AMENDMENTS

A. Background
ERISA is the legislature's attempt to balance the competing interest
of the employee and employer in company sponsored benefit plans.'" On
one hand, ERISA must protect benefits promised to employees. 6 On the
other hand, it cannot excessively burden employers or increase their exposure to litigation as to discourage companies from implementing the
plans." Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the courts provide specific
guidance to employers attempting to navigate this litigious area of employment law.
Instead of enumerating the employer's fiduciary responsibilities,
ERISA relies on the common law of trusts to define the general scope of
responsibility.'9 ERISA defines three common law of trust principles by
requiring employer-fiduciaries to: (1) comply with the statute's "prudent
person" rule, (2) act solely for the interests of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries, and (3) act for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to plan participants and their beneficiaries.' Not surprisingly, when

14. Lindsay, 112 F.3dat 1068.
15. See Bryan L. Clobes, In the Wake of Varity Corp. v. Howe: An Affirmative Fiduciary Duty
to Disclose Under ERISA, 9 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 221, 222-23 (1997) (arguing that courts should read
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to effectuate the enforcement of fiduciary standards in such a way as
not to discourage employers from offering benefits plans); Davi, supra note 3, at 638 ("Legislators
intended ERISA both to protect the interests of employee benefit plan participants and alternately to
avoid undue hardships on the private pension plan system."); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.
Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996) (noting that when determining ERISA's fiduciary duties, courts must account
for the competing congressional purposes of offering enhanced protection for employees and Congress's opposing interest in encouraging employers to provide benefit plans).
16. Varity Corp., 116 S.Ct. at 1070; Clobes, supra note 15, at 222-23; Davi, supra note 3, at
638.
17. See Clobes, supra note 15, at 223; Davi, supra note 3, at 638.
18. See Clobes, supra note 15, at 222; see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
19. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1070; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 295
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076 ("The labor law provisions apply rules and
remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries."); H.R.
REP. No.93-533, at 11 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."); Bintz, supra note 4, at 984.
20. Davi, supra note 3, at 640-41; see Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162
(6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the three elements as ERISA duties). As set forth in section 404(a) of
ERISA:
(1)... a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of :
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
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courts apply these broad principles to determine if a fiduciary must disclose plan changes, inconsistent judicial opinions frequently result.2'
The Supreme Court has refused to address the issue of whether
ERISA obligates the disclosure of plan changes by the plan's fiduciary.22
In fact, only recently did the Supreme Court recognize, in Varity Corp. v.
Howe,' that an individual may recover damages for breach of fiduciary
duties under ERISA." Prior to Varity, the Court interpreted ERISA as
authorizing damages only to the plan as a whole, and not to participants
in their individual capacity. ' ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes the
court to award "other appropriate equitable relief' for violations of
ERISA's fiduciary duties or other terms of the plan.26 According to the
Court, the breadth of "other equitable relief' encompasses individual
relief for breach of fiduciary duties.27
In keeping with the Court's current track record, the Varity Court
did not clarify the fiduciary's responsibility to disclose plan changes.' As
a result, the lower courts' decisions remain on a continuum of disarray
due to the combination of the ambiguity of fiduciary requirements under
ERISA and the Court's unwillingness to address the issue. For example,
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims ....
ERISA § 404(a), § 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing list of decisions evidencing the inconsistency of judicial opinions in this area); cf 3rd Circuit Addresses DisclosureDuties: Round Two of
the Fischer and Kurz Cases, 5 No. 6 ERISA Litig. Rep. 3, 3 (1997) [hereinafter Fischer & Kurz]
(arguing that the test employed by the Third Circuit to determine when ERISA requires disclosure of
plan changes is "unhelpful and likely only to produce more uncertainty and more litigation").
22. See Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1065 ("Because the breach of this duty [of loyalty) is sufficient to uphold the decision below, we need not reach the question of whether ERISA fiduciaries
have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to
employee inquires."); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1247 (1997); Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1022 (1988); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed,
474 U.S. 1113 (1986); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees,
740 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
23. 116S. Ct. at 1065.
24. Id. at 1076-79 (holding ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) authorizes a civil
action for individual relief).
25. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (holding that
ERISA §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) does not provide for equitable or remedial relief on an
individual basis, but only for the plan as a whole); see also Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1076 (distinguishing Russell from Varity in that Russell sought relief under ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(2) whereas the plaintiffs in Varity sought individual damages under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
26. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994); see Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1076.
27. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1076-77 (analyzing scope of ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
I 132(a)(3)).
28. See Clobes, supra note 15, at 222.
29. See Bintz, supra note 4, at 981 (noting that no clear framework for analyzing a fiduciary's
duties to disclose under ERISA has emerged from recent court decisions); Fischer & Kurz, supra
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in Porto v. Armco, Inc., ° the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
plan fiduciaries do not have any disclosure requirements beyond those
specifically enumerated by ERISA" The Eighth Circuit's holding represents one end of the disclosure spectrum exhibited among the judicial
circuits.
In contrast to the Porto court's refusal to recognize a fiduciary duty
to inform a participant of a plan change upon satisfaction of ERISA's
disclosure requirements, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., concluded that a fiduciary
must not only comply with ERISA disclosure requirements, but maintains an affirmative duty to provide additional information regarding a
plan's options."
In Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.," the Sixth Circuit formulated the "serious considerations" test which may strike a balance
between Porto and Eddy.3" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
plan's fiduciary mfust "seriously consider" a plan change before any misstatement by the plan's fiduciary will be considered material. After the
refinements made to the test by the Third Circuit, the "serious consideration" test has become the answer to the disclosure question for a host of
circuits.
Until Fischer v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co. (Fischer11),6 courts nar-

rowly interpreted the test, recognizing the duty not to make material misnote 21, at 3; Rossbacher et al., supra note 5, at 333 (noting that lower court decisions vary widely,
some even denying that participants have the right to enforce ERISA's fiduciary duties). But see
Clobes, supra note 15, at 221 (arguing that a recent trend among the courts is to impose an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose pending plan changes).
30. 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987). In Porto, the plaintiff made an irrevocable election to
defer the withdrawal of investment from the company pension plan. 825 F.2d at 1274-75. Subsequently, the company amended the plan allowing revocation of the once irrevocable decision to
defer withdrawal. Id. at 1275. The plan administrator notified current participants in the plan but
failed to notify past retirees. Id.
31. Id. at 1276; see Bintz, supra note 4, at 988 ("The express language of ERISA provides
little indication as to whether there is ever a fiduciary duty to disclose information to participants and
beneficiaries."). However, based on ERISA's legislative history and the pre-ERISA common law,
"there is no well-grounded basis on which wholly to exclude a duty to disclose from ERISA's fiduciary requirements." Id. at 989. But see Kytle v. Stewart Title Co., 788 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (holding that notification to the participant or beneficiary within 210 days of the end of the
plan-year in which the amendment was made fulfilled the plans' duties under ERISA's reporting and
disclosure rules).
32. Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
33. 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
34. Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1163-64; see supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's refusal to address disclosure obligations under ERISA).
35. Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1164.
36. 96 F.3d 1533 (1996). As discussed subsequently, Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Fischer 1), 994 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1993), reversed and remanded the district court's decision for a
determination as to whether Philadelphia Electric made affirmative material misrepresentations to
Fischer. Fischer I1 again reversed and remanded the district court's determination on remand with
clarified instructions as to the applicability of the serious consideration test. Since Fischer II ade-
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representations regarding the seriously considered plan changes, but declining to create a duty to disclose anything at all regarding the possibility of future amendments."
The Fischer court noted that the concept of serious consideration
recognizes and moderates the opposing interests of the employee's right
to information and the employer's need to operate on a day-to-day
basis.38 When balancing these interests, the court must determine the
materiality of the consideration by focusing on the degree of seriousness
with which a company considers a change. 9 A greater degree of seriousness results in a greater likelihood that a court will view the misrepresentation as material. ' To evaluate the degree of seriousness, the court
recognized a three part test, finding "serious consideration . .. exists
when: (1) a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to implement
the change."' An analysis should jointly consider all three elements of
the test since the factors "interact and coalesce to form a composite picture of serious consideration.": Upon satisfaction of this test, the company will be deemed as seriously considering the plan change, and any
contrary statements made will constitute material misrepresentations."
The examination of a "specific proposal" attempts to distinguish
serious consideration from mere evaluation of management's options."
Although a specific proposal may contain several options and vary
somewhat from the initial proposal, the seriously considered proposal is
one that is "sufficiently concrete to support consideration by senior management."
The second element of serious consideration, "discussions of implementation," also distinguishes the process of gathering data from serious consideration, allowing senior management to become involved in
the evaluation process without trigging a duty of disclosure." The Third
quately discusses the factual bases and procedural history of the case, the following discussion relies
upon the text of Fischer II. Kurz v. PhiladelphiaElec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996), was a
companion case to FischerH. Based on nearly identical facts, the issues and holding were identical
to Fischer II. Compare Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1533, with Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1544. As such, this survey
only refers to the Fischer II decision despite the applicability of either decision for the following
propostions.
37. Bintz, supra note 4, at 995-96.
38. Fischer 1I, 96 F.3d at 1539. The court recognized that corporations continually review
their benefit packages and the unreasonableness of disclosing every facet of these ongoing activities.
Id.
39. Id. at 1538-39.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1539.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1538-41.
44. Id. at 1539-40.
45. Id. at 1540.
46. Id.
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Circuit classified activities such as gathering data, interaction of company personnel and senior management, and hiring of outside consultants
as preliminary discussions as opposed to discussions for
implementation. '7 Only when the discussion turns to the practicalities of
implementation does the consideration become serious."
"Consideration by senior management," the final factor of the serious consideration test, focuses on the specific cadre of management
maintaining the authority to implement the proposal.'9 The analysis extends beyond a quorum of the board of directors to that level of management responsible for making recommendations on such issues to
those directors."
The Third Circuit emphasized that the serious consideration test is
not a "bright line rule."' The court acknowledged that it limits judicial
inquiry to the later stages of corporate decision-making and does not turn
on any single factor, but should remain flexible and fact specific in the
analysis of the interaction of the factors. 2 It is within this context of the
Third Circuit's articulation of the "serious consideration" test that the
Tenth Circuit decided Hockett v. Sun Co.
B. Hockett v. Sun Co., (R&M)"
1. Facts
The plaintiff in Hockett, a former employee of Sun Refining and
Marketing Company (Sun), retired prior to the announcement of new
early retirement program.' Hockett submitted his official and irrevocable
request for early retirement on June 7, 1991, effective July 1, 1991.5
During this period, Sun evaluated various downsizing strategies, including a new early retirement incentive program. ' Unsatisfied with the
original incentive program, Hockett directed specific inquires to the

47. Id.; see also Fischer & Kurz, supra note 21, at 5 (stating that Judge Roth considered the
second factor critical in distinguishing between preliminary discussions of alternatives and the
serious considerations of implementation).
48. Fischer11, 96 F.3d at 1540.
49. Id.; see also Fischer & Kurz, supra note 21, at 5 (recognizing that requiring disclosure at
this stage strikes a compromise between the extremes of discussion by lower level management at
one extreme and approval of the board of the directors at the other extreme).
50. Fischer 11, 96 F.3d at 1540.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 109 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1997).
54. Hockett, 109 F.3d at 1518. Sun Refining and Marketing Company is a subsidiary of Sun
Company. Id. This survey refers to the companies collectively as "Sun." See id. at 1524 n.2 (discussing the court's references solely to Sun, but their consideration of the activities of both Sun
Company and Sun Refining and Marketing Company).
55. Id. at 1518.
incentive retirement program expiring on
56. Id. at 1519-20. Sun Company granted a 21/2%
July 1,1997. Id. at1518-19.
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plan's fiduciary regarding the possibility of obtaining a "retirement
package."'5' The plan's fiduciary did not affirmatively respond to Hockett's request and Hockett subsequently retired on July 1, 1991.' On
August 28, 1991, Sun offered a new early retirement package to employees retiring between September 1 and October 15.59 Since Hockett terminated his employment prior to August 28, 1991, Sun refused to allow
him to participate in the retirement program.' As a result, Hockett instituted an action for breach of a fiduciary duty.: The district court held that
Sun was seriously considering the adoption of an early retirement program when Hockett made inquires regarding the same. 2 As such, Sun
breached its fiduciary duty by materially misrepresenting the possibility
of an early retirement program.' 3
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, in adopting the Third Circuit's interpretation of
serious consideration, reversed the lower court's determination that Sun
seriously considered adopting the new plan and materially misrepresented its non-existence to Hockett.' According to the Tenth Circuit,
"serious consideration of a plan amendment does not exist until (1) a
specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of implementation
(3) by senior management with the authority to implement the change."'
Applying this test to Hockett's complaint, the Tenth Circuit rejected
Hockett's contention that the plan fiduciary supplied him with materially
inaccurate information.'
According to the Tenth Circuit, the serious consideration test appropriately limits the burden on employers by reducing the instances in

57. Id. at 1519. Hockett's inquiry into a retirement "package" was in reference to a more
lucrative early retirement program than the 21/% incentive retirement program offered by Sun at that
time. Id.
58. Id. In response to the plaintiff's request for a retirement package, the vice president of
Human Resources and Administration, the plan's fiduciary, told the plaintiff that he would "check
into it and see what he could do." Id. The plan's fiduciary never provided further response to the
plaintiff's inquiry. Id.
59. Id. at 1520. The added benefits in the new early retirement package included "crediting the
employees with (1) an additional three years of age and service, (2) severance payments equal to
three weeks of base pay for every completed year of service, and (3) a bonus." Id.
60. ld. at 1521.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1523; see Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir.
1996) (articulating the Third Circuit's interpretation of serious consideration).
65. Hocket, 109 F.3d at 1523 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fischer II, 96 F.3d at
1539).
66. Id. at 1525.
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which an employer must disclose their tentative intentions." The test also
reduces the risk that competitors will use strategic business information
released to comply with ERISA to detrimentally impair the business
goals of the organization." At the same time, the test benefits employees
by not discouraging employers from improving, or even offering, the
plans.' Employers are also less likely to lay off employees because too
few employees retire under the original plan, opting instead to wait for a
retirement sweetener. 70
Applying the test to Hockett, the court did not find the intersection
of the serious consideration factors until late July or early August, a period subsequent to Hockett's retirement." The court disagreed with
Hockett's argument that Sun's internal documentation evidenced serious
consideration prior to his inquiry regarding a retirement package. 2 In
addition, assuming that Sun was relatively certain prior to Hockett's inquiry that they would offer the new early retirement program, a determination recognizing serious consideration did not necessarily follow." A
plaintiff must conclusively establish each of the three elements of serious
consideration before a fiduciary's duty of disclosure arises.7 In support
of this position, the court further noted that the record did not include any
"fresh cost-analysis or actuarial work."' While noting that satisfaction of

67. Id. at 1523 (arguing that less restrictive disclosure requirements would unduly burden the
employer by having to produce a "constant, ever-changing stream of information" that only confuses
and misleads employees).
68. Id.
69. Id. ("Changing circumstances . ..might require an employer to sweeten its severance
package, and the employer should not be forever deterred from giving its employees a better deal
merely because it did not clearly indicate to a previous employee that a better deal might one day be
proposed." (quoting Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. The court argued that employers only offer enhanced retirement plans when not enough
people retired under the original plan. Id. (citing Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d
Cir. 1996). This strategy would necessarily fail if employers were required to disclose their intentions before the old plan is given a chance, since employees would forego retiring until the implementation of the enhanced plan. Id. "If fiduciaries were required to disclose such a business strategy,
it would necessarily fail. Employees simply would not leave if they were informed that improved
benefits were planned if workforece reductions were insufficient." Id. (quoting Pocchia, 81 F.3d at
279).
71. Id. at 1524.
72. Id. at 1525. The internal company documentation is a "prime example of preliminary
exploration and evaluation" that falls outside serious consideration. Id.
73. Id. at 1524-25. Hockett relied on internal company discussions and memoranda by upper
management to establish serious consideration. Id. In addition, Hockett concluded that Sun's announcement of future downsizing plans suggested company officials knew at that time that a change
in the early retirement program would be necessary to accomodate the downsizing. Id. at 1524. The
court found these types of activities as "prime example[s] of preliminary exploration and evaluation." Id. at 1525.
74. Id. at 1524-25.
75. Id. The court refers to "fresh costs" as the cost-analysis information that would usually be
completed prior to seriously considering plan to offer an early retirement program. Id.
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the test does not require this type of work, the court recognized that it is
unlikely the company seriously considered the plan in its absence.7 6
C. Other Circuits
In Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co.," retirees asserted that the defendant intentionally misled the plaintiff that the company was not seriously
considering an enhanced retirement package.7 ' The district court held that
Kodak was not seriously considering the retirement package before the
plaintiffs retired, precluding a judicial determination that the Kodak
statements materially misled the plaintiffs. Overruling the district court,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court misconstrued the serious consideration test.'
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's ruling that
materiality necessarily requires serious consideration.' In the appellate
court's view, whenever the fiduciary of a plan speaks, the fiduciary "may
not actively misinform its plan beneficiaries about the availability of
future retirement benefits ... regardless of whether or not it is seriously
considering future plan changes.'"2 The materiality of the misstatements
depends on the nature and context of the assurances The determination
of the materiality of false factors depends on how significantly the statement misrepresented the present status of internal deliberations, whether
the employee knew of other information that eliminated some of the
negative effect of the misrepresentation, and the specificity of the assurance.
Additionally, the court refused to recognize a cause of action based
upon the "mispredictions" of future events." A viable claim may exist
based upon false statements that promise or guarantee future benefits,
especially when supported with statements of fact, provided those guarantees are not so unrealistic as to become unbelievable to the reasonable
person.' After issuing this guidance, the Second Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to determine if Kodak made material misstatements and whether the plaintiffs relied upon those misstatements!"
76. Id.
77. 109 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1997).
78. Ballone, 109 F.3d at 121.
79. Id. at 122.
80. Id. at 120, 125-26.
81. Id. at 122-24.
82. Id. at 124; see Jeanne L. Bakker & Edward T. Ellis, ERISA FiduciaryDuty LitigationAfter
Varity Corporation v. Howe, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS INEMPLOYMENT LAW 117, 125 (ALIABA Course of Study, July 17, 1997) (discussing fiduciary's duty to speak "truthfully").
83. Ballone, 109 F.3d at 124.
84. Id. at 125.
85. Id. (citing Mullings v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663,669 (2d. Cir. 1994)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit requires more
than a simple misstatement and reliance for a breach of a fiduciary duty
to occur. In Muse v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.," the plaintiffs were former employees who contended that, prior to their retirement, they made inquiries regarding the possibility of an early retirement
program.89 The plaintiffs alleged their supervisors indicated that the company would not offer an expanded early retirement program in the near
future and, relying upon the supervisor's negative response, the plaintiffs
retired.' IBM subsequently offered a superior benefit plan within a few
months of the plaintiff's retirement. 9' The plaintiffs contended that the
inaccurate information provided by the fiduciary during a period of serious consideration of plan change violated ERISA's fiduciary requirements.'
The Sixth Circuit held that IBM's serious consideration of an enhanced retirement plan triggered its fiduciary duties, but IBM did not
breach this duty since they did not intentionally deceive the plaintiff
through engaging in a "targeted plan" to deceive the plaintiffs.93 Therefore, according to the Sixth Circuit, unless the employer devises a
scheme to intentionally deceive the employee, the employer's actions
will not breach the fiduciary requirements of ERISA.9"
D. Analysis
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, it is not surprising to
find the circuit court decisions scattered along a continuum-with some
circuits only requiring compliance with ERISA's reporting provision
while other circuits require an affirmative act.? The Fischer11 and Hockett decisions fall in the middle of these extremes, giving employers a
relatively clear guide to determine their duties under ERISA.
In Fischer1I, the Third Circuit held that a plan administrator has a
fiduciary responsibility to avoid making any material misstatements to

88. 103 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1996).
89. Muse, 103 F.3d at 492. IBM offered early retirement incentives in the past, prompting the
plaintiffs, knowing of these past inducements, to inquire into whether IBM would reinstitute such
incentives in the future. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492-93.
92. Id. at 493; see ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994) (fiduciary responsibility provisions); supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's statutory requirements in the area of fiduciary responsibility).
93. Muse, 103 F.3d at 495.
94. Bakker & Ellis, supra note 82, at 126.
95. Compare, e.g., Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring fiduciaries to comply only with ERISA's enumerated requirements), with Eddy v. Colonial Life Inc. Co.,
919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing an affirmative duty to provide information beyond
ERISA's enumerated requirements). For a discussion of this continuum, see supra notes 30-52 and
accompanying text.
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plan participants. ' Similarly, the Hockett decision indicated that in the
Tenth Circuit an employer has a fiduciary duty to inform participants of
plan changes in response to employee inquires when that employer seriously considers the additional benefits.9 7
The Sixth Circuit utilized a narrower approach to the serious consideration test in Berlin." More recently, in Muse,' the Sixth Circuit further restricted the serious consideration test. The court stated that a "targeted plan" to deceive the participants must exist before the actions of an
employer breach a fiduciary duty." ° Other circuits have not applied, or
explicitly rejected, the Sixth Circuit's approach to the serious consideration test.' °'
The Second Circuit specifically rejected the bright-line rule established in Berlin.m In Ballone,m° the court held that regardless of how seriously a company considers a plan change, the plan administrator must
always speak truthfully to plan participants.'" This interpretation also
appears in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Varity"
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly blessed the serious consideration text, the circuit courts appear to agree on the propriety of the
general approach.
While relatively settled on the serious consideration approach, the
circuits still vary widely in their application of the test. As a result, corporations must consult their district court's decisions to determine what
types of disclosure the particular jurisdiction requires. To be safe, a corporation with operations in conflicting districts should follow the district
with the more stringent disclosure requirements, unless they prefer a date
in court. Concededly, inconsistent law is not good law. However, until
the Supreme Court addresses the serious consideration test and its application, corporations must cope with the law and its inefficiencies.
II. THE ILLUSIONARY PROMISES OF EMPLOYEE WELFARE PLANS
Congress enacted ERISA, in part, to preempt state regulation of
employee benefit plans and to provide a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that would protect benefits promised to employees, retirees,

96. Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Fischer 11), 96 F.3d 1533, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996).
97. Hockett v. Sun Co., (R&M), 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997).
98. Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
99. Muse v. International Business Machines Corp., 103 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 495.
101. See, e.g., Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
Berlin approach).
102. Ballone, 109 F.3d at 123-24.
103. Id. at 117.
104. Id. at 124.
105. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1073-75 (1996).
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and their beneficiaries."' In so doing, ERISA distinguishes between employee pension and welfare plans."'° A welfare plan is any program that
provides medical benefits to employees, while a pension plan provides
retirement income." ERISA requires that pension plans include nonforfeiture or vested policies, a requirement not paralleled in ERISA's
approach to welfare benefit plans."° As such, employers remain generally
free to unilaterally adopt, amend, or terminate welfare benefit plans.""
ERISA also requires employers to maintain welfare plans in accordance
with a formal written plan document (master plan document") and provide the covered employees with a Summary of Plan Description (SPD)
describing the plan."' In contrast to the complex language of the master
plan document, employers must write SPDs in easily understandable
language."' Frequently, disputes arise due to discrepancies between the

106. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) ("[T]he provision of this subchapter...
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan...."); Rossbacher et al., supra note 5, at 306 (discussing ERISA preemption).
107. Compare ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1994) (defining "welfare benefit plan"),
with ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994) (defining "employee benefit pension plan');
see infra note 108 (providing text of these definitions).
108. Section 3 of ERISA defines a "welfare benefit plan" as:
[Any plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or scholarship funds, or prepaid vacation benefits, appreticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services ....
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1994). Section 3 of ERISA defines an "employee benefit pension plan" as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer or by any
employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of
surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program (i) provides retirement income to
employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the
plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994).
109. ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C §§ 1051-1061 (stating ERISA vesting requirements applicable to pension plans); ERISA § 201(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (providing express language
excluding welfare benefit plans from ERISA's vesting provisions); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119 (1989);
In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (summarizing Congressional motivation for rejecting vesting requirements of welfare benefit plans); Gable
v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that ERISA exempts welfare benefit
plans from vesting requirements); DeVoll v. Burdick Painting, Inc., 35 F.3d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[flederal law does not prohibit an employer from altering the package of medical
benefits" offered to employees).
110. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1228; Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 949 (8th
Cir. 1994); see also Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[A] company does not act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare benefits
plan.").
11l. ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994).
112. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1230-31 (noting that ERISA requires an SPD to
"be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant" (quoting ERISA
§ 102(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. 1022(a)(1)).
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formal plan document and the SPD-a situation flowing from the employer's exercise of its ability to unilaterally amend welfare program."'
A. Background

The increase in medical costs beyond the expectations of corporate
America and increased global competition have encouraged corporations
to reduce costs by amending welfare programs unilaterally."" In addition,
recent financial accounting standards now require all businesses to record the expense of providing the future retirement benefits against current earnings. The Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement
Number 106 (FAS 106) requires companies to record millions, and even
billions, of dollars worth of expenses that reduce current earnings.""
Searching for ways to reduce benefit expenses, employers more often
than not turn to their welfare benefit plans for savings.
Welfare plans are a likely source for benefit reductions for several
6
reasons. ERISA does not require the vesting of welfare plan benefits."
Corporations faced with enormous employee welfare costs and unfavorable accounting treatment turn to their welfare benefit plans to unilaterally reduce benefits more frequently than ever before.' By 1994, more

113.
114.

Rossbacheretal.,supra note 5, at315.
Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits, in PENSION, PROFIT SHARING,
WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION BENEFITS 1, 195 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 3, 1996).
115.

EMPLOYERS'

ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS,

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, In 16-78 (Financial Accounting Standards
Bd. 1991); see Siske, supra note 114, at 195 (noting that increased costs coupled with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Statement 106, which requires employers to account for non-pension
benefits on an accrual basis, prompted employers to reduce or terminate benefits); see also Amy
Harmon, Ford Charge Will Result in Record Loss, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at Dl (reporting that
in December, 1992, Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors faced unfunded employee benefit obligations of more than 28 billion dollars, with their respective shares listed at 7 /2 billion, 4 billion, and
18 billion). With medical bills this high, no wonder corporate America searched for means to decrease expenditures related to employee benefits.
116. ERISA § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(l) (1994) (excluding welfare benefit plans from required vesting provisions); see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228
(1995); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119 (1989); see In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.
Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1995); Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851,
855 (4th Cir. 1994); DeVoll v. Burdick Painting, Inc., 35 F.3d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1994); Land v.
Chicago Truck Drivers Union (Independent) Health & Welfare Fund, 25 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir.
1994); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1992); Reichelt v. Emhart Corp., 921 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir.
1990); Alday v. Container Corp. of Am., 906 F.2d 660, 663 (11 th Cir. 1990).
117. See Rossbacher et al., supra note 5, at 308. One commentator examined some instances of
the effects of FAS 106, noting:
McDonnell Douglas Corporation cited FAS 106 as the reason for termination of health
benefits of more than 8,000 non-union retirees.... Philip Lighting Division's decision to
modify health insurance coverage for retirees under age sixty-five was precipitated by
FAS 106. Similarly, Unisys Corporation decided to phase out retiree health benefits paid
by the company when it determined its FAS 106 liability to be $170 million.
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than one-half of the companies in the United States modified their welfare plans in response to FAS 106."' The stampede of corporations unilaterally reducing benefits resulted in a large increase in ERISA litigation."9
The majority of ERISA litigation over welfare plans concerns the
employer's unilateral reduction or elimination of health care benefits
despite past promises by employers that they would not undertake such
action."l Most frequently, these disputes focus on the inconsistent language between the SPD and the more technical language of the master
plan document.' Less frequently, the dispute centers on various written
or oral representations made by management. 2
The SPD is the primary communication to the participants concerning the benefits offered by the plan." ERISA requires employers to
write the document in easily understandable language and send a copy to
every participant.'2 Many SPDs contain language which unambiguously
guarantees that the participant will receive health care benefits for some
period of time and then states, usually less conspicuously, that the employer reserves the right to unilaterally terminate or reduce the benefits
offered by the plan." When this occurs, participants fight back in court
by asserting claims based upon violations of ERISA, estoppel, breach of
fiduciary duties, and breach of contract. However, a recent Supreme
Court decision significantly diminished the effect of these claims.'27

Gregory J. Ossi, Comment, It Doesn't Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health Benefits,
Medicare, and Accounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical Coverage for Retirees,
13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233,240 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
118. FirmsChanging Benefits in Response to FAS 106, Buck Consultants Reports, 21 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2269 (Dec. 5, 1994).
119. Rossbacber et al., supra note 5, at 308; Ossi, supra note 117, at 241; cf. Siske et al., supra
note 114, at 195-96 (discussing several recent cases).
120. See Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of Financial Accounting
Standards Board Rule 106, ERISA, and Legal Challenges to Modification and Termination of
Postretirement Health Care Benefit Plans, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 427, 444 (1994); Rossbacher et
al., supra note 5, at 315.
121. See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 490-92 (2d Cir. 1988)
(addressing the effect of inconsistencies between a master plan document and a SPD); see also
Rossbacher et al., supranote 5, at 315.
122. See, e.g., Krishan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 873 F. Supp. 345, 350 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(refusing to recognize oral and informal communications as SPDs); see also Rossbacher et al., supra
note 5, at 315.
123. As recognized in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, "[a] written plan is to be required in order that every employee may, on examining the plan documents, determine exactly what
his rights and obligations are under the plan." 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1230 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
93-1280, at 297 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5077-78).
124. ERISA § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994).
125. Rossbacher et al., supranote 5, at 314-16.
126. Ossi, supranote 117, at 243.
127. Id. at 242-43; see also Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 888 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass.
1995) (employers "are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify or
terminate welfare plans" (quoting Curtiss-WrightCorp., 115 S. Ct. at 1228)).
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In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejogen," the Supreme Court
placed the burden on the employee to show that welfare benefits
vested.'" The Supreme Court held that the statement, "[t]he Company
reserves the right at any time to amend the plan and from time to time to
modify or amend ... any or all provisions of the provisions of the Plan,"
establishes an amendment procedure that satisfies the ERISA
provisions.' 0 The Court viewed ERISA as requiring welfare plans to provide a "'procedure for amending [the] plan' and '[a procedure] for identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan"' in the SPD.'3'
The Court noted that the definition section of ERISA defines a "person"
to include the term "company."'32 The Court found this fact significant
since granting "the Company" amendment authority rules out others who
also might have the authority to make plan amendments.'33 Having found
that the plan adequately identified the persons with the authority to
amend the plan in accordance with the first requirement of section
402(b)(3), the Court addressed the "more difficult" question of whether
the statement contained in the SPD established a procedure for making
plan amendment. "
Most significant in the Curtiss-Wright holding was the Court's
finding that the statement in Curtiss-Wright's SPD identified a procedure
by which the Company could unilaterally amend the plan." As stated by
the Court, "the plan may be amended by a unilateral company decision to
amend, and only by such a decision-and not, for example, by the unilateral decision of a third-party trustee or upon the approval of the union."" Although the procedure for amending the plan is simple, the
Court found this procedure appropriate given the relative simplicity of
the Curtiss-Wright plan.' As such, more detailed plans may require
more complicated amendment procedures.' 8
The Court's holding in Curtiss-Wrighteliminates another avenue by
which employees may attempt to hold employers to their word.' 9 Noticeably absent from the Court's opinion was an analysis of the effect of
the promises made by Curtiss-Wright to provide health care coverage for
128. 115 S. Ct. at 1223, rev'g 18 F.3d 1034, 1036 (3rd Cir. 1994). This survey utilizes both the
Supreme Court and the Third Circuit's discussion to establish the basic facts leading up to the dispute.
129. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 115 S.Ct. at 1231; see Ossi, supra note 117, at 250-56.
130. Id. at 1227-28 (1995) (satisfying ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)) (alteration
in original) (quoting the Curtiss-Wright SPD's reservation clause).
131. Id. at 1228 (alteration in original) (quoting ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)).
132. Id.; see ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1994).
133.

Curtiss-WrightCorp., 115 S.Ct. at 1228.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.; see ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 102(b)(3) (1994).
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 115 S.Ct. at 1229.
Id.
Id.

138.

Id.; see Ossi, supra note 117, at 253.

139.

Ossi, supra note 117, at 253-54.
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retirees." This fact appears to leave the door open for employees to pursue breach of contract claims based on bargained for promises of lifetime
coverage, thereby vesting the benefits.'" The Supreme Court recently
held that a promise made by an employer may vest benefits, indicating
42
that an ERISA breach of contract claim may maintain some validity.'
However, a virtually unanimous federal judiciary denies these ' 3claims
through decisions resting on technical failures and policy reasons.
The Sixth Circuit appears to have also adopted a pro-employer approach to ERISA. In Sprague v. General Motors Corp.,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that individuals who retired with plans containing an unambiguous reserved right to amend the plan will lose on any
estoppel claim, since there can be no justifiable reliance in those cases.'"
Therefore, any unambiguous reservation clause will always trump any
statement in a SPD that promises lifetime benefits." These holdings not
only spell bad news the advocates of retirees, but also for Chiles.
B. Chiles v. Ceridian Corp."
1. Facts
Ceridian Corporation, formerly Control Data Corporation (hereinafter referred to solely as "Ceridian"), maintained an employee Long
Term Disability Plan (LTD Plan or Plan) that expressly provided, in both
the master plan document and the SPD, that all qualified long-term disability participants would receive health care insurance fully funded by
TM In September, 1989, Ceridian sold a division to Seagate
Ceridian.'
Technologies. 4 9 Subsequent to the sale, Ceridian informed the plaintiffs
that the company expected to continue to pay health care premiums as
provided under the initial program, but Ceridian "reserved the right to
change or cancel it at any time.''"
The plaintiffs were former employees of the division sold to Seagate
who were receiving benefits under the LTD Plan. The Plan provided the
140. Id. at 253.
supra note 5, at 312.
141. Rossbacher et al.,
142. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 117 S.
Ct. 1513, 1516(1997).
143. Rossbacher etal., supra note 5, at 310.
144. 92 F.3d 1425 (6th Cir. 1996), aff d in part and rev'd in part on reh'g en banc, 133 F.3d
388, 403 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversed and remanded on unrelated matters).
145. Sprague, 92 F.3d at 1441; see also Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 906 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer's statement that coverage would continue after retirement with
no contribution from the retiree did not promise "lifetime 'paid-up' medical insurance" but merely
described the plan as it existed at that time).
146. Ossi, supra note 117, at 256.
147. 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1997).
148. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1508.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1509.
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plaintiffs with company-sponsored medical, life, and, dental benefits
entirely funded by Ceridian. The benefits were to continue as long as the
plaintiffs remained disabled as defined under the Plan.'' However, in
1992, the company informed the plaintiffs that beginning in 1993,
Ceridian would amend the LTD Plan to require the plaintiffs to pay the
same amount of health insurance premiums as active employees.' Both
Ceridian and the plaintiffs relied on plan documents to support their
rights under the plan.' 3
According to the SPD for the LTD Plan and the Health Care Plan,
Ceridian promised to pay the health care premiums of employees while
they remained disabled as defined by the plan.'' A chart in the SPD restated the promise of continued health care coverage while on disability
while the master plan document for the LTD Plan did not specifically
mention health care coverage.'" However, the master plan promised,
notwithstanding the termination of the LTD Plan, continued benefits
under the plan while the employee remained disabled." Furthermore, the
plaintiffs pointed to the SPD of the dental and life insurance plans which
also promised coverage while on long-term disability, as further extrinsic
evidence of Ceridian's intent to vest health care coverage in the plaintiffs.' 7 In contrast to this seemingly clear language, Ceridian pointed to
their reserved right to amend the Plan as conclusive evidence that they
promised no vested benefits.'
Inconsistent with the promises to provide fully funded benefit coverage, all o f the SPDs of the aforementioned plans included the following
language: Ceridian "expects to continue the [Long Term Disability/Health/Dental/Life] Plan indefinitely, but must reserve the right to
change or discontinue it if it becomes necessary."'' 9 The master plan
document contains a similar reserved right to amend the plan only if
"deemed advisable" by Ceridian." Based on their reserved right, Ceridian amended the LTD Plan to require LTD members to pay the same
amount of health care premiums as working Ceridian employees.' 6 ' As a
result, the plaintiffs brought an ERISA action seeking relief for Ceridian's breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties.' 2 In granting a

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1508.
154. Id. at1509.
155. Id.
156. Id. (stating that a participant who is disabled upon the termination of date of the plan
"shall continue to receive beneifts in accordance with the terms of the Plan").
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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summary judgment motion in favor of Ceridian, the district court held
that the reserved amendment right gave Ceridian nearly complete discretion to amend the Plan. 63
2. Decision
On appeal, the plaintiffs made three assertions: (1) The LTD Plan's
benefits vested upon the retiree's qualification for the LTD Plan and remained vested as long as the retirees qualified for LTD benefits; (2) regardless of whether the LTD benefits vested upon qualification, the
benefits vested upon the termination of the plan, which occurred when
Control Data sold Imprimis to Seagate Technologies; and (3) regardless
of the validity of the arguments contained in (1) and (2), a question of
material fact existed as to whether it became "necessary" for Ceridian to
terminate the plan.'
The Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that the defendant intended or agreed to vest the plaintiff with the
benefits, since welfare benefits do not statutorily vest under ERISA" In
addressing the plaintiff's first assertion, the court recognized the central
issue focused on whether the reservation clause, read in tandem with the
promise of life time benefits, was ambiguous with respect to the plaintiff's rights under the LTD Plan'" Ironically, the court relied on the
Plan's promise not to terminate the benefits in holding that the Plan had,
in fact, unambiguously reserved the right to amend the plan.
The termination provision stated that "[i]f the group Long-Term
Disability Plan terminates and if on the date of such termination your are
totally disabled, your [LTD] benefits and your claim for such benefits
will continue as long as you remain totally disabled." 6" The court reasoned that the provision's contemplation of a situation in which the Plan
unilaterally terminated indicated that the drafters did not intent to grant
the participants vested benefits for life.'" From this language, the court
inferred that the LTD Plan reserved the right of the employers to make
other Plan changes as well." The Plan's requirement that amendments
would bind all participants supported this inference.' 0 Since the proviso
was a clear and unambiguous statement reserving the right to terminate
or amend the Plan, the court held these statements adequately rejected
the plaintiff's assertion that the benefits vested upon qualification for the
LTD Plan.' However, this did not necessarily preclude the plaintiff's
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1510.
Id.
Id. (citing Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 1511-12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1512.
Id. at 1512-13.
Id. at 1514.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

second argument which asserted that the benefits vested upon Plan termination." 2
The ERISA provisions regarding the procedure for the termination
of the welfare plans is fairly sparse.' 3 However, the court found that several changes to the LTD Plan instituted by the company indicated the
termination of the old Plan and the start-up of the new Plan.""
In addition to recognizing the plan's termination, the plaintiff's argument also requires a finding that the Plan unambiguously vested the
LTD benefits upon termination by Ceridian. Examining the termination
clause, the court read the Plan to unambiguously vest the long-term disability benefits upon termination.'75 ERISA does not require the vesting
of benefits in welfare plans, and therefore, vesting becomes an "extraERISA commitment" that the Company must expressly state in clear and
unambiguous language.' 6 The court found the termination clause was to
meet the "extra-ERISA" requirement, and therefore, vest the long-term
disability benefits upon the termination of the plan.'" Yet, the defendants
further argued that the LTD Plan promised "benefits," which do not include health care benefits as the retirees assert. 178
The LTD Plan SPD stated that the company promised to pay premiums on company-sponsored "benefits" while the employee remained on
the LTD Plan, but did not define the term "benefits."' 9 Unable to determine the benefit entitlements under LTD Plan, the court remanded the
case to the district court to conduct a fact-finding analysis of the scope of
"benefits" under the LTD Plan's SPD.8"
C. Other Circuits
One year after the Chiles decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals offered its view on the Ceridian Plans. In Barker v. Ceridian

172. Id.
173. Id. at 1515 ("ERISA provides strict obligations and procedures regarding termination of
pension plans, but provides no guidelines to determine when a plan.terminates." (internal citation
omitted)).
174. Id. Indications of termination included the appointment of new trustees, the acquiring
company becoming the administrator, Ceridian's transfer of money to fund the new Plan, and LTD
Plan liability transfer to the acquiring company. id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1515.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1516-17.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1519.
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Corp.,'8' the Eighth Circuit made Ceridian honor their promises to employees.' 2
The facts in Barker mirror those of Chiles with respect to the language of the plans and the provisions used in each plan."' Barker asserted
that Ceridian's amendment to the Long Term Disability Plan (LTD Plan
or Plan) violated ERISA.'" The District Court of Minnesota granted
summary judgment for Ceridian, holding that the Plan contained an unambiguous reserved right to amend or terminate.' 5 On appeal, Barker
argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because evidence existed that created a genuine issue of material fact.'"
On examination of the SPD, the court noted that it contained conflicting language. ' At one point in the document, the SPD promised
lifetime coverage for insurance premiums while on disability, while at
the same time, it reserved the right to amend or terminate the Plan. ' " The
court also found conflicting language in the reservation clauses of the
different plans. The LTD Plan provided that if Ceridian terminated the
Plan, the company would continue to provide benefits for those on longterm disability." In contrast, the reservation of rights statement contained in the medical, life, and dental benefit plans only stated that
Ceridian might change or discontinue the plans if it became necessary."
A review of the SPD for the LTD Plan indicated that the Plan itself
made numerous representations indicating that Ceridian would pay the
premiums.'9 ' The SPD contained references to the other benefits plans
and, furthermore, charts in the SPD expressly provided that Ceridian
would pay the premiums for the health, dental, and life insurance programs while the participant remained on long term disability.'" Ceridian
argued that the LTD Plan was merely an income protection plan and the
insurance payments would not come from such a plan.'9
The Eighth Circuit noted that disclosure of a plan's terms represents
one of ERISA's main goals.'" Recognizing the importance of the SPD in
181. 122 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
182. For the first class action against the Ceridian Corporation alleging wrongful termination of
benefits, see Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1997). See supra notes 147-80 and
accompanying text (discussing Chiles).
183. Compare Barker, 122 F.3d at 630-32, with Chiles, 96 F.3d at 1508-10
184. Barker, 122 F.3d at 630.
185. Id. at 632.
186. Id.
187. ld. at 635.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 633.
191. Id. at 635.
192. Id. The court makes reference to the 1989 SPD which promised that the company would
continue to pay the insurance premiums while participants remained on long-term disability.
193. Id. at 633-34.
194. Id. at 633.
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achieving that goal, the Eighth Circuit accorded greater deference to the
SPD when interpreting conflicting information between the master plan
document and the SPD."9 ' Since the SPD repeatedly guaranteed payment
of premiums, the court found a reasonable person in the participant's
position would believe the SPD.'
Relying on their recent decision in Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc.," the
court remanded the case to reconsider the plan's language as a whole,
including extrinsic information.' On remand, the appellate court required the district court to determine, in light of all the information,
whether Ceridian intended to vest employees with a right to insurance
payments while on long term disability.'"
Similar to the Ceridian cases, the Seventh Circuit addressed
whether the defendant may unilaterally affect a reduction in welfare
benefits in the face of a promise to provide lifetime health care coverage
in Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc.' Rejecting the lower court's holding that the
benefits did not vest, the Third Circuit found that the promise of lifetime
insurance coverage contractually vested."' As a result, Twin Disc could
reduce, but could not eliminate, the benefits.'
In connection with the closure of a plant, Twin Disc negotiated a
Shutdown Agreement with the union which promised the plaintiffs lifetime insurance benefits.' The agreement also contained a termination
clause providing that the agreement shall end no later than "the end of
the twelfth calendar month following the calendar month in which the
last bargaining unit employee engaged in production is terminated."'
Following Twin Disc's reduction of benefits from those promised in the
Shutdown Agreement, the plaintiff instituted a suit for breach of contract,
breach of an employee benefit plan, violation of fiduciary duties, and
promissory estoppel.' The district court held that Twin Disc's separate
insurance booklet unambiguously incorporated a reserved right to amend
the plan into the Shutdown Agreement.' As a result, the district court
held that Twin Disc could amend or terminate the plan.'

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 634.
38 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 1994).
Barker, 122 F.3d at 638-39.
Id. at 639.
Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301,306 (7th Cir. 1996).
Diehl, 102 F.3d at 306-07.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Shutdown Agreement, which
stated that retired employees "shall, notwithstanding any provision of the
Insurance Agreement. .. be entitled for the lifetime of the pension to the
life insurance," as entitling retirees to just that, lifetime insurance coverage.' The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the
Shutdown Agreement incorporated the termination language of the insurance booklets.' Instead, the appellate court considered the Shutdown
Agreement as an independent agreement with independent consideration,
capable of modifying or supplanting prior contractual agreements." '°
While admitting that a participant must refer to the insurance agreement
and insurance booklets in order to determine exactly what lifetime coverage the plan granted, the circuit court found the independence of the
Shutdown Agreement rendered a finding as inappropriate that the termination clause in the insurance booklets should amend or supplant an entirely separate agreement. "' As such, the court remanded the case to the
district court to determine exactly what lifetime benefits had vested and
to what extent, if any, could the company modify those benefits."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar dispute in
American Federation of Grain Millers v. International Multifoods
Corp."3 International Multifoods amended its health care plan to require
retired participants to pay a portion of the insurance premium."" Prior to
the amendment, Multifoods paid the entire premium."' The American
Federation of Grain Millers (AFGM) brought suit alleging vesting violations of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and ERISA.' 6 As
to the ERISA claims, the plaintiff argued, in the alternative, that International improperly amended the plan by failing to include a reservation of
right in the Summary Plan Description, failing to follow proper amendment procedures, and failing to give retirees proper notice of the amendment. 7'
The parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) stated,
"[d]uring the time of this Agreement there shall be no reduction in the

208. Id. at 306.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 306-07.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 310-11.
213. 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997).
214. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 977.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994) (enforcement section of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994) (ERISA's civil enforcement provision).
217. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 978. ERISA requires that a SPD must be
,sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise ... participants ... of their rights
and obligations under the plan." ERISA § 102(a)( I), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994). SPDs must also
inform participants of the "circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial
or loss of benefits." ERISA § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).
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schedule of benefits. 2 8 However, promising benefits for a certain period
of time, "[d]uring the time of this Agreement," necessarily establishes
that once the time period expires, so do the benefits.2 9 Since the CBA
expired prior to the amendment of the health plan, the court held that
International did not violate the CBA.m With the expiration of the CBA,
any medical benefits provided by International were purely gratuitous. 22'
Regarding the ERISA claims, the Second Circuit noted that the
master plan documents unambiguously provided that International could
"amend [the plan] at any time, without consent of the insured Employees
or any other person having a beneficial interest in it. ' 22 Without disagreement from the plaintiffs, the court held the plan did not promise
vested retiree benefits.' However, the plaintiffs argued that the SPD
vested the medical benefits. ' The Second Circuit's previous rulings held
that in instances of conflict in terms, the SPD always prevails over the
formal plan documents.' Since a reasonable person could interpret International's SPD as vesting medical benefits, the plaintiff argued that
the benefits vested and were not subject to change.' The court disagreed.
According to the court, the statements in the SPD only provided that
International would pay the current benefits because a reasonable person
would not interpret any of the SPD statements to include a promise for
indefinite benefits.' Furthermore, the SPD also expressly reserved International's right to terminate the plan.' The court held the employer's
lack of a promise of vested benefits and the plan's unambiguous language reserving the right to terminate the plan required a finding that no
vested benefits existed."
AFGM argued that International's amendment procedures violated
ERISA. ° First, AFGM asserted that the SPD did not contain language

218. American Fed'n ofGrain Millers, 116 F.3d at 981.
219. Id.; see also LTV Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 945 F.2d
1205, 1208 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he parties are bound by the provisions of the Wage Agreement only
as long as the Wage Agreement itself is effective.").
220. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 981.
221. Id.
222. id. at 982.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903,908 (2d Cir. 1990)).
226. Id.
227. Id. (noting that the SPD statements, "NO COST TO YOU" and "Itihe entire cost of the
coverage is paid by Multifoods," gave no assurances of benefits to be paid in the future).
228. Id.
229. Id.; see also Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 491-93 (2d Cir. 1988)
("[Absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an ERISA welfare plan is not subject to amendment as a result of informal communications between an employer and plan beneficiaries.").
230. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 983 (arguing violation of ERISA §
402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 102(b)(3) (1994) (ERISA's plan amendment procedure provision)).
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regarding the Plan's amendment procedure."' The court disagreed, stating that the SPD's reservation of the right to terminate the Plan sufficiently informed participants that International maintained the right to
amend it. " AFGM also argued that the plan lacked a proper amendment
procedure-a contention the court rejected because the SPD contained a
provision allowing amendment by written agreement between the plan
and the insurer. " Lastly, the court rejected AFGM's argument that the
plan failed to give proper notice of the amendment, since AFGM sent
notice a month after making the amendment."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit indicated in Chiles that when confronted with a
SPD that contains an unambiguous reservation of right to terminate the
plan and a promise to provide benefits indefinitely in the future, the termination rights should control. " Sometimes referred to as the Unisys
approach, this determination is not unreasonable. " It represents a brightline test the courts can apply uniformly. Although the application of the
test is simplistic, understanding its logic is not.
One of ERISA's goals is to provide a means by which a participant
can obtain information regarding benefits plans. "7 ERISA accomplishes
this goal through the Summary Plan Description, which informs the participants of their rights under the plan." ERISA also requires plan sponsors to write this document in language understandable to the lay
person." According to the court in Chiles and under the Unisys test, plan
sponsors advance these goals by including diametrically opposed language in a document sent to participants.
Apparently, the lay person has the ability to use "interpretative
gymnastics" to determine that a promise to continue benefits into in the
future is really not a promise at all, but a contingent option-an option

231. Id.; see also ERISA § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (requiring that SPDs must be sufficently complete and accurate to inform participants or their rights and obligations under the plan).
232. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 983.
233. Id. at 983-84; see also ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994) (requiring all
benefit plans to provide an amendment procedure).
234. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 984; see also ERISA § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(1) (1994) (requiring company to provide notice of material modification "not later than
210 days after the end of the plan year in which the change is adopted").
235. Chilesv. CeridianCorp.,95F.3d 1505, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996).
236. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).
237. See ERISA § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994) (requiting that SPDs must be sufficently
complete and accurate to inform participants or their rights and obligations under the plan); H.R.
REP. No.93-1280, at 297 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5077-78 ("A written plan is
to be required in order that every employee may, on examining the plan documents, determine
exactly what his rights and obligations are under the plan.").
238. ERISA § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1); ERISA § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (requiring the publication and availability of SPDs).
239. ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1).
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the employer can trigger at will.2' To the Tenth Circuit, this "logic" promotes the lay person's understanding of the extent of benefits.'
In Chiles, the Tenth Circuit relied on the interpretive maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to find that the SPD contained a reserved right to terminate the plan. 2" Whether a lay person is familiar with
the application of this "interpretative gymnastic" flip seems doubtful.
Ironically, the Tenth Circuit applied this maxim to language in the SPD
4 3 The Tenth Circuit
which the plaintiffs pointed to as vesting benefits.*
argued that, to a lay person, a promise to continue benefits after termination of the plan actually established that the plan reserved the right to
discontinue the promised benefits.2"
The plan states that "[i]f the group Long-Term Disability Plan terminates, and if on the date of such termination you are totally disabled,
your Long-Term Disability benefits and your claim for such benefits will
continue as long as you remain totally disabled as defined by the plan."
The court inferred from this phrase that the express listing of a qualification to Ceridian's ability to change the plan logically implies the reserved
right to make other changes.2" While perhaps reasonable to the legal
scholar, it seems inappropriate to expect a lay person to read the same
phase to understand why, at age sixty-five, he must now pay his own
health insurance premiums. 7
The Eighth Circuit's approach, as evidenced in Barker, appears
more in line with the intent of ERISA." While the facts in Barker are
essentially the same as those in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Chiles, the
two decisions illustrate very different outcomes. In Barker, the Third
Circuit relied on the same phase in the SPD which the Tenth Circuit interpreted to give Ceridian the ability to amend the plan, to hold that the

240. In Diehl, the Seventh Circuit refused to engage in the type of "interpretive gymnastics"
used in Chiles. Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301,307 (7th Cir. 1996).
241. Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1996). Although the Tenth Circuit
side steps the issue of what language controls when a "reserved right to amend" statement is found
in the same document as a promise for continued benefits, the Tenth Circuit clearly endorses the
Unisys approach. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1512; see also Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 112 F.3d 628,636 (8th
Cir. 1997) (stating that Chiles followed the Unisys approach).
242. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1512. The expression, translated as "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another," is an interpretive tool used by the courts to determine ambigious meaning in
statutes and other legal documents. Id.
243. Id. at 1513.
244. Id. at 1512.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. A number of courts criticized the Chiles decison. See American Fed'n of Grain Millers v.
International Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1997); Barker v.Ceridian Corp., 112
F.3d 628,634 (8th Cir. 1997); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301,307 (7th Cir. 1996).
248. Barker, 112 F.3d at 628; see supra note 237 and accompanying text (providing congressional expressions of intent).
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benefits vested. "9 To reach this conclusion, the Third Circuit held that the
phrase, read in conjunction with other language of the SPD, assured the
participants of continued benefits. Quoting the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Chiles, the Third Circuit reasoned that ERISA intended the SPD for the
lay-person, who "should not be required to adopt the skills of a lawyer
and parse specific undefined words throughout the entire document to
determine" their intended meaning.' To find otherwise, would defeat the
expressed intent of ERISA.
III. DEFINING THE "NORMAL RETIREMENT" AGE
Much of the same corporate cost-cutting that negatively affects welfare plans, also affects pension benefit plans. However, unlike the welfare plans, ERISA requires pension plans to meet vesting requirements."'
The general vesting requirements under ERISA require that participants
earn or accrue benefits offered by a pension plan according to specific
methods and time periods, " and that these benefits become nonforfeitable or vested at specific times. 3 As a result, ERISA limits an employer's ability to make changes to a pension plan to effectuate cost reduction measures much more than with welfare plans. However, an employer, may still make prospective plan amendments that do not reduce
current benefits, but reduce the pension benefits payable in the future.'
A. Background
In Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., Thiokol asserted that changing the
normal retirement age did not reduce vested benefits.' Thus, the issue
presented in Lindsay focuses on whether a change in a pension plan's
"normal retirement age" to an age greater than sixty-five violates
ERISA" Ruling on this issue, the Tenth Circuit relied, in part, on prece8 Similar to Lindsay,
dent established in Johnson v. Franco."
Johnson
dealt with the effect of a plan amendment designed to reduce the future
benefits offered. 9

249. Barker, 112 F.3d at 635.
250. Id. (quoting Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1517-18).
251. ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (ERISA's vesting coverage provision); see Rossbacher et al., supra note 5, at305-06.
252. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(I)(A) (1994); see also 26 U.S.C. §
41 l(b)(1)(A) (1994) (Internal Revenue Code's accrued benefits requirements).
253. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994).
254. ERISA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c).
255. Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., 112 F.3d 1068 (1Oth Cir.),
cert. denied, 118S. Ct. 168 (1997).
256. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1069.
257. Id.
258. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070 (citing Johnson v. Franco,727 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984)).
259. Johnson, 727 F.2d at 442-45. Future beneifts are benefits that the plan will provide to the
participant if the participant remains in the plan until she reaches her vesting time period, at which
time the benefits become nonforfietable. Id.
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Johnson belonged to a pension plan created by the Nation Maritime
Union that vested retirement benefits in employees accumulating at least
twenty years of service.' The plan suspended payment of benefits prior
to the time Johnson attained the age of sixty-five. 6 ' Johnson instituted an
action under section 203(a) of ERISA, which states that "an employee's
right to his normal retirement benefit is non-forfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age." '
Based on section 203(a) of ERISA, Johnson asserted that he attained
normal retirement age at the time in which his retirement benefits
vested-after his ten years of service.' 3 Therefore, he claimed the termination of these benefits after vesting violated ERISA's non-forfeiture
provisions. ' The defendants argued that an individual did not reach the
normal retirement age when the benefits vested, but when the participant
attained the later of either the age of sixty-five or ten years of service."9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.'6
Overruling the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA specifically defines the "normal retirement age" as the earlier of either the
age defined by a plan as the normal retirement age or the age of sixtyfive. 6' The court disagreed with the district court's reasoning that Johnson reached the normal retirement age prior to age sixty-five through the
operation of his vested status under the plan.' Because Johnson had not
reached normal retirement age of sixty-five as defined by both the plan
and ERISA, ERISA's non-forfeitability provision afforded little protection. " Using similar reasoning, Lindsay asserted that ERISA's nonforfeitability provision prevented a plan from extending the
definition of
the normal retirement beyond the age defined by ERISAY °

260. Id. at 442.
261. Id. at 442-43.
262. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994); see Johnson, 727 F.2d at 443.
263. Johnson, 727 F.2d at 444.
264. Id. at 442-43 (asserting violation of ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)).
265. Johnson, 727 F.2d at 444 (citing the plan requirements prior to the adoption of the
amendment).
266. Id. at 445.
267. Id.; see ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1994) (defining "normal retirement age" as
the earlier of: "(A) the time a plan participant attains normal retirement age under the plan, or (B) the
later of (i) the time a plan participant attains 65, or (ii) the 5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced participation in the plan"); ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (requiring the
nonforfeitability of pension plans upon the attainment of normal retirement age).
268. Johnson, 727 F.2d at 445-46
269. Id. at 446; see ERISA §.203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994).
270. Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., 112 F.3d 1068, 1069-70 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168
(1997); see ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (nonforfeitability requirements provision).
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B. Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp."'
1. Facts
Lindsay was a former employee of Thiokol Corporation who took
early retirement prior to a plan amendment that changed the normal retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven for purposes of calculating
early retirement reductions. 72 As a result of the plan amendment, Lindsay
and several other former employees received less retirement compensation than the plan would offer prior to the amendment. 7 ' The plaintiffs
brought an action under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, asserting
that "normal retirement" under ERISA may not exceed 65 years of age.
ERISA requires that the "normal retirement age" can be no later than age
sixty-five."'
ERISA defines the normal retirement age as the earlier of either the
age defined by the plan, or the age of sixty-five. 75 ERISA further requires
that certain benefits outlined in other sections of ERISA must vest at the
76
normal retirement age or earlier, except for late joining participants.
Lindsay argued this definition establishes the retirement age at no more
than sixty-five years of age.2' Based on this assertion, Lindsay further
argued that because the plan amendment reduced retirement benefits to
the plaintiffs, the amendment also violated the following ERISA provisions: (1) the requirement that normal retirement benefits become nonforfeitable upon reaching the normal retirement age,7 8 (2) the requirement that the plan participant begins receiving benefit payments upon
reaching the normal retirement age,' and (3) the requirement that the
accrued benefits payable at normal retirement age be equal to the normal
retirement benefit.' On summary judgment, the district court held that
since the plan met the minimum vesting requirements of ERISA,
Thiokol's plan could define the normal retirement age differently than
ERISA's statutory definition. 8 '

271. Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., 112F.3d 1068 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997).
272. Id. at 1069.
273. Id.
274. Id.; see ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(3) (1994).
275. ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C.§ 1002(24) (1994). ERISA also includes a clause addressing
late-joining plan participants. See supra note 267 (providing text of ERISA's "normal retirement
age" definition)
276. See, e.g., ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994) (requiring the nonforfeitability of
pension plans upon the attainment of normal retirement age).
277. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070.
278. Id. at 1069; see ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
279. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1069; see ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1994).
280. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1069; see ERISA § 204(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1994).
281. Lindsay, -112 F.3d at 1069.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue surrounding the amendment
of the normal retirement age first, since Lindsay's other claims hinged on
whether ERISA allows the normal retirement age to extend beyond the
age of sixty-five. 2 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that even though ERISA
uses age sixty-five as the normal retirement age, ERISA does not require
a plan to adopt sixty-five as that normal retirement age. 3 The court did
not find any language in ERISA indicating a congressional intent to restrict the normal retirement to age sixty-five.' ERISA does, however,
require that plans meet certain accrual and vesting requirements when
participant's reach age sixty-five, but does not require that all plans must
define the normal retirement age at sixty-five. 5
The accrual and benefit conditions of ERISA require a plan participant's accrued benefit must become non-forfeitable at age sixty-five,'
and therefore, irreducible by a plan amendment. 7 ERISA defines accrued benefits as benefits earned by a plan participant and "expressed in
the form of an annual benefit" that begins at the normal retirement age.'
Thiokol's plan used the age sixty-seven as the benchmark from which to
calculate all retirement benefits, while the plan uses age sixty-five to
calculate the benefit's accrual and vesting amounts in accordance with
ERISA.' Therefore, a participant retiring at age sixty-five receives
86.7% of what the plan calculates as the total earned benefit at age sixtyseven.' ERISA affords full protection to this calculated benefit."'
The Tenth Circuit noted that Lindsay will receive less in retirement
benefits because Thiokol's amendment eliminated the opportunity to
accrue early retirement subsidies.'m Early retirement subsidies partially
compensate the employee for the reduction in retirement benefits, since
the plan must pay the benefit over a longer period of time.' 3 The prior
plan accrued these subsidies at specific rates, while the new plan eliminated the further accrual of the early retirement subsidies.' Since the

282. Id. at 1069-70.
283. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070; see ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1994).
284. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070.
285. Id.; see ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
286. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
287. ERISA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c).
288. ERISA § 3(23)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1994); see Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070; see
also ERISA § 204(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3) (1994) (providing for the actuarial equivalent of the
standard accrued benefits determination).
289. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070.
290. Id. at 1071.
291. ERISA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c) (protecting all accrued benefits from reduction); see
Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1071.
292. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1071.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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Thiokol plan eliminated the prospective accrual of the subsidies and left
the subsidies earned prior to the amendment intact, the plan did not violate the ERISA requirements.' 3
Having established that Thiokol could set the normal retirement age
at an age other than sixty-five, the Tenth Circuit addressed the other
ERISA violations asserted by Lindsay. Lindsay contended that the
amendment violated section 203(a), requiring normal retirement benefits
to become non-forfeitable upon reaching the normal retirement age, since
the amendment provided that the benefits earned at age sixty-five were
not forfeitable.' Although the amendment eliminated future benefits, it
did not eliminate accrued or earned benefits, thereby satisfying the
ERISA requirements. 7 The evidence also failed to support Lindsay's
assertion that the amendment violated section 206(a).' This section of
ERISA requires benefit payments to begin not later than sixty days after
the close of the plan year in which the participant attains the earlier age
of sixty-five or the normal retirement age.' Since Thiokol's plan commenced payment of the retirement benefits at age sixty-five, no violation
of ERISA occurred.'
The court also recognized a flaw in Lindsay's argument that ERISA
required the plan to pay those benefits that a sixty-five year old participant would have earned at age sixty-seven." ' The section specifies the
timing of benefit payments, not the amount." Since the plan required the
payment of the age sixty-five benefit at sixty-five, the plan satisfies the
ERISA requirements." Lindsay's last assertion that the plan violated
section 204(b) of ERISA, requiring that the accrued benefit payable at
normal retirement age equal the normal retirement benefit, failed on its
face. Thiokol's plan required that the accrued benefit at age sixty-five
equal the benefit under the plan commencing at age sixty-five.'
C. Other Circuits
In Ahng v. Allsteel Inc.," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals corrected a previous erroneous ruling and fell in line with the majority of
295. Id. at 1071-72; see ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994) (requiring the vesting of
accrued early retirement benefits); see also Ahng v. AlIsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.
1996).
296. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1072; see ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994).
297. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1072.
298. Id.; see ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1994).
299. ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1994).
300. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1072.
301. Id.
302. ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (requiring benefit payments to begin no later than 60
days after the latest plan year in which the participant attains the age of 65, or the normal retirement
age).
303. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1072.
304. Id.; see ERISA § 204(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b).
305. 96 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1996).
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other circuits on the issue of whether early retirement benefits fall within
the meaning of accrued benefits."i Prior to Ahng, the Seventh Circuit
held in Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc."° that early retirement benefits do not
fall within the meaning of "accrued benefits" as defined by ERISA
Since ERISA only protects the accrued or earned pension benefits from
reduction or elimination by amendment, the Seventh Circuit held that
reducing or eliminating early retirement benefits did not violate
ERISA.
Section 204(g) of ERISA, as initially enacted, prohibited an employer from enacting amendments to pension plans that reduce benefits
previously earned or accrued by employees.3"' The Retirement Equity Act
of 1984 amended ERISA with the so-called "anti-cutback rule."' " This
rule provides that a plan may not eliminate or reduce the early retirement
benefits or subsidies, unless the participant does not, or would not, meet
the pre-amendment conditions of the early retirement benefit."2 For example, a pre-amendment condition to early retirement benefits might
require the participant to put in thirty years of service before eligibility
for early retirement benefits occurs."' When a plan eliminates the early
retirement benefit, only those participants who have, or will have, thirty
years of service at the plan's normal retirement age will be eligible for

306. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1034.
307. 11 F.3d 1354 (7th Cir. 1993).
308. Meredith, II F.3d at 1359; see ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1994) (defining
accrued benefits as "the individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan and, except as provided in section 1054(c)(3) of this title, expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at
normal retirement age"); see also ERISA § 204(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3) (providing for the
actuarial equivalent of the standard accrued benefits determination).
309. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1034.
310. Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 204(g), 88
Stat. 829, 862 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 10 5 4 (g)) (amended 1984) ("The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan .... ").
311. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, sec. 301(b), § 204(g), 98 Stat. 1426,
1451 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)); see Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1034.
312. As amended, ERISA § 204(g) states:
(1) The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an
amendment of the plan, other than an amendment described in section 1082(c)(8) or 1441
of this title.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan amendment which has the effect of(A) eliminating or reducing an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy (as defined in regulations), or
(B)eliminating an optional form of benefit, with respect to benefits attributable to
service before the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits. In the case of
a retirement-type subsidy, the preceding sentence shall apply only with respect to a participant who satisfies (either before or after the amendment) the preamendment conditions for the subsidy. The Secretary of the Treasury may by regulations provide that this
subparagraph shall not apply to a plan amendment described in subparagraph (B) (other
than a plan amendment having an effect described in subparagraph (A))....
ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. §1054(g) (1994).
313. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1036 (citing a similar example given in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A.
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 142-43 (2d ed. 1995)).

1998]

ERISA

the benefit."' As a result, a participant has the opportunity to "grow into"
the benefit.3" The Retirement Equity Act does not afford protection to
those participants that will never meet the eligibility requirement.' 6
In the Meredith decision, the Seventh Circuit held that early retirement benefits were not "accrued benefits" as defined by section 204(g)
of ERISA, and therefore, ERISA did not protect the benefits from
amendments that reduced or eliminated the benefits entirely."7 The court
neglected to apply the anti-cutback rule that specifically applies to early
retirement benefits." ' Fortunately, Ahng, decided during the survey period, allowed the Seventh Circuit to redeem itself from the Meredith decision.
The plaintiffs in Ahng were either current employees or retirees of
Allsteel satisfying the eligibility requirements for plan benefits."' Allsteel
amended its pension plan in 1991 to eliminate an early retirement supplement that paid qualified retirees $900 a month until they reached the
age of sixty-five."l Required to follow the erroneous decision in Meredith, the district court granted a summary judgment for the plaintiff,
holding that section 204(g) only applies to accrued benefits, and not to
early retirement benefits."'
The Seventh Circuit overruled the Meredith decision. 22 The court
held that, as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, ERISA
does not permit the reduction or elimination of early retirement benefits
for those participants that meet, or will meet, the pre- amendment conditions of the plan.3" With this holding, the Seventh Circuit corrected their
previous ruling and brought their view on this issue back in line with the
other circuits.2
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit corrected a previous ruling during the
survey period when it ruled on Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem
314. Id.
315. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1036; see Hunger v. AB, 12 F.3d 118, 120 (8th Cir. 1993); Gillis v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1143-46 (3d Cir. 1993); Harms v.Cavenham Forest Indus.,
Inc., 984 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 1993).
316. Ahng, 96F.3dat 1036.
317. Meredith v. AlIsteel, Inc., II F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (7th Cir. 1993); see ERISA § 204(g), 29
U.S.C. § 1054(g).
318. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1036.
319. Id. at 1035.
320. id.
321. Id. at 1036; see ERISA § 2 04(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).
322. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1036-37.
323. Id.
324. id.; see, e.g., Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Richardson 1), 67 F.3d
1462, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1995); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 977 (6th Cir. 1994); Hunger v.
AB, 12 F.3d 118, 120 (8th Cir. 1993); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1143-44 (3d
Cir. 1993); Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indust., Inc., 984 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 1993); Aldridge v.
Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Comm., 953 F.2d 587, 590 (11 th Cir. 1992); Amato
v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1410 (2d Cir. 1985).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

Steel Corp. (Richardson II).2' Bethlehem Steel sold their West Coast
properties to Seattle Steel?26 In connection with the sale, the parties entered into an agreement concerning the employee's rights to "shutdown"
benefits. 2 ' The Pension Agreement between the Union and Bethlehem
Steel contained a provision that awarded shutdown benefits to employees
who satisfied certain age and service requirements and whose continuous
service was broken because of permanent plant shutdown."
A disagreement between Bethlehem Steel and the Union arose regarding whether the sale of the West Coast properties triggered the payment of the shutdown benefits." Bethlehem Steel argued that the company's selling of the properties as a going concern did not interrupt employees' continuous service.3 As such, the sale did not trigger the shutdown benefits provision.33' The Union disagreed, arguing that sale constituted an interruption in service, triggering the payment of the shutdown benefits."'
In order to consummate the sale to Seattle Steel, Bethlehem Steel
entered into a Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) with the Union that
3 In return for the Union's
resolved the issue of the shutdown benefits."
concession that the sale did not trigger the shutdown benefits, Bethlehem
Steel agreed to make cash payments to union workers based on their
length of service. ' The MOS also provided that the shutdown benefits
would remain in affect for forty-eight months after the sale.3 5 This provision provided the union employees with a "safety net," protecting the
employees if Seattle Steel failed during this time period."6 Union workers
ratified the MOS and Bethlehem Steel sold the properties to Seattle
Steel. " More than five years later, after Seattle Steel failed and the company laid-off their West Coast employees, the laid-off employees filed
suit under ERISA. 338
The plaintiffs in RichardsonI argued that the MOS violated section
204(g) since the MOS constituted an amendment to the Pension Plan

325. 112 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1997).
326. Richardson 1I, 112 F.3d at 984.
327. Id. at 983-84. Additional benefits paid only upon a permanent shutdown of a plant are
sometimes referred to as "shutdown benefits." Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 984.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.; Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Richardson 1), 67 F.3d 1462
(9th Cir. 1995).
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Agreement that reduced their accrued benefits. "9 As a result, they argued
against the validity of the agreement." The Plan Administrators argued
that the MOS merely interpreted the Pension Plan Agreement."' Since
section 204(g) only applies to amendments, this would render the ERISA
provision inapplicable."2 Agreeing with the defendants, the district court
determined the MOS was not an amendment because it did not eliminate
or reduce a benefit as required under section 204(g), and therefore,
4
ERISA did not apply."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court and held
that the MOS amended the Pension Plan Agreement" The court noted
that the MOS eliminated the shutdown benefits after the forty-eight
month safety net period. 45 As such, the MOS modified the Pension
Agreement from its original form, which provided shutdown benefit indefinitely." Thus, the court viewed the MOS as an amendment and not a
mere interpretation of the party's previous agreement.3 3
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit relied on their previous decision in
Oster v. Barco of CaliforniaEmployees' Retirement Plan,'" to reverse
their holding in Richardson .'" The appellate court agreed with the district court's opinion and found that the MOS was not an amendment, as
defined under ERISA.3 °
In Oster, the Ninth Circuit read the word "amendment" in section
204(g) as a word of limitation since "Congress did not state that any
change would trigger the .. .provisions; it stated that any change by
amendment would do so."'" As such, the Richardson I court held the
339. Richardson 1,67 F.3d at 1465.
340. Id. at 1467
341. Id.
342. Id.; see supra note 312 (providing text of ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. §10 5 4 (g) (1994)).
343. Richardson 1,67 F.3d at 1467; see ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (defining a plan
amendment).
344. Id. at 1467-68.
345. Id. at 1467.
346. Id. at 1467-68.
347. Id. But see Ethan Lipsig, The 9th Circuit Weighs In on the Immutability of Plant Shutdown
Benefits and, for Good Measure, Seemingly Broadens Fiduciary Breach Remedies For Individual
Plaintiffs, 4 No. 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. 21 (1995) (criticizing the court's holding).
348. 869 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1988).
349. Richardson v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Richardson I1), 112 F.3d 982, 987
(9th Cir. 1997).
350. Richardson II, I12 F. 3d at 987. See ERISA § 204(g), defining an amendment which
reduces accrued benefits as:
(2) ...a plan amendment which has the effect of(A) eliminating or reducing an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy
(as defined in regulations), or
(B) eliminating an optional form of benefit, with respect to benefits attributable to
service before the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits....
ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994).
351. Oster, 869 F.2d at 1221 (quoting Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 730 F.2d
1552, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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agreement was "an interpretation resulting from a negotiated settlement
over the application of the Plan's provisions to the sale to [Seattle
Steel]."352 The Ninth Circuit also noted that equitable considerations did
not weigh in favor of the plaintiffs, since they entered into a negotiated
settlement and received a forty-eight month safety net.5 3 Therefore, the
plaintiffs could not argue later that the safety net violated ERISA. Such
an argument would allow the plaintiffs to convert the negotiated settlement into a perpetual safety net of shutdown benefits, thereby holding
3
Bethlehem Steel indefinitely liable for any default by Seattle Steel '
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Lindsay, allowing employers to
adopt cost reduction measures is not atypical in ERISA's long-litigated
history." ' Lindsay further aids employer's cost reduction efforts by creating another avenue by which employers may reduce benefits without
violating ERISA's complex rules.
Although perhaps unjust to allow an employer to reduce benefits
after the employees retire, the plan change in Lindsay is quite fair. As the
court notes in Lindsay, the amendment reduces the plaintiff's benefits
because the employees choose to take an early retirement." The benefits
originally promised by Thiokol's old plan remained intact. 57 The "reduction" in benefits to Lindsay and the other plaintiffs are the result of two
factors.
First, the benefits are actuarially reduced since the company must
pay benefits over a longer period of time. 58 However, the present value
of the benefits do not change. The second factor relates to the early retirement subsidy offered by the plan. 59 The plan allowed Lindsay to earn
additional benefits to help compensate for the actuarially reduced benefits.' The plan calculated these early retirement subsidies based on the

352. Richardson H, 112 F.3d at 987. But see Richardson Redux: The 9th Circuit Avoids Determining When a Plant Shutdown Benefit is a Protected Benefit Under § 41)(D)(6), 6 No. 3 ERISA
Litig. Rep. 25, 26-27 (1997) (criticizing the court's holding).
353. Richardson H, 112 F.3d at 987-88.
354. Id. The plaintiffs also asserted that the agreement did not terminate the shutdown benefits
and that General Pension Board for Bethlehem Steel violated their fiduciary duty under ERISA §
404(a)(l)(A)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(A)-(C) (1994). Id. at 988. Since these issues are ones of
contract interpretation (and therefore not related to the subject under discussion) and a breach of
fiduciary duty (which was summarily dismissed by the court), they are not further discussed in this
survey.
355. See Rossbacher et al., supra note 5, at 307-08.
356. Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., 112 F.3d 1068, 1071 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168
(1997).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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employee's number of years of service. 6 ' The amended plan eliminated
the opportunity to accrue these benefits. 6 Lindsay incorrectly asserted
that the amendment violated ERISA's accrual and vesting requirements
because they reduced benefits earned. 63 The benefits that the plan will
pay to Lindsay are no less than what he earned at his early retirement
date and that Thiokol promised.
Based on the holdings in Lindsay and the other circuit decisions,
employers must simply ensure that plan amendments do not reduce any
benefits that accrued prior to the amendment.'" This approach strikes a
fair balance between the competing interests of the employer and employee. The unusually clear and objective ERISA standards free employers to reduce the cost of employee benefits without a significant fear of
litigation. At the same time, ERISA protects employees from the reduction of benefits earned and promised by employers, although ERISA
does not protect future opportunities to earn additional benefits. 3
CONCLUSION

The ERISA cases examined during the survey period litigated issues
arising from an employer's decision to reduce benefits offered to its employees in order to effectuate cost reductions. When this occurs, courts
must attempt to balance the party's competing interests under ERISA.
Frequently, the court's decisions appear unfair or not based in wellreasoned logic. However, when reviewing these decisions, one must keep
at the forefront of one's mind a primary purpose of ERISA, to promote
the use of benefits plans by employers. Excessive restrictions on the
ability of employers to make plan changes will encourage employers to
eliminate the plans completely. Keeping this overriding purpose in mind,
the courts' reasoning become much more understandable and justifiable.
DanielM. Nimtz

361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1072; see ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994).
364. See id..at 1071-72; Employer Didn't Violate ERISA by Raising "Normal Retirement Age"
to 67, [Employee Benefits] Corp. Couns. Daily (BNA) (May 12, 1997).
365. Lindsay, 112 F.3d at 1070-72.

EVIDENCE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CHILD MOLESTATION
CASES
INTRODUCTION

This survey examines the evidentiary issues raised in several cases
decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the 1996-97 survey
period.1 It specifically focuses on the court's interpretation and application of Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404(b) and 414. Part I summarizes the recent history of Rules 403 and 404(b), including the application of these rules during the survey period. Part II examines Rule 414
and the other Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to the admission of
evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault and child molestation cases.
This part also discusses the controversy surrounding these rules and explores how the court dealt with the application of Rules 403, 404(b) and
414 in its recent decision, United States v. Meacham!
I. PRIOR BAD AcTs AND STIPULATIONS TO FELON STATUS:
RULES 403 AND 404(B)
A. Background

1. Rule 404(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 404V prevents a litigant from introducing
testimony about a specific act in order to establish an individual's character and then argue that the individual acted in a manner consistent with
such character.! The rule is designed to prevent a jury from convicting an
individual either because he is "bad" and deserves punishment, or from
1. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997. The evidentiary cases heard by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals include: United States v. Wilson, 107
F.3d 774 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Shunway, 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.
1997).
2. See FED. R. EviD. 413-415.
3. 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997).
4.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) is titled, "Character Evidence Generally." It states, in

relevant part: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.... FED. R. EViD. 404(a).
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed Legislation: Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1125 (1993); see also Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign
His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1996) (discussing the historical rejection of character evidence); Russell J. Davis,
Annotation, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of Evidence of Other
Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Not Similar to Offense Charged, 41 A.L.R. FED. 497, § 2[a] (1979) ("Rule

404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence... is a codification of the traditional common law position
that a person is to be tried only for the crime of which he is accused, not on the basis of 'bad character. ").

.930
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placing too much weight on "other crimes" evidence and assuming that if
the individual committed a crime once, he must have committed the present crime.' The prohibition on the use of character evidence is one of the
oldest fixtures in American evidence law.7 The drafters of Rule 404
clearly embraced this prohibition by including language barring the admissibility of character evidence both in section (a) and (b).' Under Rule
404(b), however, evidence of other specific acts is not admissible to
show character in order to prove conduct, but it is admissible to show
other facts that may be at issue.9
The Tenth Circuit established an inclusive framework for the assessment of Rule 404(b) admissions in United States v. Nolan.'" In Nolan,
the court described the parameters of Rule 404(b), holding that it would
"allow the admission of uncharged illegal acts unless the only purpose
for their admission is to prove the criminal disposition of the
defendant."'1 The court set forth five guidelines to analyze the admissibility of uncharged illegal acts: (1) the evidence must tend to establish
one of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts as set forth by Rule 404(b);' (2)
the evidence must be so related to the importation of contraband that it
serves to establish one of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts set forth in
Rule 404(b);'3 (3) the evidence must have real probative value, not just
possible worth;' 4 (4) the uncharged illegal act must be close in time to the
crime charged;" and (5) the probative value of proving the commission
of the prior crime must outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice."'
In subsequent cases, the court articulated additional guidelines concerning Rule 404(b) admissions. 7 This eventual, rather lengthy list of

6. Davis, supra note 5.
7. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character
Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285 (1995).
8. See FED. R. EviD. 404(a), 404(b).
9. 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.20[l] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997); see also
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) entitled, "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts." It states, in relevant part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
10. 551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1977).
11. Nolan, 551 F.2dat271.
12. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
13. Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271; see also FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
14. Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 403.
17. See United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
government bears the burden of showing the relevancy of the evidence and precisely articulating the
hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence of other acts, and that
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requirements indicated the court's shift from Nolan's inclusive parameters for Rule 404(b) to a much more cautious position." In United States
v. Rivera,'9 the court stated that "the use of other crimes evidence is not
looked on favorably and its use must be narrowly circumscribed and
limited."'
The Supreme Court addressed guidelines for the admission of Rule
404(b) evidence in Huddleston v. United States.2 In Huddleston, the petitioner had been charged with possession and the sale of 32,000 stolen
videocassette tapes in interstate commerce.2 Huddleston did not dispute
that the tapes were stolen, but argued that he was unaware of this fact."
The trial court admitted 404(b) evidence of two prior incidents as proof
of Huddleston's knowledge that the tapes were in fact stolen. ' Specifically, Huddleston sold several new televisions to a retailer for twentyeight dollars each, and was arrested on another occasion for attempting to
sell appliances to an undercover FBI agent also at a greatly reduced
price.' Huddleston countered this similar act evidence by contending that
in these instances, as in this case, he had no knowledge that the items
were stolen. '
In generally addressing Rule 404(b) admissions, the Supreme Court
first examined whether a trial court must make a preliminary finding
before submitting k"similar act and other Rule 404(b) evidence to a
jury.""' The Court concluded that evidence under Rule 404(b) should be
admitted if it is sufficient to support a jury's finding that the defendant
committed the similar act.?
The Court expressed concern that unduly prejudicial evidence might
be introduced under Rule 404(b). In response, the Court crafted a barrier
which would prevent the introduction of this type of evidence. Commonly referred to as the "Huddleston factor" test, this barrier's foundation rests in four fundamental requirements found in other Federal Rules
of Evidence." Under this test, the evidence must be offered for a proper

the trial court must specifically identify the purpose for the evidence rather than simply invoking or
restating Rule 404(b)); United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
that there must be a clear and logical connection between the uncharged misconduct and the case at
trial).
18. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th Cir. 1989).
19. 837 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1988).
20. Rivera, 837 F.2d at 911.
21. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
22. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682.
23. Id. at 683.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 684.
27. Id. at 685.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 691.
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purpose' and meet requirements for relevancy." Additionally, the trial
court must make a determination as to whether the probative value of the
similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice,32 and upon request, shall instruct the jury that the similar
acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it
was admitted."
In United States v. Record,' the Tenth Circuit adopted the Huddleston approach for Rule 404(b) evidence." The court noted that its earlier, inclusive Nolan approach was vindicated both by the Huddleston
decision and the Supreme Court's comment that Congress was more
concerned with avoiding restrictions on Rule 404(b) evidence than with
preventing any possible unfair prejudice arising from its admission.'
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that Huddleston's four-part test for
avoiding potential prejudice greatly clarified Rule 404(b) admissions'
2. Rule 40338
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence offers two rather broad
positions regarding the relevancy and admissibility of proffered evidence. 9 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that evidence offered in
any action which would make the existence of a fact of consequence
more or less probable than it would be without that evidence.' ° Once
relevancy has been determined, Rule 402 addresses the admissibility of
that evidence.' While all relevant evidence is admissible, this is by no
means an absolute. '2 Admissibility is subject to a variety of potential re-

30. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
31. Huddleston,485 U.S. at 682; see also FED. R. EviD. 402.
32. Huddleston,485 U.S. at 691; see also FED. R. EviD. 403.
33. Huddleston,485 U.S. at 691; see also FED. R. EviD. 105.
34. 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989).
35. Record, 873 F.2d at 1374.
36. Id. (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688-89).
37. Id. at 1374-75.
38. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is titled, "Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time." It states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
39. See FED. R. EviD. 401,402.
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is titled, "Definition of 'Relevant Evidence."' It states:
"Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
41. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 is titled, "Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible." It states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
FED. R. EvID. 402.
42. Id.

1998]

EVIDENCE

strictions, including other Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 Rule 403 operates
as just such a restriction; it recognizes that relevance alone does not
guarantee admission."
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, ' while favoring admissibility,. requires the trial court to employ a "cost/benefit analysis" 7 and evaluate
the probative value of the evidence and the danger of the unfair prejudice
M By balancing these factors the court ultimately determines
it may create."
whether the proffered evidence is admissible. 9 While probative evidence
may be defined as that which furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof,"0 a definition of prejudice, for the purposes of a Rule 403
balancing test, is more elusive. Almost all evidence is prejudicial to one
party or the other." Under Rule 403, evidence must be more than simply
prejudicial" or unfavorable; 3 it must be "unfairly prejudicial."' Evidence

43. Id.
44. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a].
45. See supra note 38.
46. Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 Afte" United States v. Old Chief, 20 Am. J. TRIAL
ADvOC. 563, 567 (1997); see also United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981)
("Federal Rules and Practices favor the admission of evidence, rather than its exclusion if the proffered evidence has any value at all."); WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[2][c] (discussing a preference for the admission of evidence).
47. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a].
48. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a] (discussing that
the court must assess the probative value of a proffered item as well as the harmful consequences
that might flow from its admission).
49. See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a trial court "must balance the
evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect under Fed.R.Evid. 403"); WEINSTEIN, supranote 9,
§ 403.02[I][a].
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
51. See WEINSTEIN, supranote 9, § 403.04[1][a].
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that "the unfair
prejudice aspect of Rule 403 cannot be equated with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a
party").
54. See FED. R. EviD. 403. Black's Law Dictionary defines unfair prejudice as an "undue
tendency to suggest decision on [an] improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, [an] emotional one" and is caused by evidence "likely to arouse [an] emotional response rather than [a] rational decision among jurors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (6th ed. 1990); see also
WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.04[1][b]. However, a more concrete definition of "unfair prejudice"
has remained elusive. One commentator has suggested that courts are preoccupied with the factual
nuances of each "unfair prejudice" case rather than attempts to concretely define the concept through
broader analysis. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly PrejudicialEvidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 498 (1983). It has been suggested that instead of viewing evidence that evokes emotion as the hallmark of unfair prejudice, triers of fact
should employ both logic and emotion in their judgments. Id. at 503. Under this approach, the detection of unfair prejudice requires focusing on the end product of the prejudice rather than exclusively
on the process by which the prejudice might be created. Id. The Tenth Circuit, rather than defining
"unfair prejudice," focuses on protecting defendants by examining the purpose and relevancy of
prospective evidence, balancing probative value against the potential for undue prejudice, and considering if the district court submitted a limiting instruction. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,
1468-69 (1995).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

may be unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to a jury's sympathy or instinct
to punish," the individual juror's sense of horror or other intense reactions, ' or if it would be misleading and not aid or assist a jury in making
a material determination. 7 This "probative versus prejudicial" balancing
test is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 8
The prosecution may attempt to introduce evidence of an individual's past criminal convictions." Many defendants have elected to offer a
stipulation to the existence of these prior criminal convictions in an effort
to keep the name and nature of these offenses from the jury.' These
stipulations are frequently rejected by prosecutors,' who argue that they
are not required to accept stipulations and insist on proving each essential element of the case.' Typically, the defense challenges this rejection,
arguing that evidence of prior criminal acts is unfairly prejudicial. '
In United States v. Brinklow," an appellant was willing to stipulate
at trial to the existence of a prior felony conviction but proposed jury
instructions that omitted any reference to felon status. ' The Tenth Circuit
held that while the government does not have an unequivocal right to
refuse every offer by a defendant to stipulate to facts, the government is
generally not required to accept such an offer and may insist on proving

55. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.04[l]c].
56. Id.
57. Flanagan,34 F.3d at 953.
58. See United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Jacobs,
supra note 46, at 568 (stating that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence primarily relied on
the discretion of the trial judges).
59. Frequently, this type of factual situation arises out of a violation of one of several statutory
provisions which prohibit convicted felons from possessing or transporting firearms or explosives.
These cases necessarily require the prosecution to prove felon status. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994); 18
U.S.C. § 1202 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); see also United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1471-72 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a felon in possession of a firearm offense, and the government's attempts to introduce evidence relating to the
nature of prior offenses); Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
60. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away ProsecutorialAccountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 947 (1997).
61. See United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 648 (1997); Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1471.
62. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649; Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
63. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648; Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
64. 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
65. Brinklow, 560 F.2d at 1006. Brinldow was charged with "interstate transportation of
explosives by a convicted felon" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 842(i), 844(a). Id. at 1004. Brindow
proposed jury instructions that specified only the essential elements of the offense other than that of
a prior felony conviction and requested the jury be instructed that "there were additional necessary
elements with which they did not need to be concerned." Id. at 1006.
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all of the essential elements of its case.' Additionally, the court held that
the trial court could use discretion in determining whether to compel
acceptance of a stipulation to a prior felony conviction.' The court concluded by stating that the trial court's decision to fully apprize the jury of
the offense charged was not an abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Wacker,' the court addressed the admissibility of
prior crimes evidence when the defendant objected to its admission as
prejudicial and offered to stipulate to the existence of prior crimes. Appellant Lipp7' was charged with three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), by being "a felon in possession of a firearm."7 The government offered entries from Lipp's journal which detailed his prior felony
convictions as evidence to prove felon status. 3 Lipp objected to the admission of the journal entries but offered to stipulate to his prior
felonies.' The government refused Lipp's offer to stipulate and the district court allowed the admission of his journal."
In cases involving "felon in possession" charges, the existence of a
prior felony conviction is an essential element, but the nature and circumstances of that conviction are not." The court found that, unlike the
facts in Brinklow," Lipp's proposed stipulation did not attempt to keep
his felony status from the jury, but rather the nature and circumstances of
his prior felony convictions. 8 The court stated that the details of a prior
conviction do not make felony status "more probable or less probable,"
but they do tend to influence the jury's notions regarding the defendant's
character and therefore present a danger of unfair prejudice.' The court
held that the defendant should be permitted to stipulate to the existence
of a prior felony conviction when the present charge involves the "felon
66. Id. at 1006.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
70. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1471.
71. Michael Lipp was one of seven appellants in this appeal. Id. at 1453.
72. Id. at 1471. The three counts of "felon in possession of a firearm" were in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
73. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1471.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 65.
78. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
79. Id.; see also FED.R. EviD. 401.
80. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
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in possession" charge of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).' The court determined
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the journal entries,' but that any error in allowing this evidence was harmless."
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in United States v. Old
Chief' Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged with three offenses, including a violation of the "felon in possession" provision of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).' Old Chief offered to stipulate to a previous felony conviction
as a way to avoid revealing the name and nature of the previous offense
to the jury.' Additionally, Old Chief proposed a jury instruction that
would have noted his prior felony conviction for use in the jury's consideration of the "felon in possession" charge." The government refused to
accept the stipulation and the district court admitted the evidence relating
to the name and nature of Old Chief's prior conviction.' The Ninth Circuit addressed Old Chief's offer to stipulate and held that, "under Ninth
Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and thus, it has no place in the FRE
balancing process.""9 In accordance with the earlier holdings of two other
81. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73. In situations where a stipulation to felon status is not acceptable, a trial court should provide an alternate manner to notify the jury of the existence of the prior
conviction without revealing its nature or circumstances. Id. It was emphasized that the Wacker
holding was limited to cases involving violations of the "felon in possession" provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1473. The court noted that the D.C. Circuit expressed concern that '"[i]n
cases growing out of narcotics trafficking, the government is free to charge an ex-felon firearms
count together with other counts, thereby permitting the jury to hear otherwise inadmissible evidence
regarding a defendant's prior conviction."' Id. (quoting United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 50
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). The court also recognized that the requirement of proving any felon status under
section 922 represented a significant departure from the more traditional sense of fairness concerning the admission of prior crimes evidence. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
82. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1473.
83. Id. at 1474. The court's harmless error analysis in criminal cases, as with all federal appellate courts, has its foundation in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(a). 28 U.S.C. § 2111 states, "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not effect the substantial rightsof the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1997) (emphasis added).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) states that "any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not effect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Both provisions focus on whether a potential error had a "substantial influence" on the outcome of a proceeding
or "leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect." Wacker, 17 F.3d at 1473 (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). This standard elevates an appellant's burden
from simply proving the trial court was in error to showing that the error substantially influenced the
proceedings. This standard is particularly high. Additionally, in cases where the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior criminal acts, the Tenth Circuit has generally held that "where the
evidence against a defendant is overwhelming any error in mentioning a defendant's criminal record
is harmless." Id. at 1474. In Wacker, the court engaged in this "harmless error" analysis and found
that the prejudice to Lipp was slight in comparison to the evidence against him. Id. at 1473-74.
84. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
85. See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 647.
86. Id. at 648.
87. Id.
88. Compare United States v. Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. 644, 648 (1997), with Wacker, 72 F.3d at
1471-72 (refusing to accept defendant's proposed stipulation and admitting evidence).
89. See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 649.
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circuits, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its earlier recognition of the government's right to refuse an offered stipulation and proceed with its own
evidence of prior convictions.'
On review, the Supreme Court noted several other circuits had taken
the opposite position, holding that the district court was obligated to
eliminate the name and nature of the conviction if a defendant offered to
stipulate or admit to a prior conviction." In an effort to address this division between the circuits,' the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit.93 It held that evidence relating to the name and nature of prior
offenses generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant in
cases involving section 922(g)(1) and its "felon in possession" element."
Additionally, the Court held that where allowing evidence of a prior conviction may lead to a conviction on improper grounds, the only reasonable conclusion must be that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the discounted probative value of the record of conviction.
Therefore, it is an abuse of discretion to admit the record when the defendant's stipulation is available.9"
It should be noted, however, that the Court provided several caveats
to the Old Chief decision.' While the Court did not expressly confine the
Old Chief holding to section 922(g)(1) cases,' it was limited to cases
involving proof of felon status.9 Additionally, the Court stated that if
there was a "justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior
acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to prove 'motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident'), Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its admission."' The Court concluded by stating that the Old Chief decision "implied no opinion" on whether the district court's error was harmless."°

90. Id. (citing United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cit. 1993); United States
v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir.
1975)).
91. Id. (citing Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73; United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1994); and United States v. Poore, 594
F.2d 39, 40-43 (4th Cir. 1979)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 652; see also FED. R. EviD. 403.
95. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
96. See id.
at 651-56.
97. Cf. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (noting the analysis in Wacker is limited
to section 922(g)(1) cases).
98. See Old Chief, 177 S.Ct. at 651 n.7.
99. Id. at 655 (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(b)).
100. Id. at 656 n. 11.
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B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Stipulations to Prior Offenses: United States v. Wilson. 1
a. Facts
In March 1995, Wichita police officers executed a search warrant on
a residence where a "controlled buy" resulted in the purchase of approximately one-half gram of crack cocaine."° Wilson was apprehended
during this search after an attempt to evade arrest.' °3 Police found drugs
and drug paraphernalia, money, ammunition, and two SKS assault
rifles.' Wilson had been previously convicted for felony possession of
cocaine."° The government indicted and convicted Wilson on five separate counts, including three counts of possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon.'" On appeal, Wilson contended that the district court erred in allowing evidence regarding his prior felony conviction for possession of cocaine.'" At trial, Wilson attempted to stipulate to
the existence of a prior felony conviction as it related to the "felon in
possession" charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)." The district court
allowed the government to introduce the prior felony evidence despite
the offer to stipulate and over Wilson's objection."°
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first considered if it was proper for the district
court to admit prior felony evidence to prove section 922(g)(1) offenses
when Wilson had offered to stipulate."' Relying on earlier cases dealing
with rejected offers to stipulate to felon status,"' the court found that the
district court erred in admitting the prior conviction evidence, despite
Wilson's offer to stipulate, for the purposes of proving the section
922(g)(1) charges."2
The district court, however, permitted the government to offer the
prior conviction evidence for the separate, independent purpose of demonstrating "knowledge" under Rule 404(b). 3 The Tenth Circuit noted
101. 107 F.3d 774(lOth Cir. 1997).
102. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 777; 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 273 (1993) (discussing
informants and controlled buys).
103. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 777.
104. Id. at 777-78.
105. Id. at 777.
106. Id. at 778.
107. Id. at 783.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at784.
113. Id. at 783-84; see also FED. R. EViD. 404(b).
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that both the Old Chief and Wacker decisions provided for the possibility
of admitting prior conviction evidence under Rule 404(b)."' The defense
objected to the introduction of this evidence."' The court applied the four
part Huddleston test to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion in admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b)."' The court held
that Huddleston's first prong, whether the evidence was recognized as a
valid exception under Rule 404(b), had been satisfied. "7 The court found
the evidence irrelevant and not more probative than unfairly
prejudicial." 8 The court concluded that while the trial court abused its
discretion,"9 the error was harmless."
c. Other Circuits
In Redding v. United States, 2' the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue
of a rejected offer to stipulate in a section 922(g)(1) proceeding. The
district court refused a defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior conviction element and admitted the full record including the name and nature
of the prior conviction." Relying on both Old Chief' and United States
v. Ballew, 2" the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing the stipulation. However, the prejudicial effect was
minimal and the error was harmless given the overwhelming amount of
evidence against Redding and the district court's use of a proper limiting
instruction.' The Eighth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court refrained from ruling in Old Chief as to whether the refusal to allow a
stipulation may be harmless error.'
In United States v. Blake,' the Eighth Circuit again addressed
stipulations to prior convictions in section 922(g)(1) cases.'" Citing Old
Chief, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admit114. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 784.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 785.
119. Id.
120. In making this determination, the court noted that because the error in admitting the prior
conviction evidence "was not of a constitutional dimension," the error would be considered harmless
"unless it had a 'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it
has such effect." Id. at 785. In the subsequent de novo review of the record, the court found that the
other admitted evidence relating to the controlled buy, and the evidence seized from the house was
overwhelming and therefore any mention of Wilson's criminal record was harmless. Id. at 785-86.
121. 105 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1997).
122. Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255.
123. United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
124. 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that reversal is required only when an improper
evidentiary ruling affects the substantial rights of a defendant or has had more than a slight influence
on the verdict).
125. Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255.
126. Id.
127. 107 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1997).
128. Blake, 107 F.3d at 652.
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ting an entire record of prior convictions when the appellant's stipulation
would have had the same evidentiary significance.129 However, before
addressing whether the district court's rejection of the stipulation was
harmless error, the Eighth Circuit examined the sufficiency of the rest of
the evidence against the appellant.'" The court found that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing an informant's out-of-court statement
for the non-hearsay purpose of identifying the appellant as a methamphetamine dealer."' Given the potential for prejudice by both the improper out-of-court statement and the admission of the full record of the
appellant's prior convictions, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded
the matter back for further proceedings.'
In United States v. Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
rejection of offers to stipulate to prior convictions in section 922(g)(1)
cases."' At trial, the government rejected defendant's offer to stipulate to
his felon status.3 Over defendant's objections, the district court also admitted both an unredacted copy of a judgment and commitment from a
previous felony conviction and the testimony from a parole officer stating that the appellant was a convicted felon." Relying on Old Chief, the
Ninth Circuit held that the admission of this evidence was extremely
prejudicial to the appellant,' 7 and that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected the appellant's attempt to mitigate prejudice. 3 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[iun light of the closeness of the case and
the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence ... the government has not
established that the error was harmless."'3 9

129. Id. at 652-53.
130. Id. at 653.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 109 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
134. Hernandez, 109 F.3d at 1451-53.
135. Id. at 1451.
136. Id. at 1451-52.
137. Id. at 1452.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1453. Due to the finding of an abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit examined the
sufficiency of the evidence against Mr. Hernandez. Id. Under both a "fair assurance" or a "more
probable than not" standard, the government failed to show that the district court's error was harmless. Id. A lack of fingerprint evidence on the gun in question and poor identification of Hemandez
by the officer involved in the incident may have led a jury to convict Hernandez based on the evidence of his prior conviction for burglary. Id. Additionally, although the jury was given a limiting
instruction that the evidence of the prior conviction should only be considered for the purpose of
establishing that he was a felon, the prior conviction was mentioned during voir dire, the trial itself
and in the court's instructions to the jury. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that, "[t]o tell a jury to ignore

the defendant's prior convictions in determining whether he or she committed the offense being tried
is to ask human beings to act with a measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond mortal capacities." Id. (citing United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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d. Analysis
In Old Chief, the Supreme Court limited its holding only to cases
involving proof of felon status." The Tenth Circuit narrowed this interpretation. It stated that the analysis employed in the Wacker decision was
driven by the unique nature of section 922(g)(1) and therefore was limited to cases of this kind."" However, it may be possible to extract some
standard for the application of Rule 403 in cases involving offers to
stipulate to prior offenses despite the narrow considerations of Wacker
and Old Chief.
One commentator argues that Old Chief supports four general factors for use in analyzing whether a court has abused its discretion in refusing to accept stipulations to prior offenses in a Rule 403 setting."2
Those factors include: (1) the prosecution's need for the evidence of
prior convictions; (2) the probative value of that evidence;'" (3) the
potential for harm due to unfair prejudice;'" (4) and the possibility of
mitigating any potential harms.' Due to the similar holdings in Old
Chief and Wacker,"7 these four factors could apply to Tenth Circuit
analyses in similar situations.
Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
harmless error issue in Wacker." Other circuits have employed a
"harmless error" analysis in their post-Old Chief decisions.' This suggests that a fifth factor must be added in order to complete the proposed
analytical framework: (5) the sufficiency of other evidence against the
defendant.'" A "harmless error" analysis must be included in any exami-

140. United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651 n.7 (1997).
141. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See Jacobs, supra note 46, at 568.
143. Id. at 573-77.
144. Id. at 577-82.
145. Id. at 583-85.
146. Id. at 586-89.
147. Compare United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647-49 (1997), with United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a defendant offers to stipulate to
prior felon status, the trial court should permit the stipulation or provide an alternative procedure to
inform the jury).
148. Compare Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656, n.1 1, with Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1473-74 (stating that
the Court implied no opinion on the issue of harmless error).
149. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Blake, 107 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1997); Redding v. United States, 105 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir.
1997).
150. This proposed "fifth factor" in addition to the four proposed by Professor Jacobs arises
from the analysis employed by several circuits to determine whether the abuse of discretion in cases
factually similar to Old Chief constituted harmless error. See Jacobs, supra note 46 (proposing four
factors to use in determining abuse of discretion in cases involving the refusal to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior convictions); see also Hemandez, 109 F.3d at 1453 (finding that
due to the closeness of the case and the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence, the district court's
rejection of a proposed stipulation was not harmless error); Blake, 107 F.3d at 653 (finding that
given the insufficiency of the other evidence against the defendant, the court's rejection of a pro-
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nation of abuse of discretion cases where the district court refused to
accept an offer to stipulate to the existence of prior offenses."'
Following Old Chief and Wacker, an appellant must assert claims of
abuse of discretion in conjunction with claims of insufficient evidence.
Simple findings of an abuse of discretion will fail a "harmless error"
examination when there is overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt.
However, while both cases couch their holdings within a section
922(g)(1) factual scenario, it is possible that the Tenth Circuit may recognize a more general requirement that courts accept stipulations to the
existence of prior offenses in other situations. Should the Tenth Circuit
so hold, an appellant may elect to emphasize the insufficiency of other
evidence rather than the prejudicial effect of admitting a record detailing
the name and nature of prior offenses.
2. Prior Bad Acts: United States v. Shumway'
a. Facts
On June 1, 1995, appellant Shumway was charged with violating
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and damaging United
States property.'53 These charges stemmed from an unauthorized excavation of two Anasazi archaeological sites." The district court admitted
evidence, after a Rule 404(b) hearing, from a previous case where
Shumway pled guilty to three counts involving the same violations
charged in the instant case.' Initially the government was allowed to
offer this evidence only for the purposes of establishing identity under
Rule 404(b).' " However, upon reconsideration, the district court broadened the scope of its previous ruling and, absent a stipulation from
Shumway that identity was the only issue involved, allowed the evidence
for the additional purposes of proving knowledge and intent."7 The jury
found Shumway guilty on all four counts. "8
b. Decision
Of the issues presented to the Tenth Circuit, the court focused on
whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of Shumway's
posed stipulation was not harmless error); Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255 (finding that given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the district court's rejection of a proposed stipulation was
harmless error).
151. See United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson,
107 F.3d 774, 785 (10th Cir. 1997); Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1474.
152. 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. Shumway, 112 F.3dat 1417.
154. Id.
155. Id.
at1417-18.
156. Id.at1418.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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prior acts under Rule 404(b).' Relying on the four Huddleston factors,
the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of prior illegal acts under Rule 404(b)."W
As part of the Huddleston analysis, the Tenth Circuit evaluated
whether the probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403"6 Citing to an earlier decision,
the court stated that "'[elvidence of prior bad acts will always be prejudicial, and it is the trial court's job to evaluate whether the guaranteed risk
''
of prejudice outweighs the legitimate contribution of the evidence. 62
The Tenth Circuit found that the trial court, in the Rule 404(b) hearing,
satisfied the third prong of the Huddleston test by finding that the evidence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial.
3.

63
Prior Bad Acts: United States v. Segien'

a. Facts
Appellant Segien was convicted of assaulting federal officers and
employees in an incident at the Leavenworth, Kansas, United States
Penitentiary.'" A federal officer and a case manager stopped and questioned Segien" When Segien initially responded to the questioning with
hostile language, however, the situation escalated and violence erupted."
At trial the government introduced evidence of three past incidents of
misconduct. 7 On appeal, Segien claimed that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)."
b. Decision
Relying on the Huddleston test, the Tenth Circuit considered if the
district court's admission of prior misconduct evidence was an abuse of
discretion.'" The government maintained, and the trial court agreed, that
the three previous acts of misconduct showed Segien's intent and absence of mistake.' The Tenth Circuit concurred and found that the prior
acts evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b).' Additionally,
the court found that the evidence was relevant, more probative than un-

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 1419-22.
Id. at 1422.
Id. (quoting United States v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1994)).
114 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1997).
Segien, 114 F.3d at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1022-23.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
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fairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and properly limited to its Rule 404(b)
purpose.' The Tenth Circuit held that the district court satisfied all of the
Huddleston factors and had not abused its discretion.
c. Analysis
Rules 403 and 404(b) are expressly and inextricably connected
through the Huddleston test. The Tenth Circuit, in both the Shumway and
Segien decisions, demonstrated an adherence to the four part Rule 404(b)
analysis and the "more probative than prejudicial" balancing test required by Rule 403. While the detail in the analysis may vary," the
Shumway and Segien decisions adhere to the same requirements established for Rule 403 and 404(b) analysis.
Both cases suggest that the "abuse of discretion" standard is extremely difficult to overcome, but that it may be even more difficult to
avoid a determination of "harmless error."'"5 Given the broad framework
of the Huddleston decision," coupled with Congress's preference for
" successfully challenging
admission,
a Rule 404(b) admission is extremely difficult.
The subjective and deferential standard that has come to govern
Rule 403 assessments presents an additional hurdle in a Huddleston
analysis of Rule 404(b) admissions. The Shumway decision illustrates the
difficulties in establishing a case for prejudice. The Tenth Circuit stated
that "we are required to give the trial court substantial deference in Rule
403 rulings.' ' 7' This deference, coupled with the lack of any concrete
definition for "unfair prejudice"'79 within the circuit, makes a clear assessment of a Rule 404(b) challenge impossible.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Compare United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419-22 (10th Cir. 1997) (establishing each element of the four prong Huddleston test in great detail), with Segien, 114 F.3d at 1022-23
(outlining each element of the four prong Huddleston test rather briefly).
175. See Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1419; Segien, 114 F.3d at 1022.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing the Tenth Circuit position on Huddeston).
177. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1374 (10th Cir. 1989).
178. Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1422.
179. See supranote 54.
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II.SIMILAR CRIMES EVIDENCE IN CHILD MOLESTATION CASES:
RULES 403 AND 414

A. Background
1. Similar Crimes Evidence in Child Molestation Cases Pre-Rule
414
Rule 404(b) permits admission of "similar crimes" evidence only

for several clearly enumerated purposes, while acting as a general bar
against the admission of character evidence."l Prior to the enactment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 414," ' a "lustful disposition" exception had
been recognized as an extension to Rule 404(b), applying only in sex
crime prosecutions." 2

The "lustful disposition" exception was initially recognized at
common law as a result of changing perceptions of women and their legal status.' 3 The "lustful disposition" exception allowed the prosecution
to prove, in its case-in-chief, that the defendant had a propensity to

commit sex crimes through evidence of prior or later instances of sexual
misconduct.'" The prosecution could offer this evidence regardless of
whether the defendant had made an issue of his moral character.'

In

addition, the jury was free to infer that evidence of prior sexual misconduct meant that the defendant committed the charged offense.'" Only the
court's own discretion and sense of relevance limited the admission of

this evidence.'"
The federal courts' "depraved sexual instinct theory" paralleled the
"lustful disposition" exception." Policy concerns surrounding child sex-

180. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
181. Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is titled, "Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation
Cases." It states, in relevant part: "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant." FED. R. EVID.414.
182. See Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex
Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 515, 528-30 (1995); see also Roger C. Park & David P. Bryden, The TwentySecond Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases:
Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L. REv. 171, 184-86 (1993) (discussing the application
and rejection of the "lustful disposition" or "depraved sexual instinct" exception by some courts).
183. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 168 (1993).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 168-69.
186. Id. at 169.
187. Id.
188. See Park & Bryden, supra note 182, at 184; David J. Kaloyanides, Note, The Depraved
Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the Propensityfor Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1297, 1322 (1992).
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ual abuse'" and the need to circumstantially prove this type of crime" °
formed the basis for this exception. One circuit court permitted evidence
of prior acts of child abuse under the "depraved sexual instinct theory.' 91
While the "depraved sexual instinct theory" exception to Rule 404(b)
existed, however, most federal courts allowed uncharged sexual misconduct evidence under the character evidence exceptions enumerated in
Rule 404(b)."
Federal Rule of Evidence 414 was included as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.1" While the act also
included Rules 413 and 415,"' Rule 414 specifically relates to evidence
of similar crimes of child molestation in criminal proceedings.'95
2.

Rule 414

Academic discussion regarding the new Federal Rules of Evidence
began well before Congress formally debated their merits."9 Senator
Biden characterized the proposed rules as violating "every basic tenet of
our legal system."'97 He stated that Congress should postpone any action
until the Judicial Conference completed a study on the possible Rule 404
amendment allowing admission of similar sex crimes evidence. 9 Important considerations justified the rules, however, including the need to
win convictions in difficult-to-prosecute sex offense cases,'" the probative value of sexual offense evidence and the need to disprove the defense of consent,' and the need to correct imbalances and establish consistency in judicial decision making.f'

189. Kaloyanides, supra note 188, at 1322.
190. Id. at 1327 ("[1]n child abuse prosecutions, there are usually no eyewitnesses to identify
the source of the injuries. Rather, such prosecutions are commonly built upon circumstantial evidence showing a pattern ....
(quoting United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir.
1987))).
191. Id. at 1327-29 (recognizing that some courts admit specific acts evidence in child abuse
cases more readily due to the problems in proving this type of case).
192. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
MINN. L. REV. 529, 541-56 (1994).
193. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796, 2135-37 (1994).
194. Id.
195. See FED. R. EvtD. 414(a).
196. See Bryden & Park, supra note 192, at 566-75; Park & Bryden, supranote 182, at 190-97;
Reed, supranote 183, at 144-45. See generally lmwinkeiried, supra note 5 (discussing the inadequacies of the Judicial Department's arguments in support of the proposed rules).
197. 140 CONG. REC. S10277 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
198. Id.
199. See James Joseph Duane, The New FederalRules of Evidence on PriorActs of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 99-101 (1994); Jeffrey
G. Pickett, The Presumptionof Innocence Imperiled: The New FederalRules of Evidence 413-415
and the Use of OtherSexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 WASH. L. REV. 883, 895 (1995).
200. Duane, supra note 199, at 98-99; Pickett, supra note 199, at 895.
201. Duane, supra note 199, at 103-05; Pickett, supra note 199, at 895.

1998]

EVIDENCE

Following the passage of the new rules, the Judicial Conference was
provided 150 days to submit alternative recommendations regarding
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415.' The Advisory Committee received
and considered public responses to the new rules,23 and submitted a report to the Judicial Conference Committee. The report, adopted unanimously, ' stated the following: (1) the concerns expressed by Congress
in enacting these rules were already expressed in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, specifically Rule 404(b);' (2) the new rules are not supported
by empirical evidence, thus diminishing the protections against undue
prejudice;' (3) and because prior bad acts would be admissible that were
not the focus of the charges, a defendant seeking to rebut this evidence
would have to engage in mini-trials within the trial itself.'
The Judicial Conference urged Congress to reconsider the policy
considerations behind Rules 413-415, or in the alternative, adopt
amended versions of Rules 404 and 405 which would specifically address evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct. ' Congress did not act
on the Judicial Conference's recommendations within the 150 day period
set forth in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Therefore, the new rules became law.
B. United States v. Meacham'
1. Facts
A jury convicted Meacham of one count of transporting a minor in
interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in sexual activity.1 °
The victim was twelve years old when she testified at trial."' The victim
testified to two incidents of sexual abuse by Meacham, one occurring at
age eight and the other, on which the present charge was based, when she
was ten. 2 At trial, Meacham denied ever having sexual contact with the

202.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE U.S.,

REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE

reprinted
in 159 F.R.D. 51, 51 (1995).
203. A notice soliciting comment on the new evidence rules was sent to all federal judges,
about 900 evidence law professors, 40 women's rights organizations, and 1,000 other interested
organizations. Id. at 52. Of the responses received, the overwhelming majority opposed the new
rules. Id. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, American BarAssociation CriminalJustice Section Report
to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995) (resolving that the American Bar
Association opposes the substance of Rules 413-415).
204. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 202, at 52.
205. Id. at 52-53.
206. Id. at 53.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 54.
209. 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997).
210. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1490.
211. Id. at 1491.
212. Id.
ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995),
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victim.213 On cross-examination, Meacham also denied that he ever fondled his stepdaughters when they were under the age of fourteen."" The
government called two of Meacham' s stepdaughters for rebuttal and both
testified that they were molested more than thirty years ago." '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted some confusion as to whether the stepdaughters' testimony was admissible under either Rule 404(b) or Rule
414. Meacham was indicted on February 23, 1995, and was tried in September of that year."' However, Rule 414 became effective on July 9,
1995. In a case decided after Meacham's trial,21 the Tenth Circuit held
that Rule 413 applied to proceedings commenced on or after July 9,
1997 1 ' and that a proceeding commences when the defendant is
charged. 19 Congress amended the effective date of Rule 414, however,
stating that the rule would apply to "'all trials commenced on or after the
effective date of such amendments."' While the congressional action
appeared to overrule the Tenth Circuit's holding that Rule 414 applied to
Meacham, the court analyzed the evidence from both a Rule 414 and a
Rule 404(b) perspective."
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether Rule 403 applied to evidence
proffered under Rule 4 14 .' The court held that prior acts evidence under
Rule 414 must still be relevant and subject to the Rule 403 balancing
test.' The Tenth Circuit found that the district court performed a "more
probative than prejudicial" balancing test regarding the stepdaughters'

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872, 878 (10th Cir. 1996).
218. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1491.
219. Roberts, 88 F.3d at 878.
220. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1491 (citing the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-25).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1492-93. The Tenth Circuit initially addressed the question of the staleness of the
stepdaughters' testimony. Id. at 1491-94. The court found that while the language of Rule 414 itself
did not address the issue, the historical notes and the congressional history appeared to indicate that
there was no cutoff point beyond which prior sex offenses are inadmissible. Id. at 1492. The court
cited the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), in which
that circuit held that evidence of offenses occurring 13 years earlier was admissible. Hadley, 918
F.2d at 851. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "notwithstanding very substantial lapses in time" no
time limit is imposed on the use of uncharged offenses as evidence of other sex crimes. Meacham,
115 F.3d at 1492. See W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Remoteness in Time of Other Offenses Committed by Accused Affecting Admissibility of Evidence Thereof in Prosecutionfor Sex Offense, 88
A.L.R.3d 8 (1978).
223. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1495.
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testimony in a ruling on a motion in limine made before trial,tm and during arguments before the bench prior to their testimony. '
The court also determined that the trial court applied a Rule 404(b)
analysis to the evidence. ' Therefore, the court analyzed the decision
from the perspective of Rule 404(b)."7 Applying the Huddleston test, the
court found that: (1) the district court properly identified the purposes of
plan, preparation and intent; m (2) the district court properly weighed the
probative and prejudicial factors under Rule 403 as informed by the legislative history to Rules 413 and 414 and found no unfair prejudice;'
and (3) the district court gave a proper limiting instruction before the
evidence was introduced and at the end of the trial.2' The Tenth Circuit,
satisfied that the Huddleston test was met, found no abuse of discretion
in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b)."'
C. Other Circuits
232 the Second Circuit addressed the issue
In United States v. Larson,
of whether Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence.233 In a situation similar
to Meacham, the Second Circuit evaluated the district court's Rule 403
decision under both Rules 404(b) and 414. ' The Second Circuit held
that a Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence offered under Rule
414 was consistent with its interpretation of the legislative history for
Rule 414.

In United States v. Sumner,23 the Eighth Circuit also found that a
Rule 403 balancing test applies to evidence admitted pursuant to Rule
414.' The district court denied the government's evidence of "prior bad
acts" on the grounds that the rule was unconstitutional without the application of a Rule 403 balancing test.237 Instead, the district court admitted
the evidence under Rule 404(b).238 The Eighth Circuit noted that "[i]t is
224. Id. at 1492 n.2.
225. Id. at 1492-94.
226. Id. at 1494 (noting the sense of the district court's colloquy and limiting instructions).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1495.
232. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
233. Larson, 112 F.3d at 604.
234. Compare Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1495, with Larson, 112 F.3d at 604-05 (quoting the
statements of Representative Molinari and Senator Dole regarding the prejudicial and probative
effect of the evidence).235. 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
236. Sumner, 119 F.3d at 661.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 660. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in admitting the prior
acts evidence under Rule 404(b). Id. at 660-61. The court found that the evidence did nothing more
than demonstrate a propensity to commit crimes and was therefore prohibited under Rule 404(b). Id.
at 661.
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logical that Rule 403 applies to Rule 414... and nothing in the language
of Rule 414 precludes the application of Rule 403.'' 9 Citing the Second
Circuit's decision in Larson and independently evaluating Rule 414's
legislative history, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it was Congress's
intent to apply Rule 403 to Rule 414.'° However, the court declined to
perform a Rule 403 balancing to determine whether the evidence was
admissible under Rule 414, remanding the matter for a new trial."'
D. Analysis
Meacham is significant for two reasons: (1) the finding that Rule
403 applies to evidence offered under Rule 414; and (2) the finding that
applying Rule 403 to Rule 414 effectively bars constitutional claims
against Rule 414.
Prior to Meacham, as well as Larson and Sumner, there was doubt
as to whether Rule 414 was subject to a Rule 403 balancing test. 2 Rule
404(b) contains the phrase, "may ...be admissible," 3 contemplating a
further assessment to establish what evidence might not be admissible.
Rule 414 contains no such language, however, stating that evidence of
another offense or child molestation "is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."' This language has solicited debate ranging from subtle questioning as to whether
Rule 403 might apply to the new rule,' to contentions that Rule 403
does not apply to Rules 413-415, thereby preventing a fair trial.
Meacham established that prior acts evidence must still be relevant and
followed by a Rule 403 balancing.' While Rule 403 applies, "clearly
under Rule 414 the courts are to 'liberally' admit evidence of prior uncharged sex offenses."'
Meacham also addressed, in a subtle manner, some commentators'
fears that the new rules will open the floodgates and allow the presentation of previously inadmissible evidence. In addition to evaluating the
evidence under Rule 414, the court performed a Rule 404(b) assessment
and held that the evidence in question was properly admitted.' This
analysis implies that evidence now offered under Rule 414 was previ-

239.
240.
241.

Id.at 662.
Id.
Id.

242.

See WEINSTEIN,

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See FED. R. EviD. 404.
See FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
See Bryden & Park, supra note 192, at 566.
See United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488. 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1492.
Id. at 1495.

supra note 9, § 414.04[2].
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ously admissible under Rule 404(b).2' 9 Additionally, Sumner suggested
that evidence that fails under a 404(b) assessmentm might fail under a
joint Rule 414/403 assessment."' A recent Tenth Circuit decision, while
addressing Rule 413 evidence, indicates the potential rejection of propensity evidence under Rule 403 in order to avoid jury confusion."
Several commentators have attacked Rules 413-415 as unconstitutional. 3 The court in Meacham cursorily addressed potential constitutional challenges. It stated that "[u]nder Rule 414 the prior acts evidence
must still be relevant and followed by a Rule 403 balancing. Both conditions were met and, under the circumstances of this case, the prior acts
evidence was not so prejudicial as to violate the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial."' While this statement, if tested, may have
249. It should be noted that the admission of evidence offered under Rule 413, the counterpart
to Rule 414, is by no means guaranteed. See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1326, 1332
(10th Cir. 1988).
250. See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1997).
251. Sumner, 119 F.3dat 662.
252. The court's recent decision in Guardia addressed a Rule 403 rejection of proposed Rule
413 evidence. The court initially found that evidence offered under Rule 413 must meet three
threshold requirements: (1) a trial court must determine that the defendant is accused of sexual
assault; (2) the court must find that the proffered evidence concerns the defendant's commission of a
separate offense of sexual assault; and (3) the evidence must be relevant by showing the defendant
had a particular propensity and that this propensity has a bearing on the charged crime. Guardia, 135
F.3d at 1328-29, 1332. The court then added that the trial court "must make a reasoned, recorded
finding that the prejudicial value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative
value." Id. at 1332. This final "clear record" requirement was held to be particularly important due to
the sensitive nature of the balancing test performed in these types of cases. Id. at 1331. The court
examined two possible "misapplications" of a Rule 403 balancing test in Rule 413 situations. Id. at
1330. First, a trial court could elect to exclude Rule 413 evidence because of the traditional ban on
character evidence. Id. The court found that while Rule 413 "removes the per se exclusion" on
character evidence, courts should continue to consider the traditional reasons for rejecting character
evidence when performing the "probative versus prejudicial" balancing test. Id. The court also noted
that this type of evidence can have a confusing effect on a case, and trial courts should take this into
consideration. Id. at 1331. Second, a trial court may believe that Rule 413 requires a more restrained
or lenient Rule 403 balancing test. Id. The court stated that while Rule 404(a)(l)-(3) establishes
exceptions to the ban on propensity evidence, trial courts still perform a traditional Rule 403 balancing test. Id. Similarly, the court held that Rule 413 does not require a more lenient standard to its
exception banning propensity evidence. Id. In the instant case, Guardia was charged with several
counts of sexual abuse based on the complaints of two alleged victims. Id. at 1327. At trial, the
government offered evidence under Rule 413 of four additional individuals alleging a similar manner of abuse. Id. at 1327-28. The trial court rejected this evidence under Rule 403, citing concerns
that the testimony would confuse the issues in the case and mislead the jury. Id. at 1331. The Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. Id. at 1331-32.
Additionally, the court rejected the government's contention that the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to develop an alternate method of presenting the evidence to minimize the risk of
confusion. Id. at 1332. Distinguishing a previous decision where an abuse of discretion had been
found for this type of failure, the court held that the evidence in the instant case was not susceptible
to an alternate presentation. Id.
253. See James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1995); Natali & Stigall, supra note 5, at 23-38;
Mark A. Sheft, FederalRule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier,33 AM. CRtM. L. REV.
57, 76-87 (1995).
254. United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
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proven inadequate to withstand constitutional challenge, a recent Tenth
Circuit decision bolsters this position."5
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit remains committed to the general principles of
application for Rules 403 and 404(b) as articulated by the Supreme Court
and by its own precedent. The Tenth Circuit has also taken a lead in addressing the application of Rule 403 to both Rule 413 and 414 similar
crimes evidence. In light of the court's recent decisions, the potential for
a constitutional challenge to the Meacham decision appears to have
waned. The Tenth Circuit's decisions regarding Rules 413 and 414 will
provide strong precedent for the Tenth Circuit and beyond.
ChristopherDopke

255. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998), while decided after the survey
period, lends direct support to Meacham's constitutional provisions. Compare FED. R. EVID. 413
(applying to sexual assault cases), with FED. R. EvID. 414 (applying to child molestation). Enjady
was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual abuse. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1429. Among the issues
brought on appeal, Enjady contended that the trial court's decision to allow testimony of a prior
sexual assault violated his constitutional right to a fair trial and to due process. Id. at 1430-34. Appellant argued that the admission of propensity evidence creates the danger of conviction because the
defendant is a "bad person," therefore denying him a fair opportunity to defend against the charges.
Id. at 1430. The court agreed that Rule 413 raises serious constitutional due process issues, indicating that several commentators have argued its unconstitutionality. Id. However, these arguments are
based on assumptions that Rule 403 does not apply to Rule 413 and that the "is admissible" language
in Rule 413 can be read as bypassing rule 403, requiring all pertinent evidence in all circumstances.
Id. at 1431. Citing the Meacham decision, the court noted its earlier holding that Rule 414 was
subject to a Rule 403 balancing. ld. The court set forth, in great detail, the protections afforded to
defendants through the application of balancing the probative value of the evidence against the risk
of undue prejudice. Id. at 1431-33. The court concluded that, in light of the safeguards of Rule 403,
Rule 413 is not unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1433. In
considering Enjady's Equal Protection claim, the court utilized a "rational basis" analysis and indicated that a "strong presumption of validity" attaches to the evidentiary classification made in enacting Rule 413. Id. at 1433-34. The court found that Congress's objective of enhancing effective
prosecution for sexual assaults is a legitimate governmental interest and Rule 413 is a legitimate
means to that end. Id. at 1434. Therefore, the court held that Enjady's Equal Protection claim was
without merit. Id. As Federal Rule of Evidence 413 is almost identical to Rule 414, the Enjady
decision provides, through analogy, strong support for Meacham's rather superficial constitutional
analysis. As the court cited to Meacham as support for the Enjady decision, expect the roles to be
reversed should a constitutional challenge be made against the validity of Rule 414.

HEALTH LAW
INTRODUCTION

Public health is an increasing global concern.' Governments have
ranked public health as among their foremost concerns. 2 "[H]ealth care is
an important social value, so fundamental to the realization of other
rights, that it should be given particular legal protection and promotion
within our society." 3 During the survey period,4 the Tenth Circuit decided three significant cases pertaining to health law. Since health law
encompasses so many aspects of American law,5 these recent Tenth Circuit decisions are quite disparate. This article analyzes these decisions.
Part I provides a general background of health law. Part II explores the
abortion issue. Part III examines dietary supplement regulations, and Part
IV discusses the physician/hospital relationship, paying particular attention to a physician's hospital privileges.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution does not explicitly give the federal
government the authority to regulate public health.6 The Commerce

1. Virginia Leary et al., Health, Human Rights and InternationalLaw, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 122, 122 (1988) (indicating that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
international implications).
2. See Ashley W. Warren, Comment, Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical
Devices: Are the Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furtheredor Hindered?,49 SMU
L. REV. 619, 621 (1996); see also LAURENE A. GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTiVE ON U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM 3 (1993) (indicating that concern around the world is
focused on developing strategies to manage the rapidly increasing health care costs); Edward 0.
Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS. 1, 6 n.22 (1997) (stating
that public health is among a local government's primary concern); Conquering Disease as an
Enemy of Empire, TIMES LONDON, Aug. 15, 1997, at 9, available in 1997 WL 9222940 (indicating
that the maintenance of public health was a high priority in Victorian Britain); Mozambican President Pledges to Improve Workers' Living Conditions, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, May 1, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 3759913 (stating that public health is ranked as Mozambique's government's
priority); P.K. Roy, India: On a DistrictFormation Spree, HINDU, May 12, 1997, at 17, available in
1997 WL 9971024 (stating that public health is among the Indian government's priorities for which
they use very limited funds).
3. See Carlo V. DiFlorio, Comment, Assessing UniversalAccess to Health Care: An Analysis
of Legal PrincipleandEconomic Feasibility, II DICK. J. INT'L L. 139, 160 (1992).
4. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
5. Aspects of civil law that affect health care regulation include tort law, contract law, and
governmental regulations. ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW 2 (1996). Health
law increasingly involves criminal law as the government expands its use of the criminal law system
to create systemic changes in the health care industry. Id.
6. The United States Constitution declares that among the common goals of the people, is the
goal to "promote the general Welfare." U.S. CONST. preamble; see also Kellen McClendon, Do
Hospitalsin Pennsylvania Relieve the Government of Some of Its Burden?, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 517,
573 (1994). Itis interesting to note that in other countries, health care is considered a human fight
and provided for all citizens. See Jeanne M. Woods, The Fallacy of Neutrality: Diary of an Election
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Clause7 delegates to the federal government the ability to regulate interstate commerce! As such, the federal government may regulate public
health insofar as it affects interstate commerce.9 The responsibility for
the maintenance of public health, however, mostly resides with state
governments under the police powers. ° Under the police powers, the
state has extensive authority to regulate its' public health." Traditionally,
state governments
have delegated some of this authority to local gov12
ernments.
The controversy surrounding health care coverage has gained national attention in recent years. In theory, health care insurance is available to all Americans through four avenues. The government provides
Medicare 13 for the elderly and disabled; and Medicaid 4 for those with

Observer, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 475, 523 (1997) (indicating that health care is included in South
Africa's new constitution).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-203 (1824).
9. Joy Elizabeth Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via Telecommunications
Will Save Lives, But Can Congress Answer the Call? Federal Preemption of State Licensure Requirements Under CongressionalCommerce Clause Authority & Spending Power, 22 VT. L. REV.
231, 245 (1997).
10. See Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that pursuant to
the state's police powers, the state may guarantee the quality of meat and dairy products that everyone in the state consumes, ensure the accuracy of the scales as the basis for charging consumers,
control the use and diversion of water, and regulate the use of pesticides). Congress and the Clinton
administration agreed on a 1998 budget provision allotting $24 billion to states to fund children's
health initiatives. See Karen Jacobs, On Your Own: Gloria Brown Wants to Buy Health Insurance;
She Just Can't Afford It, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at RI0; see also Howard D. Cohen & Taylor
Mattis, Prepayment Rights: Abrogation By the Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1,32 (1993).
11. See Cohen & Mattis, supra note 10, at 32; see also Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics
and Politics of Emergency Health Carefor the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 971, 975 n.13 (1992) ("Over the years, state government responsibility for public health expenditures has varied from about 12 to 14%, while federal government responsibility has varied
from 11 to 30% [which has] led to a power struggle between the national and state governments in
terms of who will pay what, who will cover what, and who is actually running the program.").
12. See Josephine Gittler, ControllingResurgent Tuberculosis: Public Health Agencies, Public Policy, and Law, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 107, 108 (1994).
13. The Medicare program is administered by the Social Security Administration of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994). Medicare does not cover
prescription drugs or long-term care and, until recently, Medicare did not cover liver transplants.
Robert Baker, Rationing, Rhetoric, and Rationality: A Review of the Health Care Rationing Debate
in America and Europe, in ALLOCATING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 57, 60 (James M. Humber &
Robert F. Almeder eds., 1995).
14. Hylton, supra note 11, at 1022 n. 13. Medicaid is designed to provide funds to the blind,
the disabled, and families receiving aid for dependent children in order to cover selected health
services. Id. Medicaid does not cover all expenses. It is jointly subsidized by federal and state governments. Id. (indicating that "over the years, state government responsibility has varied from about
12 to 14%, while federal government responsibility has varied from about I1 to 30%"). The Medicaid program is administered by individual states according to a plan the state adopted in conformity
with federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994). As a result, benefits are inconsistent from state to
state. Hylton, supra note 11, at 1022.
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low incomes or certain disabilities. 5 In addition, some employers provide subsidized coverage for their employees. 6 Finally, coverage can be
purchased on an individual basis. 7 Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) pride themselves on providing preventative care for
individuals. Ironically, however, individuals suffering from chronic
illness, those who stand to gain the most from preventative medicine, are
often denied coverage under HMOs' cost-cutting policies. 9
Americans increasingly call upon medical care and health care2" to
satisfy the needs of a changing and expanding population. The public
outcry for universal health coverage2' pressures the health care system to
reform.22 Rapid technological advances are required to meet society's
demand for improved medical care.23 Medical advances can create new
opportunities for people suffering from chronic illnesses, 2 but these
technological
advancements must be regulated to ensure the safety of the
25

consumer.

The issue is no longer just whether the health care field should be
regulated by the government, but instead, how much regulation is necessary and within constitutional limits. 26 The government must weigh the
15. See DiFlorio, supra note 3, at 148.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Test Over Time: Managed Care is Geared Toward Preventing
Illness; But What About People with Chronic Ailments?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at R6. Preventative care includes such things as regular checkups, in other words, medicine designed to keep
healthy people healthy. Id. In the long run, huge savings result from preventative medicine through
early diagnosis. Id.
19. See id.
20. The difference between medical care and health care is that providing access to health care
does not guarantee that everyone will get the same medical care. EMERGENCY! HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA (ABC News 1992) (interviewing Dr. June Osborne, Dean of the University of Michigan
School of Public Health).
21. The current health care system in the U.S. lacks a social definition of equity, feebly attempts to contain costs, inadequately covers millions of Americans, and does not cover another 37
million Americans. DiFlorio, supra note 3, at 139.
22. The discontent with the current health care system consistently inspires proposals for
reform. Louise G. Trubek & Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Searching for a Balance in Universal Health
Care Reform: Protectionfor the Disenfranchised Consumer, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1994)
(indicating that the health reform project has been attempted several times without success during
the 40 years prior to 1994).
23. See Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1997) (discussing the conflict between a desire for improved health
care and granting patents to inventors of medical advancements).
24. See Jeffrey, supra note 18 (discussing chronic illnesses like diabetes and asthma).
25. See Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1015-16 (1997) (reporting that the rapid pace of developments of medical technology challenges the health care profession because "funding all interventions that would provide some health benefit to some patient would preclude spending on any other
desirable social good"); see also Brad Dallet, Note, Economic Credentialing:Your Money or Your
Life!, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 325 (1994) (indicating the relationship between the physician and
patient is changing along with the economic changes in health care).
26. See McClendon, supra note 6, at 573. McClendon stated:
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interest in preserving and promoting life2 7 against an individual's constitutional rights." These issues are particularly relevant in light of recent
health crises, including AIDS,29 assisted suicide, 3' and the controversy
surrounding abortion."
Central to most medical care issues is the medical care provider, the
physician. State governments administer the majority of the physician
licensing standards.32 Medical care below the standard may result in injury to the patient and the patient may have a malpractice claim.33 A physician's misdiagnosis is not considered negligence if the patient does not
When the public health is involved, a person's liberty to choose how to care for himself
or herself gives way to the requirement of the state.... [W]hen medical care is involved,
the concern is for the good of the individual; when public health is involved the concern
is for the good of the public.
Id. But ".[i]t is legitimate for state government to regulate the conduct of an individual where that
conduct presents a risk to the health, safety, or welfare of others, but it also may be legitimate where
the regulation is only for the protection of that individual."' Id. (quoting KENNETH R. WING, THE
LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 20 (2d ed. 1995)).
27. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
28. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271, 2775 (1997) (addressing the notion
that the "lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of
the young and healthy"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
282 (1990) (stating that a government has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life"); see also Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument Against Mandatory
AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 492 (1997)
(concluding that a mandatory AZT treatment regime for people with AIDS would be unconstitutional).
29. See Susan Fox Buchanan, Medical Ethics at the Millennium: A Brief Retrospective, COLO.
LAW., June 1997, at 141, 142 (1997) (asserting that the physician/patient confidentiality may have an
exception in the case of "hazardous communicable diseases" such as AIDS); Margaret Salmon
Rivas, The California AIDS Initiative and the Food and Drug Administration: Working at Odds with
Each Other?, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 107 (1991) (discussing why the United States has fallen
behind other countries in adopting a national policy on AIDS); Halem, supra note 28, at 491 (analyzing the constitutionality of mandatory AZT treatment of pregnant women).
30. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (upholding a New York statute prohibiting assisted suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271, 2775 (1997) (indicating that
the "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause" and that "Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to [the] promotion and protection" of the state's interests); see also Leonard J.
Deftos, Physician Assistance in Dying: The Supreme Court Should Limit But Not Prohibit,
POSTGRADUATE MED., June 1, 1997, at 13 (reviewing Vacco and Glucksberg); Linda C. Fentiman,
Law and Ethics at the End of Life: High Court Speaks, Where do We Stand After Decisions on PhysicianAssisted Suicide?, 218 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1997).
31.
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
32. See Katopis, supra note 23, at 386-87.
33. DAVID CUNIFF & MARY ELLEN MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT MEDICINE 223 (1994). Patients
may take legal action when physicians make mistakes. See, e.g., SAL FISCINA & JANET B. SEIFERT,
LEGAL CHECK-UP FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR THE HEALTH CARE TEAM
40, 46-47 (1997) (describing situations in which legal action was taken against physicians who made
mistakes).
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disclose information central to the diagnosis, despite the physician's inquiry.34 However, if a physician finds conflicting information and has
reason to question it, she must take proper steps to clarify the issue.35
The most extensively regulated institutions include health care facilities and hospitals.' Health care facilities are held liable for mistakes
related to care37 and hospitals may be held responsible for its physicians'
actions. 38 Therefore, many facilities have established a peer review process among the medical staff in an effort to guarantee that physicians perform adequately. 39 The review committee evaluates each physician's
performance, and compares the care offered with what a "reasonable
physician [would] be expected to know and do under the specific circumstances presented."'4
II. ABORTION
A. Background
The term abortion is derived from the Latin word "aboriri," to miscarry. 41 The word evolved into the present, common usage of a "deliber' Abortion is
ate termination of a pregnancy."42
an issue that has divided
43
America. Current law dictates that a woman has a limited constitutional
right to an abortion.' Courts considering abortion issues must confront
the validity of the legal justification for limiting legislative power to
regulate the availability of abortions.45
The text of the Constitution does not specifically make reference to
abortion nor a right to privacy. 46 However, the Supreme Court has inter-

34. See FISCINA & SEIFERT, supra note 33, at 46.
35. See id at 47. Physician care for different types of patients is delineated. Id. at 67-70. The
duty a physician owes to a non-patient is determined partly by the relationship the physician has with
the actual patient in connection with the non-patient. Id. at 83.
36. MILLER, supra note 5, at 43.
37. Dallet, supra note 25, at 326-27.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See FISCINA & SEIFERT, supra note 33, at 45.
41. See Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact of a New Technology on an Old
Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 717 (1997).
42. See id. at 717; Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law
on Abortions and Births, 278 JAMA 653 (1997) ("Of the approximately 6.5 million pregnancies in
the United States in 1992, 1.5 million or 23% were voluntarily terminated.").
43. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, The Adolescent's Right
To Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, PEDIATRICS, May 1, 1996, at 746; Prothro, supra
note 41, at 715-16.
44. See Prothro, supra note 41, at 721. See also 141 CONG. REC. E1690 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1995) (statement of Rep. Hoekstra) (indicating that hospitals are now required to incorporate mandatory training for abortions as part of their family planning instruction but medical students whose
moral or religious beliefs prevent them from performing abortions are exempted).
45. See 141 CONG. REC. E1690 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoekstra).
46. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973).
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preted the Constitution to protect enumerated rights47 and certain unenumerated rights. 48 In order to determine if the Constitution provides for an
unenumerated right, the Court considers the degree to which these rights
are a part of the traditions of the United States 9 The Supreme Court's
decisions have been relatively consistent, recognizing unenumerated
rights in its decisions.5" For example, the right to privacy is considered an
unenumerated, fundamental right; 5' the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses provide the foundation for protection of the privacy of its
citizens. 2 The fundamental right to privacy has been extended to include
marriage, contraception,
abortion, child-rearing, education, and family
3
relationships.1
The development of abortion case law paralleled the case law on the
right to use contraceptives. 54 The Court recognized the right of marital
privacy55 and a married couple's right to use contraceptives. 56 As a result,
the Court determined that abortion, unlike assisted suicide, 7 is a funda-

47. For example, the Constitution explicitly grants that citizens possess the rights to free
speech, to keep and bear arms, and to confront witnesses against defendants in criminal trials. U.S.
CONST. amends. I, II, VI.
48. See Oversight Hearing on the Origins and Scope of Roe v. Wade Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (April 22, 1996), available in
1996 WL 10162661 (statement by Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center, regarding the history of abortion rights and Roe v. Wade) [hereinafter Tushnet]. Unenumerated rights define a set of constitutional rights which, although necessary, are not
provided in the text of the Constitution. Ronald Dworkin, Exchanges, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 386 (1992). Among these
rights are the right of travel and the right of association. Id.
49. Stephen Aaron Silver, Note, Beyond Jafee v. Redmond: Should the Federal Courts Recognize a Right to Physician-PatientConfidentiality? 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1809, 1835 (1998). The
sources of unenumerated rights are state law or a "natural law of fundamental rights." See Tushnet,
supra note 48 ("Once we recognize unenumerated rights based on a higher law, it is hard to understand why only the national government has to respect those rights.").
50. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down involuntary sterilization of
certain recidivist felons as violative of the basic human right to procreate); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
87, 139 (1810) (recognizing "general principals which are common to our free institutions"); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (identifying "certain vital principles in our free Republican governments").
51.

See KAREN O'CONNOR, No NEUTRAL GROUND?: ABORTION POLITICS IN AN AGE OF

ABSOLUTES 40 (1996) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
52. See Tushnet, supra note 48.
53. See Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of Marriage, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195,
(1997). In the future the right to privacy may extend to apply to homosexual relationships. Id.
54. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. See id.; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court
identified the right of unmarried couples' use of contraceptives. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
(1972).
57. Fentiman, supra note 30, at 5 (discussing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
U.S. 261 (1990)).

212
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mental right, and consequently the Court is constitutionally justified in
regulating the legislative determinations on abortions."
The Supreme Court exercised this power in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman's constitutional right to an abortion. 9 The Roe Court
determined that the viability of the fetus' was the first point at which the
state could declare an interest in the fetal life, and could constitutionally
ban non-therapeutic abortions. 6 Prior to viability, if the government were
to attempt to interfere in the woman's right to an abortion, it would have
to establish a "compelling'2 reason. 63 The first trimester of a woman's
pregnancy cannot be regulated. 64 During the second trimester, the government can only interfere to the extent that the interference safeguards
the mother's health. 5 Thereafter, whenever fetal viability is reached, the
government may interfere to protect the interests of the fetus,
provided
66
an abortion is not necessary to protect the woman's health.
Since 1973, subsequent cases have interpreted and limited this
right.67 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth68 recognized the Roe Court's
determination that "viability" was a medical judgment and the essence of
the term was to remain flexible to interpretation. 69 Upholding Roe, Danforth determined that is was not the role of legislatures or courts to specifically define viability, that is, to determine at which point viability is
actually achieved.7" Rather, it is a medical decision influenced by various
factors unique to each pregnancy. 1 In City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor
Reproductive Health 2 the Court stated that parental involvement for minors was constitutionally permissible, but a bypass mechanism providing

58.
59.

See Tushnet, supra note 48.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53,154 (1973); O'CONNOR, supra note 51, at 46;

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 11 (1990) (stating that Roe v. Wade

codified the right to an abortion as a privacy right as had been determined by earlier cases).
60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-61.
61. See id. at 163-64. A therapeutic abortion is when the abortion is "necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother." Id.
62. Id. at 162-63.
63. SeeTRIBE, supranote 59, at 11-12.
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see TRIBE, supra note 59, at 12.
67. See Jennifer L. Stevenson, Supreme Court Rulings on Abortion, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1997, at 4D (stating that since 1973 there have been 26 cases related to abortion on the U.S.
Supreme Court's docket); see also 139 CONG. REC. S195 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (discussing the
Freedom of Choice Act and the need for its affirmation to ensure that a woman's fundamental right
to chose is preserved as according to Roe).
68. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 62-63.
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id.
72. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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for approval by a judge must also be available for those minors who cannot obtain parental permission.73
In a series of cases, the Court articulated the difference between a direct interference with a woman's right to choose an abortion and an indirect deterrence on that right.74 In 1989, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services75 challenged the Roe precedent.76 The abortion opponents argued for mandatory testing that would ascertain the viability of the
fetus.77 Because the composition of the Court had changed since Roe,78
many questioned whether the right to choose an abortion would survive,
but Roe was upheld. 79
Justice O'Connor was the motivating force. O'Connor articulated the
standard of evaluation
established by Roe and subsequent cases"0 as the
"undue burden" test.8 In Webster, the Court determined that the regulations at issue did not place an "undue burden" on the woman, and therefore the state regulations were upheld.82 O'Connor's decision left Roe

73. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 427 n. 10.
74. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 16 (stating that "in the years following Roe one could safely
predict that direct restrictions on abortions would be overturned"); see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (stating that a denial of federal Medicaid funds for a therapeutic abortion was not
unconstitutional); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (stating that a public hospital owned by the
city was not required to provide nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(determining that a state regulation that denied state Medicaid funds for non-therapeutic abortions
was constitutional).
75. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
76. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that "the government of Missouri ... and the Bush
administration both urged the Court to take the Webster case as an occasion to reconsider its decision
in Roe v. Wade"). This case was so remarkable because the law being challenged provided "a restriction on the performance of abortions in public institutions, even when the woman would be
paying her own bill; a preamble in the statute that declares that 'the life of each human being begins
at conception;' and a regulatory requirement that a number of tests of fetal viability be performed
when a woman seeking an abortion is believed to be twenty weeks pregnant." Id.; see also LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,

1867-1973 251 (1997) (discussing Webster).
77. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490.
78. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that the additions of Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy would really test the foundation of Roe).
79. Webster, 492 U.S. at 513-14.
80. For an early articulation of a "burden" test, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1967).
Even earlier, the Court articulated the "maximum destructive impact" test. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (indicating that a prohibition on the use of contraceptives would
have a maximum destructive impact on a marital relationship). For an abortion case that articulated a
"burden" test, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973) (articulating the "unconstitutional
burden" test).
81. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 23. Previous cases have described the test as "unconstitutionally burdensome" on the woman's right to choose an abortion. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall followed this standard in their opinions in Webster. Id; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). Justice O'Connor actually devised the undue burden test. TRIBE, supra note 59, at
23.
82.

TRIBE, supra note 59, at 23.
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open to future modifications, including the possibility of being overturned. 3
In 1992, the Roe decision was slightly modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 4 In Casey, the plaintiffs, abortion clinics, and physicians,
challenged the constitutionality of several sections of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982.85 The Casey Court rejected Roe's trimester framework8 6 and adopted the "undue burden" standard. 7 The Court
determined that this standard applied in evaluating the constitutionality
of legislative actions influencing a woman's right to an abortion.88 The
Casey Court asserted that if the statute or regulation has "the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus," then it creates an undue burden on the
woman.8 9 The undue burden standard allows courts to analyze a statute
under two prongs: the legislative purpose intended by the statute, coupled with the actual effect of the statute. 90 Arguably the Casey decision
weakened a woman's right to choose an abortion.9 '
Under the guidance of this Supreme Court precedent, courts have
considered what constitutes an undue burden and what makes a fetus
viable. The "undue burden" standard is a determination made by the
courts. Legal experts have since drawn an analogy between constitutional
rights in right-to-die cases and the undue burden on the right to an abor83. Id. at 24.
84. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
85. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. These sections included:
[Section] 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at
least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; § 3206, which mandates the informed
consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass
procedure; § 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married
woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her
husband; § 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with
the foregoing requirements; and §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(0, which impose certain
reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203, 3205, 3206, 3207, 3209, 3214 (1990)).
d. at 878.
86.
87. Id. at 876.
88. Id. at 877.
89. Id. The Court did not specify whether once a statute is determined to be an undue burden,
it is therefore invalid or once the statute is determined to be an undue burden, a balancing test must
be done to determine if the statute is invalid.
90. See Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes BarringClaims
For Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1995); EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING
THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 132 (1996).

91. McDONAGH, supra note 90, at 125 (1996) (stating that the Casey decision secured a
woman's right to an abortion). In April 1996, the Supreme Court used the Casey "undue burden"
standard when it refused to grant certiorari in Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S.Ct. 1582
(1996). The Eighth Circuit determined that a South Dakota law, requiring physicians to notify the
parents of a minor seeking an abortion, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (MICHIE 1994), was unconstitutional because it failed the undue burden test. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452,
1458 (8th Cir. 1995).
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tion.92 The issue of viability, however, is still left to professional medical
determination."
B. Jane L. v. Bangerter94
1. Facts
A Utah statute contained a section regulating abortions occurring
before twenty weeks gestational age.95 Another section of the statute
regulated abortions after twenty weeks gestational age.96 The plaintiff,
Jane L., challenged the constitutionality of the statute.97
At trial, the court determined that the statute's provision regulating
abortions up to twenty weeks gestational age was unconstitutional,9" but
determined that the provision regulating abortions after twenty weeks
gestational age was constitutional and severable. 99 Jane L. appealed the
district court's determination as to severability and the appellate court
reversed the lower court's decision.'0° After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellate court's determination 1 that the provision was not severable and then remanded the
0
case.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined, on remand, that the provision regulating abortions after twenty weeks gestational age was unconstitutional
because it placed an undue burden on the woman's rights to choose to
obtain an abortion in three instances."°2

92. Cal Thomas (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 16, 1996) (interview of host Cal Thomas
with Dr. Richard Doerflinger of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and Dr. Peter Goodwin
of Oregon Death with Dignity), availablein 1996 WL 7484498 (transcript of interview).
93. Patricia Schroeder, Statement On H.R. 1833-The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 1995
(stating the concern of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that the partialbirth abortion bill attempts to establish terminology that is not even recognized by the medical community), availablein 1996 WL 8784986.
94. 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 117 S. Ct. 2453
(1997).
95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(2) (1995). Such circumstances include if "the abortion is
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life;" "the pregnancy is a result of rape... [or] incest;" or
"to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical health ... ."Id.
96. Id. § 6-7-302(3).
97. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 870 (D. Utah 1992), affd in part,rev'd in part, 61
F.3d 1493 (1Oth Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996).
98. JaneL., 809 F. Supp. at 870.
99. Id. at 871. Severable means that because section 302(2) is unconstitutional does not mean
that section 302(3) is unconstitutional.
100. JaneL., 61 F.3d at 1496-99.
101. JaneL., 116S.Ct.at2068.
102. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane
L., 117 S. Ct. 2453 (1997); see discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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Initially, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the principles established in
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'0 3 The court determined
that viability occurs when a fetus has a high chance of survival outside
the womb with or without artificial support,0 4 and asserted that this determination should be made by the attending physician based on the individual circumstances. 5
The court also determined the constitutionality of section 302(3) of
the Utah Code.' 6 Through this statute, the legislature was effectively
defining viability as occurring at twenty weeks into gestation.' °7 In order
to resolve these issues, the Tenth Circuit Court identified the previability
standard' °8 as the most appropriate standard to resolve the case because
the statute affects the choices available to the woman before her fetus is
viable.
The court applied the "undue burden" standard' °9 and examined the
purpose of the legislation and the process leading to the creation of the
Utah statuteY° It concluded that section 302(3) was "enacted with the
specific purpose of placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking the nontherapeutic abortion of a nonviable fetus after
twenty weeks, and it therefore imposed an unconstitutional undue burden
on her right to choose under Casey.""'

103. JaneL., 102F.3dat1114-15.
104. Id. at 1115 ("Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the
particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.").
105. Id.
Because this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts
may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability--be it
weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor-as the determinant of when
the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical
point.
Id.The court recognized that viability is a medical determination, one that courts are incapable of
making, though they have attempted to make this medical decision in previous cases. ); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
106. SeeJaneL., 102F.3dat 1115.
107. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1995) (suggesting that "20 weeks gestational age, measured from the date of conception" is essentially viability).
108. Jane L.,102 F.3d at 1115-16. The previability standard rejects the strict scrutiny standard.
Id. at 1115.
109. Id.at 1116. The lower court had apparently applied the Salerno test which required "the
challenger to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid." Jane
L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 871-72 (D. Utah 1992). The Tenth Circuit determined that the
Casey Court specifically did not apply the Salerno test and instead applied the undue burden test.
Jane L.,102 F.3d at1116.
110. Jane L., 102 F.3d at 1116.
Ill. Id. at1117.
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C. Other Decisions
Recently, in Mazurek v. Armstrong,' 12the Supreme Court reversed a
federal appeals court decision blocking enforcement of a 1995 Montana
law barring the performance of abortions except by licensed doctors." 3
In 1995, the Montana legislature enacted a statute that prohibited
physician assistants from performing abortions." 4 The statute was challenged by a group of physicians and the one physician assistant." 5 The
district court determined that they had not met the "undue burden" standard of Casey and therefore denied their motion for preliminary injunction."' The appeals court remanded the case because the court determined that there may have been adequate evidence to meet the "undue
burden" standard." 7
The Supreme Court performed a balancing test, weighing the need to
ensure safe abortions by requiring that only doctors perform the operation against the undue burden on the woman's right to choose an abortion. "8 Through this application of the "undue burden" test, the Court
determined that Montana's law was not a "substantial obstacle" to a
woman's right to choose an abortion.' 9
D. Analysis
In Jane L., the Tenth Circuit applied the "undue burden" test in a
manner slightly different than the one utilized by the Supreme Court,
although both courts weighed the government's interest in promoting life
against the constitutional rights of the women seeking abortions. In Jane
L., the Tenth Circuit determined that the woman's right to obtain a nontherapeutic abortion of a nonviable fetus superceded the government's
stated interest in preserving life.120 The Jane L. court would not allow the
definition of this right to be narrowed. On the other hand, the Mazurek
Court considered that a statute preventing physician assistants in Montana from performing abortions did not place an "undue burden" on a
woman seeking an abortion.

112.
113.

117 S.Ct. 1865 (1997) (percuriam).
Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1869.

114. Id. at 1865. Since there was only one physician assistant who performed abortions, the
legislation seemed to be aimed at one person in particular. Id. at 1869-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id.at 1866.
116. Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1866 (citing Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (D.
Mont. 1995)).
117. Id. at 1866 (citing Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 1996)). The district court
issued an injunction pending appeal which made the statute inapplicable to the physician assistant.
Id.
118. See David G. Savage, Court Affirms Abortion Laws: Justices Adhere to Legal Line They
Adopted in 1992 Cases, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 17, 1997, at 3A.
119. Mazurek, 117S. Ct. at 1867.
120. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Both courts applied the "undue burden" standard and considered
precedent as part of their analysis. Arguably, the two statutes regulated
two different people. While the statute in Jane L. directly affected a
woman's ability to obtain a specific abortion, the statute in Mazurek did
not directly affect that ability. Rather, the statute in Mazurek directly
affected the physician assistant and therefore, did not create an undue
burden on the woman seeking an abortion who could receive an abortion
from a licensed physician. This distinction is imperfect, however, because both statutes affect the woman's ability to obtain an abortion either
by narrowing the time in which she can get the abortion, or by reducing
the group of individuals who can legally administer an abortion. In rural
communities where there are few doctors, it may be an undue burden to
determine a physician's assistant cannot legally administer an abortion.
The Jane L. decision reduced the uncertainty 2 ' of the longevity and
strength of the Roe decision in the Tenth Circuit. It standardized Roe's
conclusion that "viability" is a conclusion that can be made only by
doctors. More importantly, the Tenth Circuit identified with the woman's
right to an abortion without an undue burden. If this is a continuing
trend, the Tenth Circuit will create a substantially solid foundation for
22
the rights of women. Other circuits may find this approach compelling.
Since the Mazurek decision by the United States Supreme Court came
after the Jane L. decision, however, it may limit the applicability of the
Jane L. trend.
III. DIETARY SUPPLEMENT REGULATION
A. Background
As society has become increasingly health conscious, the demand for
health-related products, such as vitamins and dietary supplements, increases.123 Dietary supplements "claim to boost, balance, enhance,
cleanse, uplift or otherwise benefit every bodily organ and function," and
therefore have great appeal among consumers. 124 "[T]hey [are] now sold
and ballyhooed in grocery and drug stores, on radio and TV, through
direct mail and major magazines, and on the Internet.' ' 21 Many fear that

121. This uncertainty was partially created by Justice O'Connor's decision. See supra notes 8084 and accompanying text.
122. Recently, the House of Representatives discussed the values and demerits of a committee
bill that would prohibit federal and district funds to be used to pay for abortions with an exception
for endangerment of the life of the mother, rape, or incest. 143 CONG. REC. H8751 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1997). The opposition expressed concern that language was unconstitutional because it placed an
undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion.
123. Jane E. Brody, Millions Spent on Unproven Vitamins, DENVER POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at
A25.
124. Marie McCullough, Supplements: Harmful or Helpful?, DENVER POST, Oct. 2, 1997, at
A28.
125. Id.
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these products provide false hopes and waste consumers' money and
valuable time for treatment.'26
Like other food products, dietary supplements must meet a certain
standard established by the government. 127 In the past, manufacturers
used dietary supplement labels as the primary method to advertise to
consumers. By limiting the content of these labels, manufacturers argue,
the government
effectively restricted the manufacturers' means to sell
28
their product.
In the 1980s, the FDA began an aggressive campaign against labels
making unsubstantiated health claims, giving particular attention to dietary supplements. 29 As a result of this campaign, Congress passed the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). 3 ° The NLEA
applied to conventional foods, requiring standardized labeling and prohibiting manufacturers from making false claims. 3 ' By enacting the
NLEA, Congress sought to increase the government's authority to regulate nutrition labeling and limit health claims that could be made about a
product.'3 2 Specifically, the Act designated the Secretary of Health and
Human Services as the regulator of nutritional labeling information. 133 In
response to these regulations, the FDA established similar standards for
dietary supplements. 34 Reacting to the FDA's increased regulation, dietary supplement manufacturers lobbied to prevent the FDA from regulating the industry by telling consumers the FDA sought to decrease the

126. North American Health Claim Surf Day Targets Internet Ads: Hundreds of E-mail Messages Sent, FED. TRADE COMM'N NEWS RELEASE, Nov. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 689015
(stating that "[i]f it sounds to good to be true, it probably is," and this can lead to consumers wasting
money and investing hope and time into a fraudulent therapy) [hereinafter FrC]. Often cancer and
AIDS or HIV patients fall victim to the false hope of fraudulent health claims. Id. But see Patricia
Sabatini, Company Sells UnauthorizedDiet Supplement: Pills' Health ClaimsNeed FDA Approval,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 1997, at C8 (quoting Arthur Whitmore, spokesperson for the
FDA, that "[a] majority of the industry does abide by the rules").
127. But see Alexander Volokh, Pruning the FDA, NAT'L REV., Aug. 11, 1997, at 44 (arguing
that the FDA's overzealous regulations hide helpful health information, to the detriment of the
public).
128. Labeling Rules for Supplements May Jump Start Fledgling Sector, CHEMICAL MARKET
REP., Oct. 20, 1997, at 16 [hereinafter Labeling Rules].
129. See Peter A. Vignuolo, The Herbal Street Drug Crisis: An Examination of the Dietary
Supplement Health andEducation Act of 1994, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 200, 212 (1997); Labeling
Rules, supra note 128 (arguing that consumers must have a solid understanding and basic knowledge
to make informed decisions about dietary supplements).
130. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353, 21
U.S.C. § 343-1 (1994).
131. Jennifer J. Spokes, Note, Confusion in Dietary Supplement Regulation: The Sports Products Irony, 77 B.U. L. REV. 181, 189 (1997).
132. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878,880 (10th Cir. 1997).
133. See Vignuolo, supranote 129, at 212.
134. Spokes, supra note 131, at 189.
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available supplements. 3 ' In fact, the FDA sought to regulate claims on
the labels, not the number of supplements on the shelves.'36
In response to the conflict and a persuasive lobbying effort, the Dietary Supplement Act (DSA)' 37 put a one year moratorium on the enforcement of the NLEA."3 ' Further lobbying efforts eventually led to the
enactment of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA).' 39 The DSHEA shifted the burden of proof to the FDA to rebut the presumption that the product is presumed safe."'
The FDA requires that dietary supplement labels offer a disclaimer,
explaining that certain claims have not been evaluated by the FDA and
that the supplement "is not intended to treat, cure or prevent any disease."' 141 Ironically, this allows manufacturers to make multiple claims
about their product on the dietary supplement without actual proof, provided they include the disclaimer on the label. 42 The DSHEA aided the
vitamin and mineral supplement manufacturers by establishing that the
FDA would not interfere unless something went wrong.' 43
The DSHEA also requires that the FDA develop standards for supplement labels.'" Consistent information about vitamins and minerals is
lacking because qualitative long-range studies have never been conducted, making conclusive determinations difficult. 45 In response to the
need for more information about supplements, Congress requested the
establishment of the Office of Dietary Supplements in 1995.' 6 In addition, the Presidential Commission on Dietary Supplements is authorized
to advise the FDA on the most effective methods of monitoring claims

135. See Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 204.
136. Id. at 213-16.
137. Dietary Supplement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491.
138. See Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 216-17.
139. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325. The DSHEA was an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Vignuolo,
supra note 129, at 204-06. Prior to the DSHEA, supplements were regulated as food or drugs. The
FDA approved for sale as food many ordinary vitamins and minerals while less common products
like herbs and hormones were withheld from sale. Marie McCullough, Americans Swallow the AllPurpose Pills; Herbs: Debate Brewing Over Health Claims, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 11, 1997, at
B 1. Currently, however, as a result of the DHEA, the FDA considers vitamins and minerals as dietary supplements. Brody, supra note 123 (stating that the dietary supplement industry's lobbying
was coupled with a "letter-writing campaign by consumers who feared that government rules would
limit their access to supplements of all kinds").
140. See McCullough, supra note 124; Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 205.
141. McCullough, supra note 124.
142. Id. (stating that such claims are that a dietary supplement benefits "bodily 'structures,'
such as bone, or 'functions,' such as digestion").
143. Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
144. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 21 U.S.C. § 343-2 (1994).
145. Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
146. Id.
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on dietary supplements. 47 The FDA approves the dietary supplement
labels based on the "significant scientific agreement" standard."4
The FDA's long range goals include changing the regulations of nutrient claims by modifying the classifications of dietary supplements,
providing percentage levels of dietary ingredients that have not been
already classified, and allowing manufacturers of vitamins and mineral
dietary supplements to display ingredients other than a vitamin or mineral on their labels. 49
B. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala 5 °
1. Facts
In National Councilfor Improved Health v. Shalala,151 the plaintiffs
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a regulation that
mandates that prior to placing a dietary supplement with a health claim
label on the market, the FDA must issue an authorization to the seller of
the supplement.1 2 The FDA will authorize the health claims if it determines,
based on the totality of publicly available scientific evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in a manner
which is consistent with generally recognized scientific procedures
and principles), that there is significant scientific agreement, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
53 evaluate
such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.
After this evaluation, the FDA may determine that the health claim is not
supported by the "publicly available evidence" and, therefore, refuse to
authorize the health claim label.5 4
The plaintiffs claimed that this regulation violated their right to free
speech under the First Amendment. 55 The defendants argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because the plaintiffs had not alleged an

147. Government Mulls Tougher Scrutiny ofSupplements, ENVrL. NUiTRiTON, Aug. 1, 1997, at
3 (stating that the Commission recently encouraged "swift enforcement action" by the FDA to
monitor the safety of dietary supplements and this process will not increase the responsibility of the
manufacturer to prove the safety of the supplement).
148. See Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Foods, 58 Fed. Reg.
2478, 2504 (1993) (discussing the "significant scientific agreement" standard).
149. Food Labeling; Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, Health Claims, and Statements
of Nutritional Support for Dietary Supplements, CHEMICAL BUS. NEWSBASE, Sept. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13725210.
150. 122 F.3d 878 (loth Cir. 1997).
151. National Council, 122 F.3d at 878.
152. Id. at 880.
153. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (1997).
154. National Council, 122 F.3d at 88 I.
155. Id.
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injury."s Although the district court determined that the plaintiffs had
standing, the court found that there was no First Amendment violation.,57
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit court vacated the lower court's decision as to the
constitutionality of the regulations and dismissed the case on the grounds
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.'5 8 The Tenth Circuit reiterated the
three requirements for standing established by the Supreme Court.'59 The
court focused on the requirement that the plaintiff suffer an "injury in
fact." The court determined that in this case the plaintiffs challenged the
health claims regulations without demonstrating that the regulations
caused them a specific harm.'6t
A plaintiff may only assert his or her own constitutional rights. The
overbreadth doctrine, however, allows a plaintiff to assert First Amendment rights of someone not before the court, but whose rights may be
infringed upon by an overly broad regulation.16' The overbreadth doctrine requires that the plaintiff suffer an injury as well. 162 Assertions of a
general nature are inadequate to constitute a specific and concrete
harm. 63 The court concluded that since "no potentially prohibited claim
ha[d] been made, there [was] no possible violation of the health claims
regulations and thus no possibility of prosecution. ' 64 The court then
determined that the lower court inaccurately applied 6the "overbreadth
doctrine," incorrectly expanding the notion of standing. 1
C. Analysis
The decision in National Council did not apply the NLEA or the
statute at issue. Although the court vacated the district court's determination that the regulation was constitutional, the court protected the ability of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create and implement regulations by requiring that plaintiffs challenging these regulations
assert an injury in fact.

156. Id.
157. National Council for Improved Health v.Shalala, 893 F. Supp. 1512, 1516, 1520 (D. Utah
1995).
158. National Council, 122 F.3d at 883.
159. Id. at 881 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). First, the plaintiffs
must claim "an injury in fact." In addition, plaintiffs must show causation. Finally, the plaintiffs
must show that a favorable decision will likely cure the plaintiff's injury. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 555.
160. National Council, 122 F.3d at 883.
161. Id. at 881 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 634 (1980)).
162. Id. at 882 (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 1997)).
163. Id. at 884.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Targeting the nutritional supplement industry, the FDA recently established final regulations for labeling which will take effect in April
1999."6 Furthermore, the Food and Nutrition Board 167 recently revised
the Recommended Daily Allowances. 168 The new regulations are not
ironclad like regulations in other industries. 169 Despite progress, dietary
supplements may still be sold without necessarily providing proof of
safety or effectiveness, 7 ° which could jeopardize the public's need to
safeguard itself against fraudulent claims.' 7 '
V. THE PHYsIcIAN/HosPITAL RELATIONSHIP
A. Background
Before Medieval times in Europe, hospitals were viewed as charitable (and often religious) resting places for the sick, rather than a place in
which one would be cured.'72 When Europeans settled in the Colonies,
they brought this "tradition of charitable giving.' ' 73 The modem hospital
evolved in the eighteenth century, and over time has become more available to serve varied medical concerns.
At the beginning of this century, hospitals catered to the poor because the wealthier patients preferred to have private doctors care for
them in their homes. 175 As hospitals acquired more advanced technology,
medical education improved and surgery became more centralized in the
hospitals. As hospitals became more respectable, more individuals
elected to be cared for in a hospital,
increasing the need for more sophis76
ticated regulation of hospitals.1

166. Labeling Rules, supra note 128, at 16.
167. The Food and Nutrition Board makes recommendations about intake levels of vitamins
and minerals. See Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
168. Id.
169. See Labeling Rules, supra note 128, at 16 (stating that regulations like the Good Manufacturing Practices or monographs are more concrete).
170. Sabatini, supra note 126, at 68.
171. FTC, supra note 126 (providing measures to better inform the public). The public needs to
be aware of products that "advertis[e] as a quick and effective cure-all for a wide range of ailments
or for an undiagnosed pain ... [or] .. .use key words, such as 'scientific breakthrough,' 'miraculous
cure,' 'exclusive product,' and 'secret ingredient."' Id.
172. See Helena G. Rubinstein, Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the Federal Tax Exemption: A
Fresh Prescription, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 381, 390 (1997). The sick were usually cared for by clerics
or knights, rather than doctors. Id.
173. See id. at 391. "As in Europe, almshouses, the forerunners of American hospitals,
'serv[ed] general welfare functions and only incidentally car[ed] for the sick,' housing them together
with the elderly, the insane, and the orphaned." Id. (quoting PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 149 (1982)) (alterations in original).

174.
175.
176.

See id.
See Dallet, supra note 25, at 331.
See id. at 331-32.
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The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO) was
created in 1952 to combat the lack of standards among hospitals.'" The
JCAHO increased the standards necessary for hospital accreditation and,
since that time, has primarily set the standards for hospital, medical staff,
and physicians.'78 The JCAHO determined that each hospital must adopt
medical bylaws, to which the hospital and practicing physicians agree. 7 9
These bylaws have been described as "a contract between the hospital
and the physician."' 8 ° The immunity provisions in the bylaws were intended to protect the hospital and its personnel from suits alleging defamation or another claim arising from determinations made in the peer
review process. 8 '
Responding to the need to create a higher standard of medical care
and to the increasing instances of medical malpractice, Congress passed
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act'8 2 in 1986.83 Congress recognized that "[tihe threat of private money damage liability ... unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional
peer review."' 84 Congress sought to provide an ideal environment for
professional peer review in the medical community which required ensuring immunity from damage actions to all those who qualify.' 85 A
member of a peer review board is considered immune if the action meets
four requirements, including that the action must be taken
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of
quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of
the matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are
fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement [regarding the conduct of the hearing]. 86
As hospitals' liability has increased, hospitals have focused on improving the quality of care within their facilities.'8 7 The peer review process is the primary means by which hospitals guarantee that the quality
of care remains high by establishing a mandatory level of performance
for the physicians as a prerequisite to obtaining hospital privileges.' 88

177.

See id. at 332.

178.

See id.

179.
180.
181.

See MILLER, supra note 5, at 161.
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991).
Rees, 808 P.2d at 1076.

182.

42U.S.C.§§ 11101, 11111-11115, 11131-11137, 11151-11152(1994).

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996).
Brown, 101 F.3d at 1333 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
See Dallet, supra note 25, at 326-37.
See id. at 327.
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Hospital privileges entitle a physician to admit his patients to a hospital for treatment. 89 Without those privileges, the physician cannot have
access to the hospital's equipment, staff, and supplies.' 9 Whether or not
a physician will be granted hospital privileges depends on the peer review process.' 9' The peer review board may reject the physician applicant's initial application to obtain hospital privileges, or the board may
not renew privileges, or may even limit the physician's hospital privileges.' 92
B. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services' 93
1. Facts
Dr. Brown was a physician with Lincoln County Medical Center
(Medical Center).194 The Medical Center, managed by Presbyterian
Healthcare Services, revoked her hospital privileges, after Dr. Williams,
an economic competitor of Dr. Brown, conducted an initial peer review
proceeding.' 95 Later, formal peer review revealed that Brown breached a
consultation agreement with the hospital by not obtaining proper consultation with other doctors.' 96 As a result, the peer review board recommended that the hospital terminate
Brown's privileges, an approach
97
which the Medical Center adopted.
Following the disciplinary action, the Medical Center filed a report
regarding the revocation of Brown's privileges with the National Practitioner Data Bank (Data Bank).' 98 It was determined that Brown's performance would be classified as "Incompetence/Malpractice/Negligence."'" Brown submitted her own report to the Data Bank,
claiming that the Medical Center never found her incompetent, guilty of
malpractice, or negligent.' ° Although the Medical Center was notified
that Brown had submitted a report, the Medical Center did not take the
opportunity to revise its report.2 '
At trial, the jury found for Dr. Brown on her claims for defamation,
tortious interference with a contract, and some of Brown's antitrust
189. See id. at 329.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 10. A difference exists in the process
whether a physician seeks hospital privileges at a public or private hospital. Id.
193. 101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996).
194. Brown, 101 F.3d at 1327.
195. Id. at 1327-28.
196. Id. at 1328.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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claims. The judge set aside the jury's award of damages for tortious interference with a contract claim and the award of punitive damages
against Dr. Williams on the antitrust claim.20 2 Both Brown and Presbyterian Healthcare
Services appealed the amended decision of the trial
20 3
court.

2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court committed no error, but determined that the court should not have set aside the jury
award of damages for Brown's claim of intentional interference with a
contract. 2° In its analysis of Brown's issues on appeal, the court considered that a jury's award of damages should not be disturbed unless
"clearly erroneous or there is no evidence to support the award. ' 20 5 After
reviewing the financial analysis of two witnesses, the court concluded
that Presbyterian's interference caused financial harm to Brown's practice and would provide a "reasonable basis for estimating the plaintiff's
loss."' ' In addition, the court concluded that Dr. Brown presented
enough evidence such that a jury could reasonably determine the amount
of loss to the plaintiff. 2 7 Therefore, the court determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have made an accurate determination
of compensatory damages.' The court reversed the district court's order
vacating the award. 209 The court also concluded that the punitive damages must be reinstated. 2'0 The court determined, however, that the award
of punitive damages against Dr. Williams would be duplicative and improper and therefore, affirmed the district court's decision to set aside
those damages.21'
In addition, the court concluded that the hospital was not immune
from damages resulting from the revocation of Dr. Brown's privileges
pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act.21 2 Dr. Brown
proved that reasonable efforts were not taken by the peer review board to
gather the facts about her, 213 failing to meet one of the requirements under the Act.2t4

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1327.
1329.
1330.
1331.

1332.
1333-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1), (2) (1994)).
1333.
1334.
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The court also rejected Miller's immunity claim.2"' The court asserted that immunity would apply to Miller if she did not have "knowledge of the falsity of the information contained in the report [to the Data
Bank]. 216 Because Miller assisted in the preparation of the report which
stated that Dr. Brown was negligent, incompetent, and guilty of malpractice, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to have reasonably concluded
that this report was false and that Ms.
2 17
fact.
that
of
aware
was
Miller
The court also responded to the Medical Center's claim that the trial
court committed error in failing to enter judgment as a matter of law in
their favor with regards to Brown's antitrust claim.1 8 The court concluded that both Ms. Miller and Dr. Williams were very involved in the
decision making process that revoked Brown's privileges. 219 A jury could
reasonably have concluded that Dr. Williams and Ms. Miller "controlled,
coerced or unduly influenced the decisionmaking process. ' ' 2
Finally, the court resolved Ms. Miller's claim that the district court
erroneously failed to award her judgment as a matter of law based on the
merits of Dr. Brown's defamation claim.22' The court concluded that
Brown established actual injury because hospitals check the National
Data Bank record every time they receive an application for privileges. A
negative comment about Dr.
Brown would harm her chances to be ap222
proved for other privileges.
C. Other Circuits
In Davila-Lopes v. Zapata,223 the First Circuit determined that a
physician did not a have a property interest in a hospital's grant of privileges. 22' Dr. Davila-Lopes sought re-instatement of his hospital privileges
at Puerto Rico regional hospital. 22 Since the hospital was financed by the
Commonwealth, all of the hospital bylaws were approved by the Secretary of Health.226 The bylaws of the hospital were "comprehensive and
procedurally detailed 227 and included a requirement that prior to any
hearing the physician must be given notice "contain[ing] a concise
statement of the practitioner's alleged acts or omissions, including [pa215.

Id.

216.
217.

Id.
Id.

218.

Id.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id. at 1335-36.
Id. at 1336.
111 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1997).
Zapata, 11I F.3d at 197.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 194.
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tient records] or the other reasons or subject matter forming the basis for
the adverse recommendation."22' 8
The hospital declined to reinstate the plaintiff's hospital
privileges. 29 Prior to a final decision, the plaintiff attempted to obtain a
statement describing the reasons for the refusal,230 however, he never
" ' The court concluded that the hospital
received this notice.23
did not follow the procedures established in the bylaws.2 32 Although a requirement
of adequate process in decisions affecting hospital privileges can create a
property interest,233 the court determined that even though there was a
detailed set of procedural34 rules this did not establish a constitutionally
protected property right.
D. Analysis
Courts appear to accept regulations that closely monitor physicians'
practices. The Tenth Circuit and the First Circuit defined the manner in
which hospitals would be monitored. Although the First Circuit did not
define the hospital privileges as a physician's property interests, the court
determined that the hospital had deviated from its bylaws, infringing on
the physician's right. The Tenth Circuit concluded that in addition to
hospitals and peers monitoring physicians, the court also must monitor
the evaluation process itself.
As more nonprofit hospitals become private hospitals, 235 the peer review process may have a dilatory effect on the hospital services available
to patients. The goal of these hospitals has changed from charity to
profit.2' Many of the sales of hospitals or joint ventures that are estab237
lished are between these nonprofit hospitals and a for-profit company.
The for-profit company will make the decisions for the hospital.2 38 These
decisions, based on the ultimate goal of profit, may result in a trimming
of services and responses to community needs.23 9 The peer review process may fall victim to the same profit-minded goal.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 195.
233. Id. (citing Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 338 (1 st Cir. 1992)).
234. Id.
235. See Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA and the Resurgence of the For-Profit Hospital Business, NEW ENG. J. MED., Aug. 3, 1996, at 446.
236. See Harris Meyer, Selling... or Selling Out, HOsPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS, June 5, 1996,
at 22.
237. See VOLUNTEER TRUSTEES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, WHEN YOUR
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL GOES UP FOR SALE 8 (1996).

238.
239.

Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The multi-faceted health care system combines public federal, state,
and local programs, private insurance, charity, and individual
payments. 24° Each level of the health care system supports varying needs
of the constituents. Tenth Circuit health law reflects the diversity of the
overall health care system. It has followed the general trend towards improving conditions for patients. First, hospital and physician regulation
has been more clearly defined to increase the quality of care for patients.
Second, the Secretary of Health and Human Services continues to clarify
health claim regulations, which provide more knowledge to consumers
and decrease the chances that consumers will be misled by false claims.
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue of a woman's right to an
abortion. The term "viability" remains flexible because the Supreme
Court recognized its inability to define the term, preferring to allow the
medical experts to determine on a pregnancy-by-pregnancy basis. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit has upheld the "undue burden" standard.
The Tenth Circuit is striving towards better conditions for patients
and consumers of the health care system. Although this requires increased regulation, that is a small price to pay to ensure health.
ChristyneJ. Vachon

240.

CUNIFF & MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 4.

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Circuit recently decided several cases having a significant impact on federal and tribal authority over matters occurring in Indian country.' Delineating the lines of authority between the federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes is an historically contentious
process. Persistent fluctuations in United States policy towards Native
Americans provide a constant source of disputes over jurisdiction in Indian country. A brief outline of the history of United States policy will
set the stage for a discussion of recent Tenth Circuit decisions regarding
the definition of "dependent Indian community," the tribal court exhaustion doctrine, and treating tribes as states under the Clean Water Act.
American Indian tribes existed as self-governing, independent societies long before the arrival of Europeans, who recognized them as
sovereign nations from the beginning of the colonial period.2 While tribal
sovereignty survived the formation of the United States, the tribes came
to occupy a unique position in American society. Dubbed "domestic dependent nations,"3 American Indians maintain a trust relationship with
the United States similar to that of a "ward to his guardian.'" The nature
of this unique arrangement gives the federal government plenary and
exclusive power over Native Americans.! The exercise of this power is
limited only by notions of a fiduciary responsibility that stems from the
trust relationship.'
Following the colonial period, western expansion and settlement by
non-Indians gave birth to a policy of removal where the tribes were
forced from their ancestral homelands, relocated west of the Mississippi,
and eventually restricted to specific reservations.! Then, in 1887, Con-

1. "While the public is probably most familiar with the term Indian reservation, for most
jurisdictional purposes the governing legal term is 'Indian country."' FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 27 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982). This
survey of federal Indian law covers cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
2. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832); Angela R. Hoeft, Coming
Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigationfrom an InternationalHuman Rights Perspective, 14
LAW & INEQ. J. 203, 209-11 (1995).
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
4. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The Court remarked that "[tihe condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence." Id. at 16.
5. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557-61; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323
(1978) ("[Tribal sovereignty] exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance.").
6. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 221 ("[T1he trust relationship is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law."). For a discussion on the trust responsibility see STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE
RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26-36 (Norman Dorson ed., 2d ed. 1992).
7. See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021,
1022-23 (1997).
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gress passed the Indian General Allotment Act8 which authorized the
distribution of reservation lands to individual Indians in an effort to destroy tribal authority and assimilate Native Americans into white
society.9 Proponents of the Act naively assumed that Native Americans
would shed centuries of cultural heritage, cultivate the land, prosper, and
join mainstream America."°
To accommodate settlers in the West, the Allotment Act also provided for the sale of surplus reservation lands to non-Indians." This sale
of surplus lands resulted in a checkerboard effect with respect to land
within the reservations, and contributed to the monumental decline in the
amount of reservation lands in the United States.'2 The misguided policy
of assimilation ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act,'" which promoted tribal existence and attempted to restore tribal
ownership of unoccupied surplus lands lost during the allotment period."
In the 1950s, Congress abruptly adopted a policy of termination, attempting to end the protective status of Native Americans and destroy
tribal communities.'" The Termination Era ended roughly a decade after
it began,'6 and since the 1960s, Congress has slowly constructed its current policy of supporting tribal self-determination and self-governance
with the understanding that tribal communities are here to stay.'7

8. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
9. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1024; see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995) (noting that "[a]ssimilation was viewed as both humanitarian and
inevitable"). Originally, all allotted lands were to be held for the individual Indians in trust by the
federal government for a period of 25 years, after which the individual would receive the land in fee.
See id. at 10. Once held in fee, the land would be fully alienable, and the holder of the land would be
subject to state civil and criminal law. See id. Subsequent amendments to the Act provided mechanisms for the direct distribution of reservation land in fee to "competent" individual Indians, thereby
accelerating the destruction of the reservations. See id. at 10-11.
10. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 5; see also Royster, supra note 9, at 10.
I1. See Royster, supra note 9, at 13.
12. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 5; see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 1025 (noting a decline in
Indian-held land from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934).
13. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
14. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 6. "Indian tribes were encouraged to adopt their own constitutions, to become federally chartered corporations, and to assert their inherent powers of local selfgovernment." Id.
15. See id. at 57; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at 152 (noting that official United States
policy was the destruction of tribal governments and the termination of the unique tribal-federal trust
relationship). Congress also passed Public Law 280 during this period. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch.
505, Pub. L. No. 280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1994)).
This Act extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction into Indian country in five specified states;
Alaska was added in 1958. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 362.
16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 180.
17. See Hoeft, supra note 2, at 217-18; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at 185. Two important
pieces of legislation signified the shift in U.S. policy, the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)), and the Indian
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I.

DEFINING "DEPENDENT INDIAN COMMUNITY"

A. Background
Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is mostly governed
by two statutes." The General Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction
over interracial crimes,' 9 and the Major Crimes Act confers federal jurisdiction over sixteen specified crimes committed by Indians against other
Indians.' Tribal governments maintain concurrent jurisdiction over nonmajor crimes committed by tribal members, but do not have jurisdiction
over non-Indian criminal defendants regardless of the location of the
crime.2

Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a450n (1994)).
18. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 286.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian
country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to
the Indian tribes respectively.
Id. State law is assimilated into federal proceedings as a gap filling device when there is no applicable federal substantive criminal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (1994).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). The Major Crimes Act currently reads:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with adangerous weapon, assault resulting serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16
years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
Id.; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1977) (noting that some
courts of appeals have read the Act to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal govemment, but
not deciding the issue). The Major Crimes Act applies only when the perpetrator and victim of the
crime are Indian; it remains unsettled whether the Act divests tribal courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
See Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31
ARIz. L. REV. 329, 332 (1989). A significant exception to federal jurisdiction under the Major
Crimes Act is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1162, which provides for state jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country in a limited number of states and territories. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162. See also sources cited supra note 15.
21. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. The Supreme Court rejected the Suquamish Tribe's assertion of such jurisdiction which the tribe based on retained national sovereignty and inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians. Id. at 212.

980
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The Major Crimes Act governs only those offenses occurring in
Indian country where both the victim and the perpetrator are Indian.' If
an offense occurs outside Indian country, the federal government is
without jurisdiction under the Act.' Indian country, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1151, consists of three types of lands: reservations, dependent
Indian communities, and Indian allotments. ' The term "dependent Indian
community" represents congressional recognition of two Supreme Court
decisions, United States v. Sandoval' and United States v. McGowan."
In Sandoval, the Court considered whether the federal government
could maintain a criminal prosecution for "introducing intoxicating liquor into the Indian country" where the area in question consisted of about
twenty scattered Indian pueblos. 2 The Indians owned the land communally in fee, originally under grants from the King of Spain which Congress subsequently confirmed.' The federal government provided agents
and superintendents to guard the interests of the Indians, established
schools, and constructed dams and irrigation works on the pueblo lands.'
The Court found that because the federal government treated the pueblos
as "dependent communities," federal jurisdiction over the area was appropriate.'

22. The Major Crimes Act was passed in the late 1800s in response to the Supreme Court
decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Crow Dog was a Brule Sioux who murdered
another Indian of the same nation in Indian country. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. He was prosecuted
in federal court, found guilty and sentenced to death. Id. The Supreme Court held that in the absence
of "a clear expression of the intention of Congress," the federal courts were without jurisdiction over
such criminal incidents. Id. at 572. This ruling prompted a displeased Congress to pass the Major
Crimes Act, listing seven specified major crimes over which the federal courts would exercise jurisdiction. See Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885); see also
COHEN supra note 1, at 300. This action has been described as a "major blow at the integrity of the
Indian tribes." FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 334 (1976). The Supreme Court justified the congressional intrusion into Indian affairs by noting the dependent status of
the tribes as wards of the federal government. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84
(1886).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The section states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided ... the term "Indian country" ... means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
Id.
25. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
26. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
27. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38-39.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 39-40.
30. Id. at 47-48.
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McGowan also concerned a federal prohibition on the introduction
of intoxicants into Indian country."' In McGowan, however, the land in
question had been purchased and held by the federal government for the
benefit of needy Indians who were scattered across the state of Nevada."
The Court found that because the federal government had purchased and
held the land for the benefit of a "dependent people," federal jurisdiction
over the area was appropriate."
While neither of these cases involved reservations, "the dependency
of the Indians on the government ... was sufficiently similar to the dependency of reservation Indians to include those areas within the meaning of the term Indian country."' The 1948 statutory codification of these
cases, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, allowed for the first time the application of the
federal criminal code to strictly Indian crimes occurring off-reservation."
Since then, courts have struggled to create a workable definition of dependent Indian community that would adequately address the complex
nature of the federal-tribal relationship. The definition carries tremendous significance because section 1151 has become the baseline for not
only criminal, but civil jurisdiction in Indian country as well.3
Until early 1998, the Supreme Court had eschewed formulating any
definitive test for dependent status, preferring instead to frame the issue
as "whether the area has been 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the [federal] Government.'
Without Supreme Court guidance, the circuit courts developed various
multi-factor tests to deal with the issue. The Tenth Circuit formed its
approach to the dependent status issue over a series of cases. In United
8 the Tenth Circuit adopted a three factor analysis conStates v. Martine,"
31. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 536.
32. Id. at 536-37.
33. Id. at 538-39.
34. United States v. Adair, 913 F. Supp. 1503, 1509 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
35. SeeCOHEN, supra note 1,at 301 n.153.
36. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1974) ("While § 1151 is
concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally
applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction."); see also Indian Country U.S.A. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he Indian country classification is the benchmark
for approaching the allocation of federal, tribal, and state authority with respect to Indians and Indian
lands.").
37. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 598 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (quoting United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)). In February of 1998, the
Supreme Court set out a definitive test for dependent community status that may render moot much
of the discussion in this section of the survey. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
The Court held that dependent Indian community "refers to a
118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (Venetie 11).
limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two
requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the
Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence." Venetie II, 118 S.Ct. at
953. A few thoughts concerning the effect of this holding on future questions of dependent community status will follow the discussion of circuit decisions. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying
text.
38. 442 F.2d 1022 (1Oth Cir. 1971).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

sidering "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and the federal government, and the
established practice of government agencies toward the area.' 9
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit outlined a four-factor analysis in
United States v. South Dakota." In addition to the Martine factors, the
court considered whether the United States retains title to the lands and
authority to enact protective laws, whether there is an element of cohesiveness in the area, and whether the "lands have been set apart for the
use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.""' The South
Dakota court determined that a housing project constituted a dependent
Indian community for several reasons: the federal government held title
to the land in trust for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, the government provided financing for the construction of the project, the overwhelming majority of inhabitants were Indian, and the Board of Commissioners of the Housing Authority were appointed by the Tribal Council. 2 The finding of dependent status meant that the federal government,
and not the state of South Dakota, had jurisdiction over the project."
In Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v Watchman," the Tenth
Circuit further refined its dependent status analysis. In Watchman, the
district court ruled that a specific mine site did not constitute a dependent
Indian community. ' The Navajo Nation challenged the district court's
choice of the mine site as the proper area on which to focus its analysis,
arguing that the surrounding community should have been used instead."
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court should not have focused its analysis on the mine site in isolation
from the surrounding area.'7 To guide the district court on remand, the
court established a two-step analysis for evaluating assertions of jurisdiction based on dependent Indian community status. ' The first step involves a threshold determination of whether the area in question may
appropriately serve as a "community of reference." ' This determination
entails two analytical subparts, consideration of "the status of the area in
question as a community" and consideration of that "community of ref-

39. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
40. 665 F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 838.
42. Id. at 839-43.
43. Id. at 837-38.
44. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (involving a question of civil jurisdiction).
45. Id. at 1535.
46. Id. at 1536.
47. Id. at 1542-43. The state raised the proper community of reference issue on appeal in
South Dakota, but the Eighth Circuit avoided the the issue because it had not been raised at trial.
South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 841-42.
48. Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1542-45.
49. Id. at 1542-43.
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erence within the context of the surrounding area." After establishing
the proper community of reference, a court moves to the second step of
the Watchman test and applies the South Dakota factors to the chosen
community of reference." As outlined by the court, those factors include:
(1) whether the United States has retained "title to the lands which it
permits the Indians to occupy" and "authority to enact regulations and
protective laws respecting this territory"; (2) "the nature of the area in
question, the relationship of the inhabitants in the area to Indian tribes
and to the federal government, and the established practice of federal
government agencies toward the area"; (3) whether there is "an element of cohesiveness ... manifested either by economic pursuits in
the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by
that locality"; and (4) "whether such lands have been set aside for the
use, occupancy and protection of Indian peoples. ' 2
B. United States v. Adair"
1. Facts
In United States v. Adair, the Tenth Circuit applied the Watchman
standard to an assertion of federal jurisdiction over a Cherokee defendant
charged with aggravated sexual abuse committed against another
Indian.' The offense took place in a Mutual Help Home built by the
Cherokee Nation Housing Authority (CNHA), a Cherokee Nationcontrolled Oklahoma state agency." The CNHA home was located in a
rural area of eastern Oklahoma known as "Rocky Mountain," which at
one time consisted mainly of restricted Indian allotments.' The passage
of time resulted in removal of restrictions from a majority of the allotments, and thus Indians and non-Indians held most of the land restriction-free. 7 Rocky Mountain's population was approximately one-half
Cherokee, but its geographical boundaries were uncertain. 8 No tribal or
local government existed, and aside from a small convenience store,

50. Id. at 1543-44,
51. Id.at1545-46.
52. Id. at 1545 (quoting and adopting the rule from United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d
837 (8th Cir. 1981)). The Watchman court remanded the issue of dependent community status to the
district court. Id. at 1546.
53. 111 F.3d 770 (10th Cir. 1997).
54. Adair, Ill F.3d at 772. The defendant was charged with four counts of sexual abuse in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Id. The government premised jurisdiction on 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Id.
55. Id. at 772.
56. Id. at 773. The allotments in question resulted from the forced migration of Indians from
the southeastern United States. Id. The defendant's family originally acquired the land on which the
CNHA home sits as a restricted allotment, but then conveyed it to the CNHA so that the home could
be built. Id. at 772. For a discussion of Indian allotments, see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying
text.
57. Adair, Ill F.3d at 773.
58. Id.
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there were no established businesses in the area. ' The federal government provided a number of social services including an Indian Health
Service nutrition program, a Bureau of Indian Affairs substance abuse
program, and Head Start.'
The federal government contended that Rocky Mountain was a dependent Indian community and therefore considered Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151." The district court disagreed and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the area failed to constitute an
appropriate community of reference for dependent Indian community
analysis. 2
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, finding that
Rocky Mountain was not a community and thus could not serve as a
community of reference for testing the presence of a dependent Indian
community.' Focusing on the lack of specific boundaries, the court of
appeals noted that consideration of the four factors of Watchman's second step would become problematic." According to the court, Rocky
Mountain did not satisfy the Watchman definition of community because
the area exhibited a paucity of institutions and services, and displayed a
general dependency on surrounding areas for its economic vitality.'
Despite finding that Rocky Mountain failed the threshold test, the
court applied the four factors of the second step of Watchman and found
that even if Rocky Mountain were an appropriate community of reference, it would fail to qualify as a dependent Indian community." The
dispositive factors included: private ownership of most of the land, a lack
of cohesiveness manifested by an absence of government and economic
activity, removal of a majority of the restricted allotments, and the fact
that eligibility for federal benefits arose from the inhabitants' status as
Cherokee Indians, not from the status of the Rocky Mountain area as an
established, protected, or serviced community. While no single factor
was determinative, the undercurrent of this stage of the court's analysis
suggests that where federal benefits are given to individual Indians because of their status as Indians, as opposed to their status as members of
an Indian community, no dependent Indian community exists and the
federal government lacks jurisdiction.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 772.
United States v. Adair, 913 F. Supp. 1503, 1515-16 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
Adair, 111 F.3d at 775.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id. at 776-77.
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C. Other Circuits
In NarragansettIndian Tribe v. NarragansettElec. Co.," the First
Circuit addressed the question of whether the Narragansett Tribe had
authority to construct a housing complex without first obtaining various
permits and approval from the state of Rhode Island The tribe had purchased land for the project from a private developer and based jurisdiction on dependent community status." The Department of Housing and
Urban Development had provided financing for the purchase and construction of the project, and had agreed to subsidize rents.'
In a case of first impression, the First Circuit focused its analysis on
four factors: the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes
and the federal government, the cohesiveness of the community, who
holds title and exercises authority over the area, and whether the lands
have been set apart by the federal government for the use, occupancy,
and protection of dependent Indian peoples."2 The court commented that
"[rloughly speaking, the second and third factors weigh whether there is,
in fact, an Indian community, and the first and fourth whether it is a dependent one." Under the facts presented, the court held that while the
second and third factors indicated the existence of a community of Indians, the first and fourth demonstrated that it was not a dependent one.
Ultimately, the court determined that federal involvement in the project
was insufficient to establish that the site was "set apart" for the benefit of
a dependent Indian community. Accordingly, the Narragansett had to
comply with state regulations in building the housing project.
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the question of dependent
Indian community status in Alaska ex rel Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.' In that case, the Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government had attempted to impose a Business Activities Tax on a construction company hired by the state of
Alaska to build a new school in the village. 8 The state, as the party ultimately responsible for paying any impost, claimed that Venetie lacked
jurisdiction to impose the tax. 9 Venetie based jurisdiction on its depend-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996).
Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 910-I1.
Id. at 911. The land for the housing site was located adjacent to other tribal lands. Id.
Id.
Id. at 916-21.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 922.
101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) (Venetie 1),
rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 948 (1998) (Venetie I1).
Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1289.
Id. at 1290.
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ent Indian community status.' The district court determined that Congress had extinguished dependent Indian community status in Alaska
when it passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)'
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ANCSA had not extinguished dependent Indian community status in Alaska, and that Venetie
qualified as a dependent Indian community. 82 Briefly, Congress enacted
ANCSA to pave the way for the construction of the trans-Alaska oil
pipeline." The Act extinguished all aboriginal rights and claims in exchange for cash payments and the creation of Native corporations which
have an extraordinary degree of control over Native institutions." The
Ninth Circuit held that ANCSA did not extinguish dependent Indian
community status in Alaska because in passing the Act, Congress was
"fulfilling, not abandoning, its trust responsibilities."
Venetie had taken advantage of a provision in ANCSA allowing
village corporations to opt out of the Act and to receive title in fee simple
to their former reservation lands in lieu of land or monetary distributions
from the regional corporation.' This fact played a critical role in the
Ninth Circuit's analysis. The court held that a dependent Indian community required a general showing of federal set aside and federal superintendence." To inform its decision, the court examined six factors including: the nature of the area, the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government, the established practice of government agencies toward that area, the degree of federal ownership of
and control over the area, the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants, and the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."
In its analysis, the court noted that the area was reasonably well
defined, there existed a high degree of cohesiveness among the inhabitants, the inhabitants maintained significant relationships with numerous
federal agencies, and the federal government exhibited continued involvement through grants for the construction of an airport, housing

80. Alaska ex rel Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 856 F.2d
1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1290 (quoting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629 (1994)).
82. Id. at 1294-1300.
83. See COHEN, supra note 1,at 739-43.
84. See id.
85. Venetie I, 101 F.3d at 1299.
86. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b)). Venetie represents the merger of two Native
villages whose inhabitants descend from the Neets'aii Gwich'in, a group of Native Alaskans that has
historically occupied the area of land in question. Id. at 1289.
87. id. at 1294.
88. Id. This test is a combination of case law from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. See United
States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d. 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022,
1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
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units, and wastewater systems.89 Most importantly, the court found that
the reunification of Venetie with its former reservation land through
ANCSA, a congressionally enacted statutory mechanism, demonstrated
that the land had been "set aside for the use occupancy and protection of
Alaska Natives."
The Supreme Court reversed, and in a unanimous decision held that
dependent Indian community "refers to a limited category of Indian lands
that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government
for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence." 9' The Court concluded that Venetie's ANCSA
lands did not meet either requirement.' In direct contrast to the Ninth
Circuit's view, the Court found that "ANCSA, far from designating
Alaskan lands for Indian use, revoked all existing reservations in Alaska
[that had been] 'set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial
Order for Native use."'"' The Court also found that one of ANCSA's
central purposes, to effect Native self-determination through outright
land transfers, was contrary to any notion of federal control and superintendence." The Court, relying in part on Sandoval and McGowan," held
that superintendence required active federal control of the land in question such that the federal government was serving as guardian for the
Indians.' The federal government's involvement in the health, education
and welfare of the Tribe failed "to support a finding of federal superintendence." 7
D. Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Venetie H is certain to have considerable effect on the issue of dependent community status. The Court,
in creating the new standard, disregarded any notion of "community," an
issue that had garnered significant circuit court attention for many years.
All of the circuit tests discussed above contained some factor that addressed the issue of community. The Tenth Circuit was especially concerned with the issue, creating and applying the threshold "community of
reference" test. In the future, none of these "community" factors will
have any significance in light of the narrow focus of the Supreme Court's
new test.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1300-01.
Id. at 1302.
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948,953 (1998) (Venetie If).
Venetie 11, 118 S. Ct. at 955.
Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994)) (emphasis by Justice Thomas).
Id. at 956.
See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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It appears that the Supreme Court has significantly raised the bar for
those claiming dependent community status. Not only is a specific set
aside required, but basic federal aid such as housing supplements and
health and education benefits will no longer amount to dependency. Dependency must rise to a level of superintendence equal to active control
by the federal government. Given the federal government's promotion of
tribal self-determination by providing finances and then granting tribes
the authority to administer the various social programs on their own, the
degree of federal control, and therefore, the likelihood of dependent
status, is certain to decline. The diminishing role of the federal government that flows from this policy justifies a corresponding decrease in
federal criminal jurisdiction. But dependent community status is also tied
to questions of civil jurisdiction, and it is bittersweet irony for tribal
authorities that as they gain control over the management of social programs they become less dependent and their jurisdictional authority decreases.
II. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION AND THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

A. Background

In contrast to criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction in Indian country is generally not governed by federal statutes and its contours are less
precise." Tribal courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction over suits
brought against tribal members for any claim arising in Indian country."
Where the defendant is not a tribal member, jurisdiction often turns on
whether the incident took place on tribal land. A leading case outlining
the current extent of tribal civil jurisdiction is Montana v. United
m
States."
Montana addressed the issue of whether the Crow Tribe could
prohibit non-Indian fishing and hunting on land within the reservation
but owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.'' The Supreme Court held
that while the Crow could prohibit nonmembers from hunting and fishing
on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for
the Tribe, it could not prohibit such activity on land held in fee by nonmembers."m The Court ruled that the exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government was inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes and could not survive without express

98. See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 334. One source notes:
The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian country has been
markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.
Contrary to the rule in criminal matters, Indian Tribes retain civil regulatory and judicial
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,
however, is not fully determined.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 253.
99. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959); COHEN, supra note l, at 342.
100. 450U.S.544(1981).
101. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
102. Id.
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congressional delegation." The Court relied on its earlier decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,'" which flatly prohibited criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.' ' The Court reasoned that the principles on
which Oliphant relied "support the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of the
nonmembers of the tribe."' ' The Court qualified this broad assertion by
noting:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'07
Montana's significance is its initial presumption that, absent express
congressional delegation, tribes do not have legislative or regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation. "0This
presumption can only be overcome where nonmembers enter into consensual relationships with tribal members,'" ' or where nonmember conduct threatens the political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.'
While the factual situation in Montana concerned the extent of legislative jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Supreme Court recently clarified any misconceptions that Montana did not apply to similar questions
of adjudicatory jurisdiction as well. In Strate v. A-i Contractors,"' the
Court stated unequivocally that as to nonmembers, "a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.'"' 2 In its decision,
the Court affirmed a finding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over
a case involving an auto accident between two non-Indians that occurred
on a portion of public highway maintained by the state of North Dakota
under a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land."3 The
Court specifically rejected the petitioner's argument that tribal court jurisdiction over the case rested exclusively on the concept of inherent
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

Id. at 564.
435 U.S. 191 (1977).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-95.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 565-66.
See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 345.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
117S. Ct. 1404,1413(1997).
Strate, 117 S.Ct. at 1413 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1408-09.
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sovereignty."" The Court concluded that unless one of the Montana exceptions were present, the tribal court was without jurisdiction."'
Significantly, Strate expressed no view on the proper forum for
claims against non-Indians arising on tribal lands in Indian country, '1 6 and
the Supreme Court has thus far refrained from establishing definitive
boundaries for tribal jurisdiction over such claims."" Instead, in an attempt to effectuate the congressional policy of self-determination, the
Court established the tribal court exhaustion doctrine."' The exhaustion
doctrine encourages federal courts to refrain from exercising federal
question and diversity jurisdiction in favor of giving tribal courts the first
opportunity to evaluate challenges to their authority. "9
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,'" the Supreme Court held that a determination of tribal civil jurisdiction required an examination of the extent to which tribal sovereignty
had been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, executive branch policy, and administrative or judicial
decisions.'2 ' Furthermore, the Court held that such an "examination
should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself." ' The
Court noted, however, that application of the exhaustion doctrine was not
required where assertions of tribal jurisdiction were conducted in bad
faith, where the action was patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions, or where exhaustion was futile because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge jurisdiction."
Two years after National Farmers, the Supreme Court reinforced
and expanded the exhaustion doctrine to apply to cases involving federal
diversity jurisdiction.'24 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,'2 the
Court concluded that tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on

114.
115.

ld. at 1414.
ld. at 1410-13.

116.

Id. at 1408.

117.

See COHEN, supra note 1, at 255-56.

118. See Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1995). The exhaustion also served
to expand federal review of tribal court decisions. Id. at 1092.
119. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). For
a discussion of the abstention doctrine as it functions in state court proceedings see John Harte,
Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Civil Actions Arising In Indian
Country: Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63
(1997).
120. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
121. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56 (citations omitted). The Court refused to extend its
holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe to issues of civil jurisdiction. Id. at 855 (citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1977)).

122.

Id. at 856.

123.
124.

Id. at 856 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)).
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).

125.

480 U.S. 9(1987).
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reservation lands was an important part of sovereignty and that civil jurisdiction would presumptively rest in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.'26 It is important to note that a federal court decision requiring exhaustion of tribal
remedies does not remove, but merely postpones the exercise of federal
question or diversity jurisdiction until the tribal court has had an opportunity to hear the case."'
B. Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Farley"
1. Facts
For more than twenty years, the Kerr-McGee corporation milled
uranium on the Navajo Reservation under a lease from the Tribe.'" In
1995, members of the Navajo Tribe filed a complaint in Navajo Tribal
Court against Kerr-McGee alleging that the corporation's uranium mill
had "released vast quantities of radioactive and toxic materials, causing
them injuries.""'n The defendants brought suit in federal district court
seeking declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction.'3 ' They argued that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over nuclear tort claims under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA).'" In passing the Price-Anderson Act
(PAA) and subsequent amendments, Congress created expansive federal
jurisdiction over claims arising out of nuclear accidents by providing
both original jurisdiction in federal district courts and an automatic right
of removal from any action brought in state court.'33 The Act was silent,
however, regarding claims arising out of nuclear incidents on tribal land.
The district court, applying the tribal exhaustion rule, denied the injunction and stayed further action in federal court until the tribal court ruled
on its jurisdiction."'

126. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
127. See Reynolds, supra note 118, at 1101-04.
128. 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 880(1998).
129. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1500.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ld.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994). The pertinent parts provide:
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in the district where the nuclear incident takes place.
. . shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of any party of the
amount in controversy. Upon motion of the defendant or of the Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such action pending in any State court... shall be removed..
. to the United States district court having venue under this subsection.
Id.
134.

Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1500.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit took the case on interlocutory appeal and affirmed the lower court decision.'" Kerr-McGee argued that the language
of the PAA granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over the claim, thereby
implicating one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine outlined in
National Farmers.' Specifically, Kerr-McGee contended that an action
in tribal court would be patently violative of the express jurisdictional
prohibitions of the PAA, making tribal exhaustion inappropriate." ' The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the PAA had not expressly prohibited the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction.'38 Because the statute did not provide for
removal from tribal court as it did from state court, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that a federal court could not speculate as to Congress's intent
regarding actions brought in tribal courts. 9
Kerr-McGee further argued that even without an express jurisdictional prohibition, Navajo adjudicatory power over such claims went
beyond what was necessary to protect tribal self-government and, therefore, could not survive without express congressional delegation.'" The
court responded that the proper inference to be drawn from congressional
silence required reconciling "two arguably divergent strands of case
law," but that Navajo authority over the nuclear incident was not patently
violative of an express jurisdictional prohibition.' The two arguably
different strands of case law to which the court referred were Iowa Mutual" 2-- congressional silence gives rise to a presumption of tribal jurisdiction, and Montana"3--without express congressional delegation, jurisdiction does not exist beyond what is necessary to protect the Tribe.'"
Because Kerr-McGee clearly conducted its operations on Navajo land,
however, the Tribe's jurisdiction was not open to challenge under Montana.' Ultimately, the court applied the exhaustion doctrine because the
PAA had not specifically divested tribal courts of jurisdiction over nu-

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1502; see also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 857 n.21 (1985).
137. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1502; see also NationalFarmers,471 U.S. at 857 n.2 I.
138. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1505.
139. Id. ("Simply put, 'exclusive [federal] jurisdiction' is not conferred unless conferred explicitly.").
140. Id. at 1505-06. Kerr-McGee based this argument on the Supreme Court's holding in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
141. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1506-07.
142. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 544, 564 (1987).
143. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
144. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1505-06.
145. The court noted as much by finding the Supreme Court's decision in Strate to be inapposite: "Kerr-McGee's alleged torts did not occur on tribal lands over which the tribe [had] ceded
authority and control .... Id. at 1507 n.4.
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clear incidents and, therefore, had not created an express jurisdictional
prohibition."
The court also considered the comity concerns behind the exhaustion doctrine and concluded that the congressional commitment to Indian
self-government required that federal courts allow tribal courts to adjudicate allegations of mass toxic tort injuries occurring within their jurisdiction."7 This was especially true in this case, where the tribal nexus was so
strong; the mill was located on the reservation and the alleged victims
were all tribal members."'
C. Other Circuits
While none of the other circuits surveyed faced precisely the same
issue presented in Kerr-McGee, the Ninth Circuit applied the exhaustion
doctrine in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf. 9 Red Wolf
involved a personal injury claim brought by the heirs of two members of
the Crow Tribe who were killed when a train struck their car at a rail
crossing on the reservation.'" A jury verdict in tribal court resulted in a
$250 million judgment against the rail company."' The defendant sought
to enjoin execution of the judgment in federal court, arguing that it
would be futile to await further tribal court proceedings to determine the
amount of a supersedeous bond because, if enforced on the reservation,
the $250 million judgment would possibly be immune from a constitutional due process challenge in federal court.' 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that the futility exception of NationalFarmers spoke to questions of jurisdiction only, and that the railroad had not exhausted its tribal remedies. 3 The Supreme Court, however, pursuant to its decision in Strate,
vacated the Ninth Circuit's Red Wolf decision.' The Ninth Circuit apparently failed to recognize the application of Montana to the issue of
adjudicatory jurisdiction in Red Wolf

146. Id. at 1507.
147. Id. at 1508.
148. Id.
149. 106 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
150. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 869.
151. Id. The dissenting judge had "serious doubts" regarding the fairness of the tribal court
judgment and noted that the "the trial appear[ed] to have been in the 'wave the bloody shirt' genre."
Id. at 872 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 870. Because Indian tribes are neither states nor part of the federal government, they
are not limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth AmendmenL See Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896). Federal courts do possess the power to deny enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States where the defendant was not accorded sufficient due process. See Red
Wolf, 106 F.3d at 871 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
153. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 871.
154. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
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D. Analysis
In Strate, the Supreme Court established a bright line rule essentially removing tribal jurisdiction over any non-Indian defendant for actions occurring on fee lands within the reservation."' Under this rule, the
exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of Red Wolf. The Crow
were simply without jurisdiction to hear the case because the defendant
was non-Indian and the incident did not take place on tribal land within
the reservation." Kerr-McGee involved different facts. Not only did the
incident take place on tribal lands, the defendant was also actively and
willingly engaged in activity with the Tribe. 7 Under these circumstances, employment of the exhaustion doctrine was appropriate.'! 8
If the policy of self-determination retains any significance, tribes
must be permitted to exercise judicial authority over nonmembers wishing to enjoy the benefits of tribal resources. By requiring defendants to
exhaust their tribal remedies, federal courts will promote "advances in
the responsibilities and competence of the Indian courts." 9 The Strate
decision may have clarified and streamlined the judicial process regarding incidents involving nonmembers on fee lands within the reservation,
but it did so at the expense of tribal authority. Removing tribal jurisdiction over an entire category of circumstances undermines the policy of
self-determination by decreasing the ability of the federal courts to apply
the exhaustion doctrine.

155. Strate v. A- I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
156. Strate, 117 S. CL at 1406.
157. Kerr-McGee leased the land from the Indians for its mill site from the tribe. Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1500 (1997).
158. But see James W. Kuntz, Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations: Who's Jurisdiction?
Tribal Court Exhaustion v. The Price-Anderson Act, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 103, 126 (1997) ("As a
result of complete federal preemption in the area of nuclear safety, there is an express jurisdictional
prohibition against Price-Anderson actions in any court but the United States federal district court..
• or in state court with an absolute right of removal .... "). Kuntz recommends that tribes refuse
jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims because of the complexities of both nuclear tort litigation
and intra-tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 128.
159. See Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231,
273 (1987). Others do not look favorably on the exhaustion doctrine. See generally Robert N.
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law,
46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 150 (1993) (noting that review of "tribal court decisions reflects the ultimate
colonial distrust of leaving the final resolution to. .. tribal governance"); Reynolds, supra note 118,
at 1156 (concluding that the exhaustion doctrine has had the negative effect of allowing expansive
relitigation on the merits in federal court and recommending instead a policy of selective review of
tribal court decisions by way of writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court).
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III. TREATING TRIBES AS STATES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT

A. Background
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act"w with the goal of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation's waters. ' In furtherance of this goal, Congress amended the Act in
1977 by passing the Clean Water Act (CWA). 62' The CWA envisioned a
partnership between the states and the federal government with the states
as primary actors, free to set water quality standards in order to encourage the development of new technologies."3 The Act precludes states
from adopting water quality standards that are less stringent than federal
standards, but recognizes a state's right to adopt standards that are more
stringent than those promulgated by the EPA.' " Utilizing a cooperative
federalism approach, the EPA issues National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits to waste treatment facilities based
on discharge limits that meet state water quality standards.'"
The EPA interprets the Act to allow it to condition the issuance of a
discharge permit in one state on compliance with the water quality standards of another, downstream state.'" Acting in this the manner, the EPA
gives the downstream state's standards extraterritorial effect. In Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 7 the Supreme Court upheld this interpretation as a reasonable exercise of statutory discretion and a well-tailored means of
achieving the Act's goal of improving water quality standards.'"
Despite its broad provisions, the CWA was initially silent on
whether the phrase "the Nation's waters" included waters on Indian
lands. 9 This silence created a jurisdictional gap because states generally
do not have regulatory authority over Indian lands.7 In 1987, Congress
acted to fill this void by amending the Act to include a provision giving
the EPA authority to treat Indian tribes as states, provided the tribes meet

160. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1994)).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
162. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §1, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. & 43 U.S.C.).
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
164. Id. § 1370.
165. Id. § 1342 (1994). The states may also issue such permits upon application and approval
from EPA. Id.
166. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1997); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105 (1992).
167. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
168. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 104-07.
169. See James M. Grijalva, Tribal Government Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reservation Waters, 71 N.D. L. REV. 433 (1995).
170. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987). In Cabazon,
the Court looked to traditional notions of tribal sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian selfgovernment and ruled that California could not regulate gaming on Indian land. Id. at 216-22.
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certain criteria. 7 ' Pursuant to its new authority, the EPA promulgated
rules requiring interested tribes to submit an application containing the
following: a statement that the Secretary of the Interior recognizes the
tribe, a statement documenting that the current tribal governing body
carries out substantial governmental duties and powers over a defined
area, a description of the tribe's authority to regulate water quality, and a
description of the tribe's ability to administer a Water Quality Standards
program.'72 Upon receiving an application, the EPA provides notice to
"all appropriate governmental entities" and allows thirty days for comment regarding the tribe's assertion of authority.'73 If the tribe satisfies the
listed requirements to the satisfaction of the EPA, the tribe may administer a Water Quality Standards program.' Once authorized, the tribe,
like a state, is free to set its own standards either by following EPA recommendations or by using other scientifically supported criteria.'" The
tribe must provide notice and the opportunity of a public hearing before
submitting its proposed water quality standards to the EPA for final approval.7 6
7
B. City of Albuquerque v. Browner'

1. Facts
The Rio Grande River flows from north to south through the state of
New Mexico and then turns southeast to form the border between the
United States and Mexico. 78 Albuquerque's water treatment facility discharges into the river about five miles upstream from the Isleta Pueblo

171.

33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994). The statute reads:
The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State for the purposes of
subchapter H of this chapter and sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1324,
1329, 1341, 1342, and 1344 of this title to the degree necessary to carry out the objections of this section, but only if(1) The Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and
protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States
in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such propeity interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation; and
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's
judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable regulations.
Id. Tribes have been given state status in other areas as well. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-I 1 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1994).
172. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(l)-(4) (1997).
173. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(c).
174. Id.
175. 48Fed. Reg. 51,400,51,411 (1983).
176. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(e).
177. 97 F.3d 415 (1Oth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 410 (1997).
178. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419.
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boundary.'" In 1992, the Isleta Pueblo became the first Tribe to be recognized as a state for the purposes of the CWA. ° Subsequently, Isleta
Pueblo adopted and the EPA approved water quality standards significantly more stringent than those of either the federal government or the
state of New Mexico.'81 To comply with the Isleta Pueblo's standards, the
city of Albuquerque would have needed to spend $250 million for improvements to its water treatment facility.' 2 The city brought suit against
the EPA challenging the stricter standards.' The district court granted
summary judgment to the EPA on all issues and the city appealed. ,'
Prior to the appeal, the city, the EPA, the state of New Mexico, and
the Isleta Pueblo agreed to a four year NPDES permit for Albuquerque.'
On appeal, the city argued that the settlement rendered the issue moot."M
The Tenth Circuit ruled that granting the permit did not render the issue
moot because the Isleta Pueblo water quality standards and the EPA's
regulations were still in force, and the agreement concerned only the
issuance of the permit. ' More importantly, Albuquerque argued that the
CWA forbade the tribes from establishing water quality standards more
stringent than those of the federal government, and forbade the EPA
from enforcing tribal standards beyond reservation boundaries."
2. Decision
The city based the first part of its argument on the fact that Congress, in granting the EPA authority to treat tribes as states in section
1377, made no reference to section 1370, which allows states to set more
stringent standards.' 9 The Tenth Circuit applied a "Chevron analysis"'"
179. Id.
180. Mark A. Bilut, Albuquerque v. Browner, Native American Tribal Authority Under the
Clean Water Act: Raging Like a River Out of Control, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 887, 894 n.54 (1994)
(quoting a letter from B.J. Wynne, Regional Administrator, EPA, to Alex Lucero, Governor, Pueblo
of Isleta (Oct. 13, 1992)); see also City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M.
1993).
181. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
182. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 896.
183. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419.
184. Id. at 418.
185. Id. at 419.
186. Id. at 420.
187. Id. at 420-21. The court also pointed out its concern that the city merely wanted "to expunge the district court's adverse decision, giving the City the option to relitigate [the] action at
some later date." Id. at 421.
188. Id. at 421.
189. Id. at 423.
190. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Chevron requires a two step approach to judicial review of an agency's construction of a
statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The court first determines whether congressional intent is ambiguous. Id. at 843. If not, the agency must follow the clear intent of Congress. Id. if the statute is
ambiguous, the court moves to the second step and determines whether the agency's interpretation is
based on a "permissible construction of the statue." Id. At this stage, agency interpretation is entitled
to considerable deference from the court. Id. at 844.
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and held the EPA's construction of the statute to be reasonable.' 9' Because Congress designed the CWA to give states a primary role in eliminating pollution from the nation's waterways, Congress's intent in excluding section 1370 from section 1377 was "unclear and ambiguous."'"
In the second step of its analysis, the court held that the EPA's interpretation of section 1370 as a "savings clause that merely recognizes powers
already held by the states" was permissible. Under the EPA's permissible
interpretation, "Congress' failure to incorporate § 1370 into § 1377 [did]
not prevent Indian tribes from exercising their inherent sovereign power
to impose standards or limits93 that are more stringent than those imposed
by the federal government.'
The city based the second part of its argument on the fact that section 1377 did not expressly permit Indian tribes to enforce their standards
on upstream dischargers outside of tribal boundaries.' The court dismissed this argument, reasoning that it is the EPA, and not the tribes, that
exercises authority in issuing NPDES permits in compliance with downstream state and tribal water quality standards.'95 As noted above, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the EPA has authority to impose a downstream state's standards on upstream dischargers.'"
Albuquerque also challenged the EPA on procedural grounds,
claiming that the EPA failed to meet the notice and comment requirements prior to approving the standards,'97 and that the EPA's decision
was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported by the record.'"
The court ruled that the notice and comment period provided by the
Tribe before submitting the standards to the EPA was sufficient, and that
Congress did not intend that the EPA conduct an additional notice and
comment period. ' " In response to the city's argument that the EPA acted
arbitrarily in adopting standards that were unattainable and not supported
by the record, the Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA's role was limited to
a determination of whether the standards were stringent enough to com-

191. Browner, 97 F.3d at 422.
192. Id. at 423. The Tenth Circuit also noted that it had been criticized by the Supreme Court
for failing to afford the EPA the appropriate level of deference in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. Id. (citing
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 421.
195. Id. at 424. The court pointed out that the CWA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme and
must be read as such. Id. at 423. Thus, "[wihile § 1377 incorporates § 1342, § 1342 incorporates §
1311 and thereby provides the EPA the authority to issue NPDES permits to upstream point source
dischargers which are in compliance with the downstream state's and tribe's water quality standards." Id. at 424 n. 13.
196. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
197. Browner, 97 F.3d at 424; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
198. Browner, 97 F.3d at 426.
199. Id. at 424-25.
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ply with the federally recommended standards." ° The EPA may approve
of more stringent standards without reviewing the scientific support and
has the discretion to determine whether such standards are attainable.'
In essence, the court ruled that the policy of Congress and the EPA to
afford states and tribes the ability to enforce more stringent standards
was beyond judicial review. n
In promulgating its water quality standards, the Tribe designated its
use of the Rio Grande as "Primary Contact Ceremonial Use. ' '" The
city's last challenge was that the EPA's approval of the ceremonial use
designation offended the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 0 '
by promoting the Pueblo's religion at the city's expense.' The court
ruled that the "EPA's purpose in approving the designated use [was]
unrelated to Isleta Pueblo's religious reason for establishing it," and that
the designation did not "invalidate the EPA's overall secular goal." ' The
EPA's decision advanced the goals of the CWA and provided only an
incidental benefit to the Tribe's religion.'
C. Other Circuits

In Montana v. EPA,' the state of Montana and individual nonIndians challenged the EPA's grant of state status to the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes.' The complaints alleged that the Tribes did
not have inherent jurisdiction over water quality, and that granting such
authority would improperly subject Montana to the civil regulatory
power of the Tribe." ' The new tribal standards would apply to several
towns and counties within the reservation,2 ' the population of which is
200. Id. at 426. The Isleta Pueblo arsenic standard, for example, was 1000 times more stringent
than the federal Safe Drinking Water Standard. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp 733,
742 (D.N.M. 1993). The district court was troubled by the fact that the arsenic standard was not
measurable by current laboratory equipment and that "arsenic occur(ed] naturally in Albuquerque's
groundwater at relatively high levels and [was] not discharged to the water by industrial polluters."
Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 747. EPA had not even concluded that enforcing the Pueblo's standards
would actually improve downstream water quality. Id.
201. Browner, 97 F.3d at 426.
202. Id. ("It is not our role ... to decide which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that
Congress has entrusted such decisions to the [EPA].").
203. Id. at 428.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ").
205. See Browner, 97 F.3d at 428. The city also challenged the standards for vagueness.
Browner, 97 F.3d at 429. The court ruled that the Pueblo's standards were not vague because the
NPDES permit system gave sufficient notice of the specific enforceable standards. Id.
206. Browner, 97 F.3d at 428.
207. Id.
208. 941 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996).
209. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 947.
210. Id. at 947-48. Because of the new standards, the claimants were required to seek discharge
permits from the EPA and could no longer discharge pollutants pursuant to a permit from the state of
Montana. Id.
211. Id.
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less than one quarter Indian."2 Citing the statutory language and referring
to common sense, the district court noted that Congress likely intended to
grant tribes the authority to set water quality standards for the entire reservation area, including areas where stream segments traverse or bound
non-Indian land.1 3
The district court noted that in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
4 Justice White cited section 1377 as an
Bands of the Yakima Nation,""
example of an "explicit delegation of congressional authority to Indian
tribes.""3 The EPA had taken a more cautious view, deciding that Congress had made no such express delegation, and required the tribes to
prove jurisdiction on a case by case basis."6 The EPA based its operating
rule on United States v. Montana,"' where the Supreme Court held that
tribes may retain inherent jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians
on fee lands within the reservation where the activities threaten or have
"some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe."2 8 Under EPA guidelines, once a tribe
has made an adequate showing of tribal jurisdiction over fee lands, it is
up to the competing governmental entity to demonstrate the Tribe's lack
of jurisdiction."9 In this case, the EPA determined that pollution of surface waters traversing or appurtenant to nonmember land would have a
serious and substantial impact on the tribe's health and welfare.' ° The
court found the EPA's determination consistent with the record and not
contrary to law."'
D. Analysis
Under current decisions, the future bodes well for tribes seeking to
gain state status under the Clean Water Act.' The EPA guidelines have
212. See Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: Legal Bases
for TribalRegulatory Authority Over Non-Indian ReservationLands, 20 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 151,
190 (1996) (citing the BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF THE
POPULATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKAN NATIVE

AREAS 6 (1992)).

213. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 951-52.
214. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
215. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 951-52 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989)). The district court noted that the plurality of the Brendale
Court supported the continued use of the Montana test. Id. at 957.
216. Id. at 952 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,879-80 (1991)).
217. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
218. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 952 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66
(1981)).
219. Id. at 953 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879).
220. Id. at 957.
221. Id. at 958.
222. Tribal jurisdiction to regulate water quality under the Clean Water Act is widely accepted.
In Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit used the
fact that EPA recognized the Narragansett Tribe as the functional equivalent of a state under the
CWA to conclude that the tribe exercised sufficient government power to trigger the application of
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not been successfully challenged in any of the federal circuits.- Additionally, despite the EPA's view that the CWA does not constitute a congressional delegation of jurisdiction, the relationship between water quality
and tribal health and welfare will satisfy the Montana test in most instances. Both the holdings are significant. By upholding the EPA's determination of inherent jurisdiction over non-tribal members within the
reservation, the District of Montana decision represents a halt in the erosion of tribal jurisdiction over the activities of non-members within the
reservation. By upholding EPA enforcement of a downstream tribe's
water quality standards on an upstream state, the Tenth Circuit decision
represents a thunderous expansion of tribal authority. All of this at the
hands of Congress and the EPA.
Some commentators have criticized the Browner decision on the
grounds that the EPA did not act reasonably in approving the Isleta
Pueblo's standards.' Under Browner, critics fear the EPA could approve
standards that required 100% pure water and upstream cities would be
required to comply." This fear is misplaced for at least two reasons.
First, section 1377(e) requires the EPA to "provide mechanisms for the
resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of
differing water quality standards set by states and Indian tribes located
on common bodies of water." Why the state of New Mexico did not
challenge the Pueblo's standards under this section is not known. If the
state had done so, the adopted standards may have been very different
and more accommodating to the city. Second, tribes are subject to the
same EPA regulations, and the fact that a tribe could one day find itself
beholden to another state's or tribe's standards will provide an important
reminder of the golden rule. 6
Other commentators have argued that empowering tribes to establish their own water quality standards will increase politicization and

important provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Rhode Island, 19 F.3d at 703. In another
case, the First Circuit ruled that state jurisdiction to regulate Individual Sewage Disposal Systems
located on tribal lands was preempted by federal law because the EPA had granted the Narragansett
Tribe state status, allowing the tribe to set its own standards under the CWA. See Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F. Supp. 349 (D.R.I. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 89
F.3d 908, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that the land in question was not a "dependent" community, and therefore not Indian country over which the tribe could exercise jurisdiction).
223. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 907 (arguing that EPA could control standards by application
of section 1377(e) which requires EPA to "provide a mechanism for the resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of differing water quality standards .....
224. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 913.
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994). The statute requires EPA to consider the "economic impacts"
of differing standards. Id.
226. "The precept of 'do as you would be done by."' I THE NEw SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1114 (4th ed. 1993). Evidence of this awareness is seen in a Ninth Circuit case where
the Confederated Tribes adopted standards that were virtually identical to the those set by Montana.
Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945,947 n.l (D. Mont. 1996).
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undermine effective watershed management." The issue of effective
watershed management is beyond the scope of this survey, but traditional
Native American notions of a person's relationship to his or her environment would likely improve any discussion. By recognizing tribal jurisdiction over water quality standards, Congress and the EPA have taken
a step in furtherance of two goals, maintaining the integrity of our nation's waterways and promoting tribal self-determination.
CONCLUSION

The recent Tenth Circuit decisions manifest confidence in the ability
of tribal governments to regulate their own affairs and generally support
a policy of Indian self-determination. Kerr-McGee reminds non-Indians
that tribal courts have authority over non-Indian activities occurring on
tribal lands. Such authority is fundamental to any policy of selfdetermination. Non-Indians wishing to engage in economic pursuits on
tribal lands should be aware of tribal customs and regulations. The tribes,
by providing fair and competent forums in which to settle disputes, will
encourage and hopefully reap the benefits of such activity. The Browner
decision also supports the policy of self-determination. The power to
adopt water quality standards and monitor improvements provides an
opportunity for balanced interaction between tribes and surrounding nonIndian communities. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Venetie
H, the Tenth Circuit's Adair decision will have little effect on the extent
of tribal or federal authority as it relates to dependent community status.
Delineating the boundaries of authority between the federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes is always controversial, but if
tribes are to be self-governing and self-sufficient they must exercise
meaningful authority over issues important to them. The Browner and
Kerr-McGee decisions recognize this precept. The Supreme Court's Venetie H and Strate decisions may have simplified the process of delineation, but the aftermath of these decisions will likely yield a decrease of
tribal civil authority.
Timothy M. Reynolds

227. John S. Harbison, The Down Stream People: Treating Indian Tribes as States Under the
Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. L. REV. 473 (1995) (encouraging tribes to use the leverage they acquire
by being treated a's states to promote a watershed approach to water quality protection).

INSURANCE LAW
INTRODUCTION

Insurance law functions to regulate the relationship between the
risks insurance carriers assume and the responsibilities assumed by those
they insure.' As insurance policies become more complex, the balance
between these responsibilities shift and either insurers or insureds may
call upon courts to assist in striking new balances. This survey examines
how the Tenth Circuit interpreted several insurance coverage issues during the survey period.2
Part I of this survey provides a brief historical background of insurance law. Part II examines courts' interpretations of motor carrier policies governed by the MCS-90 Endorsement, which the Tenth Circuit
interpreted in Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.' Part III of this survey examines the effect of temporary substitute vehicle policy provisions which
the Tenth Circuit addressed in Houston General Insurance Co. v. American Fence Co.' Part IV discusses Hays v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.,' in which the Tenth Circuit focused on the issue of misrepresentations on insurance applications.' Part V covers the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of pollution exclusions under comprehensive general liability
policies in Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America.'
I.BACKGROUND

Americans annually pay over one trillion dollars in insurance premiums in exchange for peace of mind and financial security from risks of
future financial loss or harm.' Many business transactions involve or
implicate insurance in some form or manner.9 Insurance law, therefore,
plays an important role in daily business transactions.
The idea of insurance can be traced back centuries before Christ."'
Recognizing the hazards of their trade, Phoenician merchants engaged in
commerce by sea and they provided each other with mutual assistance."
From the twelfth through sixteenth centuries, Italian merchants devel1. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY,

AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1986) (describing the major functions of insurance law).
2. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
3. 99 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. 105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. Hays, 105 F.3d at 583.
7. 123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
8. I ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.1,
at3 (2d ed. 1996).
9. See id.
10. Id.
at5.
11. Id.
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of law developed to
oped marine insurance.1 2 During this time, a body
3
regulate insurance and other commercial matters.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, seafaring merchants
developed the business of insuring goods at Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse
in London." Lloyd's coffeehouse evolved into a market for insurance."
Over time, various lines of insurance evolved."' Distinct classifications of
marine, life, fire and casualty insurance developed.'
Insurance in the United States developed from the English practice
originating at Lloyd's coffeehouse.'8 Traditionally, the United States
government left regulation of the insurance industry to the indivivual
states.'9 As law regulating interstate commerce evolved, however, so did
the federal government's role in regulating the insurance industry.' Federal regulation seeks to prevent unfair claims practices and to promote
adequate coverage in common situations.2' As litigation involving coverage interpretation has exploded in the last quarter century,' the task of
keeping up with developments in the field of insurance law can be
daunting.
II. EXPANSION OF COVERAGE UNDER THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT

A. Background
The Interstate Commerce Act granted the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) the power to make regulations ensuring that motor
carriers be fully responsible for the operation of vehicles certified to
them.' In response to this congressional mandate, the ICC developed
regulations which required that every lease entered into by an ICClicensed carrier stipulate that the carrier maintain exclusive possession of
12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Thomas W. Wilson, How Lloyd's Functions:A Primeron Operations, in LLOYD'S AND
THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET 1994, at 7, 14 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 706, 1994).
16. 1 HOLMES, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 6.
17. Id. at 8.
18.

JEFFREY W.

STEMPEL,

INTERPRETATIONS

STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS §

19.
20.
21.

OF

INSURANCE

CONTRACTS:

LAW

AND

1.1, at 5 (1994).

Id.§26.1.1,at580.
See id. at 581.
See John H. Mathias & John D. Shugrue, Emerging Issues: The PolicyholderPerspective,

in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION 1993, at 9, 11 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 477, 1993).
22. Id.
23. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir.
1989) (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 304(e) (1956)). The ICC was abolished by
Congress in 1995. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 803 (1995). Congress transferred the
ICC's authority to regulate motor carriers to the Department of Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. §
13501 et seq. (Supp. I 1996).
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and control over leased equipment. The regulations also mandate that the
carrier assume total responsibility for the equipment's operation for the
duration of the lease.'
To ensure that motor carriers complied with these regulations, the
ICC developed the MCS-90 Endorsement.' This endorsement to a motor
carrier's insurance policy negates any policy terms that limit the insurance carrier's liability.' The MCS-90 Endorsement ensures that a motor
carrier will carry adequate insurance coverage and holds a negligent carrier financially responsible.' It requires a carrier to maintain a minimum
level of coverage for environmental restoration, bodily injury and property damage liability.' It also requires that the motor carrier obtain a
minimum level of financial responsibility, which relieves the motor carrier's insurance company from unlimited liability.'
Federal circuit courts have interpreted the scope and effect of this
endorsement. In Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Guaranty National Insurance Co.," the Tenth Circuit analyzed the issue of primacy
between two insurers under the terms of the endorsement.' The court
held that insurers governed by the endorsement may enter into contractual agreements allocating ultimate liability among themselves so long as
such agreements do not adversely affect the rights of the public and shippers. 2 The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of primacy between insurers
in Canal Insurance Co. v. First General Insurance Co." In Canal, the
court held that the endorsement expanded coverage for third-party members of the public to include vehicles not listed on the motor carrier's
insurance policy, but that it did not expand coverage for purposes of disputes among insurers over ultimate liability.'
During the survey period, in Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.," the
Tenth Circuit addressed the question of how far the endorsement extends
to cover a vehicle not listed in an insurance policy. In Adams, the court
addressed whether the endorsement could preclude a policy from limiting coverage based on the definition of an insured as one who "owns,
hires, or borrows" vehicles listed on a policy. 6

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Liability
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Empire, 868 F.2d at 362.
Id.
Id. at 363.
49 C.F.R. § 387.15 (1996).
Motor Carriers of Property Minimum Amounts of Bodily Injury & Property Damage
Insurance, 132 I.C.C. 948, 952 (1982).
Id.
868 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1989).
Empire, 868 F.2d at 361.
Id. at 366.
889 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1989).
Canal, 889 F.2d at 611.
99 F.3d 964 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
Adams, 99 F.3d at 970.
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B. Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.
1. Facts
In Adams, Royal Indemnity Company (Royal) issued two pertinent
insurance policies." First, Royal issued a policy to Thomas, a member of
the partnership that owned Trailer 701 and had leased the trailer to Geigley." Second, Royal issued a policy to Geigley.3' Both policies included
the MCS-90 Endorsement.'
Geigley lent Trailer 701 to his son-in-law, Hofer.' In January 1986,
Hofer was driving a tractor owned by his brother and pulling Trailer 701
when a load of steel trusses fell from the rig, causing an accident that
severely injured Adams."2 Adams sued Hofer in state court and obtained a
default judgment of approximately one million dollars when Hofer failed
to appear."3
Because Adams was unable to collect the judgment from Hofer,
Adams brought a diversity action against Royal in federal district court."
The district court found that neither policy afforded coverage because
Trailer 701 did not constitute a covered auto under the policies' defimitions.' Adams appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'
2.

Decision

The Tenth Circuit addressed two issues on appeal. First, the court
considered whether either or both of the two basic policies covered
Trailer 701." Second, the court addressed whether a driver whom the
basic policies did not cover was covered under the terms of the endorsement.'
Both basic policies limited liability coverage to automobiles owned
by the insured and listed on the policy.' Because neither Thomas nor
Geigley owned Trailer 701 and neither policy listed Trailer 701 as a cov-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 965.
Id.
Id. at 965-66.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 969-70.
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ered automobile, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that Trailer 701 was not covered by either basic policy.'
The court found, however, that the MCS-90 Endorsement had the
effect of expanding coverage to Hofer under Geigley's policy." It found
that the endorsement indirectly modified Royal's policy definition of
"insured," which limited coverage to a person using a "covered auto."52
Based on this modification, the Tenth Circuit found that Hofer constituted an "insured" under Geigley's policy." The court held Royal liable
to Adams for the judgment he obtained against Hofer.'
C. Other Circuits
Three other circuits interpreted the effect of the MCS-90 Endorsement on coverage during the survey period. The Ninth Circuit addressed
the scope of the endorsement's coverage in Harco National Insurance
Co. v. Bobac Trucking, Inc." In Harco, a self-employed trucker acting as
an independent contractor for Bobac Trucking Company, delivered a
trailer and shipping container owned by China Ocean Shipping Company
(Cosco) to a warehouse also owned by Cosco.' The trucker parked the
trailer so that it jutted out into a street.5 ' Burdick was injured when a vehicle in which he was a passenger struck the parked trailer. 8
Burdick sued Bobac and Cosco in state court.5 9 Bobac sought coverage from its insurer Harco National Insurance Company (Harco). '
Harco, however, denied coverage because its policy with Bobac did not
list the trailer as a covered vehicle. ' The action was removed to federal
court, and the parties settled.' Harco contributed a portion of Bobac's
share of the settlement pursuant to the MCS-90 Endorsement, after
which Harco sought a declaration that the endorsement did not require it
to pay.' The district court granted Harco's summary judgment motion.'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the

50. Id. at 971.
51. Id. The court found that Thomas's policy did not apply because at the time of the accident
Thomas neither owned nor had control over the trailer. Id. Rather, the partnership of which Thomas
was a member owned the trailer. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 972.
55. 107 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 1997).
56. Harco, 107 F.3d at 734.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 735.
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MCS-90 Endorsement did not expand coverage to automobiles not listed
under the main policy."
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the endorsement's effect on coverage
in John Deere Insurance Co. v. Truckin' U.S.A.' That case involved the
death of Mr. and Mrs. Kurocik as a result of an accident with a tractortrailer rig owned by Truckin' U.S.A.' Their heirs sued multiple defendants, including Copp Trucking, Inc., whose name appeared on the tractor rig.' Transport Insurance Company insured Copp Trucking.' Transport settled the Kurocik heirs' claims against Copp." Truckin' U.S.A.
carried an insurance policy with John Deere Insurance Company."
Transport sought reimbursement from John Deere for the settlement
amount it paid on behalf of Copp." John Deere brought a declaratory
action in federal district court. 3 The district court granted John Deere's
motion for summary judgment based on the finding that Copp did not
qualify as an insured under John Deere's policy."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of John Deere." Because the policy did not name Copp
Trucking as an insured, the Fifth Circuit held that the MCS-90 Endorsement provided no basis for relief. The court stated that when an insurance policy does not provide coverage for non-listed vehicles, except to
third-party members of the public through operation of the endorsement,
the policy provides no coverage for purposes of disputes among insurers
over ultimate liability."6
The Sixth Circuit interpreted coverage under the endorsement differently in Prestige Casualty Co. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co.' In
Prestige, Bogle leased a vehicle to Wolverine Expediting, Inc. (Wolverine) in June 1985." Prestige Casualty Company (Prestige) insured Bogle,
and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company (Michigan Mutual) insured
Wolverine. 9 Pursuant to the MCS-90 Endorsement attached to its policy
with Michigan Mutual,' Wolverine was liable for all damages arising out
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 736.
122 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1997).
John Deere, 122 F.3d at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id.
99 F.3d 1340 (6th Cir. 1996).
Prestige,99 F.3d at 1343.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1347.
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of operation of the vehicle during the lease period." Bogle hired driver
Gregory Freed and paid part of his wages for each trip."2 Freed struck a
vehicle in October 1985, seriously injuring the driver." Just prior to the
accident, however, Bogle borrowed the truck back from Wolverine."
Bogle and Freed settled the case, and Prestige paid the settlement
amount." A state court held that Bogle was indemnified against Wolverine, and ordered Freed to pay Wolverine the full amount of the settlement." Prestige filed a declaratory judgment action against Michigan
Mutual seeking a determination that Michigan Mutual's policy provided
primary coverage for payment of Bogle's judgment against Wolverine
and Wolverine's judgment against Freed." Finding that both policies
provided excess coverage only, the district court apportioned liability on
a pro rata basis in accordance with Michigan law."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the endorsement negated limiting provisions in the policy to which it was attached, but did
not establish primary liability over other policies that are also primary by
their own terms.' Based on the language of the pertinent policies and the
Michigan law governing insurance contracts, the Sixth Circuit found
both policies were primary? Since both policies contained identical apportionment schemes, the court held the policies to be primary on a pro
rata basis."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit and other circuit courts give great weight to the
public policy rationale behind the MCS-90 Endorsement, which is to
protect the public from unscrupulous or negligent motor carriers who
may not carry insurance on their vehicles. Such carriers would thus expose the public to the costs of accidents caused by those vehicles.' The
court in Adams emphasized that the plaintiff in the action was "a member
of the general public, which is precisely the group that is intended to be
protected by this . . . endorsement," 9' and followed closely the observa-

81. Id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(c)(1) (1996) (stating that the lessee shall have exclusive
possession and responsibility for the duration of the lease).
82. Prestige,99 F.3d at 1343.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1344.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1345.
88. Id. at 1347.
89. Id. at 1348.
90. Id. at 1352.
91. Id.
92. See Adams v. Royal Indem. Co., 99 F.3d 964,968 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 969.
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tion the court made in Empire that the purpose of the MCS-90 Endorsement is to provide protection to the public."
The court's decision in Adams demonstrates its willingness to interpret the endorsement to provide relatively broad protection to the public
as against motor carriers. This stance is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
5 and its dictum in John Deere,"
holding in CanaP
which interpreted the
endorsement as expanding coverage to include a non-listed vehicle when
such a vehicle was involved in an accident which harmed a third party.
The stance is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harco,
which stated that the endorsement does not expand coverage to vehicles
not listed on the policy to which the endorsement applies.'
Though at least three circuits appear willing to interpret the endorsement relatively broadly, the courts are willing to expand the endorsement's scope only so far. The Tenth Circuit is unwilling to find that
the endorsement allocates primacy among insurers, which in effect
would make one insurance carrier the "insured" of another." Neither are
the Fifth, Sixth, nor the Ninth Circuits willing to take the scope of the
endorsement to the extent that it indemnifies one insurer against
another.' Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit set no prohibition on insurers
allocating among themselves liability which may arise under the endorsement."° Insurers, therefore, may find some flexibility when called
upon to extend coverage in an uncontemplated situation.
M11.TEMiPORARY SUBSTITUTE VEHICLES

A. Background
Collision insurance usually covers damage occurring during the
operation of an insured vehicle for any legitimate purpose not expressly
excluded by the terms of the policy. '°1 Automobile insurance policies
may afford automatic coverage for newly acquired automobiles."m Insur94. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362-63 (10th Cir.
1989).
95. Canal Ins. Co. v. First Gen. Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 604,611 (5th Cir. 1989).
96. John Deere Ins. Co. v. Tnickin' U.S.A., 122 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1997).
97. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bobac Trucking Inc., 107 F.3d 733,736 (9th Cir. 1997).
98.
See Adams v. Royal Indem. Co., 99 F.3d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing the
purpose of the endorsement as protection of the public); Empire, 868 F.2d at 367 (stating that the
endorsement does not absolve the liability of an insurer that would otherwise provide primary
coverage).
99. See Harco, 107 F.3d at 736 (stating in dictum that the endorsement allows insurers to
aggregate costs); Prestige Cas. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1340, 1348 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding the endorsement imposed no primacy); Canal, 889 F.2d at 611 (holding that the
endorsement provides no coverage for disputes among insurers over ultimate liability).
100. See Adams, 99 F.3d at 969; Empire, 868 F.2d at 366.
101. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 172 (1980), available in Westlaw, 7 AMJUR
AUTO INS § 172.
102. Id.
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ance carriers also provide automatic coverage to insureds when policyholders require the use of a non-owned vehicle in certain
circumstances."
Standard automobile insurance policies usually include a temporary
substitute vehicle provision.'" The insurer designs such clauses to provide the policyholder with continuity of liability protection when the
insured vehicle becomes unavailable for use and the policyholder temporarily uses a non-owned vehicle in its place."5 The outcome of several
threshold inquiries determines whether the non-owned vehicle constitutes a "temporary substitute" under the insurance policy terms."(6
One such inquiry determines the meaning of "temporary" within the
context of a policy. Many courts construe the word "temporary" to mean
any use that is not permanent in nature."' Whether an insured uses a substitute vehicle temporarily is a matter of subjective intent."' Accordingly,
the courts look to what is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether the use is "temporary."'" °
Another inquiry looks to the circumstances under which the use of a
substitute vehicle occurs. Many insurance policies stipulate that the insured vehicle must be "withdrawn from normal use" as a result of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." By limiting the circumstances under which a policyholder may use a substitute vehicle, the insurer protects itself from excess exposure which results when a policyholder regularly uses a vehicle not listed in a policy."' Parties to insurance contracts have called upon courts to interpret the meaning of "withdrawn from normal use."
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the phrase in Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Norman,"' a case in which an employee used his personal
vehicle during the course of a business trip."' After an accident occurred
involving the vehicle, the employee sought coverage under his employer's automobile policy, contending that the employee used his vehi-

103. Id. §236.
104. James L. Isham, Annotation, Construction and Application of Substitute Provision of
Automobile Liability Policy, 42 A.L.R. 4th 1145, 1153-54 (1985).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1154-57.
107. Id. at 1156-57.
108.

12 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 526 (Ronald A.

Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., 2d ed. 1981).
109. See id. at 527. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the use of the involved
vehicle was temporary even though the insured borrowed the vehicle from his mother on four or five
separate occasions. McKee v. Exhange Ins. Ass'n, 120 So. 2d 690, 692-93 (Ala. 1960).
110. 12 COUCH, supra note 108, at 511.
11l. See id.
112. 197 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1952).
113. Western, 197 F.2d at 68.
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cle as a temporary substitute for the company truck."" The court held that
the employee's vehicle did not constitute a substitute vehicle because the
employee had previously used his own car extensively in almost every
phase of conducting business."5
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed the meaning
of "temporary substitute" and "out of service" under a provision of a
standard automobile insurance policy in Houston General Insurance Co.
v. American Fence Co."6 No other circuit courts addressed the temporary
substitute vehicle provision during the survey period.
B. Houston General Ins. Co. v. American Fence Co.
1. Facts
In December 1991, Jim Woodie, President of American Fence
Company, and John Woodie, his brother and an employee of American
Fence, drove Jim's 1986 pickup truck to a dealership where they purchased a new 1992 pickup truck for American Fence."' They planned to
drive both vehicles to another location and leave the new truck for installation of a cellular phone."' En route, John was involved in an accident while driving the 1986 truck."9
American Fence carried an automobile insurance policy with
Houston General Insurance Company.'20 Although the policy listed the
new 1992 truck, it did not list the 1986 truck as a covered vehicle.'2 ' Jim
Woodie did not carry any insurance on the 1986 truck.'" American Fence
sought coverage from Houston General claiming that the 1986 pickup
truck was a substitute vehicle under the terms of the policy.'"
Faced with the demand from American Fence to defend and indemnify, Houston General sought declaratory relief in federal district court.'24
The district court entered summary judgment in favor26 of Houston General.'" American Fence appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'

114.

Id.

115. Id. at 69; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 558 A.2d
1244, 1247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that a substitute vehicle clause provided coverage
for only one substitute vehicle at a time).
116. 115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).
117. Houston, 115 F.3d at 806.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit focused its analysis on the temporary substitute
vehicle provision of Houston General's insurance contract with American Fence.'" The court found no indication that the plaintiff used the
1986 truck in place of the 1992 truck.'" Because the Woodies had
planned to drop off the 1992 truck and return to company headquarters in
the 1986 truck, they required the use of both vehicles.'" In addition, the
court noted that the pertinent policy required a covered vehicle be "out of
service" due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss
or destruction in order
30
for a substitute vehicle to qualify for coverage.
Applying Oklahoma law to interpret the contract, the Tenth Circuit
found that the terms of the policy were unambiguous.'"' Therefore, the
court accepted the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract to determine the intention of the parties at the time they entered into it. 3
The appellant relied on Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West' 3 to
argue that a covered vehicle need not be completely disabled or with3
drawn from normal use to qualify as a substitute vehicle for coverage.' 1
In West, the policyholder used his father's vehicle because the tires on
the covered vehicle were dangerously worn.' 3 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the policy provision did not require that the insured's
covered auto be unsuitable for all use. 6 The court found that because the
covered vehicle represented a danger, if driven, it constituted a vehicle
withdrawn from "normal" use, as opposed to "possible" use, and was
covered under the temporary substitute vehicle policy provision. '
The Tenth Circuit rejected the relevance of the West decision.' 8 Instead, the court analyzed the insured's purpose for using the 1986 truck
in place of the 1992 truck.' Unlike the insured in West, Jim Woodie
intended to use the listed vehicle at the same time he was to use the "substitute" truck.'4" Even though the 1992 truck was to be out of service, it
was not yet out of service when the accident occurred.'"

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
at806-07.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id.
351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1959).
Houston, 115 F.3d at 807.
West, 351 P.2d at 399.
Id.at400.
Id.at401.
Houston, 115 F.3d at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Because Woodie did not use the 1986 truck as a substitute for the
1992 truck, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
1986 truck did not constitute a "temporary substitute" under the policy. 2
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit justly decided Houston General. The purpose for
the substitution provision is to recognize and permit the insured's operations to continue should a vehicle listed on the policy be temporarily out
of commission. 3 However, an insurer must limit the coverage on the use
of such non-listed vehicles in order to establish a fair policy rate.'" Failure to restrict the use of vehicles not listed on a policy would result in
liability risks uncontemplated by the insurer."
The Tenth Circuit's finding followed prior interpretations of the
"out of service" meaning. The majority of case law on this issue indicates that a listed vehicle need not be withdrawn from all use in order to
be considered withdrawn.'" The majority of courts have held that in order
for the substitute vehicle provision to apply, a listed vehicle must merely
be withdrawn from normal use.'
The Tenth Circuit may have reached a different conclusion had the
accident occurred while the 1992 truck was unavailable for use during
the installation of the cellular phone. However, the accident would have
had to occur during a time when the company had substituted use of the
1986 truck for the 1992 truck's normal business use.
Houston General properly protected the insurer's interest in allocating risk by recognizing that Woodie paid no premium to cover the use
of the unlisted truck.'" Insurance premium rates should reflect an-appropriate allocation of risk between insurer and insured. Allocation of risk,
however, is not the only factor that determines insurance premium rates.
Insurance fraud is a threat to automobile insurance companies."9 Although the precise financial impact of fraud is impossible to calculate,
the estimated costs of fraud have risen over the years, reaching billions
of dollars." Insurers then pass these losses on to consumers.

142. Id. at 809.
143. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 236 (1980), available in Westlaw, 7 AMJUR
AUTO INS § 236.
144. Id.
145. Houston, 115 F.3d at 807.
146. Isham, supra note 104, at 1154.
147. Id.
148. Houston, 115 F.3d at 806.
149. Lisa Moore, Note, National Insurance Association v. Peach: An Analysis of Extended
Issues To Be Raised by Insurers, Insureds and Injured Third Parties, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 375 (1997).
150. Edward L. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and its Effects on the Insurance
Industry, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 23, 23-24 (1997).
151. Id. at 24.
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IV. MISREPRESENTATIONS ON INSURANCE APPLICATIONS

A. Background
Policy applications provide data necessary to enable an insurer to
determine whether to accept the risk of insuring an applicant, as well as
information which allows the insurer to set a premium.' Although false
information on a policy application could result in mistaken issuance of a
policy or incorrect rates, more than one out of five adults believe that
lying on an insurance application is an acceptable practice.'
When a prospective insured misrepresents material information in
the policy application, the insurer is generally permitted to deny coverage of the submitted claim, reform the policy, or rescind the policy.'" If
the insurer rescinds the policy, the policy is rendered void ab initio."' In
that case, the insurer must usually return the insured's paid premiums
with interest." State law determines what constitutes sufficient fraud or
misrepresentation sufficient to enable a court to rescind the policy.' 7
A material false representation' would reasonably influence the
insurer's decision whether to accept the risk, or accept it under different
conditions.'" The requisite proof of materiality varies among jurisdictions. Under an objective approach, the insurer must show that "a prudent insurer would regard the true facts as increasing its risk under the
policy."'" Under the subjective approach, the insurer must show that it
would have done something different with the policy, if it had known the
true facts. 6'
In addition to the material false representation requirement, some
jurisdictions require that an insurer prove an intent to deceive in order to
rescind the policy.' 2 This requirement poses two problems for the insur-

152. 7 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 10 (Ronald A. Anderson
ed., 2d ed. 1981).
153. Joel P. Williams, Note, Insurance Law-Protecting the Public Under Maryland's
Compulsory Vehicle Insurance Scheme: The Abrogation of an Insurer's Common Law Right To Void
an Insurance Contract Ab Initio for a Material Misrepresentation in the Policy Application, 25 U.
BALT. L. REV. 289, 289 (1996).
154. Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and
Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573,584 (1996).
155. Id. at 585.
156. Id.
157. P. Jay Wiker & Edward K. Lenci, Utmost Good Faith and Rescission, in REINSURANCE
LAW & PRACTICE: NEW LEGAL AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 147, 223 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 756, 1997).
158. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1012, at 1018 (1982).

159. See Brunnemer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1938).
160. Sheila J. Carpenter, The Impact of AIDS on Life and Health Insurance Fraud, 93 A.L.I.
229, 232 (1996).
161.

Id.

162. See Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 F.2d 459, 462 (1 Ith Cir.
1983); White v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 327 N.W.2d 606, 609-10 (Neb. 1982).
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ance industry.'" First, because many courts have held that the intent to
deceive cannot be proven as a matter of law, the insurer cannot dispose
of potentially costly litigation with summary judgment.'" Second, the
insurer bears a substantial burden of proof in order to establish that the
insured acted with a malicious or evil purpose."
Courts in many jurisdictions which require automobile insurance
coverage have held that an insurer cannot void a policy ab initio for fraud
or misrepresentation in the application to avoid payment to a third-party
claimant.'" In Teeter v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'6' a New York court described the rationale for this policy.'" The court reasoned that the aim of
a compulsory insurance scheme is to provide continuous liability coverage for all vehicles registered in the state and that a supervening public
interest restricts the rights of the parties once the policy is in force.'" In
Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Clay,70 the Kansas Supreme Court
held that public policy favors the compensation of innocent, injured third
parties in cases where fraud may otherwise preclude coverage."'
The courts do not, however, always uphold coverage under an insurance policy when an innocent third party is injured. Most courts draw
the line when the policyholder procures insurance for an accident that
has already occurred,' 2 reasoning that coverage would provide an incentive for motorists not to purchase required insurance.'
Insurance fraud can be very difficult to prove.' Although insurance
agents may suspect fraudulent activity, lack of evidence and fear of bad
faith lawsuits result in payment of meritless claims.'" During the survey
period, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of insurance fraud in Hays
v. Jackson NationalLife Insurance Co.'6

163. S.Leigh Moore, Comment, A PromisingAlternative to Intent to Deceive: Intent to Induce
Issuance, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1996).
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 274-75.
166. Williams, supra note 153, at 296-97.
167. 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App.Div. 1959).
168. Teeter, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
169. Id. at 615-16.
170. 811 P.2d 1202 (Kan.1991).
171. Clay, 811 P.2dat 1207.
172. Moore, supra note 149, at387-88.
173. Id. at 388.
174. Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 907,929 (1992).
175. Id.
at 942-43.
176. 105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
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B. Hays v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.
1. Facts
Hays applied for a life insurance policy with Jackson National Life
Insurance Co. (Jackson National) in the fall of 1991.'" The application
form required information concerning his medical history.' A Jackson
National agent completed the medical history information section based
on Hays's responses. 9 Hays disclosed that he previously had an ulcer
which required surgical intervention, as well as some minor incidents in
his medical history.'" However, he neglected to mention he had serious
medical problems related to his esophagus.'8'
On November 8, 1991, Jackson National issued a life insurance
policy to Hays with a coverage amount of $500,000.2 On August 31,
1992, Hays died of esophageal cancer.' Upon submission of the claim,
Jackson National investigated Hays's medical history.'" It discovered
that Hays had been diagnosed with Barrett's Esophagus' 5 and, as a result,
received a significant amount of medical treatment.' Based on Hays's
failure to disclose this information, Jackson National denied coverage
under the policy and returned the premiums which Hays paid on the policy to Hays's estate." 7
The beneficiaries of the policy sued, asserting claims for contractual
bad faith, outrage and reformation.'88 The district court dismissed all
claims.'" The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
3.

Decision

The Tenth Circuit looked to Oklahoma law to determine whether
Jackson National had the burden of proving an intent to deceive. 9 ' After
analyzing the pertinent statute and case law, the court concluded that a

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
of gastric
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Hays, 105 F.3d at 584.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Barrets Esophagus is a change in esophageal tissue which results from repeated reflux
acid. Id. n.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.

1018

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

company must prove this intent by the applicant in order to deny coverage.'
Title 36, section 3609 of the Oklahoma Statutes states that a company cannot rescind a policy unless the misrepresentation is either
fraudulent or material.'93 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the statute
could be read to mean that an insured's state of mind is irrelevant to a
determination of misrepresentation.'" It found, however, that Oklahoma
case law indicated otherwise.95
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Allen,'" the Oklahoma Supreme Court defined misrepresentation as an untrue statement
made with the intent to deceive or mislead.'9" Because the supreme court
subsequently applied this "intent to deceive" requirement in Brunson v.
Mid-Western Life Insurance Co.'" and Claborn v. Washington National
Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law required proof of intent to deceive in order to rescind an insurance policy
on grounds of misrepresentation of material information on an application."
The court noted that under Oklahoma law a statement made on an
insurance application without an intent to deceive is not misrepresentation." Although the court indicated that in this case the information
given on the application could have given rise to an inference of intent to
deceive, it could also have led to the conclusion that Hays did not intend
to deceive.' Because the court found that a material issue of fact existed
regarding whether Hays intended to deceive Jackson National, it reversed
the dismissal of the breach of contract claim.'
Refusing to allow incentives for fraudulent misrepresentation, the
court determined that beneficiaries are not entitled to reformation of a
policy to the amount of insurance that would have been issued had the
insurer known of the insured's true medical history.' The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the reformation
claim.'

192. Id. at 588.
193. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3609 (West 1990).
194. Hays, 105 F.3d at 587.
195. Id. at 587-88.
196. 416 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1965).
197. Allen, 416 P.2d at 940.
198. 547 P.2d 970, 973 (Okla. 1976).
199. 910 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Okla. 1996).
200. Hays, 105 F.3d at 588.
201. Id. at 588-89.
202. Id. at 589.
203. Id. at 589-90.
204. Id. at 590.
205. Id.
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Plaintiffs argued that Jackson National acted unreasonably in issuing the policy without first conducting an investigation into Hays' health.
Holding that the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract must be
based upon an insurer's wrongful denial of a claim, not upon the conduct
of an insurer in selling a policy, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the bad faith claim.' The court also affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the outrage claim, finding that Jackson National acted reasonably in issuing the policy without first conducting an investigation.'
C. Other Circuits

The Sixth Circuit addressed a fraudulent claim case in Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Reynolds.2' In that case, the Navarre
Company purchased a disability insurance policy from Massachusetts
Casualty Insurance Company for each of its five or six employees. Navarre Company paid the premiums for each of the employee's policies
under a common billing invoice.2 ° Massachusetts Casualty gave Navarre
a discount on premiums so long as an individual policyholder continued
as an employee with Navarre and at least five employees carried similar
policies."' Under the policy terms, Navarre paid the premiums under a
common billing invoice unless and until an employee left the company,
at which time the employee had the option to pay his own premiums." 2
On October 17, 1989, Reynolds completed the required individual
application for disability coverage. 3 He failed to disclose certain preexisting conditions, including Meniere's Syndrome. 2 ' Reynolds's employment with Navarre Company terminated on April 10, 1992.2' He
continued to pay the premiums himself.2 6 Approximately one month
later, Reynolds filed a claim for total disability based on a tentative diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. '
Massachusetts Casualty began making disability payments and investigated the claim.2 8 In the course of its investigation, Massachusetts
Casualty discovered the preexisting medical conditions.2 ' On September
206.

Id.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 590-91.
113 F.3d 1450 (6th Cir. 1997).
Reynolds, 113 F.3d at 1452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

214. Id. Meniere's Syndrome is a disease of the labyrinth of the ear, characterized by deafness,
ringing in the ears, dizziness, nasua, and blackouts. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK
DICTIONARY 481 (1996).
215. Id.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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15, 1992, it denied Reynolds's claim, based on his failure to disclose the
required information on the policy application." The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Massachusetts Casualty, entering
judgment for the difference in the benefits paid and the amount of premiums accepted.22' Reynolds appealed to the Sixth Circuit."' 2
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district
court.' The court held that the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) governed the plaintiff's claims, preempting claims relating
to the agent's alleged misrepresentations.*2' The court further held that
whether the insured made the misstatements on the insurance application
with the requisite knowledge and intent to defraud constituted factual
questions, precluding summary judgment."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit properly reversed the district court's dismissal of
the breach of contract claim in Hays. Insurance contracts are contracts of
the utmost good faith." Because the rescission of a policy can result in
severe consequences for the policy holder,' proof of intent to deceive
should be required.
The existence of intent to deceive is generally a question of fact for
the jury.' Because Hays provided information on comparatively unimportant medical information, but failed to reveal his previously diagnosed
medical problems, a reasonable person could conclude that he intended
to deceive the insurance carrier.' The Tenth Circuit therefore correctly
held that a finding of intent to deceive should have come from a jury of
peers."0
Requiring the insurer to prove intent to deceive before a jury, however, results in costly litigation." Faced with this requirement, insurance
carriers are forced to weigh the costs and risks of litigation against the
potential payout on a suspected fraudulent claim." Insurance carriers
may tend to pay out on fraudulent claims rather than fight them. Therefore, potential policyholders may find little disincentive against perpe220. Id.
221. Id. at 1453.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1456.
224. Id. at 1453.
225. Id. at 1456.
226. 6 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 81-37 (Lee R. Russ ed., 3d ed. 1997).
227. See Wiker & Lenci, supra note 157, at 224.
228. 6 COUCH, supra note 226, at 81-123.
229. Hays v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 583, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1997).
230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 163, at 274-75 (explaining that courts cannot dispose of
costly litigation at summary judgment because of the requirement to show intent to deceive).
232. See Moore, supranote 163, at 274.
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trating fraud. Evidence shows that the public perceives that the likelihood of being caught committing fraud is slim and that the consequences
of fraud are insignificant. " Nevertheless, the cost of insurance fraud ultimately shifts to innocent consumers.23
V. POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES

A. Background
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies are designed to protect the insured against liability arising from damages
caused by the insured's actions." Such policies have traditionally provided insureds with the broadest coverage against third party claims.'
CGL policies typically impose a duty on the carrier to defend any suit
against the insured seeking damages resulting from actions covered by
the policy. 7 This duty is broader than the insurer's obligation to provide
coverage. 8 Many courts have found a duty to defend so long as the claim
could conceivably fall within the policy's coverage."
Prior to 1966, most CGL insurance policies covered bodily injury
and property damage resulting from accidents. 2' During that time, the
courts construed the term "accident" very broadly, which often resulted
in coverage for long-term exposure to harmful conditions or
substances.2 '
The insurance industry introduced the pollution exclusion clause in
1970."2 As a result of increasing environmental concerns and disasters,
many insurance carriers included pollution exclusion clauses in their
CGL policies which exempted coverage to knowing polluters. " Beginning in about 1973, insurers broadened the pollution exclusion to apply
to most environmental contamination causes, except those that were
"sudden and accidental. ' "

233. Schrenk & Palmquist, supra note 150, at 24.
234. Id.
235. Timothy M. Gebhart, A "Timeless" Interpretation of the "Sudden and Accidental"
Exception to the Pollution Exclsuion?, 41 S.D. L. REV. 314, 315 (1996).
236. David W. Steuber, Overview of Environmental Claims and Insurance Coverage Litigation
Under Comprehensive GeneralLiability, in INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 3,

4 (Lynne M. Miller & Mary J. Mallonee eds., 1989).
237. Irene A. Sullivan et al., Hazardous Waste Litigation: Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Coverage Issues, in INSURANCE, EXCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1992,
at 203, 209 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series NO. 427, 1992).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 206.
241. Id. at 206-07.
242. Gebhart, supra note 235, at 316.
243. Id. at 316-17.
244. Id. at 315-17.
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Because the policies did not define "sudden and accidental," extensive litigation ensued. " The courts split on what constituted a "sudden"
occurrence. " The insurance industry argued that the term "sudden" has a
temporal component, requiring that the polluting discharge occur
abruptly and quickly. 7 The policyholders contended that the terms "sudden"2 and "accidental" are ambiguous, requiring construction in their favor. 4

Although courts interpreted "sudden and accidental" in a variety of
ways, they have developed three common approaches. "9 First, courts may
find the terminology ambiguous and construe it against the insurer.'
Second, some courts define "sudden and accidental" to mean unexpected
and unintended, thereby allowing coverage for pollution events that occur over a relatively long period of time."' Third, some courts interpret
the phrase as limiting coverage that would otherwise be granted under
the term "occurrence." ' Courts in this latter category will often find a
temporal element in the meaning of "sudden" and separately define "accidental" as "unintended." '
The Tenth Circuit decided a case on this issue in Quaker State
Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.,' where a distributor
of used oil sought insurance coverage when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified the company as a potentially responsible
party (PRP) for contamination at a used oil processing facility owned by
Ekotek, Inc.' 5 The Tenth Circuit concluded that oil which Quaker State
Minit-Lube, Inc. (Minit-Lube) sold to Ekotek, and which contaminated
the Ekotek plant, constituted pollution.' It also found that the "sudden
and accidental" exemption in Ekotek's policy did not apply because the
contamination was long-term and gradual, and that the question of
whether the pollution was "sudden and accidental" should be considered
from Ekotek's perspective, rather than that of Minit-Lube.n? The Tenth

245. Id.at 317-18.
246. See Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997)
(listing the different cases interpreting the "sudden and accidental" meaning).
247. See Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution
Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 168-69 (1992).
248. Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1339.
249. See Murphy, supra note 247, at 178-79.
250. Id. at 179.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995).
255. Minit-Lube, 52 F.3d at 1525.
256. Id. at 1530.
257. Id. at 1530-31. The pollution at the Ekotek plant was continuous and part of its regular
operation, but Minit-Lube argued that from its perspective, the pollution occurred in isolated events.
Id. at 1530.
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Circuit revisited this issue during the survey period in Mesa Oil, Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of North America. 8
B. Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America
1. Facts
Mesa Oil, Inc., an oil recycler, sold twelve shipments of lubricant
feedstock processed from used oil to Ekotek, Inc., expecting Ekotek to
refine and resell the oil. 9 Ekotek, however, stored the oil at its Utah facility for several years, mishandling it as well as oil purchased from
many other sources." This mishandling led to high levels of soil and
groundwater contamination, which resulted in the facility being declared
a superfund clean-up site."' Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),262 companies
which the EPA determines to be potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
for contamination at a site are jointly and severally liable for cleanup and
response costs." The EPA identified Mesa Oil as one of the PRPs for the
Ekotek site.2"
On October 21, 1994, Mesa Oil settled its liability claim with the
EPA. 65 However, on May 24, 1994, a group of other PRPs named Mesa
Oil as a defendant in a lawsuit seeking contribution toward the costs of
the investigation and cleanup at the Ekotek site.26 At this time, Mesa Oil
sought defense and indemnification from its insurer, Insurance Company
of North America (INA), for both the claims brought by EPA and the
2 7 INA carried Mesa Oil's CGL insurance during the time
group of PRPs.
period in question.' INA denied Mesa Oil's coverage request based on a
pollution exclusion in Mesa Oil's policyY
Mesa Oil sued INA in a New Mexico state court."' INA removed
the case from state court and transferred it to the federal district court for
the district of Utah."' The district court granted INA's motion for summary judgment." Mesa Oil appealed to the Tenth Circuit."
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1335.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Mesa Oil's contention that this case
differed from Quaker State because New Mexico courts interpret insurance policies more liberally than Utah courts. '4 Mesa Oil argued that
New Mexico courts would not apply the pollution exclusion contained in
its policy with INA to its sale of oil to Ekotek on the ground that selling
oil was Mesa Oil's primary activity and it was that activity that INA
contracted to insure.275 Mesa Oil contended that under New Mexico law,
a policy exclusion is repugnant to an insuring clause when it simply nullifies the purpose of the policy." The court disagreed and held that the
policy was not null because the exclusion did not eliminate all coverage
arising out of Mesa Oil's selling of oil."'
The second issue the court addressed involved the application of the
"sudden and accidental" exemption of the policy exclusion.27" Mesa Oil
argued that the "sudden and accidental" requirement should be viewed
from the insured's standpoint, rather from that of the polluter. ' Applying
New Mexico law, the Tenth Circuit found that a New Mexico court
would attribute the plain meaning to unambiguous words in a policy.'
The court found the words "sudden and accidental" to apply to pollution
that occurs quickly and abruptly. "
The court listed three distinct rationales for its interpretation of the
word "sudden" in the policy exemption." First, the court found that the
plain meaning of the word "sudden" contains a temporal component."
Second, it found that because insurance policies typically state whether
the facts may be evaluated from the insured's perspective, the fact that
INA's policy did not contain such language precluded the court from
evaluating the facts from Mesa Oil's perspective. ' Finally, the court
referred to a New Mexico Supreme Court decision stating that the supreme court would enforce the plain language of insurance contracts."
However, New Mexico courts generally allow a party to introduce extrinsic evidence of a contract's meaning to determine whether an ambiguity exists.' Because Mesa Oil failed to provide sufficient evidence to
overcome the plain meaning interpretation of the pollution exclusion, the
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Gonzales v. Allstate Ins. Co., 921 P.2d 944, 947-48 (N.M. 1996)).
Id.
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Tenth Circuit rejected Mesa Oil's contention that the term "sudden," as
used in its policy with INA, was ambiguous."'
Under New Mexico law, the insurer's duty to defend is distinct from
its duty to indemnify. 8 Mesa Oil argued that such a duty exists when the
complaint alleges facts which potentially fall within the policy
coverage. ' However, because the court found that there was no potential
coverage based on the facts alleged, it held that INA had no duty to defend.'
C. Other Circuits
The Fifth Circuit also interpreted a pollution exclusion clause during
m In
the survey period in SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co."
1982, SnyderGeneral Corporation purchased the assets of Singer Company's Climate Control Division, which included a manufacturing facility in North Carolina.' SnyderGeneral utilized the facility to manufacture air conditioning and heating equipment between the years 1982 and
19 8 8 .3 The company used industrial degreasing solvent trichloroethane
(TCA) and groundwater in the manufacturing process. '
In 1983, approximately 500 gallons of TCA spilled at the facility.'
By the date of the opinion, SnyderGeneral paid approximately $2 million
toward cleanup costs resulting from the spill.' SnyderGeneral sought
coverage from its primary CGL policy with Union Insurance Company
(Union) and its excess coverage carrier, Century Indemnity Company
(Century)." Century denied coverage.'
SnyderGeneral brought suit in Texas state court.' Century removed
the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment."° The district
court concluded that the environmental cleanup costs did not constitute
damages under the policy and that Century was not responsible for the
reimbursement of expenses incurred."' SnyderGeneral appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.'w

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id..
113 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1997).
SnyderGeneral, 113 F.3d at 537.
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 537.
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On appeal, Century reiterated its argument that the term "damages"
in its policy referred to the technical distinction between legal damages
and equitable relief" , It argued that because the cleanup costs resembled
restitution or reimbursement, they did not constitute "damages" under the
policy terms."' The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that environmental
cleanup costs constituted damages and, therefore, were covered under the
policy.3"
Century further contended that neither the pollution exclusion
clause nor the care, custody and control exclusion clause of SnyderGeneral's policy with Union precluded recovery."' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion clause had a temporal component.' Because a question of fact existed as to the suddenness of the spill, as well as to the total and physical
use or control of the groundwater, the court held that summary judgment
was not appropriate.3"
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue in LaFarge Corp. v.
3 " In that case, General
Travelers Indemnity Corp.
Portland, Inc. (GPI)
contracted with Jernigan Trucking Company (Jernigan) to haul waste
from its cement manufacturing sites." ' Jernigan promised GPI that it
would haul the waste to a proper landfill."" However, Jernigan diverted
the waste to a site which did not properly contain the waste, and which
became the target of an EPA investigation.' LaFarge Corporation acquired GPI in 1983.' In 1988, the EPA notified LaFarge that it was investigating LaFarge as a generator of toxic waste at the site where Jernigan had deposited GPI's waste materials."' In 1990, the EPA named LaFarge as a party potentially responsible for the pollution cleanup costs." '
LaFarge notified its insurer, Travelers Indemnity Co. (Travelers), of
the potential charges."6' Travelers denied coverage based on its pollution
exclusion clauses. 7 LaFarge brought suit against Travelers and other
insurance carriers seeking a declaration that the insurers had a duty to

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
Id.
118 F.3d 1511 (l th Cir. 1997).
LaFarge, 118F.3dat 1513.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1514.
Id.
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defend and indemnify it against the EPA's claims." 8 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.3 9 LaFarge appealed to the Eleventh Circuit."l
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit followed Florida law.32' Because the
initial deposits of waste at the site took place over five or six months and
the subsequent seepage took place over several years, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that such disposal was not "sudden" under the policy terms."' Further, the court rejected LaFarge's contentions that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and that it created an
absolute exclusion in contravention of the terms of the pertinent
policies."

D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Mesa Oil represents the trend of
pollution exclusion interpretations at the appellate level. Many courts
have rejected the ambiguity argument and relied on a much more factspecific analysis which concentrates on whether a business accused of
polluting knew or should have known about the pollution."' This approach has resulted in almost evenly split outcomes." Such fact-specific
analysis results in a lack of predictability and consistency in judicial decisions.326

The policy reasons for upholding pollution exclusions are clear.
Allowing insurance coverage for liability incurred from negligent or
careless spills or releases would discourage policyholders from taking
sufficient precautions against environmental contamination."' An insured
would be even more likely to relax his vigilance if he knows that the
deposit or release of toxic waste or pollutants would be covered, so long
as such a deposit or release was unexpected." Coverage exclusions for
unexpected contamination create an incentive for a business to prevent
environmental harm."
Despite the public policy incentive to discourage relaxed vigilance,
the courts must wrestle with pressure to produce decisions which result

318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1515.
322. Id. at 1517.
323. Id.
324. R. Stephen Burke, Comment, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ecstacy, and
the Irony for Insurance Companies, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 443,462-63 (1990).
325. Id. at 463.
326. Murphy, supra note 247, at 196.
327. Burke, supra note 324, at 459.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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in effective cleanup of contaminated sites." The costs of cleanup and the
financial viability of both the insured and insurer may be factors which
courts consider in determining whether an insurer is liable for
coverage."' Because pollution damage may take years to discover, current decisions potentially have a significant impact on future disputes."'
Although the federal courts appear to have generally supported the
insurers by interpreting "sudden and accidental" according to its plain
meaning, the onslaught of litigation over the meaning of the term has
resulted in a change of policy wording. ' The typical CGL policy now
carries an absolute pollution exclusion.3 However, the litigation in this
area is far from over. Discovering contamination takes time. Thus, courts
will continue to wrestle with the meaning of "sudden and accidental" in
CGL policies.
CONCLUSION

During the 1996-97 survey period, the Tenth Circuit held in Adams
v. Royal Indemnity Co. that the MCS-90 Endorsement can expand coverage on an automobile policy by redefining the policy's definition of an
insured.3 This finding is inconsistent with prior interpretations of the
endorsement and a factually similar Ninth Circuit case decided after Adams.
In Houston General Insurance Co. v. American Fence Co.,336 the
Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's personal truck did not constitute a temporary substitute vehicle, because the covered vehicle was
not out of service at the time of use." In Hays v. Jackson National Life
Insurance Co.,"8 the Tenth Circuit ruled that Oklahoma law required
proof of an intent to deceive in order to rescind the policy based on misrepresentations on the policy application. 9
Finally, in Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,' the
Tenth Circuit interpreted for the first time a pollution exclusion clause
under New Mexico law. The Tenth Circuit upheld the exclusion on the
ground that it did not eliminate all coverage under a basic policy and
because the pollution problem in this case was not "sudden and acciden-

330.
331.
332.
333.
exclusion
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Murphy, supra note 247, at 192.
Id.
Id.
See generally Burke, supra note 324, at 465-66 (describing the redrafting of the pollution
as a result of increased litigation).
Id. at 466.
99 F.3d 964, 971 (10th Cir. 1996).
115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).
Houston, 115 F.3d at 808.
105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
Hays, 105 F.3d at 588.
123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
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tal."34' This finding was consistent with a factually similar case, MinitLube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., that the Tenth Circuit decided in 1995.2
Sharon Cohen Collier

341. Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1341.
342. See Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1524 (10th
Cir. 1995).

OIL & GAS LAW
INTRODUCTION

Conflicts over oil and gas interests continually arise in situations
involving ownership of coalbed methane, royalty payments on settlement
proceeds, and tortious interference with oil and gas leases. The Tenth
Circuit addressed these conflicts during the survey period.' Part I summarizes the historical background and legislation surrounding oil and gas
law. Part II addresses ownership of coalbed methane within the context
of the multi-hundred million dollar case Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
Amoco Production Co.2 Part III discusses the payment of royalties on
settlement proceeds in Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell3 and Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.' Part IV examines issues involving tortious interference with oil leases in Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc.' and Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

As the natural gas industry boomed in the 1920s, inconsistent state
regulations created interstate transportation problems.! In a series of
opinions, the United States Supreme Court prohibited the states from
regulating interstate gas transportation In 1938, Congress responded
with the enactment of the Natural Gas Act (NGA). 9 The NGA delegated
1. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997. The
Tenth Circuit addressed some oil and gas law issues not discussed in this survey. First National Oil,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 102 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 1996), addressed "spin
down" authorizations. The Tenth Circuit addressed two other royalty-related issues. Tulsa Energy,
Inc. v. KPL Production, Co., 111 F.3d 88 (10th Cir. 1997), discussed the payment of interest accrued
on royalties. James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 124 F.3d 1321 (10th
Cir. 1997), involved royalty payments on settlement proceeds based on the interpretation of complex
mineral leases.
2. 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
3. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. 94F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 53, 53 (1995) ("State regulation of interstate transportation of gas created
intolerable problems ...").
8. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause of the United States
Constitution prohibited such state action. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co.,
273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1924); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1923).
9. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1994). The Act applies to the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or
sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local
distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
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to the Federal Power Commission the authority to set "just and reasonable" rates for the interstate resale of natural gas by pipelines and producers.'
Severe gas shortages due to industry regulation in the 1970s spurred
Congress to enact the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)." Under
the NGPA, Congress established the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, giving it the authority to determine price ceilings based on gas
price characteristics and the cost of locating and producing gas supplies.'2
In response to the new opportunity to purchase gas, pipelines committed
to large take-or-pay clauses in supply contracts. 3 This contractual restructuring between natural gas producers and purchasers created new
legal problems involving royalty obligations and take-or-pay contract
provisions."
This chronology set the stage for judicial resolution of royalty disputes. In addition, new problems arose with the ownership of coalbed
methane and tort-based claims.
II.

OWNERSHIP OF COALBED METHANE

A. Background

Coalbed methane (CBM) has sparked recent interest and problems.'5
CBM results from the coalification process whereby the carbonaceous
matter of plants initially decays to form peat.'6 Subsequently, thousands
of years of elevated pressure and temperature metamorphose the peat

Id. § 717(b).
10. Id. § 717c.
11. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 19 (1987)
[hereinafter Pierce, State Regulation]; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., National Gas Regulation,
Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 72 (1981) ("[A] call for deregulation followed the
publication of evidence linking regulation to shortages in the interstate gas market [in the 1970s].").
The NGPA functioned as a complicated compromise between gas pipeline operators and gas producers which sought to gradually phase in natural gas deregulation over the following several decades. See id. at 85-86.
12. Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1983).
13. Pierce, State Regulation, supra note 11, at 19.
14. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 226 (1996).
15. See Harry Cohen, Developing and Producing Coalbed Gas: Ownership, Regulation, and
Environmental Concerns, 2 PACE ENvrL. L. REV. I, 1-3 (1984). See generally Nancy P. Regelin,
Coalbed Gas Ownership in Pennsylvania-A Tenuous First Step with U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 23 DuQ.
L. REV. 735, 735 (1985) (commenting that the question of ownership of coalbed gas has only recently arisen). CBM is also known as "firedamp," "coalbed gas," or "coal seam gas." Jeff L. Lewin,
Coalbed Methane: Recent Court Decisions Leave Ownership "Up in the Air," but New Federal and
State Legislation Should Facilitate Production, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994).
16. Jeff L. Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative Determination of the Ownership ofCoalbed Methane, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 563,572 (1992).
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into coal and methane." This methane, called CBM, is found within the
micropores of coal.'8
Coal mining releases CBM in two steps. First, CBM detaches from
micropores and flows into larger macropores."9 Second, the gas travels
from the macropores through a series of fractures into the mine face.'
Although most CBM stays within the coal seam, some CBM leaks into
the coal strata." Regular mining practices create fractures or fissures in
the coal seam, which allows CBM to migrate to areas of relatively low
pressure.' The CBM collects in these areas, creating the potential for
explosions." Obviously, this susceptibility to explosions is a substantial
hazard for miners." Deadly explosions caused by CBM occur each year.'
In the past, miners extracted CBM from the coal mine prior to mining in
order to avoid this danger. 6 Today, federal law requires ventilation of
mining areas."
For most of the century, the coal mining industry only thought of
CBM as a hazard and a nuisance." Even though miners have been suc17. Id.
18. Stacy L. Leeds, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company: Judicial
Construction of Coalbed Methane Gas Ownership, 17 ENERGY L.J. 489, 490 (1996). Technically,
methane is located within coal because
biochemical and bacterial transformation [occurs] during the peat state of coal deposition and subsequently by metamorphic processes as buried peat increases in rank to
become coal. Because of the fine pore structure of coal and degraded peat, sorptive
capacities of such substance are very large so that much of the methane evolved during
coalification is held in the peat and in the coal.
Cohen, supra note 15, at 4. CBM and natural gas are compositionally similar, but not identical.
While methane is the primary component of each gas, CBM and natural gas can be distinguished due
to the presence of other chemical compounds within these two gases. Lewin et al., supra note 16, at
572.
19. Lewin etal., supra note 16, at 573.
20. Id.; Leeds, supra note 18, at 490.
21. Lee Davidson, Comment, Oil and Gas Law: Ownership of Coalbed Methane Gas, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 911,913 (1994). The coal seam is the "porous layer where solid rock is located."
Leeds, supra note 18, at 490 n. 10. The coal seam contains millions of tiny pores in which the coal is
found. Davidson, supra, at 913 n.33.
22. Leeds, supra note 18, at 490.
23. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914.
24. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 632.
25. Regelin, supra note 15, at 748-49.
26. Cohen, supra note 15, at 2.
27. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914. "All coal mines shall be ventilated by mechanical ventilation equipment installed and operated in a manner approved by an authorized representative of the
Secretary and such equipment shall be examined daily and a record shall be kept of such examination." 30 U.S.C. § 863(a) (1994). Additionally, Alabama requires that:
Main fans ventilating mines shall be operated continuously, except when the mine is shut
down with all power underground cut off and with all men out of the mine. When the fan
is started again, the mine shall be examined for gas and other hazards by certified persons
and declared safe before underground power may be restored and men other than the examiners permitted to enter the mine.
ALA. CODE § 25-9-80(i) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); cf. Regelin, supra note 15, at 750 (arguing
that ventilation practices waste a valuable energy resource).
28. See Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 567.
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cessfully extracting marketable CBM since the 1930s and 1940s, the
demand for CBM was historically low since alternative sources of oil
and gas were plentiful and inexpensive.' After the energy crisis of the
1970s, however, the energy industry began to consider CBM a valuable
and productive resource:"
Several factors served as catalysts for increased CBM production:
technological advancements enhanced CBM as a viable energy source;'
federal tax credits given for CBM production increased interest in the
resource; 2 and environmental concerns during the 1980s turned more
attention to CBM. 3 These 'catalysts forced advancements in CBM extraction technology4 and increased CBM production to the point that it
now constitutes approximately six percent of the United States' viable
gas reserves.3
As CBM production became viable, mineral owners began disputing
the legal issue of CBM ownership.' Problems exist when there is "a diversity of subsurface ownership rights, with one party holding title to the
coalbed and another party holding property interest in other subsurface
resources such as oil and gas. ..

29. Id.
30. Id. The energy crisis stimulated interest in CBM as an alternative energy resource. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914.
31. See Davidson, supra note 21, at 914 (suggesting that technological advancements spurred
CBM exploration and production). Geological advancement also aided CBM development. Donald
F. Santa & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14
ENERGY L.J. 1,44 (1993).
32. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914-15; see Santa & Beneke, supra note 31, at 45. CBM
qualifies for the nonconventional fuels tax credit under section 29 of the Internal Revenue Code.
I.R.C. § 29 (1996). Although the statute does not expressly refer to CBM, the definition of a gaseous
product in the coal strata includes CBM. Leeds, supra note 18, at 489 n.3.
33. See Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 583-87.
34. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914-15; see also Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 691 n.l 1
(listing various conferences held discussing CBM technology). West Virginia has recently welcomed
a plan to build a $200 million power plant fueled by CBM. Governor Announces Power Plant Plan,
(last modified Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.state.wv.us/govemor/Presstpower.html>.
35. Leeds, supra note 18, at 489. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the nation's
coalbeds may contain as much as 850 trillion cubic feet of available methane. Regelin, supra note
15, at 737.
36. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 3; Leeds, supra note 18, at 490. Most oil and gas leases do
not provide for ownership of CBM. Santa & Beneke, supra note 31, at 45. Most states lack legal
guidance on the issue. Id. Some leases do contain CBM ownership provisions; however, leases are
usually a standard form oil and gas lease which cannot easily be manipulated to include a CBM
ownership provision. See Harry Cohen, Leasing of Coalbed Methane Gas Rights----Are Oil and Gas
Lease Clauses Analogous?, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 703, 721-222 (1985). Lawyers are advised to draft
CBM leases on an individual basis and to not use standard form oil and gas leases. Id. at 722.
37. Leeds, supra note 18, at 490. "A person who holds the undivided 'fee simple title' to the
surface and to all coal, gas and other mineral rights in a property underlain with gas-bearing coal
strata undoubtedly has title to the CBM." Lewin, supra note 15, at 636. The ownership problem
usually arises when the mineral interests are transferred and the coal rights are severed from the gas
rights. Id.
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In 1981, the Department of the Interior attempted to resolve the
ownership issue and accelerate CBM development. 8 The Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Interior
detailing his legal opinion on the ownership issue. 9 The letter was subsequently promulgated as a Solicitor's Opinion. '
The Solicitor concluded that the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910
did not include CBM in the coal reservation and that the rights to CBM
passed to the surface owner when the patent was first issued."' In reaching this conclusion, the Solicitor found several factors to be relevant.
First, the Solicitor examined the physical characteristics of coal and
CBM and found that CBM is separate and distinct from coal because it is
a gas and potentially severable from coal. 2 Second, the Solicitor observed that CBM was considered to be a hazardous nuisance as evidenced in the legislative history of the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and
1910." Next, the Solicitor emphasized that the Uraniferous Lignite Act"
expressly stated which minerals were subject to a reservation in the
United States."5 Finally, he supported his conclusion by relying on case
law based on common law principles that a coal reservation does not
include CBM. '
Some courts have also addressed the CBM ownership issue, relying
on the physical properties of CBM and coal to resolve it."7 The first case
concerning CBM ownership, United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge," held
that ownership of CBM vested in the owner of the coal. '9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the physical characteristics of the CBM

38. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816,829 (10th Cir. 1997).
39. Id.
40. Id. The letter was promulgated without notice or comment. Id.
41. Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88 Interior Dec.
538, 538 (1981).
42. Id. at 540.
43. Id. at 541. "When coal was reserved by the United States under the 1909 and 1910 Acts,
coalbed gas was viewed not as a valuable resource, but as a nuisance, and an acknowledgement of its
hazardous qualities is found in the legislative history of the Act of June 22, 1910." Id. The Solicitor
relied on the colloquy of Congressmen Stephens and Mondell to determine that the legislative intent
of the Acts limited coal ownership to coal, not CBM. Id. at 542.
44. 69 Stat. 679 (1955) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 541-541i (1994)).
45. Id. at 542-43.
46. Id. at 544. However, the Solicitor admitted that the case was not controlling on the issue of
federal lands. Id.
47. See NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a
gas interest reservation includes CBM when the CBM migrates outside the coalbed); Vines v.
McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1309 (Ala. 1993) (holding that CBM ownership accompanies coal ownership); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the
coalbed owner also owns the CBM).
48. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
49. U.S. Steel, 468 A.2d at 1383.
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by specifying that the coal owner owns the CBM if it is still located
within the coal seam."
5
B. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co.

1. Facts
Between 1874 and 1880, the entire Southern Ute Indian Reservation
ceded to the United States due to the discovery of mineral resources on
the land. 52 The land was then opened up to homesteading and mineral
exploration. 3 In 1906, President Roosevelt withdrew 64 million acres
from homesteading to promote federal government interests in coal.' To
counteract the homesteading problems, Congress enacted the Coal Lands
Acts of 1909P and 1910' which allowed homesteaders to obtain patents
for land subject only to a reservation of coal. In 1934, Congress passed
the Indian Reorganization Act,' which restored the tribal lands back to
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, including equitable title to the coal, subject to outstanding homestead patents.'
In recent decades, Amoco, the owner of oil and gas leases on the
reservation lands, explored and extracted CBM from coal owned by the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe (Tribe).' However, the Tribe claimed ownership of the CBM since it held legal title to the coal.' As owner of the
coal, the Tribe sued, alleging that Amoco trespassed on tribal lands and
coal, failed to pay a severance tax to the Tribe, and deprived the Tribe of
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Tribe sought remedies including a declaratory judgment giving the Tribe CBM ownership and

50. Id.
51. 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
52. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 824.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 825.
55. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1994). The relevant portion of the Act states:
(Any person... may... upon making satisfactory proof of compliance with the laws
under which such lands are claimed, receive a patent therefore, which shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in said lands, and the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same.
Id.
56. 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). The relevant portion of the Act states:
[Ulpon satisfactory proof of full compliance with the provisions of the laws under which
entry is made, and of sections 83 to 85 of this title, the entryman shall be entitled to a patent to the land entered by him, which patent shall contain a reservation to the United
States of all the coal in the lands so patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same.
Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 825.
48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
Id. However, the land was actually returned to the Indians in 1938. Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
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requiring tribal consent for CBM extraction.' In addition, the Tribe
sought an order quieting title to the CBM, injunctive relief to halt CBM
extraction, damages for injuries to coal, title to all exploration and production facilities on tribal lands, and costs and attorney's fees.' The
Tribe also sued several federal defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as
trustees for the Tribe.'
The district court held that CBM ownership rested with Amoco and
granted summary judgment for the federal defendants on the breach of
fiduciary duty claim.' The court did not address the Tribe's other claims
since it found that Amoco owned the CBM. ' The Tribe appealed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the Tribe
owned the CBM 9 The court identified the issue upon appeal as whether
the Tribe, as owner of the coal, also owned the CBM.' ° The court first
turned to the acts of 1909 and 1910 to determine whether Congress intended to include or exclude CBM from the statutory reservation of
coal." The court found no specific congressional intent to include CBM
as part of coal because the plain meaning of the statutes did not define
coal nor indicate a congressional intent to include CBM as part of coal. 2
CBM could not economically or efficiently be extracted from coal in
1909, and therefore, Congress was unaware of the CBM's value. 3 The
court did find, however, that Congress had a broad general intent to reserve all coal with present and future economic value to the United

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The federal defendants included the Secretary of the Interior and the Department of the
Interior's subordinate agencies. Id.
66. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1161 (D. Colo. 1995).
67. Id.
68. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 820.
69. Id. at 836.
70. Id. at 820.
71. Id. at 821.
72. Id. at 824. Amoco argued that Congress's use of the word "coal" specifically referred only
to solid coal. Answer Brief for Amoco at 15, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579).
73. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 823 n. 11. In 1909, coal degasification was possible
but it required the extraction and destruction of the coal to obtain the coalbed methane gas. Id. In
contrast, CBM drilling "for the first time allows CBM to be released from coal without bringing
large volumes of coal to the surface. The technique is typically employed where the coal... cannot
economically be mined." Id.
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States." Congress realized that "full economic realization of that benefit
would require advances in technology.""
Amoco argued that the 1981 Solicitor's Opinion, which construed
the meaning of coal within the Acts of 1909 and 1910 to exclude CBM,
was controlling and should be given great deference. 6 The court, however, considered the Solicitor's Opinion to be arbitrary." Accordingly,
the court found that the general congressional intent behind the statutes
governed this issue.78 Therefore, the court held that coal ownership included CBM, which rested with the Tribe. 9 The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues.' °
Amoco petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing en banc.8'
Amoco alleged that the three-judge panel failed to consider the meaning
of "coal" and analyzed CBM in situ rather than at the wellhead.'2 Amoco
claimed that the Tenth Circuit also ignored historic treatment of mineral
reservations and erroneously refused to consider how CBM is treated
under the Mineral Leasing Act."
The Tribe contended that established statutory canons of construction required the court to resolve any ambiguities in favor of the government since the acts do not expressly convey CBM."' The Tribe also argued that since the only way to mine CBM in 1909 was through coal
mining, "Congress would not have granted CBM to agricultural entry-

74. Id. at 826. The court followed the Tribe's argument that Congress adopted a "broader
view" that accounted for future technological advancements that would expand CBM uses. Brief of
Southern Ute Indian Tribe at 33, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579). Amoco argued that
Congress chose a very narrow interpretation of coal. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 825.
75. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 828. "Courts have consistently construed mineral
reservations in favor of the United States." Id.
76. Id. at 829. The opinion was entitled Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in
Federal Coal Deposits, 88 Interior Dec. 538 (1981). Id.
77. Id. at 835-36. "An agency decision which is not reasoned persuades no more than it controls." Id. at 835.
78. Id. at 836.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Amoco's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Southern Ute
Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579).
82. Id. at 3. In situ means "not at the surface." Id. at 9. Amoco argued that since Congress
used the word "coal" instead of "gas" in the acts, Congress intended "coal" to mean solid rock. Id. at
4.
83. Id. at 11, 15-16. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994)). The Mineral Leasing Act construed with the acts of 1909 and 1910
would have, according to Amoco, compelled the court to consider "coal" to be solid rock. Id. at 1516.
84. Tribe's Supplemental Brief Rehearing En Banc at 7, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 941579).
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men . ..",Moreover, since the 1909 and 1910 acts reserved "all the
coal in the lands," Congress expressly retained ownership of all undis".

covered coal.'

. The Tenth Circuit granted Amoco's petition for a rehearing en
banc,
hearing oral arguments on March 17, 1998. The court reheard only the
issue of whether "coal" included CBM under the acts of 1909 and 1910.7
3. Postscript: Rehearing En Banc
The Tenth Circuit, in its opinion issued on July 20, 1998, affirmed its
decision granting the Tribe ownership of the CBM. 8 The court emphasized again that "ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms employed [in land
grants] should be resolved in favor of the government." " The court restated, almost verbatim, its analysis of the plain meaning of the statutes
and general congressional intent.'
The court expanded its previous analysis of specific congressional
intent by emphasizing that on the face of the statutes, the coal was reserved for subsequent mining and removal. 9' The court concluded that
the existence of alternative dictionary definitions created an ambiguity in
the statutes.' In response to the dissent and Amoco's reliance on the fact
that Congress created split mineral estates on public lands by the 1909
Act, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's seminal decision in United States Steel v. Hoge," which held that the CBM contained
within coal belonged to the owner of the coal estate, rather than the natural gas owner.' Therefore, Congress lacked the specific intent to exclude
CBM from its reservations of coal.

85. Id. at 15. The only way to extract CBM was through coal mining. Id. The right to mine
also included the right to vent CBM. Id. at 16. Therefore, CBM ownership vested with coal ownership. Id.
86. Id. at 28. The common dictionaries and encyclopedias of the early 1900s indicate that coal
contained gaseous components now called CBM. Id. at 29.
87. Order, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579) (order granting rehearing en banc). The
court declined to rehear argument concerning the Solicitor's Opinion.
88. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94-1759, 1998 WL 404549 (10th Cir.
July 20, 1998).
89. Id. (quoting Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 680 (1914)).
90. Id. at *4, *10-14.
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id. at *5-6. The court stated that
Amoco and the dissent focus solely on the word "coal" and totally ignore what is apparent from the face of the statutes: the coal was reserved from patents issued to land claimants under the land grants of "non-mineral" lands to homesteaders; the lands had been
"classified, claimed, or reported as being valuable for coal;" and the reservation of coal
included "the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same."
Id.
93. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
94. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *8-9.
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C. Analysis

The analysis of both the Tenth Circuit and district court centered on
the definitions of coal and CBM.9' However, the Tenth Circuit arrived at
the opposite conclusion than the district court while using similar references, such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and legislative history.' The
district court felt that the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 were unambiguous because Congress only intended to reserve solid rock coal exclusive of the CBM retained within the coal. 97 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the exclusion of the words "coalbed methane" from the
acts created an ambiguity in the statutes because no evidence existed that
Congress intended the gas owners to also own CBM, an inherent constituent of coal." The existence of alternative definitions of coal and
CBM also created an ambiguity in the statutes.'
The Tenth Circuit continued the analysis by applying the canon of
statutory construction that "ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms employed [in land grants] should be reserved in favor of the government.""
The Tenth Circuit's decision hinged on its interpretation of coal and the
legislative history indicating that Congress reserved all constituents of
coal, including CBM, when it reserved "all the coal" to the United States
with an eye toward the future economic value of CBM and advancements in extraction technology.' 1°
The Tenth Circuit's decision that a coal reservation includes CBM
is not unusual. The Tenth Circuit followed other jurisdictions resolving
the CBM ownership issue in favor of the coal owner by focusing on the
physical characteristics of CBM and coal.'" In its analysis of specific
95. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 822-23 (10th Cir.
1997); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (D. Colo. 1995).
96. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 822-23; cf.Southern Lte Indian Tribe, 874 F.
Supp. at 1153 (deciding that the Congress intended the coal to mean "solid rock fuel").
97. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 874 F. Supp. at 1153.
98. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 822. "[CBM] is not sufficiently like other natural
gases for us to conclude that Congress unambiguously intended the owners of other natural gases to
also own CBM associated with the reserved coal." Id.
99. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *5-6.
100. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 821 (quoting Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234
U.S. 669, 680 (1914)).
101. Id. at 826. The court stated:
Rather than indicating a limited reservation of coal to the United States, the legislative
history suggests that Congress adopted an interpretation of coal which encompassed
both the present and future economic value of coal, including value that could only be
realized through advances in technology such as those which drive the present day exploration for CBM.
Id.
102. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *9; see NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v.
West, 631 So. 2d 212, 221 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the coal owner owns CBM contained in coal but
the gas owner owns migrated CBM); Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1309
(Ala. 1993) (finding that coal ownership extends to CBM); United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468
A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (deciding that CBM ownership vested in the coal owner).
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congressional intent, the court emphasized that extraction methods did
not exist in 1909 and that CBM, an essential component of coal, was
trapped within coal." Although the court in its decision declined to follow these cases because the Southern Ute case involved a statutory
analysis rather than a common law analysis, the court relied on these
cases in its rehearing en banc and appropriately focused more on the
physical properties and difficult extraction methods of CBM as justification for its holding that the coal owner also owned the CBM contained
within the coal.",
Although the Tenth Circuit took a positive step toward resolving the
CBM ownership issue, legal uncertainty still remains because the decision is highly fact specific and will only be applicable in situations involving the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910.0 Lawyers and regulatory
agencies will continue to struggle with the problematic application of
existing oil and gas laws to CBM ownership, exploration, extraction, and
production."' Due to varying physical conditions, oil and gas statutes do
not apply to CBM, magnifying the need for specific regulation of CBM
ownership through legislation. 7
III. ROYALTY PAYMENTS FROM SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
A. Background
During the 1970s and 1980s, gas purchasers frequently entered into
long-term contracts including "take-or-pay" clauses with gas producers."
These clauses gave gas purchasers two options. The gas purchaser could
take a specific quantity of gas at the maximum lawful price during each
contract year,"° or the gas purchaser could also make one annual payment
to the gas producer if the quantity of gas taken fell below the minimum

Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.2d at 823. The court stated:
It is not reasonable to impute to Congress a desire to retain only solid rock coal constituents and to convey gaseous coal constituents when CBM is an integral component
of coal and in 1909 there appears to have been no technology by which a patent holder
could extract CBM from coal without damaging or destroying the coal.

103.

Id.
104. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94-1759, 1998 WL 404549, at *8-9
(I 0th Cir. July 20, 1998). Cf. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 828 n. 17.
105. Leeds, supra note 18, at 500.
106. Cohen, supra note 15, at 15.
107. Id. at 15-16. Oil and gas conservation statutes prevent the loss of "oil and gas by inefficient production." Id. at 17. However, CBM, will not be lost if owners do not compete for it, because
it must be stimulated before it can be removed. Id.
108. Beverly M. Barrett, Note, Oil and Gas: Roye Realty v. Watson: Are Royalties Owed on all
Take-or-Pay Settlements in Oklahoma?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 745,745 (1993).
109. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988). Takeor-pay clauses required the gas purchaser to make minimum payments even if no gas was taken.
Barrett, supra note 108, at 745.
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annual contractual quantity.' ° Take-or-pay clauses "apportion the risks of
natural gas production and sales between the buyer and seller."" Since
the gas producer bore the risk of production, the gas purchaser compensated by agreeing to take a minimum quantity of gas." 2 Gas pipelines, as
purchasers, also benefited from take-or-pay contracts."3
During the energy crisis of the 1970s, take-or-pay payments became
substitutes for price competition."" Severe gas shortages compelled Congress to enact the National Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), which required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate gas
through classifications." 5 When the NGPA prevented gas producers from
competing for prices, gas producers turned to take-or-pay clauses for
protection against demand fluctuations." 6 The percentage of contracts
containing take-or-pay clauses increased from twenty-five percent in the
early 1970s to as much as ninety percent at the apex of the gas market. 7
When gas demand declined in the 1980s, gas purchasers found themselves saddled with enormous take-or-pay liabilities, frequently greater
than their net worth."' Purchasers defaulted on their take-or-pay agreements, spurring enormous amounts of litigation." 9 Purchasers' potential

110. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., 853 F.2d at 1164. The gas purchaser can also take
the oil or gas already paid for in the following years. Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil,
Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. LAW. 885, 894
n.30 (1997).
111. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., 853 F.2d at 1167 (citing Universal Resources Corp.
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987)).
112. Id. "[Tiake-or-pay payments are payments for the pipeline-purchaser's failure to purchase
(take) gas." Id. (citing Pennzoil Co. v. State, No. 104-35 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 20, 1986), affd, State
v. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1995)).
113. See Angela Jeanne Crowder, Comment, Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements--Does the
Landowner Share?, 49 LA. L. REV. 921, 922 (1989) ("Since gas cannot be stored, the pipelines
could now take only the amounts needed and, rather than face breaching the contracts when the
market demand was low, simply pay for the remaining amounts not taken.").
114. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 263 n.269 ("[In the 1970s ...pipeline companies used high
take-or-pay commitments as substitutes for price competition, which was barred by the federal gas
regulatory scheme."); Joseph P. Tomain, Energy Policy Advice for the New Administration, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 73-74 (1989) (discussing how the effects of the oil embargo, regulation,
and gas shortages in the mid-1970s encouraged oil producers and purchasers to enter into take-orpay contracts).
115. Pierce, supra note 7, at 54. The categories pertain to "certain characteristics of gas supplies and the costs of producing those supplies," which FERC used to determine price ceilings.
Pierce, supra note 12, at 348.
116. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227; see also Pierce, supra note 7, at 55.
117. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. FERC estimated that gas purchasers' take-or-pay agreements accrued between $7 and $10 billion by 1984. William H. White, The Right to Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 664 (1988).
118. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. Pipelines suffered losses in the form of "payments for gas not
taken, above-market payments for gas that was taken, or payments to settle contract disputes." J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1122 (1997).
119. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227 ("When gas demand ... declined sharply in the early 1980s,
the gas boom became a litigation boom as gas pipelines defaulted on their take-or-pay obligations..
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liability ranged from sixty to seventy billion dollars and settlement costs
ranged from twelve to fifteen billion dollars.'2" The lawsuits and settlements between gas producers and purchasers sparked a new surge of
litigation over whether royalty owners were entitled to a share of the
producers' settlement awards.'2'
Most jurisdictions do not allow royalties for take-or-pay payments
or settlements unless the payment is for gas actually produced. The Fifth
Circuit in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel'22 held that royalties were not due on take-or-pay payments, reasoning that no gas was
produced at the time a payment was made.'" Royalties are due only when
gas was produced, and production means "the actual physical severance
of minerals from the formation."'2
A minority of jurisdictions apply the "cooperative venture" theory,
allowing royalties for take-or-pay payments even without the actual production of gas.'" In Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the cooperative venture analysis.' v The court looked
at the general intent of the parties when entering into the lease, equitable
principles, and economic realities of the industry. If the lease was silent
. ."). Some take-or-pay agreements allow for time to "make up" the gas not taken. White, supra note
117, at 663. However, if the purchaser does not take the gas within the scheduled "make up" period,
the purchaser may be liable to the seller for the costs. Id.
120. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. FERC promoted settlements by encouraging producers to
offer credits against take-or-pay claims. John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty Problems in the
Gas Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547, 560-61 (1988) [hereinafter Lowe, Current Lease].
121. White, supra note 117, at 663-64. A royalty is the "landowner's share of production, free
of expenses of production." Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1371,
1376 (1997). As one commentator stated, "royalty owners are increasingly more sophisticated and
cognizant of their rights and lately have become much more litigious." Si M. Bondurant, Royalty
Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571, 571 (1990). Another commentator suggests that courts usually do not experience problems with enforcing the terms of take-or-pay contracts as a matter of law. John Burritt McArthur, A Twelve-Step Program fbr COPAS to Strengthen
Oil and Gas Accounting Protections, 49 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1455 n.9 (1996).
122. 853 F.2d 1159(5th Cir. 1988).
123. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1164. The court held that the value of production is
indeterminable until gas is taken. Id. at 1166-67.
124. Id. at 1168. "Production requires severance of the mineral from the ground." State v.
Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988).
125. See Ban-ett, supra note 108, at 750-52. A "cooperative venture" requires the lessor to
contribute the land and the lessee to contribute the expertise and capital to develop minerals for the
parties mutual benefit. Crowder, supra note 113, at 928-29. The lease is merely a "bargained-for
exchange." Patricia A. Brown, Klein v. Jones: Equitable Right to Royalties on Take-or-Pay Settlements, 47 ARK. L. REV. 749, 775 (1994). The cooperative venture theory is an extension of the
"Harrell rule," which characterizes a gas lease as a mutually beneficial relationship between lessor
and lessee. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996). Professor Thomas
Harrell coined the terms "Harrell rule" and "cooperative venture." Lowe, supra note 14, at 241-42.
126. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
127. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 173. The court's use of the cooperative venture theory was based on
unusual state statutes that could be interpreted to expand royalty obligations based on unjust enrichment. Lowe, supra note 14, at 257.
128. See Brown, supra note 125, at 772-73; Lowe, supra note 14, at 240-41; Barrett, supra note
108, at 750-5 1.
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on the production of gas as a prerequisite to royalty payments on take-orpay agreements, the court did not require actual production if such an
intent could not be found in the lease negotiations or related extrinsic
docum ents.'" Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's rationale, the Tenth
Circuit declined to apply the cooperative venture approach and required
the actual production of gas for royalties on take-or-pay payments."
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell3.
a. Facts
The New Mexico State Land Office issued oil and gas leases in state
lands held in trust for various beneficiaries, including educational institutions.'32 Harvey E. Yates Co. (HEYCO) produced natural gas under
many of these leases.'33 HEYCO entered thirty-five gas supply contracts
with two pipeline companies, El Paso Natural Gas Company and Transwestern Pipeline Company."'3 The contracts included take-or-pay clauses
which later became impractical as the natural gas market price dropped.'3"
HEYCO settled with the two pipeline companies, but failed to pay the
state royalties for settlement payments as required by New Mexico law.'36
However, HEYCO did pay royalties on gas produced after the settlements.
HEYCO and the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association (NMOGA)
filed a declaratory judgment action in district court against the Commissioner of Public Lands (Commissioner) to invalidate a New Mexico State
Land Office regulation governing royalty payments and calculations for
oil and gas leases.' 8 The Commissioner filed a counterclaim in federal
district court for royalty payments and damages based on HEYCO's settlements.' 9 The court granted summary judgment for HEYCO on all of
the Commissioner's counterclaims, determining that royalty payments

129. See Lowe, supranote 14, at 240-41.
130. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1996).
131. 98F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
132. ,Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1226.
133. Id. at 1227.
134. Id. Thirty-three of these contracts were with the El Paso Natural Gas Company and two
with the Transwestern Pipeline Company. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1227-28.
137. Id. For example, HEYCO paid royalties to the state on gas produced at lower spot market
prices following the Transwestern settlement. Id.
138. Id. at 1226. The case refers to the regulation as "Rule 1.059." Id.
139. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of
HEYCO."2 First, the court addressed whether HEYCO breached its duty
to pay the state royalties on the settlement proceeds."" Under the plain
meaning of the New Mexico statute governing oil and gas leases, the
court determined that the lessee was only obligated to pay royalties on
gas actually produced.'"
The court developed a three-part framework to determine whether
royalties are due on cash settlement payments from the various types of
leases containing take-or-pay clauses." First, the gas must be physically
extracted from the ground before royalty payments are due on a production-type lease." Second, cash settlements for a take-or-pay lease con4
tract are not royalty-bearing.'"
Third, the lessee must pay the lessor royalties on a buy-down portion of a settlement payment that is a buy-down
of the contract price for gas at the time of production.'"
The court used this framework to reject the Commissioner's argument that the lease should be broadly construed with emphasis placed on
the intent of the parties when entering into the lease contract. 9 The court
also rejected the Commissioner's reliance on cases applying the "cooperative venture" approach to require royalty payments on take-or-pay
settlement proceeds." Unlike the cases on which the Commissioner relied, the New Mexico statute did not broadly define royalty payments
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
at 1241.
143. Id. at 1229. "Although the terms of the New Mexico oil and gas lease are prescribed by
statute,
the lease itself is a contract between the State as lessor on the one hand and HEYCO as
lessee on the other." Id. at 1229-30.
144. Id. at 1230. The statute states:
Subject to the free use without royalty, as hereinbefore provided, at the option of the lessor at any time and from time to time, the lessee shall pay the lessor as royalty one-eighth
part of the gas produced and saved from the leased premises, including casing-head gas.
Unless said option is exercised by lessor, the lessee shall pay the lessor as royalty oneeighth of the cash value of the gas, including casing-head gas, produced and saved from
the leased premises and marketed or utilized, such value to be equal to the net proceeds
derived from the sale of such gas in the field ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-10-4.1 (Michie 1978 and Repl. 1994).
145. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1231 (citing Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822
S.W.2d 153, 164 (rex. Ct. App. 1991); Killam Oil Co. v. Bnni, 806 S.W.2d 264,268 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The amount must reflect a "fair apportionment of the price adjustment payment over
the purchases affected by such price adjustment." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1231-32.
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and specifically linked royalty payments with gas production. 5 ' The
court concluded that HEYCO did not owe royalty payments to the state
unless gas was actually produced.'
Next, the court addressed whether HEYCO's settlement proceeds
from El Paso and Transwestem were paid for gas production.' 3 The
payment of royalties depended on whether the proceeds were ascribed to
take-or-pay deficiencies based on non-production or whether the proceeds were ascribed to price adjustments to be obtained in the future.'-'
The court believed a genuine issue of material fact existed because the
record was unclear and, therefore, remanded the case to the district
court.'5"

2.

Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co."
a. Facts

Several lessors of oil and gas interests (Lessors) sued Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) for failure to pay royalties on settlement proceeds.' 7 ARCO received $300 million in recoupable payments from a
settlement with a gas pipeline purchaser.'58 ARCO paid the lessors royalties on gas produced but not from the settlement proceeds.' The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of ARCO, reasoning that
ARCO's lease did not include royalty payments for settlement proceeds
and the proceeds were not attributable to gas production.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed ARCO's duty to pay royalties.'6 ' These
"production-type" leases only required royalty payments when gas was

151. Id. at 1233 (discussing the fact that under New Mexico state law, royalties are specifically
linked to gas which is produced on the leased premises). The cases cited by the Commissioner, Frey
v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992), and Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.
1992), involved constructively different statutes which did not explicitly linkeroyalties to gas production. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1233-34.
152. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d. at 1234-35.
153. Id. at 1235.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
157. Watts, 115 F.3d at 789. Lessors also filed a claim, not discussed in this survey, against
ARCO for failure to obtain the best price available. Id.
158. Id. The gas pipeline producer in this case, Arkla, bought gas from ARCO produced at the
Wharton Field. Id. at 788. Litigation between ARCO and Arkla subsequently arose over Arkla's
refusal to purchase gas produced at the Wharton Field, resulting in the $300 million recoupable
payments. Id. at 788-89.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 788-89, 790.
161. Id.
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actually produced.'62 The court determined that the district court erred in
deciding that royalties were not due because payment of settlement proceeds were not included in the lease."' The court reasoned that the settlement proceeds must have been expressly excluded from the leases."M
Consequently, settlement proceeds are technically for gas produced and
sold.'"
In addition, the court addressed whether the settlement proceeds
were attributable to actual production."M The court relied on its prior decision in Harvey E. Yates Co. to resolve this issue."' However, a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the non-cash settlement proceeds constituted payment for produced gas.' " The court reversed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of ARCO and remanded the issue to
the district court.'
C. Other Circuits
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Century Offshore Management
Corp.'7" faced a similar issue of whether settlement payments were royalty-bearing.'7 ' Century Offshore Management Corp. (Century), a natural
gas producer, leased federally-owned land, subject to royalties.' Century
contracted with Enron for the sale of gas.' 3 Enron paid Century a lump
sum to terminate the contracts containing take-or-pay provisions and
replace them with new contracts.' Century failed to pay the government
royalties on the lump sum payment.' 5
The court interpreted Diamond Shamrock to require some nexus
with production and determined that the replacement contracts provided
the necessary nexus between payment and production.' The court reasoned that the lump sum payment constituted an advance payment for
162. Id. at 791. "Under the plain terms of these so-called 'production-type' leases, the lessee is
not obligated to pay a royalty on the value of gas in the abstract, but only on the cash value of gas
that is actually produced and sold from the leased property." Id. (citing Harvey E. Yates Co. v.
Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1231).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 790.
168. Id. at 794 ("Although the district court concluded that none of the settlement proceeds
were related to the production of gas, the record does not allow us to rule out such a finding. We,
therefore, reverse... [and] remand to the district court for further proceedings on this question.").
169. Id.
170. 111 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1997).
171. Century, I11F.3dat443.
172. Id. at 445.
173. Id. at 446.
174. Id. at 447.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 449-50. "Though this gas was not make-up gas, it is analogous to make-up gas in the
sense that though it is paid after the payment at issue, it provides a link to production." Id. at 450.
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production sold; therefore, the lessee must pay royalties on the lump sum
payment when the gas was produced.'"
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has developed into what some commentators call
a "plain terms" jurisdiction.'78 The court will not look at the intent of the
parties or other extrinsic evidence when interpreting a lease.' 79 Instead,
the court will look only at the plain language in the lease without considering the parties' intent or relationship.'" Therefore, parties should carefully draft the lease to incorporate provisions for royalty payments on
take-or-pay payments or settlements.'8'
The Sixth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, appears to be a plain terms
jurisdiction requiring gas to be produced before royalties were due.'82
However, the Sixth Circuit seemed to allow a broader interpretation of
production since no gas was actually produced at the time the lump sum
was paid in Century.'
IV. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH OIL LEASES
A. Background

Oil and gas production may interfere with the oil producing capabilities of neighboring mineral leases through the use of water flood

177. Id.
178. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 244. A plain terms jurisdiction defines the royalty obligation
by only looking at the plain terms of the royalty clause. Id. One commentator contends that most
courts will eventually adopt the cooperative venture approach for three reasons. Id. at 251-52. First,
analyzing a lease as a cooperative venture is realistic because the presence, quantity, and production
of minerals is uncertain. Id. at 252. Second, the plain terms of a lease are only helpful in the field,
not to the parties. Id. Third, royalty has historically been payable in kind upon production. Id. at 25253.
179. Id. at 244.
180. Id. According to one commentator, royalty owners are more likely to win in cooperative
venture jurisdictions than in plain term jurisdictions. Id. at 254.
181. James E. Prince, Note, Production, Production, What is Production?: Diamond Shamrock
v. Hodel, 1989 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1350. Royalty payments due to lessors depend largely on the
terms of the royalty clause in the oil and gas lease. Arthur J. Wright & Carla J. Sharpe, Direct Gas
Sales: Royalty Problems for the Producer, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 235, 236 (1993). Private lease holders
should draft leases according to their own terms. Id. Parties should negotiate lease terms and expressly include the negotiation results in the lease. See Crowder, supra note 113, at 929. The parties
should delete any offending clauses. See Bondurant, supra note 121, at 599. The interests of the
lessee and lessor should coincide in the royalty clause, ensuring clarity. David E. Pierce, Incorporating a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 786, 830 (1994).
182. See Century, Ill F.3d at 449.
183. Id.
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projects and the drainage of oil and gas from one lease to another.'" Such
damage to production may constitute a tortious act."5
Lessees engaging in oil production enhancement techniques, such as
subsurface fluid injection and hydraulic fracturing, which damage neighboring production, may be liable under various tort theories, such as subsurface trespass and private nuisance.'" A typical injection method involves "pumping salt water (or other fluid) into an injection well as part
of an enhancement recovery operation to 'sweep' hydrocarbons toward
producing wells, thereby recovering reserves incremental to primary
recovery ....,' Courts have generally held the lessee liable for subsurface trespass if the injection operations reduced the adjoining property's
mineral recovery. ' "
Similarly, hydraulic fracturing invokes the same subsurface trespass
claims.'" Hydraulic fracturing pumps viscous fluids into a well bore to
fracture the reservoir rock." The fracture serves as a drain for oil and gas
extraction.'9 ' However a subsurface trespass may result since the size and
direction of the fracture is controlled by the compressive stress of the
rock formation and not the operator."
A lessee also has a duty to protect the leased property against drainCourts recognize an implied covenant to protect against drainage,
even if the term is not found in the lease.' 8 Courts require the lessee to
age.'93

184. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 795 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing gas drainage into surrounding leases); Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing water flood projects); see Pierce, State Regulation, supra note I1,at 20-21.
185. Watts, 115 F.3d at 795.
186. Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing:The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA
L.J. 311,335 (1993).
187. Id. Other methods of fluid injection include "pumping salt water into a well to inexpensively dispose of 'waste' fluids in a salt water formation ... and ..
injecting natural gas into an
underground storage reservoir." Id.
188. Id. at 335-36.
189. Id. at 338.
190. Id. at 338. The "fluid is mixed with a proppant and pumped with sufficient pressure into a
well bore" to create the fracture which extends into the producing area. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444, 446 (10th Cir. 1945). Drainage is
defined as the "[m]igration of oil or gas in a reservoir due to a pressure reduction caused by production from wells bottomed in the reservoir." Bruce M. Kramer, The Interaction Between the Common
Law Implied Covenants to Prevent Drainage and Market and the Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 15 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. I, I n.3 (1995). Factors to consider when dealing with
drainage include reservoir location, presence of adjoining wells draining the reservoir, and the
amount of gas the wells lose from drainage. John Burritt McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 180 (1996).
194. See Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases-Past,Present & Future,
33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 640 (1994) ("While some have contended that implied covenants are implied in fact, candor requires us to acknowledge that implied covenants are judicial creations ....
(Tihe courts require that the lessee conform to some standard of fair dealing with the lessor.").
Courts define implied covenants as "unwritten promises" that originate from oil and gas lease ambi-
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conform to a "reasonably prudent operator" standard.'" A prudent operator's duty includes "the doing of that which an experienced operator
of ordinary prudence should do" on the premises, while having due regard for the interests of both lessor and lessee.'"
To establish a breach of an implied covenant to protect against
drainage, the lessor must first establish that oil or gas has been, or is being, drained from the lease.'97 Second, the lessor must prove that drilling
an offset well would abate the problem by recovering operating costs and
a reasonable profit.'" The lessee does not bear the burden, however, of an
implied duty to drill an offset well if it would be economically
infeasible.'" Remedies for a breach of a drainage covenant are usually
monetary damages.'
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc."'
a. Facts
Rhodes Field is a common underground oil supply subject to many
leases.' Morsey owned a lease (Section 20) at Rhodes Field.' Chevron
operated a water flood project on neighboring oil leases.' The previous
owners of the Morsey and Chevron leases committed to a cooperative
waterflood project.' The flood project involved the injection of water

guities and the relationship between lessor and lessee. Lowe, Current Lease, supra note 120, at 564.
Some leases include express obligations to protect against drainage. McArthur, supra note 193, at
180.
195. Martin, supra note 194, at 640-41. Courts control the lessee's behavior by imposing this
standard which is analogous to tort law's "reasonable man" standard. Id. at 666.
196. Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446. "Whatever... would be reasonably expected of operators of
ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required."
Kramer, supra note 193, at 7 (citing Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801,814 (8th Cir. 1905)).
197. Kramer, supra note 193, at 8-9.
198. Id. at 9.
199. Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446. "No obligation rests upon the lessee to carry the operations
beyond the point where they are profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor would result
from them." Id.
200. Kramer, supra note 193, at 11-12. The underlying cause of action is usually a breach of
contract claim. Id. at 11. Royalty owners can also seek class remedies. McArthur, supra note 193, at
180. However, class action drainage claims often fail the numerosity element, because only one or
two wells may be affected, or the commonality element, because the plaintiffs interests may not be
common enough if some lessors benefit while others are hurt by drainage. Id.
201. 94F.3d 1470 (l0th Cir. 1996).
202. Morsey, 94 F.3d at 1473. The Rhodes Field produces oil from the Mississippi formation
4,450 feet underground. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1474.
205. Id. at 1473.
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through pipes into the field.' The project recovered otherwise unrecoverable oil reserves.'
Morsey claimed that Chevron's flood project "interfered with and
damaged the oil producing capabilities of his oil lease."' When Chevron
used injection pumps, the fluid level of Morsey's wells dropped.' Morsey sued Chevron for temporary and permanent damages, damages inflicted on the leasehold prior to his acquisition, and punitive damages" '
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Chevron on all
of Morsey's claims."'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Chevron on Morsey's claims." 2 The court noted that
Kansas law gives leaseholders a remedy for wrongful interference with a
lease." ' Such interference includes injury to the oil producing ability of
the lease.""
Initially, the court addressed Morsey's request for temporary damages." ' Temporary damages limit recovery to intermittent and abatable
injuries." 6 Morsey failed to bear the burden of proving that the water
preventing oil production on Section 20 could be remedied, removed, or
abated within a reasonable time.2 ' Morsey's suggestion that the damage
might be abated was insufficient." 8 Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chevron on this issue."9
The court also rejected Morsey's argument that his punitive damages claim should be heard before a jury.2" The court reasoned that since
Morsey failed to prove actual, temporary damages, his claim for punitive
206. Id.
207. Id. The water pumped into the field raised the pressure in the field forcing out reserves
otherwise unrecoverable. See id.
208. Id. at 1474.
209. Id. Furthermore, it was determined that water from the Rhodes Unit was being communicated to the Morsey lease. Id.
210. Id. Morsey claimed that his predecessors-in-interest assigned all fights to him; therefore,
he was entitled to recover damages that occurred prior to his acquisition of the leasehold. Id.
211. Id. at 1474-75.
212. Id. at 1477-78.
213. Id. at 1475. "[A] leaseholder is entitled to a remedy for wrongful interference with his or
her interest in the leasehold." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1476 (citing McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 662 P.2d 1203, 1212 (Kan. 1983)).
217. Id. at 1476-77. The court stated that the possibility that the condition could reasonably be
remedied, removed or abated was insufficient for proving temporary damages. Id. ("[P]roof of
temporary damages requires more.").
218. Id. "Possibilities are not proof, and ... speculation and conjecture are no substitute for
evidence." Id. at 1477.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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damages also failed."' The court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Chevron.'
Finally, the court addressed Morsey's claim that his acquisition of
the lease included his predecessors' right to sue for past injuries.' Kansas law prohibits assignment of this type of tort claim." ' Damages to the
leasehold prior to Morsey's acquisition belonged to his predecessors-ininterest and expired when the lease was transferred to Morsey. ' Thus,
the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against
Morsey on this claim."
2. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co."'
a. Facts
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued Field Rules recognizing the Arbuckle Formation as a common gas supply.' The Field
Rules specified monthly "allowables" limiting production at each unit. '
The Field Rules were designed to make sure each well produced only its
fair share.'m Whenever a well underproduced its allowable amount (underage), the Field Rules allowed the underage to be carried over into the
next month."' The underages would be cancelled after exceeding a specified limit.
Several of Atlantic Richfield Company's (ARCO) wells accumulated underages approaching cancellation levels.23 To make up for the
underages and satisfy the Field Rules' allowable requirement, ARCO
began workover operations which increased production in these wells.24
Lessors, who owned neighboring leases, maintained that the workovers
drained gas from their wells, resulting in decreased gas production. '
Lessors sued ARCO for uncompensated drainage, but the district court
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1478.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
228. Watts, 115 F.3d at 789. "[A]ny one well could ultimately drain all the gas in the formation." id.
229. Id. "Allowables" are limits on the monthly production of gas for each unit of wells at the
Arbuckle Formation. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. The accumulated underage increased the limit on future production. Id.
232. Id. The Field Rules included an "Effective Date" which gave the Unit Operator from May
I, 1990, to December 31, 1991, to adjust any under and over production before the amounts were
subject to cancellation. Id.
233. Id. at 789-90.
234. Id. at 790.
235. Id.
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granted summary judgment in favor of ARCO because the Field Rules
barred Lessors' claims.2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of ARCO.f' Under Oklahoma law, oil and gas leases
contain an implied covenant to develop a lease as a prudent operator by
protecting against drainage, and failing to do so may constitute a tortious
act ."' The court rejected the district court's reasoning that the Field Rules
excused ARCO from liability and found that nothing in the Field Rules
prevented ARCO from protecting against drainage."
C. Analysis
Some commentators assert that courts are usually unwilling to assess liability due to strong public policy in favor of promoting enhanced
oil and gas production. 2" Similarly, the Tenth Circuit appeared to favor
production over the rights of neighboring lease owners, like Morsey"
Morsey bore the burden of proving that Chevron could have remedied
the damage resulting from the water flood project, leaving no room for
the mere possibility of abatement.42 The Tenth Circuit will not penalize
oil producers and hinder production even if the plaintiff shows that damage abatement is probable. This reasoning promotes enhanced oil and gas
production.4 Consequently, the individual lease owner will not prevail
against the oil and gas company even if the lease owner's property is
damaged."
The Tenth Circuit in Watts further promoted oil and gas production
by protecting leases from drainage.2 '5 The Tenth Circuit is willing to imply a covenant to protect against drainage despite the absence of local
laws to the contrary.2' Therefore, a lessee who is draining oil or gas from
a neighboring lease will be exposed to potential liability.

236. Id.
237. Id. at 796.
238. Id. (citing Morriss v. Barton, 190 P.2d 451, 457 (Okla. 1947)).
239. Id. at 796.
240. See Ragsdale, supra note 186, at 335 (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d
560, 568 (Tex. 1962)).
241. Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1996).
242. See id. at 1476-77 ("[P]roof of temporary damages requires more.').
243. See Ragsdale, supra note 186, at 335.
244. See id.
245. See Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 796 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
Atlantic Richfield Company is required to comply with its implied duty to protect against drainage).
246. Id. at 795.
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CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit addressed a very controversial issue regarding
CBM ownership and attempted to clarify ambiguities in the statutory
language used to identify coal and CBM ownership rights. The issue will
remain uncertain, however, until Congress passes specific legislation
governing CBM. In contrast, the court did not deviate from the established law governing royalty payments of settlement proceeds and tortious interference with oil and gas leases.
MirandaK. Peterson

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

Most Americans have limited, if any, knowledge or concern about
what happens inside of prisons.' Individuals outside prison walls hear
only the most severe and exceptional cases involving inmates' suffering.'
Prisoners often suffer harm beyond segregation from society and loss of
liberty.' For the many prisoners who are forced to endure harsh prison
conditions or treatment, their only relief is the judicial system.' During
the 1996-97 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases involving prisoners' rights. This survey focuses on five significant cases,
dividing them into two distinct categories. Part I provides a brief background of prisoners' rights. Part II addresses three cases concerning the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Part III discusses Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable searches
and seizures.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

Courts have unequivocally upheld the notion that incarceration for a
crime does not force a prisoner to entirely sacrifice his constitutional
protections. The prisoner, however, will have fewer rights than he had
prior to his imprisonment.! Courts tend to justify this position based on

1. Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 921
(1992).
2. See id. at 921.
3. Jason D. Sanabria, Note and Comment, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any
Rights Left Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHITHiER L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1995).
4. See James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights
of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 101-02 (1987).
5. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
6. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Prison inmates also retain other rights.
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (finding right to be free from creel and
unusual punishment); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-23 (1972) (per curiam) (reaffirming right to
freedom of religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (finding a right to petition the
government for redress of grievance and the right of access to the courts); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546, 642 (1941) (holding that incarceration does not deprive prisoners of their right of access to
courts).
7. Tracy McMath, Comment, Do Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protection
From Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1987). See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (holding that although prisoners retain the fundamental right to marriage, this
right is subject to limitations as a result of incarceration); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56 (restating that
prisoners' due process rights are not stripped with incarceration, subject to restrictions consistent
with the legitimate administration of prisons); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974) (determining that regulation preventing media representatives from selecting particular inmates to
interview and forbidding prisoners from initiating interviews did not unconstitutionally infringe
prisoners' First Amendment rights); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (holding that
prisoners only retain rights that do not interfere with penal interests).
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the conventional wisdom that this diminution of constitutional rights is
part of a prisoner's punishment for criminal activity.
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. . . . [A] corollary of this
principle is that a prison inmate retains those ... rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.!

Despite prisoners' retention of certain constitutional rights, federal courts
have been hesitant to interfere with the administration of prisons.9
A prison regulation unreasonably encroaches upon a prisoner's constitutional rights if it is not reasonably related to the legitimate administration of the prison.'0 In Turner v. Safley," the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a formula to evaluate the reasonableness of penological interests.' 2 According to the Turner test, four factors are relevant in this determination, including (1) whether a rational connection exists between
the prison regulation and the legitimate state interest; (2) whether alternative means are available for the prisoners to exercise their rights;' 3 (3)
the impact of accommodating the prisoner's exercise of these rights on
other prisoners, guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally;
and (4) the existence of alternate means of achieving the penal interest."

8. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
9. Lawrence M. Reich & Ethan E. Litwin, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1561, 1561 (1997); see Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995) (asserting "federal
courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment"); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (stating that the separation of powers doctrine should
caution judicial intervention in prison administration, an area traditionally governed by the state
legislative and executive branches); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (holding that
courts should exercise judicial discretion rather than assuming that prison administrators are insensitive to prisoners' constitutional rights).
10. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Reich & Litwin, supra note 9.
I1. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
12. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; see also Reich & Litwin, supra note 9.
13. The Court rejected a "least restrictive alternative" test where prison officials would be
required to "set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating"
the prisoner's asserted right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91; accord Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
401-14 (1989) (adopting the Turner reasonableness standard, as opposed to the least restrictive
alternative test, for regulations restricting inmates' receipt of publications).
14. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
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II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT

5

A. Background

Alexis de Tocqueville toured an American prison in the late 1800s
and "found half of the prisoners chained in irons, and the rest plunged
into an infectious dungeon." 6 De Tocqueville's observations are a vivid
example of the history of brutality in American prisons." Judicial intervention began a new era of refining Eighth Amendment rights.'"
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a precise test by which conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.'9 The Court, however, has
indicated that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which,
although not physically barbarous, 'involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain,' or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.... Among 'unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those
that are 'totally without penological justification.' 2. The Eighth
Amendment, drawing its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"'" dictates that conditions of confinement must not result in a serious deprivation of basic
human needs." Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never clearly indicated
which needs are identifiable human needs.'

15. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. REV.
1173, 1175 (1997).
17. Id.
18. ld.atl178-80.
19. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981).
20. Id. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976), Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), respectively); see also
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393
(10th Cir. 1977)). The court in Ramos stated:
[T]he Eighth Amendment... is, inter alia, intended to protect and safeguard a prison inmate from an environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely
because of the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering, whether physical or
mental ....[W]hile an inmate does not have a federal constitutional right to rehabilitation, he is entitled tobe confined in an environment which does not result in his degeneration or which threatens his mental and physical well being.
Ramos, 639 F.2d at 566 (quoting Battle, 564 F.2d at 393).
21. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
22. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
23. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181-82. The Supreme Court has explained that the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also Jeffrey D. Bukowski,
Comment, The Eighth Amendment and OriginalIntent: Applying the ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and
Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DiCK. L. REV. 419, 434 (1995). The Court has further explained that only those deprivations
which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to support an
Eighth Amendment claim. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Bukowski,
supra. Identifiable human needs include food, warmth, and exercise. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see
also Bukowski, supra. However, because prison conditions are allowed to be unpleasant and even
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Prior to the 1960s, courts followed the "hands-off' approach when
addressing problems within prisons and jails. ' The "hands-off' doctrine
provided that the administration of prisons should be left entirely up to
the unrestrained authority of correctional facilities' administrators and
staff.' The "hands off' doctrine was not so much a rule of law as it was a
policy of judicial hesitation to interfere in the internal administration of
prisons.' Eventually, however, courts began to crack down on prison
officials by identifying and protecting inmates' constitutional rights. '
Through judicial intervention in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts reestablished control over the prisons and jails.' This period between the
1960s and 1970s came to be known as the Rights Period for its focus on
prisoners' rights. '
During the Rights Period, the "deliberate indifference" standard became the governing standard for prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims. 0
Because inmates rely on prison officials to provide their basic human
needs, a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to any identifiable
human need may result in violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights.' The Supreme Court first articulated the Eighth Amendment standard of "deliberate indifference" in Estelle v. Gamble."
In Estelle, the prisoner complained that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment because he received inadequate treatment for a back
harsh, as they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their violations of the law, a
court should defer to legislative determination of the States to determine what conditions their prisons must conform. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Bukowski, supra, at 434-35.
24. See Jack Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner's Rights, 59 FED. PROBATION 36, 36
(1995).
25. See id. Deference to prison officials was thought necessary to preserve separation of
powers between the branches of government.
26. Sanabria, supra note 3, at 1134. This judicial hesitation was described in Stroud v. Swope,
187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951), where the court stated, "[wle think that it is well settled that it
is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." Stroud, 187 F.2d at
851-52.
27. See Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1178. The lack of publicity from behind prison walls allowed prison officials relative ease in depriving prisoners of their rights. Id. at 1176.
28. Id. at 1178-79. The courts began to scrutinize prison conditions more closely in an effort
to minimize deplorable conditions of confinement. See Sanabria, supra note 3, at 1135. The Supreme
Court expanded the Eighth Amendment far beyond the scope that it had during the hands off period.
Id.
29. See Call, supra note 24. But see Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1178-79 (indicating that the
Rights Period occurred during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren on the United State Supreme
Court). Justice Warren was on the Court from 1953 to 1969. Ralph Adam Fine, Book Review, 70
WIS. LAW. 47,47 (1997) (reviewing CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN (1997)).
30. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181.
31. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). "It is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)); see
also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,302 (1991).
32. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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injury allegedly sustained while doing prison work." To establish an unconstitutional denial of medical care, the Court determined that a prisoner must prove "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical
needs."3 ' A prison official exhibits "deliberate indifference" if she knows
that an inmate "face[s] substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."' This interpretation alleviates the prisoner's need to show intent and comes close to
equating "deliberate indifference" with negligence on the culpability
continuum. 6 Some courts, however, enforced a stricter standard by
equating "deliberate indifference" with recklessness.37
Thus, courts identified two major levels of neglect in defining "deliberate indifference." At the first level, tortiously reckless conduct defines "deliberate indifference."38 Tortious recklessness is a heightened
form of negligence similar to criminal recklessness. 9 To demonstrate the
prison official's deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that the
prison official entertained an appreciation of the high degree of risk resulting from their action or inaction. '
The second level finds "deliberate indifference" when conduct is
criminally reckless.' Under this characterization, prison officials must
33. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
36. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181.
37. Id. The Second Circuit, in assessing deliberate indifference, has held that recklessness is
some proof of the requisite degree of intent to cause harm, although an express intent to inflict
unnecessary pain is not required to prove deliberate indifference. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942
F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding an Eighth Amendment claim existed when an inmate was
drenched with scalding water while in special housing unit despite requesting a transfer rather than
release into general prison population due to threats from another inmate).
38. See Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1183.
40. Id. A number of courts have recently held that the deliberate indifference standard may be
met by proof of repeated negligent acts. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11 th Cir.
1991) (stating that prisoners can establish prison officials' deliberate indifference to their medical
needs by showing repeated negligent acts).
41. Criminal recklessness is found when
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when [s]he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his [or her] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to his[or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990). Compare Miltier v. Beom, 896 F.2d 848, 852-53
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding deliberate indifference when three doctors ignored a prisoner's complaints
of chest pains, blackouts and shortness of breath, and the prisoner consequentially died from a heart
attack), and Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (identifying deliberate
indifference when prison officials failed to give an inmate liquid diet supplements when the inmate
was unable to ingest solid foods), with Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding no deliberate indifference when a prisoner with an ankle injury was forced to work in hardsoled boots after an x-ray came back negative for fracture or break), and Beny v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d
1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no deliberate indifference when prison officials transported an
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have actual knowledge of the high degree of risk resulting from their
action or inaction."2 Criminal recklessness and intentional conduct are
parallel in this formulation because an inmate must demonstrate that the
prison official was aware of the high risk present and, despite this awareness, deliberately continued in his action or inaction. '
The Rights Period of the 1960s and 1970s found the courts inundated
with prisoner complaints." Consequently, the courts began to abandon
their commitment to protecting prisoners' rights in hopes of freeing up
the dockets." The Court thus returned to a more conservative, "hands
off" approach to prisoners' rights."
The Court's modem approach to prison litigation began in 1979.' In
Bell v. Wolfish," the Supreme Court held that prison policies should not
be questioned so long as they are rationally related to a correctional institution's legitimate goals. '9 Bell involved body cavity searches of inmates which were required after every contact visit with a person from
outside of the institution.' Prison administrators identified the penal interest for the searches as the prevention and deterrence of the smuggling
of contraband.' The Court reversed the holdings of the lower courts and
held that the interest in prison security was of paramount importance and

inmate to a medical center within two hours of the inmate noticing blood in urine and the inmate was
unable to offer proof of harm from delay).
42. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1182-83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1188.
45. Herbert A. Eastman, Drainingthe JudicialSwamp: An Examination of Judicialand Congressional PoliciesDesigned to Limit PrisonerLitigation, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 61, 71-73
(1988).
46. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1188. Most recently, Congress passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (P.L.R.A.) on April 26, 1996 to address the alarming explosion in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by state and federal prisoners. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996); see also 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole introducing the P.L.R.A. in the Senate). "The P.L.R.A. announced a comprehensive restructuring of
remedies available to prisoners in state and federal courts ...." Stacey Heather O'Bryan, Note,
Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury
Requirement on the ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners,83 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1997). Section
803(e) of the P.L.R.A. provides that: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury." P.L.R.A. § 803(e), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1997); see also P.L.R.A. § 806, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). Although the
P.L.R.A. was enacted just prior to the start of the 1996-97 survey period, few courts have interpreted
the statute. Those that have already vary in their interpretation of the level of injury required.
O'Bryan, supra, at 1213. Legal scholars have questioned the intent of the requirement of a physical
injury. Id. at 1224. Their concern is that the physical injury requirement may prevent legitimate
claims. Id.
47. Call, supra note 24, at 38.
48. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
49. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539.
50. Id. at 558.
51. Id.
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therefore outweighed the inmates' interests in being free from such procedures."
In Rhodes v. Chapman," the Supreme Court further restricted the circumstances under which a prisoner may seek relief for his grievances.
The Court reviewed a prisoner's claim that "double ceiling ' inmates
was cruel and unusual punishment." Without conducting an inquiry into
the prison official's state of mind, as in Estelle, the Court determined the
prison officials had not inflicted "unnecessary or wanton pain.'" Considering the objective seriousness of the alleged deprivation, the Court acknowledged that conditions of confinement, "alone or in combination,"
may amount to deprivation of an inmate's basic necessity, so as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment." In this case, however, the
Court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. 8
During the most recent Deference Period" the courts tightened the
application of the "deliberate indifference" standard in cases where prisoners claimed that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.' In Wilson v. Seiter," the prisoner alleged that the conditions of his confinement' violated his Eighth
Amendment rights.6' Wilson extended the "deliberate indifference" standard to Eighth Amendment attacks on prison conditions by identifying
two requirements that a prisoner must satisfy: a subjective prong and an
objective prong." The subjective prong requires evidence that the prison
official acted with a culpable state of mind and was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety.' The prisoner must satisfy the objective prong by demonstrating a sufficiently serious deprivation.' Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that Estelle established the basis for the subjective part of the test and that Rhodes was the basis for the

52. Id. at 560.
53. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
54. "Double ceiling" is putting more than one prisoner in each cell, which measures only
sixty-three square feet. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 348.
57. Id. at 352.
58. Id. at 347.
59. The Deference Period saw courts return to a hands-off approach when considering prisoners' claims. The courts recognized that prison administrators were in a better position to operate
penal institutions than the judiciary. Call, supra note 24, at 38-39.
60. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1191. For a discussion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see
supra note 46.
61. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
62. The prisoners alleged overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating, cooling, and
ventilation, insect infestation, insufficient storage space, unsanitary eating conditions, unsanitary
restrooms, and being housed with mentally and physically ill prisoners. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 298.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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objective component. 7 The Court then remanded the case for reconsideration under the two-prong "deliberate indifference" standard."
The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson became a landmark for reinstituting a policy of deference to prison administrators. ' By defining
"punishment" narrowly, the Court effectively placed prison conditions
outside the scope of the Eighth Amendment and limited the Court's role
in prison reform.7The majority argued that an implicit intent requirement
must be satisfied to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment." Justice Scalia further articulated
that, by definition, "punishment" involves a "deliberate act intended to
chastise or deter."'2 Thus, Wilson provided that a prisoner making an
Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions must demonstrate that
prison officials acted with at least deliberate indifference, regardless of
whether the conduct was intentionally directed at the prisoner, or
whether it was a result of the general prison conditions."
In Farmer v. Brennan," the Supreme Court further refined this standard. The Court found that liability attaches to prison officials under the
"deliberate indifference" test only when the officials knew that an inmate
faced substantial risk of serious harm and then did not take reasonable
measures to diminish it." The Court renounced a purely objective test for
determining liability. Instead, the Court applied subjective recklessness. 6
In addition, the subjective Farmer test does not require an inmate who
requests refuge from threatening circumstances to await trauma before
receiving relief." Writing for the majority, Justice Souter indicated that a

67. Id.
68. Id. at 306.
69. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause--PrisonConditions: Wilson v. Seiter, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 235, 236 (1991).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
75. Farmer,511 U.S. at 830-31, 849 (remanding an Eighth Amendment claim charging prison
officials with deliberate indifference when they placed a transsexual inmate, whose behavior reflected many feminine characteristics, in the general male prison population, and who was subsequently beaten and raped by another inmate).
76. Id. at 835-36. Compare DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding
deliberate indifference when prison officials state of mind indicated recklessness because they had
knowledge of impending harm which would have been preventable), with Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d
557, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no deliberate indifference when secretary negligently left prisoner's authorization to attend mother's funeral on desk).
77. Farmer,511 U.S. at 837 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993)); see
also Sarah Botz & Robert C. Scherer, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners,84 GEO. L.J. 1465,
1479 (1996).
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prisoner may fulfill the subjective intent requirement by proving that the
risk of harm was obvious."8
The Tenth Circuit has relied on Supreme Court precedent in determining Eighth Amendment violations by prison officials.'9 In the following cases, the Tenth Circuit adopted the subjective test of the "deliberate indifference" standard requiring the prison guard's actual knowledge of a substantial risk, and subsequent disregard of that known risk.
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Northington v. Marin
a. Facts
In February 1990, Northington was serving a sentence at the Denver
County Jail that allowed him to leave the jail to work for a painting company.8 A deputy at the jail sold Northington a truck, despite a regulation
forbidding deputies from engaging in business relationships with inmates.82 As a result of the deputy's conduct, internal affairs conducted an
investigation in which Northington cooperated, ultimately leading to the
dismissal of the deputy. 3 Northington alleged that Deputy Main, an internal affairs investigator, "assaulted and threatened him to obtain his
cooperation. '" He also alleged that Deputy Marin labeled him as a snitch
in the prison population, causing other inmates to assault him." Northington based his claims on the Eighth Amendment." The district court
entered judgment against Deputy Marin and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that under the Eighth Amendment, liability
extends to a prison official for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement if the official knows of and disregards a substantial risk of
serious harm to the inmate." The court rejected Deputy Main's argument that the evidence did not support liability under the Eighth

78. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
79. See Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1995) (addressing the right to be
free from sexual harassment in prison); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986)
(determining that prison administrators are not required to administer estrogen as a particular treatment, but do have a duty to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoners).
80. 102 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1996).
81. Northington, 102 F.3d at 1566.
82. Id. at 1566-67.
83. id. at 1567.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
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Amendment. " The couri relied on Marin's acknowledgment that it was
probable that if he spread a rumor that an inmate was a snitch, that prisoner would likely be beaten by other inmates.' Adopting the magistrate's
finding, the court concluded that Main knew that spreading such a rumor placed Northington in serious jeopardy of assault by other inmates.91
Denying Marin's claim that his motivation was to protect other inmates
from being labeled snitches by association, the court asserted that an
"intent to protect other inmates is not inconsistent with a knowing disregard of a substantial risk to Northington's safety.'"
2. Green v. Branson93
a. Facts
Green filed suit against the warden, physicians, and guards employed at the Oklahoma State .Penitentiary alleging prison beating and
wrongful medical treatment which occurred in 1993.' Green was an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary when a fight erupted between
him and several prison guards. 95 The cause of the fight was in dispute.9
After the fight, Green returned to his cell and asked for medical attention
for his injuries resulting from the fight.' According to Green, Warden
Reynolds was aware of the beating, but took no action." Additionally,
Green claimed that the prison physician "refused to treat his injuries and
falsified medical documents to help cover up the beating." The district
court granted summary judgment for the prison officials and the court of
appeals reversed on Green's Eighth Amendment claims.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed Green's excessive force claim and held
that "[a] prison guard's use of excessive force is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment if it is 'applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1567-68.
93. 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997).
94. Green, 108 F.3d at 1298.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1299. According to Green, he was seeking legal information from another inmate
when a prison guard became impatient and beat him with a stick. Id. The prison guard, however,
claimed that Green initiated the altercation by hitting him with his handcuffs and then falling on top
of him. Green claims that two other prison guards joined the first in kicking, stomping on, and
punching him, and then dragged him by his handcuffs to his cell. Id. The guards denied using any
unnecessary force, only that which was needed to subdue Green after his attack on the first guard. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1305-06.
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restore discipline,' as opposed to being applied 'maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."""' The court asserted that
penal institutions should be given deference when reviewing a claim for
use of excessive force."' The court also held that unless it appeared,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
was a wanton infliction of pain, the case should not go to the
that there
3'
jury.

In Green, a material fact was the question of whether Green provoked the fight with the prison guards. The guards claimed that Green's
alleged provocation of the fight was the reason that the guards used force
to subdue him." The court laid out the parameters for the standard of an
Eighth Amendment claim:
Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance... that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, we think the question whether the measure
taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately
turns on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.".. . "[S]uch factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted,". . . are relevant to that ultimate determination."'
The Tenth Circuit held that absence of serious injury" was not the deciding factor in determining whether the force inflicted was wanton, and
remanded the issue to be determined by the trier of fact. 7
In addition, the court considered Green's claim that the warden
should be held liable for Green's alleged mistreatment and deliberate
lack of medical care following his fight with the prison guards." The
Tenth Circuit applied the standard that a supervisor's liability is dependent on his "deliberate indifference," rather than mere negligence."'9
Therefore, to be liable, the warden must have known that he was creating
a "substantial risk of bodily harm" to Green."'° Green must prove that "an
'affirmative link' existed between the [constitutional] deprivation and
either the supervisor's 'personal participation, his exercise of control or

101. Id. at 1300 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21(1986)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1301.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) and Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) respectively).
106. The absence of serious injury would be relevant to an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at
1302. See supra note 46 for a discussion of the P.L.R.A.'s requirement of physical injury.
107. Green, 108 F.3d at 1302.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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direction, or his failure to supervise."'" The court held that Green met
this burden." 2
Finally, the Tenth Circuit applied the same "deliberate indifference"
reasoning to the prison doctor and his supervisor."' The court determined
that falsification of medical data involves plainly deliberate action and
inaction of a culpable nature, and therefore reversed the summary judgment ruling with respect to the treating physician.'" However, the court
upheld summary judgment with respect to the supervising physician because an affirmative link did not exist between the constitutional deprivation and his failure to supervise. '
3. Barrie v. GrandCounty Utah"6
a. Facts
Ricks was arrested in Grand County, Utah on October 26, 1991, and
placed in the jail's "drunk tank" after the deputy noted that Ricks had
been drinking alcohol." 7 Ricks was permitted to retain possession of the
clothing he was wearing at the time of his arrest, which included sweat
pants with a 38-inch long cord to cinch the waist."' Despite deputies
making two routine cell checks of Ricks's cell without incident, during a
third check deputies found that Ricks had committed suicide by hanging
himself with the sweat pants' draw cord." 9
Barrie, as personal representative of Ricks's estate, alleged that
Deputies Walker and Neal subjected Ricks to "unreasonable conditions
of confinement" which violated the Eighth Amendment." In addition,
Barrie asserted that Ricks's family had a liberty interest under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments "in the continued care, comfort and society
of their father and son respectively"' 2 ' which had been violated by the
"gross negligence and callous indifference of the defendants."' 2

SI11. Id. (quoting Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Langley v.
Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10th Cir. 1993).
112. Green, 108 F.3d at 1303.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1304.
115. Id. (quoting Meade, 841 F.2d at 1527).
116. 119 F.3d 862(10th Cir. 1997).
117. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 863.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 863-64.
120. Id. at 864.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that the treatment of claims based on a jail
suicide is the same as claims based on the failure of prison administrators
to provide adequate medical care for those in their custody.'" In its
Eighth Amendment analysis, the court applied the same constitutional
protection against deliberate indifference to the medical needs of pretrial
detainees as it did to convicted felons. 24
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the behavior that amounts to
"deliberate indifference." Quoting Estelle v. Gamble,"n the court concluded that indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners met the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard. 126 The court further
determined that the degree of fault required was "deliberate indifference"
to a known or obvious risk, and in this case, the defendant's conduct did
not rise to that level. 7
C. Other Circuits
When defining "deliberate indifference," other circuits have applied
the same test established by the Supreme Court. Initially the courts have
evaluated whether there exists a showing of punishment that is an objectively, sufficiently serious risk to the prisoner. To meet this burden, the
prisoner must show that prison officials possessed a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, in that they knew of, yet disregarded, the serious risk to the
inmate's health or safety.
The Second and Fifth Circuits considered Eighth Amendment
claims from prisoners who had been sexually assaulted. The Second Circuit in Boddie v. Schnieder,12 recognized that severe or repetitive sexual
abuse of an inmate by a prison official "has no legitimate penological
purpose, and is 'simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.""' However, the court held that
isolated episodes of harassment and touching were not severe enough to
be objectively, sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment

123. Id. at 866; see Poham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("Because jail suicides are analogous to the failure to provide medical care, deliberate indifference has
become the barometer by which suicide cases involving convicted prisoners as well as pretrial detainees are tested.").
124. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 866-67.
125. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
126. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 869 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
127. Id.
128. 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997). Specifically, Boddie claimed that a female prison official
made a statement that he believed to be "a pass" at him. Boddie, 105 F.3d at 859. In addition, he
claimed that the prison official squeezed his hand, touched him inappropriately, and said, "[y]ou
know your [sic] sexy black devil, I like you." Id. at 859-60. Finally, Boddie alleged that the prison
official ordered that he take off his sweatshirt and that she rubbed against him pressing her body
hard against his chest. Id. at 860.
129. Id. at 861 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,834(1994)).
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violation."' The Fifth Circuit determined that "an official's failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,
while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned
as the infliction of punishment."' 3
The Third Circuit stated that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is
simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."' 2 The Third Circuit asserted that a Department
of Corrections chairperson was aware of a substantial risk to a prisoner's
safety when she reviewed the multi-disciplinary team's unanimous recommendation to place the prisoner in protective custody.'33 Relying on
Farmer, the Third Circuit explained the type of circumstantial evidence
sufficient to support a finding of actual knowledge on the part of the
prison official.
[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a
substantial risk of inmate attacks was "longstanding, pervasive, welldocumented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past," and
the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus "must have
known" about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a
trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of
the risk. '
The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence of record in
the pending case was essentially identical to the Farmer case. "' Therefore, because the prison official's actions met the second prong of the
Farmer test, he violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights by
failing to act to ensure the prisoner's safety."
The Fourth Circuit held that an Eighth Amendment claim based on a
deprivation of medical attention is valid only if the medical need of the
prisoner is serious.'3 The court explained that "society does not expect
that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care.""' 8 The court
determined that the pharmacy's failure to deliver the medicine did not

130. Id.
131. Downey v. Denton County, 119 F.3d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1997). The court concluded
that an inmate who was sexually assaulted by an employee of the county sheriff's department, and as
a result had a child, failed to show that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent when the inmate and
the employee were left alone for close to two hours in an unmonitored and unsupervised room. Id. at
386.
132. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 345 (1981)).
133. Id. at 747.
134. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,842-43 (1994)).
135. ld. at 748.
136. Id.
137. Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 609 (4th Cir.
1997) (considering claims from disabled prisoners).
138. Id. at 610.
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amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs because
"prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the
39
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.'
The Seventh Circuit relied on criminal recklessness as the standard
to determine "deliberate indifference."'" The court stated that "[miere
negligence or even gross negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference.""' In holding that the removal of an inmate's toenail, without
local anesthetic, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the
court explained that "the Eighth Amendment is not a vehicle for bringing
claims for medical malpractice.''
The Seventh Circuit also recognized that claims brought based on
the deprivation of medical attention may only be valid if the medical
condition is sufficiently serious. 3 In Gutierrez, an inmate brought an
action claiming he received inadequate medical attention for an
infection.'" The Seventh Circuit analyzed several of its sister circuits'
definitions of "sufficiently serious" in the Eighth Amendment medical
care context and recognized that, although a condition did not have to be
life-threatening, a 4 mere
ache or pain would not support an Eighth
5
Amendment claim.'
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a
federal prisoner may bring an Eighth Amendment claim against prison
officials where the prisoner showed no physical harm.'" The court held
139. Id. at612.
140. See Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 590.
142. Id.
143. See Gutierrez v. Peters, Ill F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).
144. Id. at 1365.
145. Id. at 1371-72. Specifically, the court considered the following formulation: "A 'serious'
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id. at
1373 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)). The court also considered the Ninth Circuit's formulation for when a "serious" medical condition exists: when "the failure
to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Finally, the court contemplated the Ninth Circuit's formulation for indications that a prisoner has a
serious medical need: "The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain."
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60; see, e.g., Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d
14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that prison officials cannot be held liable for failing to adjust its
policy to accommodate a "serious medical need" of which it was not made aware); Hill v. Dekalb
Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1994) (deciding that a county in which a
prison exists cannot be held responsible for a prison's alleged unreasonable delay in providing
medical attention when it is not shown that the county had any control over the institution).
146. See Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996). The prisoner had been stabbed seven
times in an attack by a gang inside of the prison. Id. at 268. When he was transferred to a new facility, he discovered that he had not escaped the reaches of the gang. Id. The court considered principles of tort law to establish the duty that prison officials owe to their inmates. Id. at 271. Because
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that despite the prisoner's fear of physical harm, prison officials had not
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of a prisoner when no harm was
inflicted and there was no indication of malice on the part of prison officials
The Eighth Circuit found that a serious medical need is one that a
lay-person could easily identify as requiring a doctor's attention.'" The
court held that although a woman's pregnancy generally does not meet
the sufficiently serious standard, evidence of previous rapid labors and
premature deliveries indicative of pre-term labor, would be recognizable
to a lay-person as requiring a doctor's attention.' 9 The court paralleled
the Seventh Circuit in its analysis of the subjective component of an
Eighth Amendment claim, holding that a prison official's culpable mental state may be inferred from circumstantial evidence or from the fact
that the risk was obvious9
D. Analysis
In Northington, the Tenth Circuit, without lengthy discussion, followed Supreme Court precedent by applying the Farmertest."' The court
acknowledged that a prisoner was not required to show malicious or
wrongful intent to support liability, as long as evidence is introduced
showing that prison officials knew of, and disregarded, a substantial risk
of serious harm to the inmate.' The court's brevity demonstrates its easy
acceptance of the well-established Farmer standard.'3 However, the
court failed to discuss the prison official's alternatives with respect to the
other inmates when noting that the prison official's intent to protect other
inmates from being labeled snitches by association is not inconsistent
with a knowing disregard of a substantial risk to the plaintiff-prisoner's
safety. A prison official has a duty to protect all inmates under his supervision. The court left unanswered what a prison official should do when
the means necessary to protect one or a group of inmates comes at the
expense of possibly endangering another inmate. The court's absence of
discussion about the prison official's options for protecting inmates'
competing interests leaves no guidance for prison officials in such a
situation. By not providing guidelines, the court invites abuse by prison
administrators who choose to exploit the power structure established for
prison security.

there had not been a breach of the duty to protect, in that no harm materialized, the court held that an
Eighth Amendment claim could not stand. Id. at 273.
147. Id. at 267.
148. Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778,784 (8th Cir. 1997).
149. Id. at 785.
150. Id.at 786.
151. Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1567 (10th Cir. 1996).
152. id. at 1567.
153. Id. at 1567-68.
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In Green, the Tenth Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent and
carefully applied the two-prong test established in Farmer.'" However,
by concluding that the doctor exhibited deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs, the court did not provide a discussion
on the defining standard for a "serious" medical condition. The court
duplicated the list of claimed injuries from the plaintiff's complaint, and
held that a refusal to provide medical attention, along with falsification
of medical records, may amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
Therefore, although the court explained that the falsification of medical
records is highly suggestive of a culpable mental state, it fell short in
dictating guidelines for the first prong of the analysis.
In Northington and Green, the court appeared conscious of the risks
involved to inmates when courts defer to prison administrators. The administrations' close contact with inmates creates an atmosphere inviting
direct abuses by prison officials, resulting in denial of inmates' basic
constitutional rights." When prison administrators are permitted to operate with little judicial scrutiny, they are left with wide discretion.'" Prison
administrators left with wide discretion could easily abuse their power
and punish inmates by, for example, placing them in solitary or maximum confinement, preventing them from having visitors, and revoking
their playground time.'57
For purposes of an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical
attention, the Barriecourt established that there is no difference between
a pre-trial detainee and an inmate in a correctional facility, and adhered
to its earlier decisions rejecting the Seventh Circuit's meaning of deliberate indifference. Though courts have struggled to attach a strict definition
to deliberate indifference, the majority are consistent with the Tenth Circuit, finding "deliberate indifference" requires less than intentional or
malicious infliction of injury.
The Tenth Circuit, although recognizing the importance of penal
interests, appears to be firm in its position that prisoners retain important
rights while incarcerated. The late 1990s are no longer a time when cruel
and unusual punishment refers only to barbarous conditions. However, in
an effort to divert a free flow of frivolous claims brought by prisoners,
the court was careful to provide and thoroughly discuss the two prongs in
the Farmer test."

154. Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302-04 (10th Cir. 1973).
155. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1177.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. As evidenced by the history of the "deliberate indifference" standard, it is very difficult to
apply. Michael Cameron Friedman, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of
Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921,
947 (1992). The terms "deliberate" and "indifference" are contradictory in nature. Id. "Deliberate"
suggests conduct that is considered, planned, or premeditated while "indifference" on the other hand,
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III. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'59

A. Background
In 1919, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment entitles inmates to rights, though those rights may be minimal." In subsequent years, the Court addressed which elements constitute a reasonable search and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the6 justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted. '
Today, only the Seventh Circuit has boldly proclaimed that prisoners
do
62
not have privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The law regarding prisoners is constantly shaping. Although the
Supreme Court established that prisoners retain some of their basic, fundamental rights while incarcerated, the lower federal courts have attempted to define more specifically those rights to which prisoners are
entitled. In 1973, the Tenth Circuit upheld a prison's requirement that its
inmates submit to rectal examinations by trained medical personnel prior
to leaving and before returning to the prison. 3 The court identified the
dangers of contraband smuggling as significant justification for its decision.'"
65 the Supreme
In 1984, in Hudson v. Palmer,'
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a prisoner had a "reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amend-

suggests the absence of concern or attention. Id.; see Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 720 n.7 (IIth
Cir. 1991), vacated pursuant to settlement (describing the conceptually vague distinction between
deliberate indifference and negligence).
159. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..U.." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
160. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919). In 1962, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its holding in Stroud and again recognized that convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain
Fourth Amendment rights. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
161. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
162. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir. 1995).
163. See Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 294.
165. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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ment against unreasonable searches and seizures."'"M The Court balanced
the competing interests of an inmate's subjective expectation of privacy
in his cell, and society's objective determination of the reasonableness of
that expectation." The Court concluded that "society is not prepared to
recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell. ' " In addition, the Court explained
that a "right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order."'"M
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit considered whether a prison system had a
legitimate penal interest in extracting a prisoner's blood for AIDS testing."0 The court applied the Turner test to balance the intrusiveness of
requiring a prisoner to submit to blood testing against the interests that
the prison advanced for administering such a test.'' The court concluded
that a rational relationship existed between the prison's regulations
and
72
the blood test, and therefore it passed constitutional muster.
Despite the express holding in Hudson, the Court entertained prisoners' challenges to body cavity searches in the prison setting.1 7 In those
searches, the Court refused to adopt a precise definition of "reasonableness" for Fourth Amendment purposes.' Instead, the Court considered
the circumstances of each case and relied on balancing the "need for the
particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails.""'
In 1995, the Tenth Circuit considered what constituted a random
selection process for requiring inmates to provide urine samples for drug
analysis.'" In Lucero, the court held that correctional facilities may sam-

166.

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519.

167. Id. at 525.
168. Id. at 525-26.
169. Id. at 527-28.
170. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 1194-96. For a discussion of the Turner test, see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
172. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194-96.
173. See Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1986) (determining that Hudson does
not subtract essentially from the requirement of reasonableness for body cavity searches set forth in
Wolfish).
174. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979).
175. Id. at 559 (stating that "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place where it is conducted").
176. Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995).
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pie and test inmates' body fluids when such sampling and testing reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." '
In the following cases, the Tenth Circuit expands its prior holdings,
allowing prison administrators to sample and test inmates' body fluids.
In reaching its conclusions, the Tenth Circuit used a balancing test to
weigh the minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests against the
legitimate government interests.'78
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Boling v. Romer"9
a. Facts
Plaintiff Boling challenged the constitutionality of a Colorado statute'" requiring him, as an inmate whose convictions involved a sexual
assault, to provide the state with DNA samples before his release on parole.'' He also challenged the Department of Corrections' policies in
implementing that statute. 2 The district court entered summary judgment
against Boling and the Tenth Circuit held that the search and seizure was
reasonable.' 3
b. Decision
In holding that testing and analysis of DNA from inmates' saliva
and blood samples was reasonable, the court weighed a prisoner's diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion of saliva and blood tests,
and the legitimate governmental interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner similar to the use of fingerprinting.'' The Tenth Circuit was persuaded by similar cases in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.' Although the
177. Id. at 874. The courts generally give deference to prison officials who can best balance the
constitutional rights of prisoners against penal interests. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 348 (1987).
178. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
179. 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996).
180. The statute provides:
As a condition of parole, the board shall require any offender convicted of an offense for
which the factual basis involved a sexual assault as defined in part 4 of article 3 of title
18, C.R.S., to submit to chemical testing of his blood to determine the genetic markers
thereof and to chemical testing of his saliva to determine the secretor status thereof. Such
testing shall occur prior to the offender's release from incarceration, and the results
thereof shall be filed with and maintained by the Colorado bureau of investigation. The
results of such tests shall be furnished to any law enforcement agency upon request.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201(5)(g)(I) (1997).
181. Boling, 101 F.3d at 1338.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1340.
185. Id.
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court recognized that obtaining and analyzing DNA or saliva of an inmate was considered a search and seizure, the court nonetheless held that
such a search was reasonable.'"
2. Schlicher v. Peters8'
a. Facts
In 1992, five Kansas state prisoners challenged the constitutionality
of a Kansas statute allowing for collection of saliva and blood samples
from certain convicted felons for use by the government to detect and
deter recidivists from committing crimes.' After the district court entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Kansas statute at
issue, Schlicher was the only prisoner to appeal.' 9
b. Decision
Recognizing that the collection, analysis, and storage of saliva and
blood as authorized by Kansas law constitutes a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit decided

186. Id. The court considered Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), in which the
Fourth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute requiring convicted
felons and prison inmates to submit to DNA testing for inclusion into a data base for use in future
law enforcement. Id. at 302. The court in Jones asserted that, "when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim
privacy in it." Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. The Boling Court also harbored Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556
(9th Cir. 1995), in which the Ninth Circuit noted that, "[tihe information derived from the blood
sample is substantially the same as that derived from fingerprinting-an identifying marker unique
to the individual from whom the information is derived." Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Rise, 59
F.3d at 1559). The Rise court also articulated that, "[o]nce a person is convicted of (a felony]... his
identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the identifying information derived from blood sampling." Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560. The distinction
between drawing a person's blood and rolling a person's finger through ink was not held to render
the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights from DNA testing violative. Id.
187. 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996).
188. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 941-42. In 1991, McColpin, a state prisoner, brought suit alleging
that the defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 942. In
1992, Hutchcraft and Schlicher, both state prisoners, brought suit also alleging that defendants,
acting under color of state law, were violating their constitutional rights. Id. By order of the district
court, these three actions were consolidated. Id. The Kansas statute provides in relevant part:
Collection of specimens of blood and saliva from certain persons; Kansas bureau of investigation, powers and duties, a) Any person convicted... of an unlawful sexual act as
defined in subsection (4) of K.S.A. 21-3501, and amendments thereto, or an attempt of
such unlawful sexual act or convicted ... because [of murder in the first degree, murder
in the second degree, incest, aggravated incest or abuse of a child] ... regardless of the
sentence imposed, shall be required to submit specimens of blood and saliva to the Kansas bureau of investigation in accordance with the provisions of this act, if such person is:
1) Convicted... of a crime specified in subsection (a)... ; 2) ordered institutionalized as
a result of being convicted ... of a crime... ; 3) convicted ... of a crime specified in
this subsection ... and is presently confined as a result of such conviction.., in any state
correctional facility or county jail ....
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995).
189. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 942.
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that the search and seizure in this case were reasonable.'"° The court
identified the important purpose of DNA testing used to create data
banks to assist the government with solving past and future criminal
acts.9
C. Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit considered whether a visual body cavity search of
a male prisoner, performed by female prison guards, as well as being
watched by the guards while showering naked, violated the prisoner's
Fourth Amendment rights.'" In Somers v. Thurman, the court discussed
Bell9' and Hudson,'" and declared that a convicted prisoner retains some
reasonable expectations of privacy while in prison, particularly if the
prisoner is forced to expose himself to guards of the opposite sex. 9
D. Analysis
Critics have questioned whether, in reality, balancing is really balancing." Instead of balancing competing interests, the Tenth Circuit
merely examined whether requiring inmates to provide saliva and blood
samples was reasonably related to a government interest.'9' Under a true
Fourth Amendment balancing test, the impact of extracting saliva and
blood samples on the physical and psychological well-being of the prison
inmate, as well as the government's needs for obtaining such samples
must be considered." ' By failing to give adequate consideration to the
effect of the intrusion upon the inmate, the balancing test becomes nothing more than an if/then proposition: If there is any government interest
in requiring prisoners to submit to saliva and blood tests, then such a
requirement is valid on constitutional grounds. 9' The result gives wide
latitude to courts to interpret statutes in favor of governmental and penological interests."

190. Id. at 942-43. The court relied on its recent opinion in Boling, although the court did not
reiterate Boling's analysis. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Boling, 101 F.3d
at 1336 (reviewing the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' decisions in Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), and Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that statutes
requiring inmates to submit saliva and blood samples for DNA testing did not violate their constitutional protections).
191. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 942.
192. See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1997).
193. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
194. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
195. Somers, 109 F.3d at 617-19; see supra notes 46-50 and 150-56 and accompanying text.
196. See McMath, supra note 7, at 748.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Supporters of deference given to prison administrators appreciate the difficult task
administrators undertake to "preserve security in an explosive environment." Melvin Gutterman,
Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU L. REV.
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The Tenth Circuit's allowance of blood tests, which will yield personal information about the prisoners, follows Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court has progressively allowed more intrusive prison
searches to come within the realm of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness."' The increasing deference surrendered to prison administrators has resulted in a decline of Fourth Amendment protections for
prison inmates.'
A "balancing" test, inquiring mainly into correctional facilities' interests, will likely lead prison officials to abuse their power.' These
abuses, inherent in a system fostering close relations between prison officials and inmates without much judicial oversight, will go unnoticed,
unless flagrant.' The consideration of the intrusiveness of a particular
search will always be outweighed, and the once limited Fourth Amendment protections for prisoners have eroded to almost no protection at
all.'
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit carefully follows Supreme Court precedent in
remaining committed to giving deference to prison administrations. The
court recognizes important societal interests in correctional institutions'
objectives and weighs those interests heavily against prisoners' competing interests. The court, however, also seems cognizant of the probable
risks if prison administrations were granted unbridled power.
As a result of public policy, many of the court's decisions seem to
protect those who inflict punishment. Actually, the Eighth Amendment
was designed to protect those who are punished.' Therefore it is repugnant to the Constitution to determine that "punishment" cannot include
conditions of confinement or treatment without some form of intent on
0 Failing to relieve prison conditions that are
the part of prison officials."
barbaric simply because a prison official did not have the proper state of
mind is illogical.' The debate surrounding prisoners' rights undoubtedly

857, 857 (1992). In addition to security, rehabilitation and discipline also outweigh many of prisoners' most basic and fundamental rights, in order that those important penal interests may be
achieved. Id. As the courts shift in their trends of deferring to prison administrators, or alternatively
recognizing the consequence of not upholding prisoners' rights, the question, "is balancing really
balancing," can be asked in the other direction. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. The
if/then proposition then becomes: If any conceivable constitutional right is in question, then the
government's penal interests must succumb to constitutional protections for inmates.
201. See McNath, supra note 7, at 748.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
207. Sanabria, supra note 3, at 1153.
208. Id.
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will continue, as the courts struggle to find a balance between a respect
for human dignity and the difficulty of governing prisons.
Lisa Davie Levinson

SECURITIES
INTRODUCTION

During the survey period' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
both on the cutting edge and playing catch-up in the area of securities
law. This approach resulted in the court expanding section 10(b) liability
in one instance and restricting it in another. In Sonnenfeld v. City and
County of Denver,2 the Tenth Circuit considered, as a matter of first impression, whether municipalities were subject to section 10(b) liability
for the sale of municipal securities.3 Concentrating on a 1975 amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," the court determined that Congress intended federal securities regulations to apply to municipalities
By contrast, in Grossman v. Novell, Inc.,' the Tenth Circuit effectively provided potential section 10(b) violators with a possible defense
when it adopted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a valid defense to
securities fraud. The court determined that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine' was the proper vehicle for determining that certain statements connected with the sale of securities were immaterial because they were
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language. 9
This survey examines the different approaches utilized and results
reached by the Tenth Circuit in securities regulation. Part I provides a
basic background on section 10(b) actions. Part II discusses municipal
liability and addresses the Tenth Circuit's first impression holding in
Sonnenfeld, and the effect which that holding will have on securities
regulation. Part III considers the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER SECTION 10(b)

A. Federal Securities Legislation
In the early 1930s, with the country and the world reeling from the
effects of the Great Depression, Congress enacted two monumental
pieces of securities legislation. First, Congress passed the Securities Act

i. The survey covers cases decided between September 1, 1996 and August 31, 1997.
2. 100 F.3d 744 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748-49.
4. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
5. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 747.
6. 120F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
8. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
9. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
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of 1933 (1933 Act),' which required full disclosure of material information for first-time public offerings." Second, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),' 2 which was designed to
regulate the exchange of securities in the post-distribution stage or secondary markets.' 3 The Exchange Act included five principle functions:
(1) overseeing and regulating the securities market, (2) requiring a measure of disclosure for would-be investors, (3) controlling credit extended
to the marketplace, (4) creating the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and (5) preventing fraud in the trade of securities and manipulation of such markets. 4 The Exchange Act established multiple antifraud
provisions aimed at preventing deceptive trading of securities in both
primary and secondary markets." Of the antifraud provisions, the most
frequently used and broadest in scope is section 78j(b),'6 more commonly known as section 10(b)."
Unlike the other antifraud provisions the Exchange Act,'" section
10(b) has very few limitations.'9 Section 10(b) is not limited to brokerdealers, but extends to "any person.'' It applies to both securities purchases and sales2' and prohibits fraudulent conduct regardless of whether
the security is listed on an exchange or sold over-the-counter.' Finally,
the statutory language "public interest or the protection of investors"
10. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
77a-77aa (West 1997)).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm (West 1997)).
13. See Scott M. Murray, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The
Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There Is No Implied Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 481 (1996).
14. See I LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 228-29 (3d ed. 1989).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1994) (prohibiting a dealer or broker from making a false or
misleading statement for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of a security listed on a national securities exchange); id. § 78o(c)(i) (prohibiting brokers, dealers and municipal securities
dealers from using mails or interstate commerce to induce the purchase or sale of any security not
listed on a national exchange in a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent manner).
16. This section is located in 15 U.S.C.
17.

See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 3.1.2.4, at 226

(1995).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(4), 78o(c)(1).
19. The relevant text of section I0(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any securities
exchange ...[tlo
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale for any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j(b).
20. See POSER, supra note 17, at 227; see also infra Part I1.A for a discussion of the definition
of "person" under section 10(b).
21. See POSER, supra note 17, at 227.
22. See id.
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gives the SEC almost unlimited rule-making power.' This delegated
rule-making power is crucial considering that the text of section 10(b)
articulates no specific prohibitions.'4 Instead, section 10(b) can be viewed
as an "enabling provision" which grants the SEC the power to promulgate rules.'
Pursuant to the authority granted by section 10(b), the SEC enacted
Rule 1Ob-5 in 1948.26 Rule lOb-5 makes it "unlawful for any person... to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."2' Thus Congress, by
enacting section 10(b), and the SEC, by promulgating Rule lOb-5, created a powerful antifraud device.
B. Implied Private Cause ofAction
Missing from both section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is any mention of a
private cause of action. The omission was remedied in 1946, when a
Pennsylvania federal district court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.'
held there was an implied private cause of action under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.' The court relied on the general tort principles espoused in
the first Restatement of Torts?0 Twenty-five years later, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty, Co.,3' the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the implied private right of action under section 10(b)."

23. See id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
25. Murray, supranote 13, at 483.
26. 13 Fed. Reg. 8183 (1948) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)). The rule
was so named because it was the fifth rule promulgated under section 10(b). See T. James Lee, Jr.,
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Plain Language and the Implied Private Right of Action
Under Section 10(b) and )Ob-5, 1995 BYU L. REV. 269, 271 n.17 (1995).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
28. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
29. Kardon,69 F. Supp. at 514 ("In other words, in view of the general purpose of the act, the
mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general
law implies.").
30. Section 286 states that:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other
as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
31. 404U.S.6(1971).
32. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
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More recently, in Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston,33 the Court stated
that the existence of an implied private cause of action under section
10(b) was "beyond peradventure. '34 Thus, by the beginning of the survey period, while municipality liability for violation of section 10(b)
and the status of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine may have been in
question in the Tenth Circuit, the existence of an implied private
cause of action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was an
irrefutable fact.
II. MUNICIPALITIES AND SECURITIES REGULATION
A. Background

1. Pre-1975 Amendment
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for "any person" to a use a manipulative or deceptive device in the purchase or sale of a security." Prior
to 1975, the definition of "person," which is supplied by section 3(a)(9)

of the Exchange Act,36 did not include government entities." Recognizing
this, courts had refused to impose section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 liability
on municipalities for fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities when the suspected conduct occurred before the
1975 amendment.
In Brown v. City of Covington,"' the Sixth Circuit considered
whether the City of Covington was a "person" under the Exchange Act's
pre-1975 definition, and therefore subject to section 10(b) and Rule lOb5.9 Appellants alleged that the city, in the issuance of bonds, failed to
disclose numerous material facts in violation of section 10(b). ' The facts
surrounding the omissions, the appellants alleged, were known to the
city, and were the direct cause of the appellants' loss."' The trial court

33. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
34. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
36. Id. § 78c(a)(9). Though codified as section c(a)(9) of the Exchange Act, this section was
originally published in the public laws as section 3(a)(9). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
§ 3(a)(9), 48 Stat. 881,883 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(9) (1994)). Despite
this change, the section is still commonly referred to in the securities trade, and will be referred to in
the text of this paper, as section 3(a)(9).
37. Prior to the amendment the statute read, "The term 'person' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated
organization." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(9).
38. 805 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. Brown, 805 F.2d at 1268.
40. Id. at 1267-68. The information which the appellants claimed the city failed to disclose
included: profits which would run to promoters through construction costs, the existence of two
unfavorable feasibility reports, the close relationship between the promoters and the underwriters,
and the profitability of the health care center which the bonds were issued to construct. Id. at 1267.
41. Id. at 1268.
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awarded summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the city was
not a person under the Exchange Act's pre-1975 definition."' The Sixth
Circuit affirmed. 3
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the city was not subject to section
10(b) liability for three reasons." First, the 1933 Act's definition of "person" specifically included "government or political subdivision[s]."
Prior to 1975, the Exchange Act's definition of person blatantly omitted
reference to the government even though the Exchange Act was passed
only a year after the 1933 Act.' Second, the 1975 amendment to the Exchange Act's definition of "person," which added government entities to
the list of parties subject to section 10(b) liability, provided persuasive
proof that prior to 1975, Congress did not intend to include government
agencies in its definition of "person. ''" Finally, every other court that
considered this issue came to the same conclusion, thus supporting the
Sixth Circuit's position. '
2. Post-1975 Amendment
As previously stated, in 1975 Congress amended the definition of
"person" under the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4 ,' adding governments and their agencies to the list. Thus, today the Exchange Act's definition of "person" includes "government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government."' This change to the definition appears to subject government entities to the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act. Until 1996, however, only two federal district courts
considered whether the amendment exposed municipalities to section

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1269.
45. See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)).
46. See id. at 1269-70 (citing In re New York Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 181-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
47. The amended Exchange Act definition of "person" read: "The term 'person' means a
natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a govemnment." Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(2), 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994)); see Brown, 805 F.2d at 1270.
48. Brown, 805 F.2d at 1270.
49. Id. (citing New York City Mun., 507 F. Supp. at 181-82; Woods v. Homes & Structures
489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp.
161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); and Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 95,780 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976)). The Southern District of New York is considered a
preeminent authority in the securities field. Therefore, the New York City Municipal case provided
persuasive precedent for the Brown decision.
50. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered
subsections of IS U.S.C. § 78).
51.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994).
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10(b) liability. 2 In both cases the courts rejected defendants' argument
that a municipality was not subject to section 10(b) liability. 3
The district court in Washington Public Power was the first to impose section 10(b) liability on a municipality. Bonds in the amount of
$2.25 billion were issued to finance the construction of two nuclear
power plants. 5 Purchasers of the bonds brought a securities fraud action
against numerous defendants after the project developed serious problems leading to the termination, and eventual default, by the Supply
System on its bond obligation.56 The municipal defendants 7 argued that
the implied private right of action under section 10(b) did not apply to
municipalities. 8When considering the defendants' argument, the court in
Washington Public Power established the analysis that would be applied,
expanded, and followed in later cases.
Initially, the court dealt with the municipal defendants' argument
that the 1975 amendment to the definition of "person" did not create a
private right of action against municipalities. 9 The defendants based this
argument on their interpretation of the legislative history surrounding the
1975 amendment.' In the end, however, the court determined that the
plain language of section 3(a)(9) was the "best guide to congressional
intent."' Compelled by the clear language of the statute, the court held
that the definition of "person" included municipalities.62 The court also

52. See In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1085; Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1484.
54. Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1477 (noting that the determination of whether a
private cause of action against municipalities exists under section 10(b) is a controversial and important one).
55. Id. at 1470.
56. Id.
57. The number of the public defendants illustrates the awesome magnitude of this litigation.
Such defendants included: the Washington Public Power Supply System, nine Washington cities,
nineteen Washington public utility districts, one Washington irrigation district, seven Oregon cities,
four Oregon public utility districts, five Idaho cities and a number of individuals sued in their official
governmental capacities. Id. at 1476 n.4.
58. Id. at 1476. The defendants conceded that there was strong support for the existence of a
private right of action against non-governmental parties (e.g., underwriters, dealers, etc.) for violation of section 10(b) in the sale or purchase of municipal securities, but argued that this liability did
not extend to municipalities. Id. at 1478.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1479. The court declined to evaluate this history however, preferring instead to note
that the Act was passed "in the context of a firmly established court-implied right of action under §
10(b) of which Congress must be presumed to have been aware." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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noted that numerous legal commentators had recognized that the
amendment created a private right of action against municipalities."
In holding that there was an implied private cause of action against
a municipality, the court recognized that there were prior cases reaching
the opposite conclusion." Each of these cases, however, applied the pre1975 definition of "person," and these "same court[s] would reach a different conclusion on that issue under the expanded definition of persons
in the 1975 amendment." Based on the determination that adopting the
plain language was the proper approach, and that due to the 1975
amendment, prior case law had no precedential value, the court held municipalities were subject to the implied private cause of action recognized
under section 1O(b).' In so doing, Washington Public Power laid a strong
analytical foundation for future courts confronted with this same issue.
In In re CitiSource, Inc. Securities Litigation,7 a stock underwriter
being sued by a securities purchaser brought a third-party action against
the municipality of New York City (NYC)." The stock underwriter
sought to impose liability on the municipality for the alleged violations
of section 10(b), consisting of misrepresentation and omission of material fact by the city's employees.' NYC contended that a municipality is
not an entity to which the antifraud provision of section 10(b) applied.' °
The court immediately looked to the 1975 amendment of section 3(a)(9),
and acknowledged the addition of "government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government" to the statute.' NYC argued,
however, that this amendment only extended liability to municipalities

63. Id. (providing a list of articles written after the 1975 amendment which concluded that the
section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" now included municipalities).
64. Id. (discussing In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 198
(C.D. Ca. 1976), and In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
65. Id.; see Brown v. City of Covington, 805 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against City for securities fraud in sale of municipal bonds
because alleged omission and misstatements occurred prior to the 1975 amendment, meaning the
municipality, under section 3(a)(9), was not a "person" subject to 10(b) liability when the violations
occurred); Woods v. Homes & Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1280-82 (D. Kan. 1980) (rejecting
defendant's argument that the 1975 amendment was simply a clarifying amendment, and holding
that prior to 1975 the section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" did not subject municipalities to liability
under section 10 )); New York City Mun., 507 F. Supp. at 180-81 (concluding that Congress's need
to amend section 3(a)(9) in 1975 to include government entities in def'iition of "person" under
section 10(b) proved that, prior to the amendment, municipalities were not encompassed by the
definition); Equity Funding Corp., 416 F. Supp. at 197-98 (dismissing plaintiff's section 10(b) claim
against state because the pre-1975 section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" "simply does not encompass
states or their agencies").
66. Washington Pub. Power, 632 F. Supp. at 1480.
67. 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1072.
69. id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1073.
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when they acted as issuers.' 2 In contrast to the municipal defendants in
Washington Public Power, NYC alleged that liability was not based on
the city acting as an issuer, but instead on misrepresentations and omissions made by city employees in connection with the sale of CitiSource,
Inc. securities." The court rejected such a distinction, and after reviewing
the legislative history"' of the 1975 amendment, determined that Congress's goal was to "improve efficiency, responsiveness, and fairness in
the operation of the securities markets and to improve investor protection."'" Such a goal, the court reasoned, would require a literal reading of
the 1975 amendment, resulting in imposing section 10(b) liability on
both issuing and non-issuing municipalities." Therefore, the court denied
NYC's motion to dismiss.'
Although the issue of municipality liability under section 10(b) was
never considered by a federal appellate court before November 1996, the
issue had been extensively deliberated by two federal district courts. The
court in Washington Public Power provided a solid foundation by holding that the plain language of the 1975 amendment imposed municipal
liability.78 The CitiSource court took this conclusion one step further by
determining such liability was imposed by the 1975 amendment, regardless of whether the municipality was acting in an issuing or non-issuing
capacity.'9

72. Id. The court mentioned that NYC argued that Congress did not intend to extend the
section 10(b) implied private cause of action to municipalities, but suggested that the city did not
press this argument because of the clear language of the statute and the previous holding in Washington Public Power.Id. (citing Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1478-80).
73. Id. at 1071-72.
74. Id. at 1074. After reviewing Senate Report 75 (S. REP. No. 94-75, reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179), and House Conference Report 229 (H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179), the court made the determination that municipality liability for violation of
section 10(b) was intended by Congress in the 1975 amendment. Id. The court noted that the Senate
Report focused on the fact that Congress was concerned with abuses committed by securities professionals in the municipal securities market, stating its fear that these abuses would lead to an erosion
of the public's confidence in that market, thereby jeopardizing capital raised by municipalities in the
municipal securities market. Id. The court also felt that the Senate Report and the House Conference
Report evidenced an intent to improve investor protection in general. Id. These two legislative concems, held the court, were consistent with a literal reading of section 3(a)(9), which would impose
section 10(b) liability on municipalities. Id.
75. id. (citing S. REP. No. 94-75, at 2 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 179).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1085.
78. Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1479.
79. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1074.
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B. Sonnenfeld v. City and County of Denver"0
1. Facts
The plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action against the City and
County of Denver,' alleging that the defendants made false and
misleading statements in the issuance of bonds to finance a new airport."2
Denver moved to dismiss on the grounds that there was "no implied
private cause of action against municipalities under § 10(b) or Rule lOb5." ' The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and
Denver appealed."'
2. Decision
On appeal the court focused on whether a municipality was subject
to section 10(b) liability under an implied private cause of action. 5 While
it was clear that the SEC could take action against local governments to
enforce section 10(b)," no federal appellate court had yet considered
municipality liability under the implied private right of actionY Initially,
the court discussed the 1975 amendment." The court recognized that the
plain language of the amendment seemed to mandate that municipalities
were subject to compliance with the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions. 9 The defendants, however, argued that "Congress did not intend to
create an implied private section 10(b) cause of action against municipalities when it expressly subjected governments and political subdivisions" to the definition of "person" in section 3(a)(9).'The district court,
when confronted with this argument, followed CitiSource and Washington Public Power and determined that the 1975 amendment did indeed
subject municipalities to section 10(b) liability.9 '
The Tenth Circuit stated that the court must look to the "'contemporary legal context"' at the time the legislation was enacted to determine
if Congress intended, expressly or implicitly, to create a private cause of
80. 100 F.3d 744 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
81. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 745.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 745-46.
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing In re County of Orange, 61 S.E.C. 310 (1996)).
87. As stated previously, two district court cases had decided this issue in the affirmative. See
In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power
Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other grounds, 823 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
89. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 746.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 747 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378
(1982)).
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action.93 The court concluded that, because the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) was so well established in 1975, Congress
must have intended to subject municipalities to such actions.'
To bolster this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit inspected the "limited"
legislative history which accompanied the 1975 amendment. 9 Like the
court in CitiSource," the Tenth Circuit determined that the primary objective of this legislation was to regulate the professionals who deal in
municipal securities such as underwriters, dealers, and brokers. The
language of the legislative history made it clear that municipal securities
were to remain exempt from all substantive registration requirements of
the 1933 Act;" but, the court also determined that Congress "clearly intended" municipal securities to remain subject to the securities law
antifraud provisions.' Moreover, the court stated that, regardless of
whether Congress intended the 1975 amendment to section 3(a)(9) as a
clarification or as a substantive change in the law, the net effect was to
subject municipalities to section 10(b) liability.' m
Finally, the Tenth Circuit, like the court in Washington Public
Power, recognized that there were numerous cases which held that section 10(b) liability was inapplicable to municipalities."' The court summarily dismissed the importance of these cases on the basis that they all
were applying the pre-1975 definition of "person."'" ° Thus, on the first
impression issue of municipality liability under section 10(b), the court
93. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,15-16 (1979)).
94. Id. ("We conclude that in the contemporary legal context of 1975, Congress intended by
its 1975 amendment to subject municipalities to the then well-established private right of action
under §10(b) when it expressly brought municipalities within the scope of that section.").
95. Id. at 747-48.
96. See supra text accompanying note 74.
97. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748. Senate Report 75 detailed some of the abuses by professionals in the municipal securities field which led to the need for heightened regulation. See S. REP. No.
94-75, at 43 (1979), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 221. Such abuses included "unconscionable
markups, churning of customers' accounts, misrepresentations concerning the nature and value of
municipal securities, disregard of suitability standards, and scandalous high-pressure sales techniques." Id. The report states that without "additional statutory authority" the SEC would be unable
to curb such violations. Id.
98. Senate Report 75 states:
The Committee is mindful of the historical relationship between the federal securities laws and issuers of municipal securities. Apart from the general antifraud
provision, municipal securities are exempt from all substantive requirements.
Most significantly, this means that state and local governments do have to comply with the registration and disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. The bill does not in any way change this pattern, for the Committee is not
aware of any abuses which would justify such a radical incursion on states' prerogatives.
Id., reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 221-22.
99. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748.
100. Id. at 748-49.
101. Id.at748.
102. Id.
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held, "[C]ongress intended the 1975 amendment to recognize an implied
private cause of action against municipalities.""
C. Analysis
Sonnenfeld, while a crucial decision of first impression in the federal appellate court system, may also be a single component of a larger
pattern imposing heightened restrictions on the municipal securities field.
Historically, municipalities have been immune from federal securities
regulation. Since 1975, however, this immunity has slowly eroded.'"
This erosion is a result of congressional legislation," judicial decisions,'1
and regulatory agency enforcement." Considering the amount of money
which is within the municipal securities market, it is a wonder such
regulation was so slow in arriving. For example, in 1993 there was $1.2
trillion in outstanding municipal securities.' Of that total, $480 billion
was held by individual households and another $370 billion was owned
by investment companies;" meaning individual investors owned-directly and indirectly-seventy percent of outstanding municipal securities." 0By comparison, in 1986, individual investors controlled only fortyfive percent of outstanding municipal securities."' With the amount of
money and the number of non-institutional investors involved, it is un103. Id. at 749.
104. See Robert W. Doty & John E. Peterson, The FederalSecuritiesLaws and Transactionsin
Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 284-85 (1976). In prefacing their discussion of such
erosion, Doty and Peterson stated:
Over 40 years have elapsed since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it has been over 30 years since the promulgation of Rule lOb5. Yet, until 1975, the municipal securities market-one of the nation's largest securities markets-was almost untouched by these otherwise all-encompassing legislative and regulatory
schemes.
Id.; see also Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: Issues in Implementation, 13 J. CORP. L. 65, 67 n.6 (1987) (contrasting pre-1975 cases with changes made in the 1975
amendments); Quinton F. Seamons & David S. Schaffer, Jr., Emerging Disclosure Issues for Municipal Securities, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 392, 392 (1997) (explaining the disclosure regime for municipal securities under recently enacted legislation).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994) (adding "government, or political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of a government" to the Exchange Act definition of "person"); Seamons & Schaffer,
supra note 104, at 393-94 (explaining Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12, promulgated in 1989,
requiring for the first time that municipal issuers disclose material facts in the issuance of municipal
securities, and the 1994 amendment requiring such disclosure in the sale of municipal bonds in
secondary markets).
106. See Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 749; In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069,
1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466,
1480 (W.D. Wa. 1985), affd on other grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
107. See In re County of Orange, 61 S.E.C. 310 (1996) (filing by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the first time naming a county as a defendant for alleged violations of section
10(b)).
108. Neil S. Lang & Linda M. Gardner, The SEC's Attempt to Impose a Regulatory Regime on
Municipal Securities Issuers, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 229, 230 (1996).
109. Id.
110. Id.
I11. Id.
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derstandable that Congress"' and the SEC"3 expressed interest in the
regulation of the municipal securities market. The question raised by this
trend of greater regulation is what the cost will be to municipalities.
The legislative history of the 1975 amendment recognized that municipalities relied heavily on the capital which is raised through these
securities."' There was concern, then, that regulations which were enacted in 1975 and subsequent thereto would place too high a cost on municipalities hoping to raise capital."' At the same time, however, Congress noted that if certain deceptive practices continued in the municipal
securities industry, municipal capital could be jeopardized because of
loss of confidence in the market."6 Therefore, when considering the municipal securities market there were two approaches which theoretically
could have been taken. First, Congress could have taken a "hands-off'
approach, allowing the industry to operate unfettered by fraud liability
and registration requirements. Such a system would allow municipalities
to raise money cheaply and efficiently, as there would be virtually no
administrative costs. The obvious drawback of this approach would be
the danger of graft and corruption becoming so prevalent that investors
would not put their money into municipal securities. The alternative approach would be a system of regulation which insured investor protection. In this scenario, administrative costs ' 7 would rise dramatically, but
hopefully they would be offset by the demand created in the investing
public, who would be confident enough to invest in municipal securities.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sonnenfeld, Congress,"' the
SEC," 9 and two federal district courts'" had determined the latter of these
two alternatives was more appropriate. By concluding that municipalities
112. See Seamons & Schaffer, supra note 104 for a discussion of legislation passed since 1975
which places regulations on the municipal securities market.
113. In November 1995, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, stated: "Municipal finance is the
No.1 priority of the Commission .... [IUt's an obsession of mine, and we're going to come down
hard. Municipal officials are the custodians of billions of dollars in public funds, and those who have
committed fraud will be called to task." There's a New Sheriff in Town-The SEC Extends Its Reach
to Municipal Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. to, 1995, at DI [hereinafter There's a New Sheriff in
Town].
114. S. REP. No. 94-75, at 38 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 216.
115. Id. at 43, reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 222. At one hearing, a witness representing
the Municipal Finance Officers Association indicated the concem in the municipal securities business for so-called "splash" and collateral costs, which certain members of the industry felt would
accompany regulations on municipal securities. Id.
116. Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179,221.
117. "Administrative costs" in this context means money spent by a municipality in an effort to
meet the registration requirements imposed and to avoid being subject to fraud liability.
118. See Seamons & Schaffer, supra note 104 for a discussion of legislation enacted since 1975
which has placed regulations on municipal securities.
119. See There's a New Sheriff in Town, supranote 113.
120. See In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig, 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
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are subject to section 10(b) liability, the Tenth Circuit reinforced Congress's intent to take the route of investor protection to ensure the continuing availability of capital raised through municipal securities.
III. "BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE

A. Background
1. General Background
Forward-looking statements'2 ' are often included in attempts to sell
securities. Such statements, like almost all statements made in connection with the sale or purchase of a security, can expose the party making
the statement to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability. In a section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 action, where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
made a false or misleading forward-looking statement, the defendant
may invoke the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a defense. The doctrine
can be summarized as
providing a mechanism by which a court can rule as a matter of law
(typically in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
or a motion for summary judgment) that defendants' forward-looking
representations contained enough cautionary language or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against claims of securities fraud.',
While many courts have considered the complexities of the doctrine, the
court in Rubinstein v. Collins"n explained it best when it stated that the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine stands for the "unremarkable proposition
that statements must be analyzed in context" to determine if they are
truly misleading.'2"
To establish securities fraud liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant
must have made a false statement or omission of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) the defendant must have
done so with scienter, (3) the plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon

121. The term "forward-looking statements" in this context means statements which "disclose
prospective, as opposed to historical, information .... In general, they are 'statements concerning
the future, such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations."' Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of
Mind, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 619, 619 n.2 (1997) (quoting Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft
Information in SEC Filings, U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972)).
122. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481, 482-83
(1994).
123. 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
124. Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 167. The Third Circuit provided an equally eloquent and simple
definition for the doctrine when it stated, "As we see it, 'bespeaks caution' is essentially shorthand
for the well-established principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so that
accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law." In re Donald J. Trump
Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993).
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the statement or omission; and (4) the plaintiff must have proximately
suffered damages.'" The "bespeaks caution" doctrine focuses on the elements of materiality and reliance." Essentially, the doctrine operates by
allowing a defendant to claim that due to the cautionary language provided in connection with the sale of the security, the materiality element
and/or the reasonable reliance elements were never met."
When applying the "materiality" version of the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, the question is whether "cautionary language operates within
the total mix of available information to render immaterial otherwise
material misrepresentations."'" Courts applying the "reasonable reliance"
version of the doctrine do so under the rationale that an investor will not
reasonably rely on a forward-looking statement when it is accompanied
by sufficient cautionary language." While the reasonable reliance approach could be applied individually,'30 more commonly it is mentioned
in concert with materiality. "' Regardless of whether the court used a
"materiality" approach, a "reasonable reliance" approach, or a combina-

125. Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351,356 (4th Cir. 1996).
126. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he doctrine,
when properly construed, merely represents the pragmatic application of two fundamental concepts
in the law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance.").
127. See Jonathan B. Lurvey, Who is Bespeaking to Whom? Plaintiff Sophistication,Market
Information, and Forward-Looking Statements, 45 DUKE L.J. 579, 588-97 (1995) (explaining the
complexities of the materiality and reasonable reliance elements of a section 10(b) action, and how
the court will base its application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on its evaluation of the cautionary language issued at the purchase or sale of the security); O'Hare, supra note 121, at 630-31 (noting that instead of basing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on failure to meet the materiality or reliance elements, some courts have applied the doctrine using the theory that sufficient cautionary
language prevented certain forward-looking statements from being false or misleading as a matter of
law).
128. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 588. In Trump Casino, the Third Circuit offered an example of
a court basing its application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on the materiality element. Trump
Casino, 7 F.3d at 357. There, bondholders brought an action against issuers of bonds, claiming
forward-looking statements in the prospectus relating to the bonds contained material misrepresentations. Id at 365. Upon considering plaintiffs' claim, the court stated that "cautionary language, if
sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law." Id. at
371. Thus, after finding the prospectus contained "extensive ...specific cautionary language," the
court held that the bondholders could not prove any of the alleged misrepresentations were material.
Id. at 369.
129. See O'Hare, supra note 121, at 636-37.
130. Id. at 636 n. 101 (explaining that while a section 10(b) claim has both a reliance and materiality element, claims brought under sections II and 12(2) of the 1933 Act have only a materiality
element, meaning application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine based on a "reliance" approach
would be useless).
131. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine is not new but a reformulation of two fundamental concepts in securities fraud law: reliance
and materiality.") (citing Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160,
167 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[Tihe 'bespeaks caution' doctrine has developed to address situations in which
optimistic projections are coupled with cautionary language ... affecting the reasonableness of the
reliance on and the materiality of those projections.").
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tion thereof, in recent years, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine has provided a defense for certain securities fraud defendants.
2.

Development of the Doctrine

In Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Eighth Circuit humbly
pointed out that twenty years earlier, in Polin v. Conductron Corp.,'3 the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine was born in its court."" In reality, the term
"bespeaks caution" appeared as dicta in a footnote.'5 It was not until
1986, in Luce v. Edelstein,'" that the doctrine first served as grounds for
summary judgment in a securities fraud action.' 7 Regardless of which
date one assigns to the inception of the doctrine, it is impossible to ignore
the doctrine's incredible growth and acceptance in a short period of time.
Prior to 1997, every circuit except the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
had adopted the doctrine.' 8 While Tenth Circuit district courts applied the
theory twice, " 9until August of 1997, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
never formally adopted the doctrine as a defense to a securities fraud
claim.
3. Safe Harbor Provision
Not only has the "bespeaks caution" doctrine become a widely accepted theory of securities case law, but the basic premise of the doctrine
has also been reduced to statutory form in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)." Congress passed the PSLRA in an
effort to discourage perceived abuses in the field of private security litigation actions.'' Included within the PSLRA was a provision modeled

132. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
133. 522 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1977).
134. Parnes, 122 F.3d at 548.
135. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 587.
136. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 587-88. In Luce, the Second Circuit granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the alleged misrepresentations in an offering memorandum
were surrounded by cautionary language that dealt directly with the statements at issue. Luce, 802
F.2d at 56.
138. See Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus &
Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 939 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Donald J.Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1996);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037
(6th Cir. 1991); Hardin v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995);
Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (1Ith Cir. 1995).
139. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 845, 850 (D. Utah 1995); In re Storage Tech.
Corp. Sec. Litig. 147 F.R.D. 232, 237 (D. Colo. 1993).
140. The "safe harbor" provision was incorporated in both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp.
1995).
141. According to House Conference Report 369, such abuses included:
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after the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. " ' The goal of the provision was to
encourage companies to provide the investing public with more forwardlooking information for investment decisions."3 Theoretically, companies
would be more willing to make forward-looking statements, because
under the protection of the PSLRA, they would not be concerned about
frivolous lawsuits based on those statements."
Referred to as the "safe harbor" provision, the PSLRA contains two
prongs under which a defendant could avoid securities fraud liability. "
First, a defendant's forward-looking statements fall within the safe harbor (meaning not subject to liability) if they are immaterial or identified
as forward-looking and accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially."'" Under the second prong, a defendant is not liable unless
the plaintiff shows that the defendant, with actual knowledge, made a
false or misleading forward-looking statement. "7 While the language of
the statutory "safe harbor" provision and the common law "bespeaks
caution" doctrine are not identical, the underlying, common law principle
is apparent in the newly enacted PSLRA.
Although the "safe harbor" provision was modeled after the judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine, it is important to note that
Congress simply intended the "safe harbor" provisions to supplement,
not replace, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine."' While at first blush, it
would appear the "safe harbor" provision turns the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine into a securities law dinosaur, there are certain differences between the two which require that both be given individual
consideration.' 9 To date, the Tenth Circuit has not had an opportunity to
hear any cases which raise PSLRA issues. In August 1997, however, the

(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is
a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually
to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose cost so
burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients who they purportedly represent.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730.
142. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1995 U.S.S.C.A.N. 730, 742.
143. Steven J. Spencer, Note, Has Congress Learned Its Lesson? A Plain Meaning Analysis of
the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, 111-12 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 114-15 (explaining the "safe harbor" two-prong system).
146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1995).
147. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(B)(i), 78u-5(c)(l)(B)(i).
148. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.S.C.A.N 730, 745
("The Conference Committee does not intend for the safe harbor provision to replace the judicial
'bespeaks caution' doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.").
149. See infra Part I.D for a discussion of the differences between the "safe harbor" provision
and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
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Tenth Circuit did have its first opportunity to consider the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine.
B. Grossman v. Novell, Inc.'"
1. Facts
Plaintiffs brought a shareholder class action against Novell, Inc.,
(Novell), alleging violations of sections 10(b) ' and 20(a)1 52 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The district court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. 5 The plaintiffs' securities
fraud claims centered on statements made by Novell officers and directors regarding a merger between Novell and WordPerfect Corporation
(WordPerfect).' In connection with this merger, where Novell was to
issue stock which it would exchange for outstanding WordPerfect shares,
Novell filed a registration statement and three amendments with the
SEC.'s Within the registration statement and its additional amendments,
Novell included numerous detailed warnings about the effects of the
merger. 517 On June 24, 1994, the merger was completed.' On August 19,
1994, Novell announced that it would not meet the previously published
financial estimates for the third quarter; instead, the earnings would be
59 The folbetween fifteen and twenty percent below expected amounts.'
'60
percent.
seven
dropped
lowing business day Novell's stock
The named plaintiff, a Novell shareholder, initiated this action
claiming that Novell, its officers, and directors made misleading statements and omissions regarding the merger.'6' The court certified the class
150. 120 F.3d 1112(10th Cir. 1997).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
152. Id. § 78t(a).
153. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1115 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Novell filed the registration statement on April 22, 1994, and filed the three amendments to the statement in June 1994. Id.
157. Id. at 1116. Novell's warnings gave notice that: (1) integration could be difficult due to
intense competition in WordPerfect's market and the declining financial performance of the target
company; (2) Novell's profits and stock price could fluctuate after the merger, (3) the merger would
be difficult because Novell did not have management or marketing experience in new markets which
the merger would open; (4) there was no guarantee the different businesses could be integrated; (5)
intense competition from Microsoft should be expected; (6) the merger would lead to higher expenditures; and (7) future earnings and stock prices could be subject to volatile change following the
merger. Id. Then, in amended pro forma financial statements, Novell explained that WordPerfect's
first quarter results were worse than expected and that those results could adversely affect Novell
stock prices. Id. Furthermore, in subsequent amendments to the registration statement, Novell provided additional warnings such as significant deterioration in WordPerfect's sales and profits. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Novell announced that it would incur a $120 million charge against earnings for the
quarter. Id.
160. Id. Novell's stock went from $15.12 per share to $14 per share. Id.
161. Id. at 1115.
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as all purchasers of Novell stock buying between April 27, 1994 and
August 19, 1994. 6' The plaintiffs did not allege that any material misstatements or omissions were contained in the registration statement.'
Instead, the alleged misstatements and omissions were made by the defendant's officers and directors in their statements to the press.'"
2. Decision
In dismissing the plaintiffs' claims the district court held that the
plaintiffs failed to allege materially misleading statements or omissions,
that Novell disclosed the risks of the merger, and finally, that the plaintiff
failed to plead fraud with particularity.'65 The plaintiffs appealed, claiming the district court erred in all three of its securities law holdings.'"
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, stating that
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the securities laws. 7
The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
on three separate grounds. These grounds included: (1) some of the
statements were immaterial because they were simply "corporate optimism" or "mere puffing;' 68 (2) some of the statements were immaterial
because accompanying statements "bespoke caution;"'" and (3) some of
the statements were not actionable because the plaintiffs failed to allege
falsity regarding those statements.' 70
The court explained that to satisfy the elements of Rule 1Ob-5 ,'7' a
plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant made misrepresentations of material fact or omitted a material fact necessary to avoid misleading investors.' 2 A statement is material only when a reasonable in-

162. Id. at 1116.
163. Id.
164. Id. These included statements by Novell's senior vice-president that it appeared WordPerfect's market share was increasing and that the merger would not have a dilutive effect; by Novell's
president, CEO, and chairman three days after the merger that Novell was experiencing success in
integrating WordPerfect and that the company was creating new products; by WordPerfect's CEO
and then-president of Novell's applications group shortly after the merger that it was one of the
"smoothest of mergers in recent history," id. at 1116-17; by Novell's president, CEO, and chairman
after the merger that "he was pleased with the pace of product development," id.; and by Novell in
July 1994 that integration was going well. Id.
165. Id. at 1117.
166. Id.
167. /d.at 1119.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1123-24.
171. Id. at 1118 (citing Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992)). The court explained that to "[s]tate a claim under Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must allege: (1)a
misleading statement or omission of material fact; (2) made in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages." Id.
172. Id. at 1119 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)).
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vestor would consider it important when deciding whether to buy or sell
a particular security.'"
Within this context, the court set out to determine whether any of
the statements made by Novell or its personnel were material. First, the
court held certain statements immaterial because they were simply examples of corporate optimism on behalf of the Novell employees. 7 The
court found statements such as these "the sort of soft, puffing statements,
incapable of objective verification, that courts routinely dismiss as vague
statements of corporate optimism.'" In addition, certain statements
made by Novell employees were not actionable because the plaintiffs
failed to allege their falsity.'76 In disposing of these statements, the court
explained that a plaintiff must not simply allege falsity in their complaint, but must "set forth what is false or misleading about a statement,
and why it is false."'" The court held that the plaintiff did not meet the
falsity requirement and, therefore, failed to state a claim regarding those
particular statements.
The court also considered whether the district court properly applied
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine when it dismissed certain portions of the
plaintiffs' complaint as immaterial.'79 The court began its analysis by acknowledging that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine was simply a method
of finding certain statements immaterial-and therefore irrelevant in a
securities fraud claim-when accompanied by sufficient cautionary language in documents available to the investor." The doctrine provided a
court with the vehicle for ruling, as a matter of law, that "'defendants'
forward-looking representations contained enough cautionary language
or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against claims of securities
fraud."""' However, the court recognized that not every risk disclosure
was sufficient to protect the defendant from securities fraud liability;

173. Id. (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), and Basic v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
174. Id. at 1121-22. The statements that the court concluded were simply corporate optimism
included the statement by Novell's president, CEO, and chairman that they were having "substantial
success" integrating WordPerfect and that the merger was moving "faster than we thought," and the
statement by Novell that, in combining Novell's and WordPerfect's knowledge of network applications, they were coming up with new solutions for customers. Id. at 1121.
175. Id. at 1121-22.
176. Id. at 1123-24. The statements which fell into this category included the statement by
Novell's president, CEO, and chairman that the company had not slowed down efforts to create new
products, but instead had accelerated its efforts, the statement by Novell's vice-president of finance
that reports showed WordPerfect was expanding its market share, and the statement by WordPerfect's CEO and then-president of Novell's application group that this was the merger was one of the
"smoothest of mergers in recent history." Id. at 1123.
177. Id. at 1124 (quoting In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at I119.
180. Id. at 1120.
181. Id. (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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noting, instead, that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applied when cautionary statements directly addressed the specific forward-looking statements challenged by the plaintiff.8 ' The court acknowledged that every
circuit which considered the issue had accepted the doctrine' 3 and then
recognized the "bespeaks caution"84doctrine, as defined in Grossman, as a
valid defense in the Tenth Circuit.'
After adopting the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the court considered
whether the district court properly applied the doctrine.' 5 The court found
that two statements were forward-looking and, thus, subject to the "bespeaks caution" doctrine." Neither of these statements were proper
grounds to state a cause of action, concluded the court, because the registration statement provided a detailed explanation of the risks
involved.' 7 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit ruled the district court properly
applied the "bespeaks caution" doctrine."'
The plaintiffs argued, however, that the doctrine should not be applied because the statements in question and the risk disclosures made by
Novell were contained in different documents.' 9 The plaintiffs contended
that cautionary statements must be contained in the same document as
the alleged misstatements for the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to apply' 9°
In dealing with the plaintiffs' "same document" argument, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the court in In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation'9' stated that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applied only where the

"precise cautionary language elsewhere in the document adequately discloses the risks involved."'" The Tenth Circuit determined, however, the

182. Id. (quoting In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.,
7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)).
183. Id.at1120-21.
184. Id. at 1121. While the court does not explicitly state "we adopt the doctrine for the aforementioned reasons," it appears that the district court's successful application of the doctrine and its
overwhelming acceptance in other federal appellate circuits were the basis for the Tenth Circuit's
decision. See id. at1118-21.
185. Id.at 1121.
186. Id. The statement by the vice-president of finance that the merger would not have a diluting effect on Novell's future earnings and the statement by Novell that by rapidly integrating, the
company was expanding the scope of its "network solutions" by combining Novell's and WordPerfect's knowledge and "quickly reshaping customer expectations" fell into this category. Id.
187. Id at 1122. The court pointed out that the registration statement clearly explained that the
merger could have a drastic effect on future earnings, specifically third
quarter earnings. Id. The
court further noted that the statements dealt in great detail with both the subject of combining the
companies' knowledge and reshaping customer expectations. Id
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Although the decision does not explicitly articulate plaintiffs' argument, from the
court's analysis it is obvious the plaintiffs argued that the disclosure and the statement must be in the
same document forthe doctrine toapply. See id.
191. 35 F.3d 1407 (9thCir. 1994).
192. Grossman, 120 F.3d at1122 (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,
35 F.3d 1407,
1413 (9th Cir. 1994), and citing In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
863 F. Supp. 1409, 1415-16 (D.
Colo. 1994)).
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quoted language was merely dicta. 93 Other courts did not require that the
cautionary language appear in the same document with the alleged misstatement.' Thus, the court determined that because there was no precedent which demanded the cautionary language appear in the document
with the alleged misstatement, 95 the real question, especially in a fraud
on the market situation," was the total mix of information available to
investors at the time of the allegedly fraudulent statements."
The court found that the available information was extensive.' The
cautionary statements appeared in the formal registration statement and
its amendments, and the alleged misstatements occurred in press releases
and interviews. ' The court noted that both the cautionary language and
the alleged misstatements were relatively close in time.' Furthermore,
the court found that all of the statements in the press releases and interviews were obviously directly related to the merger which was described
in detail in the registration statements." Considering the close proximity
and obvious relation of the cautionary language to the alleged misstatements, the court determined there was adequate information available to
the market.' The court held that the cautionary language limited the forward-looking projections made by the company, its officers, and directors, irrespective of the fact that all the statements were not contained in
a single document.'

193. Id.
194. Id. (citing San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos.,
75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding general optimistic statements made to press not actionable
under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine where the defendant, in an annual report, disclosed that competition from discount markets could have an adverse effect on company sales) and Raab v. General
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that cautionary statements in a press
release made the same day as an annual report, bespoke caution as to optimistic statements contained
in the annual report)).
195. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122 ("It does not appear that any court has squarely held that risk
disclosure must be in the same document as the alleged misstatements.").
196. The Third Circuit explained the theory of "fraud on the market" as follows:
The "fraud on the market" theory accords plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 class actions a rebuttable presumption of reliance if plaintiffs bought or sold their securities in an "efficient" market. Plaintiffs using this theory need not show that they actually knew of the
communication that contained the misrepresentation or omission. Instead, plaintiffs are
accorded the presumption of reliance based on the theory that in an efficient market
the misinformation directly affects the stock prices at which the investor trades and
thus, through the inflated or deflated price, causes the injury even in the absence of direct reliance.
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
197. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
198. Id. at 1123.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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C. Other Circuits
With the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, every circuit except the D.C. Circuit has adopted and actively applies it.' During the survey period, the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits
called on the doctrine.
In Gasner v. Board of Supervisors,' a bond investor sued the county
and its industrial development authority for securities fraud after the defendants defaulted on bonds." The bonds were issued to finance the construction of a solid waste processing facility.' The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants made untrue or misleading statements as to material facts
in the sale of the bonds in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.'
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and the plaintiff appealed." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding"' after determining the extensive cautionary language of the offering statement rendered the alleged misstatements immaterial.2 ' Thus, in Gasner,the cautionary statements "bespoke caution"
and prevented the plaintiff from proving the materiality element of a
section 10(b) claim."2
During the survey period the Ninth Circuit also considered the "bespeaks caution" doctrine in Provenz v Miller.t3 There, plaintiffs brought a
class action suit against a computer company and its officers, alleging
securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5., The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants inflated the price of the company stock
value by recognizing revenue before it was earned, and by failing to disclose material information about the company's products. 25 The defen-

204. See Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991); I. Me..er V'... us &
Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 939 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1996);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037
(6th Cir. 1991); Hardin v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995);
Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d
1112 (10th Cir. 1997); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11 th Cir. 1995).
205. 103 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
206. See Gasner,103 F.3d at 353.
207. See id. at 355.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 354.
210. Id. at 362.
211. Id. at 359 ("The venture failed because of the occurrence of the very same events outlined
as risks in the Offering Statement.").
212. See Lurvey, supra note 127, for a discussion of how courts embracing the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine view appropriate cautionary language in forward-looking statements as dispositive
of the materiality and reliance elements in a section 10(b) action.
213. 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
214. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1482.
215. Id. at 1482-83.
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dants asserted a "bespeaks caution" defense claiming that their cautionary statements, made to the market, counteracted any alleged misrepresentations or nondisclosures.2 ' When considering the defendants argument, the court stated that the statements considered to be cautionary
must be "precise" and "directly address" the defendants' future projections, and that "[b]lanket warnings that securities involve a high degree
of risk [are] insufficient to ward against a federal securities fraud
claim."2 7' Because the defendants' cautionary statements were general
warnings about the uncertainty of the economic environment, and failed
to disclose that the company was recognizing revenue before it was
earned, the court held the "bespeaks caution" inapplicable. '
While neither the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gasner nor the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Provenz dramatically altered the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, the two cases illustrate different understandings about the doctrine's foundation." 9 In Gasner, the Fourth Circuit applied the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine solely on the grounds that the cautionary language negated the materiality of the alleged misstatements or non-disclosures.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Provenz, explained "the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine is not new but a reformulation of two fundamental concepts in securities fraud law: reliance and materiality." 2 ' Ultimately,
these different foundational interpretations seem to be insignificant and
appear to pose no threat to the further development of this relatively
young securities law doctrine.
D. Analysis
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
1995.' Contained within this act is the "safe harbor" provision, which is
essentially a statutory form of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.2" Congress passed this legislation because it recognized securities issuers' reluctance to disclose forward-looking statements, which could be helpful
to investors, due to the risk of litigation over those statements. " In Sonnenfeld, the Tenth Circuit did not have an opportunity to consider the
PSLRA's "safe harbor" provision because the litigation began just
months before the enactment of the PSLRA." Instead, the Tenth Circuit
216. Id. at 1493.
217. Id. (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994)).
218. Id. at 1494 (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants).
219. See Langevoort, supra note 122 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine as a mechanism for judicial discretion.
220. Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351,359 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)).
221. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1493 (quoting Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414).
222. See supra Part II.A.
223. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
742.
224. See id. at 42-43, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742.
225. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1118 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997).
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analyzed the forward-looking statements at issue under the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine.226 With the "safe harbor" provision now firmly in place,
it would seem that the Tenth Circuit adopted the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine just in time for it to become outdated. However, upon closer
examination, one finds several differences between the "safe harbor"
provision and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine which warrant retention of
the doctrine.
First, Congress limited the application of the "safe harbor" provision. ' Only corporate issuers subject to the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act, or select persons working for such corporations, may invoke the provision." Non-corporate entities-such as limited liability
companies, partnerships, or limited partnerships-are not protected?"
Second, the "safe harbor" also includes a number of exclusions. ' ° For
example, the provision does not apply to forward-looking statements if
they are published in connection with a blank check company, penny
stock, a rollup transaction, or a going private transaction. z ' Furthermore,
the "safe harbor" does not apply to forward-looking statements included
in financial statements prepared according to GAAP, initial public offering registration statements, or tender offers. 2 Finally, forward-looking
statements made by an issuer who has been convicted of securities fraud
or subject to an SEC administrative order within the last three years will
not be protected by the "safe harbor.""3
The significance of these limitations and exclusions is simplewhen the Tenth Circuit accepted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a
viable defense to a section 10(b) action, it adopted a working judicial
theory, not one devoid of meaning due to subsequent legislative
enactment. Granted, in the coming years much litigation will center
around the PSLRA's "safe harbor."'" However, there will be numerous
circumstances where the "safe harbor" will be ineffectual and the
defendants will have to rely on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. After
Grossman, section 10(b) defendants have this option in the Tenth Circuit.

226. See id. at 1118-25.
227. See Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner'sView of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 311-12 (1997); Carl W. Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking
Information-Navigatingin the Safe Harbor,51 Bus. LAW. 1070, 1076-77 (1996); Spencer, supra
note 143, at 112.
228. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a) (Supp. 1995).
229. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(E), 78u-5(b)(2)(E).
230. See Rice, supra note 227, at 311-12; Schneider & Dubow, supra note 227, at 1076-77; and
Spencer, supranote 143, at 113, for a discussion of the "safe harbor" provision exclusions.
231. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(l)(B)-(E), 78u-5(b)(1)(B)-(E).
232. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A)-(C), 78u-5(b)(2)(A)-(C).
233. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)( 1)(A), 78u-5(b)(1)(A).
234. See Spencer, supra note 143, at 124 (concluding that the language and legislative history
of the PSLRA are so ambiguous that, instead of achieving the goal of reducing litigation, the PSLRA
will actually create litigation).
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IV. CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit promoted the interests
of two diametrically opposed groups in the securities field. On one hand,
Sonnenfeld furthers the goal of investor protection. The Tenth Circuit, by
concluding municipalities were persons subject to section 10(b) liability,
undoubtedly assured that issuers of municipal securities will take heightened precautions to comply with the securities law antifraud provisions.
Although such precautions may lead to additional administrative costs in
the municipal markets, hopefully the confidence created in municipal
securities will offset the added burden.
In contrast to expanding investor protection, the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Grossman created extra protection for section 10(b) violators.
Through its adoption of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the court provided a defense for parties who violated section 10(b).
Can it be said, then, that this bipolar approach to securities liability
is endemic to the Tenth Circuit? Rather, it seems that the decisions in
Sonnenfeld and Grossman reflect a larger struggle with the basis of securities regulation. For example, when the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act
were passed, the caveat emptor approach to securities regulations was
replaced with a policy of investor protection. In 1995, however, Congress feared the federal securities laws were being taken advantage of to
the detriment of securities issuers; thus, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act was born. Incorporated within this act was the "safe harbor"
provision, which, similar to the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, provided
protection to alleged section 10(b) violators. Therefore, Congress, during
the last sixty-five years, has wrestled with the same question as the Tenth
Circuit. Just like Congress, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that, at
times, investors are the proper group to protect, while, at other times,
issuers are the party in need of protection.
Gian Maurelli

TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided five important products
liability cases during the survey period.' One case dealt with the preemption of common law failure-to-warn claims2 and three cases involved or
implied the misuse defense.3 Another breakthrough case addressed the
apparent manufacturer doctrine.! Part I of this survey discusses the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of the preemption clause of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) in relation to common law tort claims. Part
II discusses a case of first impression, Yoder v. Honeywell,' and its clarification of the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine's scope. Finally, Part HI
describes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the misuse defense, and compares this approach to those used by other jurisdictions.
I. PREEMPTION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS

A. Background
Today, federal agencies regulate hundreds of consumer products
and their proper manufacture, design, and labeling.6 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is one of these agencies, regulating states' actions
in the areas of public health and safety.' The Federal Food and Drug Act,
enacted in 1906, protects the public from adulterated or misbranded
products Congress later expanded the Act to include "adulterated or
misbranded" devices and cosmetics,9 but the legislation did not authorize
control over the introduction of new medical devices.'" With new technology creating medical equipment such as pacemakers, catheters, artificial heart valves, and defibrillators," policymakers and the public grew

1. The survey period extended from September I, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
2. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782,784(10th Cir. 1997).
3. See Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1997); Allen v.
Minnstar, 97 F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (10th Cir. 1996); Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1332
(10th Cir. 1996).
4. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965)).
5. See Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1215, 1223 (failing to find any applicable Colorado case law).
6. See Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 189-90 (1993).
7. Id.
8. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2245-46 (1996).
9. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), §§ 501, 502, 52 Stat. 1049-1051
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352 (1994)); H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 6 (1976) (recommending passage of the MDA).
10. See Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2246.
11. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975) (discussing the post-war development of new
medical equipment including pacemakers and artificial heart valves).
1105
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concerned about injuries resulting from the product malfunctions. 2 These
concerns mounted in 1970," when the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine
contraceptive device," caused thousands of women to suffer from toxic
shock, infertility, pelvic infections, and even death.' Because the FDA
possessed limited authority to prevent these events," Congress enacted
the MDA in 1976,17 requiring the FDA to review medical devices before
they could be marketed to the public.' 8
The MDA classified medical devices into three risk-based categories."9 Class I, relatively risk-free devices such as crutches, are subject to
minimal regulation.' Devices in Class II, such as tampons and oxygen
masks used in anesthesiology,2' are considered riskier, and although they
do not need advance approval by the FDA, manufacturers of these devices must follow federal performance regulations called "special controls." Class III devices either "present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury,"' or are "purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life"2 ' or for use which "is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health."' Class III devices include such life-saving and potentially life-saving items as pacemakers' and heart valves. 2
Many Class III devices are subject to a rigorous and lengthy process
known as pre-market approval (PMA),28 which requires the manufacturer
12. Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2246.
13. Roger W. Bivans, Note, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State CommonLaw Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1996).
14. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246.
15. Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
history of the Dalkon Shield problems and the resulting litigation).
16. See Bivans, supra note 13, at 1088.
17. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246. The House Report on the MDA states:
Those involved in.
the development, promotion, and application of medical devices generally agree that the public deserves more protection against unsafe, unproven, ineffective, and experimental medical devices. But this belief is counterbalanced by an equally
strong conviction that excessive or ill-conceived Federal device regulation would stifle
progress in this field.
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 10 (1976).
18. See Bivans, supra note 13, at 1088.
19. Id. at 1090.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(A)(I)-(II) (1994); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp.
948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing the various classifications and providing examples of Class I
devices).
21. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing the classifications of medical devices and providing examples of Class II devices).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); see also Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2246 (discussing Class II
devices and the requirement that manufacturers of such devices comply with "special controls").
23. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C)(ii)(II).
24. Id. § (a)(l)(C)(ii)(I).
25. Id.
26. See Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992).
27. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
28. See Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2246-47.
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to submit a pre-market application with all relevant information substantiating the product's safety and effectiveness.' Such info *rmationincludes
reports of investigations of safety and effectiveness, statements of components and principles of operation of the device, and proposed
labeling."0 After the information is submitted, the FDA will not grant
approval until both FDA officials and an outside panel of experts review
and approve the PMA application.3'
Class III devices, however, may escape the rigorous qualifications
imposed by the PMA requirement."2 Section 360(k) of the MDA imposes
a limited form of review for manufacturers seeking to market new devices similar to those already available on the market. This is known as
the "510(k) process."" A device can be marketed without further regulatory analysis if the FDA determines that the device is "substantially
equivalent" to a pre-existing device." The MDA, however, gives little
guidance in defining "substantially equivalent." The broad guidelines
set forth in the MDA require the manufacturer to submit information
proving "substantial equivalence," and allow the FDA to request additional information before approval." FDA 510(k) approval is not an en-

29. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and
Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 208-09 (1987).
30. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(3)(A), (D)(i).
31. See id. §360c(b)(l)(B).
32. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247 (noting that most Class III devices have not received
premarket approval due to two important exceptions to the PMA requirement).
33. Id.
34. Id. The Medtronic Court noted that the 510(k) process eventually became the means by
which most new medical devices were approved. The Court referred to a House Report stating that
1,000 of approximately 1,100 Class III devices were considered to be "substantially equivalent" to
pre-existing devices, and therefore, not subject to the rigorous PMA process. Id. at 2247-48. (citing
STAFF SUBCOMM.

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,

HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE, MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA'S NEGLECTED CHILD 34 (Comm. Print
1983). The Court also noted that in 1990, 80% of new Class Ill devices entered the market through
the section 510(k) process. Id. at 2248 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 14 (1990)).
35. Id. at 2247.
36. See Jonathan S. Kahan, PremarketApproval v. PremarketNotification:Different Routes to
the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 519-20 (1984). Scholars have also argued that the
term "substantially equivalent" is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Kaplan, Through
the Maze of 5O(k)s, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 160, 163 (1984).
37. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(0 (1987). The legislative history regarding the definition of "substantially equivalent" states the following:
[Tihe term substantially equivalent is not intended to be so narrow as to refer only to devices that are identical to marketed devices nor so broad as to refer to devices which are
intended to be used for the same purpose as the marketed products. The Committee believes the term should be construed narrowly where necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of a device but not so narrowly where differences between a new device and a
marketed device do not relate to safety and effectiveness. Thus, differences between
"new" and marketed devices in material, design, or energy sources, for example would
have a bearing on the adequacy of information as to a new device's safety and effectiveness, and such devices should be automatically classified in Class In1. On the other hand,
copies of devices marketed prior to enactment or devices whose variations are immaterial
to safety and effectiveness would not necessarily fall under the automatic classification
scheme.
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dorsement of the device's safety,38 but the process is significantly faster
and less financially burdensome on manufacturers than the PMA
process, 9 and as a result most manufacturers prefer to file a 5 10(k) application instead of a PMA. '
Section 360k(a) expressly forbids states from establishing any requirements that are "different from or in addition to" any FDA safety or
effectiveness standard applicable to a medical device regulated by the
MDA." Thus, this amendment clearly preempts state regulations and
statutes,"2 but it remains unclear whether 360k(a) also preempts state tort
law. '3 Under state common law, products liability laws were designed to
remedy injured consumers," prompting manufacturers to design and distribute safer products and thus avoid lawsuits and large damage awards. '
The MDA, however, does not provide compensation for injured consumers," and encourages manufacturers to develop and utilize new technologies and ensure minimum safety testing." This overlap between the

H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 36-37 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2248 (noting that a 510(k) determination allowing the
marketing of a pacemaker did not in any way endorse that pacemaker's safety).
39. Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cippolone: A Divided Court
Rethinks Federal Preemption ofProducts Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV.1440,
1461 (1997). The PMA process requires the FDA to review information submitted by manufacturers
for an average of 1,200 hours while the 510(k) process takes about 20 hours. See Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 1997). In addition, the cost to manufacturers was between $111,000 and $828,000 of the PMA process while the cost to manufacturers to
undergo the 5 10(k) process was between $50 and $2,000. See Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability
and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 47 (1989).
40. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 519.
41. Section 360k(a) states, in relevant part:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use
any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
42. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 281.
43. See id. See generally Allison Weiser, Stone Offers Advice on Preemption Cases to Conference Attendees, Andrews Med. Devices Litig. Rep. 9 (July 1,1997) (discussing how courts are
confused over the breadth of the preemption provisions in product liability litigation).
44. See Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1440.
45. See id.; see, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public."); Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 137, 176 (1995) ("[T]ort law's signals [to manufacturers] contain necessary basic messages
that are not delivered through any other medium. An important function of the law is to guide early
evolution of technologies ....).
46. See Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1441.
47. See id.
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MDA's purpose and states' interests has confused courts trying to determine the preemptive scope of the MDA."
Legislative history does not reveal congressional intent regarding
MDA preemption of common law tort claims. ' The Supremacy Clause
provides that federal law takes precedence over contradictory state law,"
and preemption has traditionally involved federal regulations that supersede conflicting state and local administrative regulations, statutes, or
ordinances." Federal regulations rarely preempt state common law unless
a congressional intent to preempt is "clear and manifest." 2 The FDA,
however, has interpreted the MDA to preempt state regulations, statutes,
and the common law. The idea that federal regulations should displace
state common tort law has caused controversy and confusion.' Courts
disagree about the precise scope of 360(k)a," and the Supreme Court
attempted to settle this matter in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.'
In Medtronic, the Supreme Court analyzed and interpreted the
MDA.' Medtronic, Inc., a medical device manufacturer, introduced the
Model 4011 pacemaker into the market,' and the plaintiff was implanted
with the device.' The pacemaker basically mirrored the designs of existing models,'m and the FDA found the pacemaker to be "substantially
equivalent to devices introduced into interstate commerce prior to the
effective date of the [MDA]. '"' As a result, the new pacemaker did not
undergo the extensive review process required for new designs.' The
pacemaker failed, resulting in a "complete heart block," and emergency
surgery for the plaintiff.63

48. See id. at 1442.
49. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 282; Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1462-63.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
51. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 189. See generally Michael Maher, Federal Preemption,
New Barrier to Injured Victims, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 61 (1991) (discussing federal preemption in
the context of several areas of tort litigation).
52. Ausness, supra note 6, at 192 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). Courts are hesitant to allow preemption within a particular area traditionally reserved to the
states. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 206 (1983).
53. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 283. In addition, the FDCA contains no preemption provision while section 360k(a) expressly preempts state requirements. Id.
54. See Maher, supra note 51, at 61.
55. See Weiser, supra note 43 (discussing courts' various interpretations of section 360(k)a).
56. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
57. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2240.
58. Id. at 2248.
59. The failure of the pacemaker was attributed to a defective lead, the component that transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the "pulse generator" to the heart. Id.
60. See id.; Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1448.
61. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The plaintiff filed a complaint against Medtronic based upon state
common law negligence and strict liability.' Medtronic argued that section 360(k)(a) preempted both claims.' The Eleventh Circuit held that
although the negligent design claims were not preempted, the negligent
manufacture and failure-to-warn claims were preempted, ' and the court
limited the strict liability claim to the theory that the pacemaker was "unreasonably dangerous." 7
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's finding of no preemption of design claims, ' but reversed regarding the negligent manufacturer and failure-to-warn claims." In determining the preemptive scope of the MDA, the Court applied a twopronged inquiry. First, the Court noted that federal requirements must be
specific to a particular device.' ° The Court found that the plaintiffs state
common law claims were developed "specifically in regard to medical
devices," while the federal labeling and manufacturing requirements
essentially reflected generic and general concerns about device regulation.7
In addition, the Court held that any state regulation of medical devices must be "different from or in addition to" a federal requirement in
order to be preempted.72 The state requirements were not specifically
developed with respect to medical devices" because they were not the
"kinds of requirements that Congress and the FDA feared would impede
the ability of federal regulators to implement and enforce specific federal
requirements."' Both the failure-to-warn and negligent manufacturing
claims involved general duties of the manufacturer to use due care or to
inform users of potentially dangerous items.'5 The Court held that federal
law did not preempt these general obligations."
Despite the Supreme Court's discussion, the decision left some
gaps." First, Medtronicdeparted from an earlier Supreme Court decision
in which, under a similar federal statute, the Court found state claims
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1347-51 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that while
the negligent design claim was not preempted by the MDA, the negligent manufacture claim and
failure-to-warn claims were preempted).
67. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1347-49. The court also refused to let the plaintiffs change their preempted negligence claims into a strict liability claim. Id. at 1352.
68. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255.
69. Id. at 2258.
70. Id. at 2257.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 2258.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Weiser, supra note 43 (discussing the "badly fractured decision" in Medtronic).
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were preempted by federal law."8 Furthermore, the internal division of the
Medtronic Court failed to resolve some issues.' The Tenth Circuit attempted to clarify this issue during the survey period.
B. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc.'
1. Facts
The plaintiff replaced her artificial hip with a Porous-Coated Anatomic One-Piece Acetabular Component hip (PCA hip)" produced by
Howmedica. Eight years later she experienced severe pain in her hip and
underwent surgery, which revealed that "the staking peg was missing,
that the polyethylene liner had completely disengaged from the metal
cup, and that debris had spread into Oja's hip joint."'' This caused severe
bone dissolution and significant defects in Oja's hip.'
The plaintiff filed a products liability suit against Howmedica, asserting claims of negligence, negligent failure-to-warn, and strict liability. ' Howmedica, however, argued that these claims were preempted
under the MDA.' The district court returned a general verdict for Howmedica on the negligence and strict liability claims," but it also found
that the MDA did not preempt Oja's negligent failure-to-warn claim, and
therefore, entitled Oja to relief."
2.

Decision

The Tenth Circuit applied the Medtronic two-pronged test to determine the preemptive scope of the MDA." First, although the plaintiff's
case involved a specific federal requirement applicable to the PCA hip,
the failure-to-warn claim was not "specifically developed 'with respect
to' medical devices."" The claim was predicated upon a general common
law duty applicable to every manufacturer "to inform users and purchasers of potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in their use."'
Second, the court held that federal law did not preempt the failure-to-

78. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-23 (1992).
79. See generally Katerberg, supra note 39 (analyzing the plurality decision in Medironic and
its ramifications on products liability claims).
80. 111 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
81. Oja, Ill F.3d at 785.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 784.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 785.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 789 (quoting Medironic, 116 S.Ct. at 2258).
90. Id.
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warn claim because it did not involve the type of device-specific requirements that would threaten the MDA's federal interests." '
C. Other Circuits
Two other circuits addressed this issue during the survey period. In
Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit applied
Medtronic's two-prong test. The court determined that the state requirements specifically applied to investigational devices, unlike the
general statutory concerns involved in Medtronic.' In addition, the court
found that the state requirements were different from those mandated
under the federal scheme and would "impede the implementation and
enforcement of specific federal requirements. '" The court also determined that allowing a cause of action in a case in which the FDA specifically approved the design of a device for investigational purposes would
thwart the goals of safety and innovation."
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue as well, holding that the
MDA did not preempt common law tort claims by the recipient of a defective penile prosthesis.' In Martin v. American Medical Systems
(AMS), the plaintiff suffered from erectile dysfunction,' and was surgically implanted with AMS's Dyaflex, an inflatable penile prosthesis." He
subsequently developed a severe infection, and was forced to undergo
numerous surgical procedures that shortened and disfigured his penis."
He then filed several tort and warranty theory claims against AMS.'"
AMS moved for summary judgment, arguing that the MDA preempted
Martin's claim."' The district court held that all claims were preempted
except the breach of express warranty claim.'" The Fourth Circuit overturned, holding that because the Dyaflex received 510(k) approval, federal law did not preempt state common law tort claims." The court discussed Medtronic and noted that the 510(k) process could not be consid-

91. Id.
92. 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. Telectronics, 105 F.3d at 1098-1101 (discussing the "investigational devices" exemption
in terms of Martin's claims).
94. Id. at 1099 (citing Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258).
95. Id. at 1098-99.
96. Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1997).
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. On the breach of express warranty claim, the court held that the plaintiff could not
show reliance on the express "Limited Warranty" made to his urologist by American Medical. Id.
103. Id. at 104.
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ered as FDA approval because it only existed to preserve the pre-1976
status quo,'" which included potential state law liability."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's application of Medtronic preserved state common law doctrine. Prior to Medtronic, manufacturers faced little deterrence from producing dangerous consumer products." Although the
MDA's purpose was to increase product safety and prevent consumer
m the 510(k) exception
injuries,'"
contradicted this goal.' With the exception intact, consumers could purchase unsafe devices that were merely
"substantially equivalent" to devices already on the market." Indeed, if
pre-existing devices on the market were ineffective, unsafe, or even
deadly, manufacturers were essentially encouraged to continue production in order to satisfy the 510(k) "substantially equivalent" definition." °
Because of the MDA's vague guidelines,"' almost all manufacturers satisfied this test." 2 Even when one of these devices injured a consumer, the
manufacturer could escape common law product liability claims by raising the MDA's preemption clause, thereby avoiding litigation on the
merits of the claim." 3
In an effort to guide lower courts in applying preemption laws,
Medtronic expanded consumer protection. After Medtronic, the general
consensus among circuits is that any state claim that is "different from or
in addition to" the federal requirements will be preempted."" What exactly constitutes "different" has not been specifically defined by either
the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit, and MDA preemption issues
remain very fact-specific. Although the Medtronic test may give lower
courts additional flexibility in many situations, ' 5 the test is vague enough
to make liability difficult for manufacturers to predict. Manufacturers
may take advantage of this ambiguity and attempt to use it as technical
subterfuge to escape liability. As a result, consumers may encounter
great difficulty in relying on state common law for their claims.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 694-715 (1997) (discussing the
state of Pre-Medtronic products liability preemption, the Medtronic decision, and the aftermath).
107. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended at Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 4(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360-360k (1994)).
108. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
109. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
110. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
113. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 519; supra note 41 and accompanying text.
114. Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2248 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994)).
115. See Medtronic, i16 S. Ct. at 2257.
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II. THE APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE'S FIRST IMPRESSION:
YODER V. HONEYWELL 6

A. Background
The apparent manufacturer doctrine makes non-manufacturing sellers liable for their involvement with defective products."' Defined in the
Second Restatement of Torts, "8 this doctrine subjects a nonmanufacturer
of a product to the same liability as a manufacturer.' 9 As a result, retailers, distributors and trademark licensors"' face potential liability."' Most
apparent manufacturer cases involve "a defendant labeling or affixing to
the product its own name, trade name, or trademark, or an advertisement
identifying the defendant as the maker of the product.""'
Consumer expectations dictate the need for this approach;' a consumer may reasonably believe that the nonmanufacturer created the
product and may rely upon their reputation and skill when choosing the
product.'" Therefore, if a company induces the public to believe that it
manufactured the product, the apparent manufacturer doctrine will impose liability upon that company."' The apparent manufacturer doctrine
also helps to define appropriate accountability and to deter the misuse of
corporate structures to evade tort liability."

116. 104 F.3d 1215(1997).
117. See Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Mich. 1995).
118. Section 400 provides: "One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by
another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).

119. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223. In principle, the apparent manufacturer doctrine expands
tort liability and guarantees "that some entity in the product enterprise remains answerable for injuries caused by defective products." See Rosemary G. Schikora, No "Apparent Manufacturer" Liability in Michigan,MICH. BAR J., Mar. 1996, at 247 (quoting Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223).
120. Most courts that impose liability on trademark licensors only do so if the licensor also
played a significant role in the chain of distribution. See Burkert v. Petrol Plus, 579 A.2d 26. 33-34
(Conn. 1990).
121. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 273-74 (Ind. CL App. 1972)
(using the apparent manufacturer doctrine to impose liability on a distributor); see also Kasel v.
Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 717-19 (Ct. App. 1972) (imposing liability on trademark
licensor who played a significant role in forming the entity that manufactured the product); Rubbo v.
Hughes Provision Co., 34 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ohio 1941) (estopping defendant, who was trademark
licensor and retailer of the product, from denying agency, therefore imposing liability on the defendant).
122. Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
123. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247.
124. Root v. J.H. Indus., Inc., 660 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) (quoting Hebel v.
Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 203 (Il. 1982)).
125. See Alan J. Lazarus et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law, 32 TORT & INS. L. 499,499(1997).
126. See Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995).
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At least eighteen states have recognized the apparent manufacturer
doctrine,'2" which was incorporated into the Model Uniform Product Liability Act.'" Most jurisdictions that recognize this doctrine have also
adopted strict tort liability as a theory of recovery.'" Jurisdictions refusing to recognize strict liability often choose not to adopt the apparent
manufacturer doctrine because, when combined with other theories, it
often ultimately imposes strict liability upon nonmanufacturers' °
Some courts, however, have found that the use of the apparent
manufacturer doctrine is unnecessary because current theories of seller
liability and related tort doctrines generate the same result.' For example, a seller can be found liable under the laws of agency, fraud, and misrepresentation in a situation where the seller uses a product label upon
which consumers rely.' "Piercing the corporate veil" and successor liability may also be used by courts to establish liability,' 3 thus holding
corporate stockholders personally liable for defective product injuries,
even though the stockholder did not manufacture the product.'" Similarly, successor liability may hold a corporation that merges with, or acquires, another corporation liable for injuries caused by a defective product produced by the old corporation.'
These theories are limited, however. For example, "piercing the corporate veil" is appropriate only when public policy is violated or a corporate structure is misused to escape justice.'" Similarly, successor liability
is often available only in limited circumstances.' The precise application
127. Jan C. Leventer, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, Torts, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1181, 1207
(1997); see Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223 n.8 (listing courts which have adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine).
128. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
129. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Gauge, 844 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1994); Rice v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 763 (D. Colo. 1987); Burkert v. Petro Plus, 579 A.2d 26
(Conn. 1990); Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 233 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Black, 708 S.W.2d
925 (Tex. App. 1986); Zamora v. Mobil Corp., 704 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1985).
130. Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("Regardless of
whether the seller holds the product out as its own, the seller has no input in the design of the product. Thus, imposing liability would amount to strict liability, which this jurisdiction has declined to
adopt.").
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Fahey v.
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Commissioners of State Ins.
Fund v. City Chem. Corp., 48 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 1943).
133. See Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 224-25.
134. See Messick v. Moring, 514 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 1987) (listing commonly used justifications for "piercing the corporate veil" and imposing liability on shareholders or a controlling corporation).
135. See Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 120 (Ct. App. 1979).
136. See Leventer, supra note 127, at 1207.
137. See, e.g., Parson v. Roper Whitnesy, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (granting
successor corporation summary judgment in a products liability action by a worker who suffered
injuries while operating a hydraulic press brake); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (allowing successor corporation to escape liability for worker's asbestos-related
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of this apparent manufacturer doctrine continues to develop, and many
jurisdictions remain undecided about the scope and use of the doctrine.38
B. Yoder v. Honeywell" 9
1. Facts
The plaintiff, in the course of her employment, used a defective
computer keyboard and consequently suffered from repetitive stress injuries, including bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral radial tunnel
syndrome and bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome." She brought suit
against the manufacturer of the office keyboards, Bull HN Information
Systems, Inc., and against Bull's parent corporation, Honeywell."' One
of her claims alleged that Honeywell, even though a subsidiary and not
the actual keyboard manufacturer, should be held liable under the apparent manufacturer doctrine.' 2 She premised this claim upon Section 400 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 3 and Colorado law." Although Honeywell's trademark was on four of the seven keyboards used by the
plaintiff, the district court held that Honeywell was not liable to the
plaintiff as a manufacturer and declined to apply the apparent manufacturer doctrine."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Colorado law did not address
whether the apparent manufacturer doctrine would apply under state
law." The court examined the Colorado Products Liability Act and the
Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-21-401, which imposes strict liability for defective products on "manufacturers."" In analyzing the
injuries); Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1984) (holding that successor corporation could not be liable for a worker's injuries sustained from a metal brake); Burr v. South Bend
Lathe, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (allowing no liability to successor in a strict
liability action where there were a series of successors).
138. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
139. 104F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997).
140. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1215.
141. Seeid. at1218.
142. Id. at 1219.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
144. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1222-23.
145. Id. at 1219.
146. Id. at 1223.
147. Id. Section 13-21-401 defines a manufacturer as:
[A] person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product prior to the sale of the product
to a user or consumer. The term includes any seller who has actual knowledge of a defect
in a product or a seller of a product who creates and furnishes a manufacturer with specifications relevant to the alleged defect for producing the product or who otherwise exercises some significant control over all or a portion of the manufacturing process or who
alters or modifies a product in any significant manner after the product comes into his
possession and before it is sold to the ultimate user or consumer. The term also includes

19981

TORTS

1117

definition of "manufacturer" in the statute, the court determined that
Colorado, by negative implication, had adopted the "essence" of the Restatement. ' "
Nonetheless, the court refused to extend liability to Honeywell under the apparent manufacturer doctrine 9 because Honeywell did not sell
or distribute the keyboards, and because many courts have declined to
extend section 400 of the Restatement beyond sellers or distributors of
defective products.5" The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
Restatement allows courts to extend strict liability to owners of trademarks who are not otherwise involved in the "chain of distribution."''
The court also disregarded the argument that Colorado Revised Statute
section 13-21-401 defines "manufacturer" as someone who "otherwise
prepares a product" before its sale;'5" rather, the court limited the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark owners." In
addition, the court noted that the plain meaning of the phrase "otherwise
prepares a product" did not include those whose names were merely
placed upon the product.'5 '
C. Analysis
Because courts have experienced difficulty in determining the precise scope and application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine, Yoder
undoubtedly clarified the apparent manufacturer doctrine's scope.'5 In
imposing liability on a company whose name appears on a product, most
courts seek to protect consumer expectations.'" Despite the fact that
Honeywell's name appeared on four of the seven keyboards, which
any seller of a product who is owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer or
who owns, in whole or significant part, the manufacturer. A seller not otherwise a manufacturer shall not be deemed to be a manufacturer merely because he places or has placed
a private label on a product if he did not otherwise specify how the product shall be produced or control, in some significant manner, the manufacturing process of the product
and the seller discloses who the actual manufacturer is.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-401 (1997).
148. The court noted that the last sentence of the statutory definition was similar to section 400
of the Restatement and therefore, "[b]y negative implication the statute allows a seller who places a
private label on a product without disclosing the actual manufacturer to be liable as a manufacturer."
Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223.
149. Id. at 1224.
150. Id. The court recognized several jurisdictions following this principle. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1463 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding summary judgment on apparent manufacturer claims where defendant was neither seller of computer keyboard nor otherwise involved in the
chain of distribution); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 831 F.2d 153, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting liability for product designer who did not sell, manufacture or install gas heater); Nelson v.
International Paint Co., Inc., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (declining to impose liability on parent
company uninvolved in distribution).
151. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223-24.
152. Id. at 1224.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
156. See Leventer, supra note 127, at 1207-08.
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would give rise to the plaintiff's expectations that the keyboards were in
fact manufactured by Honeywell, the court ignored the trend"' and held
that Honeywell was not liable."
The purpose of imposing liability under tort principles is to induce
"socially desirable conduct."'' 9 Because nonmanufacturers are often unaware of the dangers created by the manufacturer, nonmanufacturer liability would not further deterrence principles and could be "grossly unfair. '' "wBy limiting the apparent manufacturer doctrine to only manufacturers, Yoder deters manufacturers of products and those extremely familiar with them from producing or distributing items that do not meet
the highest possible standards.' 6' Additionally, consumers retain the ability to seek compensation from those manufacturers.
In contrast, some commentators argue that Yoder may damage consumer interests.' Plaintiffs may face a larger burden of finding and
identifying the correct product manufacturer, " 3 may be forced to exercise
due diligence in attempting to identify the actual manufacturer, and will
be unable to rely upon labels or names placed upon the product.'" As a
result, consumers may have to file numerous claims against a variety of
defendants in order to identify the actual manufacturer.' This burden on
consumers, however, is necessary to uphold principles of fairness. While
consumers may have to investigate a product more thoroughly before
relying upon its label, such an investigation is necessary to maintain an
adequate balance between protecting nonmanufacturers from infinite
liability and insuring adequate consumer protection.

157. See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 947 (Ariz. 1990) (suggesting liability for a trademark licensor that had the ability to control the merchandise); Hartford v.
Associated Construction Co., 384 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1978) (holding that the apparent manufacturer
doctrine applies even to trademark licensors not involved in the production, marketing or distribution
of the defective product). But see Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that trademark name alone on product is not enough to justify liability under the apparent
manufacturer doctrine).
158. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223.
159. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 273 (1990).
160. Id. at 274.
161. See Kevin P. Kavanagh & Peter H. Webster, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, Torts, 42
WAYNE L. REV. 1191,1218 (1996).
162. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247; Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the
Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1992).
163. See Kavanagh & Webster, supra note 161, at 1218.
164. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247.
165. See Kavanagh& Webster, supra note 161, at 1218.
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III. MISUSE

A. Background
Misuse is one of the most common defenses to product liability actions,". asserting that the plaintiffs conduct was so unforeseeable and
improper that the plaintiff, not a product defect, caused the injury. 67 This
defense is also used to either disprove causation, or to demonstrate that a
product defect never existed." Limiting the manufacturer's or supplier's
liability ensures that products liability law does not serve as a substitute
insurance policy for consumers."w
Courts disagree upon the meaning of misuse and have developed a
variety of definitions for the doctrine, "' resulting in numerous definitional disagreements.' Misuse has been defined by some courts as "a use
or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably
expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a
use that the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for."'" Other
courts have defined misuse as "use of a product where it is handled in a
way which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen or expected in the normal and intended use of the product and the plaintiff
could foresee an injury as the result of the unintended use,""' or "use of
the product which constitutes willful or reckless misconduct or an invitation of injury.""'
Some courts define misuse simply as "a use of the product in a
manner which defendant could not reasonably foresee,"'7 5 or "a use not
reasonably foreseeable."'7 6 Many courts refer to the Restatement of (Second) of Torts section 402A as a basis for implementing this defense.'"
166.

Christopher H. Toll, The Burden of Proving Misuse in Products Liability Cases, 20 COLO.

LAW. 2307, 2307 (1991).

167. Peter Zablotsky, Appropriate Role of Plaintiff Misuse in Products Liability Causes of
Action, 10 TOURO L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1993).
168. See, e.g., Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 A.2d 907 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Calvert
Fire Ins. Co. v. Fyr-Fyter Sales & Serv., 425 N.E.2d 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
169. Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
170. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 190-91; see also Simpson v. Standard Container Co.,
527 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (discussing multiple definitions of "misuse").
17 1. See Simpson, 527 A.2d at 1341 (quoting Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348,
354-55 (Md. 1985)).
172. Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 355.
173. id. at 354-55.
174. Id.at 355.
175. Id.at 354.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 353 (stating that "[m]ost jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement view that misuse is a factor in strict liability actions"). Comment h to section 402A of the Restatement states:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is
knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as
where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where a child
eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable.
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Misuse evolved within the doctrine of strict liability embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.'" Section 402A recognizes
misuse as "a defense for the manufacturer where the user mishandles or
misuses a product and thereby causes a dangerous condition."'" Under
this doctrine, the defendant must prove that the use occurred in an unintended manner or for an unintended purpose, that the use must not have
been reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, and that the misuse
caused the injury."0
This defense is similar to comparative fault or assumption of risk,
which also involve an examination of the plaintiffs conduct.'8 ' Assumption of risk, a strict liability defense used when the plaintiff has "voluntarily and unreasonably proceed[ed] to encounter a known danger,"'"0
focuses upon the plaintiff's culpability.'" The plaintiff may not recover if
he or she "voluntarily proceeds in the face of known danger.' Comparative fault is, essentially, the application of comparative negligence
principles to other tort theories, such as strict liability." Some courts
have refused to apply this doctrine beyond negligence actions."
Other courts, however, have used comparative fault principles to
apportion the fault of each party, regardless of the theory of liability under which the plaintiff proceeds.'87 In other words, the manufacturer may
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965).

178. Section 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the us er or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
179. Id.
180. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 191-93.
181. Toll, supra note 166, at 2307.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n.
183. Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542,545 (Iowa 1980).
184. Id.; see also Toll, supra note 166, at 2307 (defining assumption of the risk as "voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger").
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (observing that
applying a comparative negligence statute in a strict liability case would be "extremely confusing
and inappropriate"); Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to
extend the application of comparative negligence principles to products liability actions under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A because such actions are not based upon negligence principles).
187. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (extending comparative negligence principles to strict liability actions and recognizing the broad applicability of "fault"
in both negligence and strict liability cases).
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be relieved of liability in proportion to the user's misuse of the product.'"
Most jurisdictions, however, apply misuse as a complete bar to
recovery.'" The difficulty with applying comparative fault principles in
strict liability arises because comparative fault neutralizes the impact and
underlying purpose of a strict liability claim.'" In some jurisdictions,
comparative fault may allow some recovery in strict liability claims in
cases where the plaintiff's misuse was either foreseeable or unforeseeable.191
Although most courts have adopted misuse in product liability actions in some form,'" courts are split in determining whether the defendant must establish misuse as an affirmative defense, or if the plaintiffs
must demonstrate an absence of misuse in cases of strict liability and
negligence. 9 Courts which view misuse as a form of proximate cause
place the burden on plaintiffs to show misuse did not occur,"9 and the
plaintiffs must show that the misuse was unforeseeable to the
defendant.'
The majority of jurisdictions, however, view misuse as a defendant's affirmative defense.'" Generally, affirmative defenses require
proof of all elements based upon the preponderance of the evidence, and
the defendants are entitled to prevail even if the plaintiff proves all ele188. The Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,737 at § 112(c)(1); see 44
Fed. Reg. 62,737 (providing that when a manufacturer proves misuse as a cause of injury, damages
are reduced or apportioned to the extent that the misuse caused the harm).
189. Note, however, that the highest courts in Kansas and Texas have completely rejected the
misuse defense and supplanted it with comparative fault and contributory negligence. See Kennedy
v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (Kan. 1980) (holding that comparative liability statutes supplant the misuse defense); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984) (holding that contributory negligence must be used to replace the misuse defense); see also Kavanaugh v.
Southland Mower Co., 641 P.2d 258, 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that if proximate or legal
cause of injury was misuse, and not product defect, there is no liability).
190. Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 199. "[S]trict liability focuses on the product rather than on
the manufacturer's conduct ....Toll, supra note 166, at 2307.
191. Toll, supra note 166, at 2308.
192. Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 353-54 (Md. 1985).
193. Id. at 354 (listing courts which have looked at causation and consequently categorized
misuse as an affirmative defense).
194. Usually the plaintiff will allege that the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous.
After this is established, the question becomes whether the harm "was within the risk created by the
defective producL" When the issue is stated as such, it becomes that of proximate cause, which is
normally part of the plaintiffs burden of proof. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A
ProposedRevision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,
1545-46 (1992).
195. Id. (stating that generally, in products liability cases, "the plaintiff is able to establish that
the product was defective, and the question then becomes whether the harm was within the risk
created by the defective product"); see, e.g., Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 356 (holding that misuse is not
an affirmative defense because causation is an element of the plaintiffs case).
196. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 190. Of the 31 states that have addressed the issue of
burden of proof with any degree of specificity or certainty, 20 view misuse as a defense and place
the burden on the defendant. Id. at 201. The remaining II establish that disproving misuse is part of
the plaintiffs prima facie case and place the burden on the defendant. Id. at 201-03.
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ments of their case.'9" This concept becomes complicated, however, when
applied to the misuse doctrine. For example, a plaintiff who proves that a
defective product "caused" an injury is actually disproving that misuse
caused the injury.'" In this sense, misuse actually becomes "an inextricable part of the causation analysis in the plaintiff's case.""
B. Tenth CircuitCases
1. Allen v. Minnstar'
a. Facts
In Allen v. Minnstar, the plaintiff fell overboard from a Wellcraft
Marine boat manufactured by Outboard Marine Corporation (OMR), and
the boat's unguarded propeller hit him.' He had been sitting in the bow
of the boat and fell when the boat's driver accelerated and made a sharp
turn in order to avoid an obstacle.' The plaintiff's left leg was so severely lacerated that amputation was required," and he suffered abdominal injuries leading to a colostomy.' He then sued both Wellcraft and
OMR for a variety of products liability claims.' The suit alleged that
Wellcraft used a defective and unreasonably dangerous design,' and that
the boat should have been equipped with a propeller guard and proper
bow seating to prevent passenger ejection from the boat.' The court
ruled in favor of OMR on summary judgment.' and the plaintiff's remaining claims against Wellcraft proceeded to a jury trial.'
Wellcraft raised the misuse defense,2 ' asserting that the plaintiff was
sitting on the gunwale of the boat rather than the bow seat.2"' The jury

197. Toll, supra note 166, at 2308. For example, if the plaintiff in a contract case proves that a
contract existed, it was breached, and damages occurred, the defendant will still win if he or she
demonstrates that the statue of limitations expired three years before the suit was filed. Id.
198. Id. at 2309.
199. Id.
200. 97 F.3d 1365 (10th Cir. 1996).
201. Minnstar, 97 F.3d. at 1367.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1993).
209. Minnstar,97 F. 3d at 1367-68.
210. Id. at 1368. The trial transcript was not included in the record on appeal; therefore, the
appeals court could not determine whether Allen objected to the introduction of the misuse defense
during trial. The record did indicate that Allen filed written objections to the introduction of the
defense. Id. at 1368 n.l.
211. Id. at 1368.
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ruled in favor of Wellcraft, concluding that the boat was not unreasonably dangerous."'
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the jury verdict for Wellcraft
and determined that foreseeability of product misuse was a jury
question.2 3' The court, applying Utah case law,"" noted that state courts
had yet to determine if foreseeability of misuse prevented the defense."'
Noting that most states recognize the misuse defense and have generally
established that foreseeability of misuse is a jury question, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the decision."6 The Tenth Circuit also noted that evidence
of the plaintiff sitting on the gunwale rather than the seat of the boat was
relevant as to whether the design of the boat's seating was the proximate
cause of the injuries, regardless of the misuse defense."' Therefore, the
court concluded, even had misuse not been used in the jury instructions,
the issue was still highly relevant because it was necessary to establish
the essential elements of the strict liability claim.'
2. Staley v. BridgestonelFirestoneInc."9
a. Facts
In Staley v. BridgestonelFirestoneInc., an employee died after a
multipiece tire and rim assembly explosively separated while he was
attempting to install a new tire on a road grader."' The decedent's estate
brought suit against Firestone, claiming that it was foreseeable that such
an explosion would occur,' and that the product was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and negligently designed.' Firestone's primary de-

212. Id. at 1367-68.
213. Id. at 1369.
214. Id. at 1368-69. The court acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court recognized misuse
as an affirmative defense in strict products liability. Id. at 1368 (citing Ernest W. Hahn v. Armco
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979)). Utah also applies comparative fault principles to the
misuse defense. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Utah 1981) (noting that
the jury should be asked to consider "the relative burden each [party] should bear for the injury they
have caused").
215. Minnstar,97 F.3d at 1368.
216. Id. at 1368-69 (citing several cases holding that the determination of forseeability is a
question for the jury).
217. Id. at 1369.
218. Id.
219. 106 F.3d 1504 (10th Cir. 1997).
220. Staley, 106 F.3d at 1507.
221. id.
222. Id. at 1508.
223. Id. The plaintiff produced evidence showing that "if the components of the rim were
assembled without being fully engaged, they might separate following the addition of inflation
pressure." Id.
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fense against Staley's estate was misuse," ' alleging that the decedent
failed to follow the suggested safety procedures.2" Firestone also claimed
that the decedent should have used the tire and rim restraint, not a hammer upon an inflated tire, and that the decedent mounted the tire contrary
to his safety training.'
As support, Firestone introduced evidence showing that the decedent had signed a training record acknowledging his familiarity and prior
training with such rims.' In addition, Firestone introduced significant
evidence demonstrating the decedent's familiarity with proper safety
procedures." Finally, the defense brought forth statistics showing that
the rim components in question had been involved in over ten million
servicings with only eight recorded accidents.2' The plaintiffs, however,
argued that because Firestone could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of the decedent's conduct, Firestone could not assert the misuse
defense.' The district court granted Firestone summary judgment on the
failure-to-warn claim,"I and the jury found for Firestone on the remaining claims. 2
b. Decision
Upon reviewing the plaintiff's appeal, the Tenth Circuit recognized
the three elements of misuse applicable under Colorado law: " (1)
whether the use was for an unintended manner or for an unintended purpose; (2) whether the use was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer; and (3) whether the misuse caused the injury.' The plaintiffs asserted the misuse defense was inapplicable, because a similar accident
had occurred in the past, making the possibility of the misuse foreseeable."5 The court disagreed and held that misuse was not foreseeable to

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1510.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1508. Relying on Cruz v. Texaco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Ill.
1984), the district
court held that the defendant was not strictly liable for failure to warn and had no duty to warn. Cruz
held that a manufacturer of a winch truck would not be liable for the death of an employee because
the decedent's employer was aware of the danger of the potential danger of driving at high speed
with objects in tow and could have warned the employee. Staley, 106 F.3d at 1509.
232. Id. at 1508.
233. Colorado has adopted the Restatement's approach. Id. at 1510.
234. Id. (citing Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (Colo. 1986)).
235. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Firestone was aware of other injuries and deaths that resulted
from conduct similar to Staley's conduct before his death. They cited a 1973 incident in which a lock
ring was not properly seated, injured a manager who hit it with a hammer and relied upon Colorado
Supreme Court decisions that found it was erroneous not to allow a misuse instruction after the
plaintiffs produced evidence of prior reported incidents involving the same type of conduct. Id.
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Firestone because of the low number of accidents occurring from the
number of servicings.' Furthermore, the court relied upon the testimony
of two defense experts that the decedent's actions were unforeseeable.'
Although the plaintiffs argued that one portion of the misuse jury
instruction did not allow the jury to consider comparative fault and apportion the fault accordingly," the court rejected this argument. The
court determined that all elements of misuse were found, and comparative fault principles need only be applied if the jury determines one of the
elements was not proven.2
3. Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co.2'
a. Facts
In Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Company, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
principles of user foreseeability. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained
injuries"4 while working in a restaurant preparing tortillas in a deep fat
fryer.' 2 After another employee accidentally poured bleach into the
fryer, 3 the plaintiff suffered from exposure to the chlorine gas2" and
consequently was unable to work full time.' She filed a failure-to-warn
claim against the manufacturer of the bleach, Ben E. Keith Company
(Keith), alleging that the bleach was defective because its label did not
adequately warn of such risks.24 The defendant claimed that the other

(citing Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 187-89 (Colo. 1992), and Schmutz v. Bolles, 800
P.2d 1307, 1316 (Colo. 1990)).
236. id. In this case, the plaintiffs presented only one incident that involved hammering on this
type of product. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The plaintiffs noted the Colorado pattern jury instruction which included the following:
If you find that all of these three propositions have been proved, then your verdict must
be for the manufacturer. (On the other hand, if you find that any of these three propostions has not been proved, you may still consider whether plaintiff's use of the product constitutes comparative fault, as that term is defined in these instructions).
Id. at 1510-11. The jury instruction submitted, however, included the following:
A manufacturer of a product is not legally responsible for injuries or damages caused by
a product if:
The product was used in a manner other than that which was intended;
That use could not reasonably have been expected by the manufacturer; and
Such use rather than a defect, if any, in the product caused the plaintiff's claimed injuries
or damages.
Id. at 1510.
239. Id.
240. 97 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 1996).
241. Daniel, 97 F.3d at1331. The plaintiff claimed to suffer from Reactive Airway Dysfunction
Syndrome (RADS). Id.
242. Daniel, 97 F.3d at133 1.
243. Id. at 1332.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1331-32.
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employee's negligent actions were the sole cause of the plaintiffs injuries. " The jury agreed and returned a verdict for the defendant.2"
b. Decision
Upon review, the Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiff must
show that he would have read and heeded warnings on the label.2" The
court found that no such presumption existed in this case because the coworker testified that he was in a hurry at the time of the accident.' While
acknowledging that manufacturers must anticipate all foreseeable uses of
the product,' the court found this particular misuse to be unforeseeable,
creating no duty to warn. 2
C. Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit also considered foreseeability as an element of
misuse in Chronister v. Bryco Arms." 3 The plaintiff brought a products
liability action subsequent to a gun accident, claiming that the gun was
defectively designed.' In addition, the plaintiff argued that the manufacturer failed to warn of the possibility of the gun misfiring.' The
manufacturer argued that, despite a recommendation on the packaging,
the plaintiff misused the product by failing to wear ear protection.' After
a trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on both strict liability and negligence claims." '
On appeal, the defendant argued that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a purchaser would use its handguns without wearing ear protection.' Additionally, the defendant asserted that use of a product that
contradicted the product's warnings could not be considered a "reasonably anticipated" use.' The court disagreed, noting that basic products
liability law dictated that a manufacturer cannot escape strict liability for

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1333.
251. Id. at 1334 (quoting Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980)).
252. Id.
253. 125 F. 3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997).
254. Chronister, 125 F.3d at 625.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The jury apportioned five percent of the fault to Chronister on the strict liability claims
and twenty-five percent on the negligence claim. Id.
258. Id. at 626-27.
259. Id. at 627.
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a defective product that has foreseeably been misused,' ° and the judgment was affirmed. 6'
D. Analysis
The Tenth and Eighth Circuits agreed that the definition of misuse
should involve some aspect of foreseeability." 2 The Tenth Circuit, however, did not clarify whether the misuse defense should be an affirmative
defense, or part of the plaintiff's claim that must be disproved.'
The Tenth Circuit failed to clarify issues raised in Allen v. Minnstar.
Initially, the court characterized misuse as if it were an affirmative defense and considered evidence introduced by the defendant to disprove
liability. ' Second, the court suggested that the defendant need not raise
the defense at all because causation was "highly relevant" to establishing
essential elements of the strict liability claim.' This analysis did not
clarify the proper scope and application of the doctrine of misuse in
products liability law.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit made significant contributions to products liability law during the survey period. A clear interpretation of Medtronic and
the preemption doctrine will undoubtedly help consumers to assert state
tort law claims against manufacturers of defective products. Similarly,
Yoder provides courts and practitioners with guidance in applying the
apparent manufacturer doctrine. The misuse defense, however, remains
unclear in the wake of inconsistent interpretations, and courts will likely
continue to struggle with this lack of clarity.
Lana Steven

260. Id.
261. Id. (finding that use of the gun without hearing protection was foreseeable, and thus the
misuse defense could not be applied).
262. See Chronister, 125 F.3d at 627; Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504,
1510 (10th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996).
263. See Toll, supra note 166, at 2307 (1991).
264. Minnstar, 97 F.3d at 1368.
265. Id.

